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Abstract 
Police services in Canada were historically self-regulating institutions that managed 
internally their administrative affairs and allegations of professional misconduct.  In recent 
decades, however, there has been an inexorable movement to external review in many 
Western nations, including Canada, whereby civilians have become increasingly involved in 
the administrative oversight of policing and the investigation of complaints about alleged 
misconduct.  Research on how police have responded to these developments is sparse and 
overwhelmingly non-Canadian.   
This study examines the attitudes and experiences of police officers pertaining to three types 
of civilian-led agencies that govern police practices and conduct in Ontario, Canada.  To wit:  
i) Police Services Boards, which provide administrative and financial governance of 
police services; 
ii) The Special Investigation Unit (SIU), which investigates instances where citizens 
have been seriously harmed, killed or allegedly sexually assaulted while in the 
care of the police; and 
iii) The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), which reviews 
and sometimes investigates citizens’ complaints about police conduct. 
A mixed-methods sequential explanatory research design was utilized in this study.  In Phase 
1: Survey Questionnaire, 1593 police officers from a large police service in Ontario 
responded to an online survey questionnaire that queried them about their experiences and 
perceptions in relation to the three previously-mentioned agencies and about their own police 
service’s Professional Standards Bureau.  In Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews, 40 
interviews were conducted with police officers from the same police service and six 
interviews were conducted with senior executive representatives from stakeholder 
organizations in Ontario and across Canada.  
Results from both the survey questionnaire and the interviews revealed that most police 
officers were generally accepting of the need for civilian-led oversight initiatives to uphold 
accountability and public trust in policing.  However, this study found that many police 
  iv 
officers queried the qualifications (i.e., knowledge, skills, training and experience) of the 
involved civilian investigators and administrators.  Respondents also raised concerns about 
issues of “procedural justice” (e.g., the quality and frequency of communication during 
investigations; speed of investigations; notification regarding the outcome) during the course 
of both civilian-led and police-led investigations into alleged misconduct.  Although the 
majority of respondents expressed a preference for alleged misconduct to be investigated by 
their own Professional Standards Bureau rather than by personnel from the SIU or the 
OIPRD, evidence was mixed on the extent to which police officers perceived that civilian 
oversight agencies pose a significant threat or challenge to their status as “professionals.”  
Many respondents opined that police officers are more closely scrutinized than other 
professional/occupational groups and are held to higher standards of accountability.  A 
number of practical recommendations are proposed related to enhanced communication and 
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Introduction and Background 
1.1  Introduction 
 
This doctoral dissertation examines the attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight 
mechanisms in Ontario, Canada.  Complaints against the police and allegations of police 
misconduct were historically investigated and managed by police-led agencies (i.e., 
“Professional Standards” or “Internal Affairs" bureaus).  However, in recent decades, there has 
been a movement to external review in many Western nations, including Canada, whereby 
civilians have become increasingly involved in the administrative oversight of policing affairs 
and both the management and investigation of alleged police misconduct and complaints against 
the police (e.g., Goldsmith, 1991; Prenzler, 2004; Smith 2009; Porter & Prenzler, 2012).  Yet, 
little is known about how police officers feel about “external” civilian oversight mechanisms 
scrutinizing their professional conduct.  To the best of my knowledge, no Canadian research has 
systematically examined police officers’ attitudes toward civilian-led oversight mechanisms.  
This is a regrettable omission, as this subject matter is pertinent to sociological and 
criminological inquiries regarding accountability in policing and policing as a profession.  
Before elaborating upon the merits of this project, I will first provide a brief overview of the 
three civilian oversight agencies that will be repeatedly referred to in this study. 
In Ontario, there are a number of civilian-led administrative agencies that oversee various 
aspects of police conduct.  These include, but are not limited to: 
Police Service Boards: As mandated by the Police Services Act (1990), Police Service Boards 
are jointly-appointed by the provincial government and the municipality.   According to Sossin 
(2007: 106-107), Police Service Boards “act as a buffer between political direction from the 
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government on the one hand and the operational control of police investigations by the chief of 
police on the other.”  Although these boards are responsible for implementing effective 
management policies for the police service, they do not dictate “‘specific operational decisions’ 
or the ‘day-to-day operation of the police force’” (Sossin 2007: 106-107).  First implemented in 
the 1970s, Police Service Boards remain in widespread use across Ontario.   
Special Investigations Unit (SIU): The “SIU investigates the circumstances of serious injury or 
death as well as allegations of sexual assault that may have resulted from criminal offences 
committed by police officers.  The agency has full powers to investigate and charge officers with 
a criminal offence” (Canada, 2009: 88).  The SIU was implemented in Ontario in 1990 and 
remains in effect across the province. 
Office of Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD): Implemented in Ontario in 2009, this 
police complaints agency is comprised of civilian investigators and administrators who 
monitor/review, delegate and, on occasion investigate complaints against the police.  The OIPRD 
functions primarily in a monitoring/reviewing capacity; the vast majority of the investigations 
they oversee are “referred” to the police service in which the complaint originated and are 
formally investigated by that service’s “Professional Standards Bureau.”  For example, between 
April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014, only 10.3 percent of cases that were brought to the attention 
of the OIPRD were investigated by that agency; 89.4 percent were referred to the originating 
police service for investigation (OIPRD, 2014: 21).     
These three agencies (known henceforth as civilian oversight agencies or mechanisms) each 
represent a different, but equally significant, role in the oversight and regulation of police 
conduct: financial administration and strategic management (police services boards); use of force 
(SIU); and complaints against the police for a wide variety of circumstances (OIPRD).  Not 
unexpectedly, police administrators and others (e.g., social justice agencies; academics) desire to 
learn more about how police officers perceive these types of civilian-led agencies, since their 
very existence and the success of their respective oversight mandates rely heavily upon 
cooperation with the police services and the police officers they oversee.  
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As Chapter 3:Literature Review and Hypotheses reveals, few have investigated police officers’ 
attitudes toward and opinions of civilian oversight mechanisms.  This modest body of research is 
largely American, now dated and largely atheoretical.  Their findings have been inconsistent and, 
to date, there has been a dearth of information on how Canadian police officers feel about this 
dramatic encroachment on what was formerly their professional turf: the regulation of 
occupational standards.  My study seeks to rectify this situation by conducting an evaluation of 
police officers’ attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario that is informed by 
multiple methods.   
1.2   Purpose and Research Design 
 
My study sought to evaluate police officers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of civilian oversight 
mechanisms.  The broad, overarching research question which catalyzed this project was: What 
are the attitudes, perceptions and experiences of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian 
oversight mechanisms?  More specifically, I sought to gain knowledge of:  
 Police officers’ perceptions of the suitability and capabilities of civilian agents/agencies 
involved in the oversight, management and investigation of police conduct (e.g., 
investigative expertise, knowledge of police work, objectivity); 
 Police officers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of investigative processes (i.e., procedural 
justice) carried out by civilian agents/agencies (e.g., respectful treatment, fair treatment, 
investigative efficiency, timely communication);   
 Police officers’ perceptions of civilian oversight as a possible challenge to their 
professionalism (e.g., professional autonomy and self-regulation of occupational 
standards).   
 
My research sought to enhance sociological/criminological knowledge of policing and, in doing 
so, add to the scholarly literature on police accountability and, more broadly, the sociology of 
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professions.  My research employed a mixed-methods sequential explanatory research design.  I 
designed and administered a survey questionnaire to police officers from a large police service in 
Ontario and conducted semi-structured interviews with police officers and other key 
stakeholders.  
Specifically, the project addresses the following central research questions: 
1. To what extent do police officers accept the legitimacy of the various civilian oversight 
agencies in Ontario (e.g., Police Service Boards, the SIU and the OIPRD)? 
 
2. How do police officers feel about the processes involved in having their professional 
conduct overseen, managed and investigated by civilians in Ontario? 
 
3. To what extent does civilian oversight challenge police officers’ sense of 
professionalism (i.e., professional autonomy and self-regulation)? 
 
Very little previous research has been conducted on police officers’ attitudes toward civilian 
oversight mechanisms.  Only a handful of academic studies have assessed police officers’ 
attitudes toward civilian involvement in the oversight and management of alleged police 
misconduct (e.g., Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Perez, 1994; Kreisel, 
1998; Walker & Herbst, 1999; Weisburd et al., 2000; de Guzman, 2004; De Angelis & Kupchik, 
2007; Wells & Schafer, 2007).  All but one (i.e., de Guzman, 2004) of these studies were 
conducted in the United States and assessed the attitudes of American police officers.  There 
have also been a handful of studies conducted on the behalf of municipal governments in 
Cincinnati, Ohio (Ridgeway et al., 2005), Pasadena, California (Bobb et al., 2006) and Seattle, 
Washington (Brody & Lovrich, 2007) that have included evaluations of the attitudes of police 
officers in their analysis of civilian oversight mechanisms.  Although these studies will be 
reviewed more fully in Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses, this body of literature 
indicates that it is common for police officers to express reservations about civilian involvement 
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in systems that oversee, manage and sometimes investigate allegations of police misconduct 
and/or criminal wrongdoing.   
Generally, previous studies have queried both (1) the legitimacy of civilian agents/agencies 
scrutinizing their professional conduct and (2) the processes involved in the investigations 
themselves.  For example, Prenzler, Mihinjac & Porter (2013: 166) conducted an analysis of 
studies that have investigated the reactions of police officers to a variety of civilian-led 
complaint systems around the world, including systems in the United States of America (Boston, 
Denver, Pasadena, Cincinnati), Australia (Queensland & Victoria), England and Wales, Northern 
Ireland, Israel, South Korea and the Philippines.  In their analysis, they found that while police 
were generally opposed to “independent (civilian-led) processes…a sizeable proportion of police 
recognized that internal processing is intrinsically suspect and does not satisfy the criterion of 
public confidence” (2013: 166; see also Perez, 1994; Kreisel, 1998; de Guzman, 2004).  My 
research attempts to shed light on the reasons why police officers may accept, tolerate or reject 
the involvement of civilians in the oversight of their professional conduct.   
Compared to many other self-regulating professions that are governed by internal control 
mechanisms (e.g., doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, accountants), the professional conduct 
of police officers is increasingly scrutinized by outside civilian agents/agencies (West, 1991: 
383; AMO, 2015: 6).  Reports from the Ontario Ombudsman (Ontario, 2008; 2011) suggest that 
police officers commonly resent civilian oversight (i.e., the SIU).  Others discern recent evidence 
which suggests that there remains considerable antipathy between police officers and civilian 
oversight agencies in Ontario (e.g., Benzie, 2011; Blizzard, 2011; Spears, 2012; Clairmont, 
2012).  My study seeks to investigate why such tensions exist.  It begins with the assumption that 
police officers’ evaluations of police oversight agents/agencies may affect the success of the 
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mechanisms that are meant to instill public trust and accountability in the police.  It is 
additionally galvanized by my desire to understand why police officers evaluate these 
agents/agencies positively or negatively.   
I queried: On what specific grounds do police officers accept, tolerate or reject the legitimacy of 
civilian oversight agents/agencies?  Do police officers differentiate between civilian oversight 
agencies and have positive/negative evaluations of some but not others (e.g., police services 
boards, the SIU, and the OIPRD)?  Do the majority of police officers prefer internally-led 
accountability mechanisms (i.e., those staffed by police personnel) over those accountability 
mechanisms controlled by civilians?  What socio-demographic factors are associated with 
positive or negative attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms?  Are there process-based 
improvements that could promote police officers’ positive assessment of civilian oversight 
agents/agencies?  In investigating these and other important questions, my dissertation seeks to 
make a meaningful contribution to the sociological/criminological literature on policing and 
professional regulation. 
   The Incidence of Police Misconduct in Ontario 
“Police misconduct” is an umbrella term for police behaviour that violates the law or brings 
discredit to the profession (Champion, 2001: 2).  Although this term denotes inappropriate 
behaviour on the part of police officers “that is either illegal or immoral or both” (Champion, 
2001: 2), there is limited consensus in previous literature on what constitutes “police 
misconduct”; this social construct may refer to a wide variety of overlapping categories.1  
                                                          
1 Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert (1994) identified four types of police deviance:  
 Police crime (illegal actions by officers, on- or off-duty);  
 Occupational deviance (both criminal and non-criminal conduct, on-duty);  
 Corruption (on-duty actions related to economic gain such as theft, bribery, fraud, etc.);  
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Therefore, it is useful to clarify the types of allegations/investigations that police officers in 
Ontario face in relation to professional misconduct and identify the organizations which are 
involved in their resolution. 
 
Table 1-1: 2014-2015 SIU Annual Report: Occurrences by Fiscal Year 
Types of Occurrences 2014-2015 totals 
Custody Injuries 
 
154   (57.9%) 
Sexual Assault Allegations 
 
41   (15.4%) 
Vehicular Injuries 
 
38   (14.3%) 
Custody Deaths 12   (4.5%) 
Firearm Deaths 6   (2.3%) 
Vehicular Deaths 6   (2.3%) 
Other Injuries/Deaths 6 (2.3%) 
Firearm Injuries 3   (1.1%) 
TOTAL 266 




Allegations of criminal behaviour among police officers in Ontario are investigated by the SIU 
and internal police investigators (i.e., Professional Standards Bureaus).  The SIU has the 
authority to investigate and charge police officers in Ontario with criminal offences pertaining to 
investigations involving serious injury, death or allegations of sexual assault.  Based on statistics 
from the SIU’s 2014-2015 annual report, the top three allegations/investigations stemmed from 
the following circumstancs: “Custody Injuries” (57.9%); “Sexual Assault Allegations” (15.4%); 
                                                          
 Abuse of authority (which may constitute physical abuse or excessive force, verbal abuse, or legal abuse, 
which are violations of citizens’ rights).  Carter (1985: 322) defined abuse of authority as “any action by a 
police officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, tread on human dignity, 
manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right of a member of the police constituency.” 
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and “Vehicular Injuries” (14.3%) (See Table 1-1).  Only 13 (5.1%) of cases of the 253 SIU 
investigations processed in the 2014-2015 fiscal year resulted in criminal charges against police 
officers (SIU, 2015: 30).   
  
The OIPRD does not investigate, recommend or lay criminal charges (OIPRD, 2014: 9).  
However, the OIPRD oversees complaints against police officers in a wide variety of on- and 
off-duty situations.  As detailed in the 2013-2014 annual report of the OIPRD (OIPRD, 2014: 9), 
people can make a complaint if they:  
 Have a concern or were offended by something a police officer(s) said or did to them; 
 Were a witness to an incident involving a police officer(s) that concerned or offended them; 
 Are concerned or distressed as a result of the way a relative or friend has been treated by a 
police officer(s);… 
 Have a complaint that a police department has not provided proper service; 
 Have a complaint about a policy of a police department; 
 
Sections 80 and 81 of the Police Services Act (1990) set out the categories under which police 
officers in Ontario may be found guilty of misconduct; the Code of Conduct (Ontario Regulation 
268/10) identifies acts which are subject to investigation/discipline (see Table 1-2).  The OIPRD 
organizes the complaints they receive according to these categories.  The top three allegations 
filed in 2013-2014 were: “Discreditable conduct (46.8%) (which applies to a wide range of on- 
and off-duty conduct); “Unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority (31.7%); and “Neglect of 
Duty” (17%) (OIPRD, 2014: 7; 49).  The 2014 OIPRD annual report reveals that wrongdoing by 
police was “substantiated” in only a small number of cases between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 
2014.  Of 2697 allegations, 181 (6.7%) were “substantiated”; 109 were deemed “less serious” 





Table 1-2: 2013-2014 OIPRD Annual Report: Conduct Allegations 
Type of Allegation  2013-2014 totals 
Discreditable conduct  1,262   (46.8%) 
Unlawful/unnecessary 
exercise of authority 
 
855   (31.7%) 
Neglect of duty 458   (17%) 
Deceit 42   (1.6%) 
Insubordination  34   (1.3%) 
Corrupt practice  29   (1.1%) 
Breach of confidence  17   (0.6%) 
Consume drugs/ alcohol 
prejudicial to duty 
 
0 




Total conduct complaints 2697 




Individual police services in Ontario are frequently involved in both SIU and OIPRD 
investigations, primarily through their respective Professional Standards Bureaus.  The vast 
majority of cases reviewed and managed by the OIPRD (89.4% of cases between 2013-2014) are 
“referred” (back) to the police service in which the complaint originated and are formally 
investigated by that service’s internal police investigators (OIPRD, 2014: 21).  Furthermore, 
when police officers are investigated by civilians for alleged criminal wrongdoing, internal 
police investigators are tasked with conducting “parallel investigations” on behalf of the police 
service in question.  Section 11 of the Police Services Act (1990; Ontario Reg. 267/10) requires 
police services in Ontario to conduct an internal investigation whenever an investigation by the 
SIU has not resulted in the laying of criminal charges.  In accordance with my research 
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agreement with the host police service (see Chapter 4: Methods), statistics pertaining to 
internal/SIU/OIPRD investigations involving police officers from the police service I studied are 
not presented in this study.  Instead, I present statistics that cover all police services in Ontario.     
1.3  Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework utilized in this study is unique.  It evaluates police officers’ attitudes 
toward civilian oversight mechanisms using the following separate but intertwined theoretical 
concepts: legitimacy, procedural justice and professionalism.   
 
Legitimacy:  This study differs from previous research efforts in that it evaluates police officers’ 
attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario using the overarching theoretical 
concept of legitimacy.  The origins of this concept are commonly traced back to Weber’s work on 
domination (“Herrschaft”), legitimacy, and legitimate domination (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 
126).  Although there are various definitions of this concept, my research proceeds with the 
understanding of legitimacy as “the right to rule” or “the recognition of the right to govern” 
(Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 124-125; see also Evetts, 2013: 783).  As Tyler et al. (2007: 10) 
observed, “[w]hen people are influenced by an authority or institution not by means of the use of 
power but because they believe that the decisions made by that authority or institution are in some 
way ‘right’ or ‘proper’ and ought to be followed…then that authority is perceived as legitimate.”  
My research examines police officers’ perception of the legitimacy (“right to rule”) of civilian 
oversight agents/agencies.  It explores police officers’ perceptions of (1) the capabilities of civilian 
oversight agents/agencies and (2) the quality and fairness of the investigative processes carried out 




As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses, previous research 
has found that police officers commonly question the legitimacy of civilian oversight 
mechanisms and perceive that these agents/agencies lack the appropriate experience and 
knowledge that are believed necessary to evaluate police conduct.  It is also common for police 
officers to accuse civilian review boards of an anti-police bias and to perceive that these 
mechanisms favour complainants and disfavour police.  In consequence, it is not surprising that 
police officers often express a preference for (i) alleged police misconduct to be investigated by 
internal investigators (i.e., police officers) rather than civilian investigators and (ii) “civilian 
review” rather than “civilian investigation,” with greater acceptance of civilians being involved 
in a “review capacity” of complaints/misconduct rather than in an investigative capacity.   
  
Procedural justice:  Building upon the work of De Angelis and Kupchik (2007; 2009), this study 
examines police officers’ perceptions of “procedural justice” in relation to civilian oversight 
mechanisms.  In this context, “procedural justice” refers to perceptions of fair and respectful 
treatment by a person or group in authority during an investigative/administrative process.  
Previous research has noted that the perception of procedural justice is impacted by factors such 
as the quality and frequency of communication during an investigation, prompt notification of 
decisions, the politeness of investigators and an absence of bias (Dailey et al., 2006: 15; Bottoms 
& Tankebe, 2012: 121).   
 
The application of the procedural justice effect is primarily associated with the writings of Tom 
Tyler.  Tyler has frequently examined citizens’ feelings of satisfaction with various 
agents/agencies of social control such as the police (Tyler, 1990, 2003, 2004; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Tyler & Lind, 2001; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 
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2003).  However, to the best of my knowledge, only two studies have systematically applied the 
concept of procedural justice to the evaluation of police officers’ attitudes toward civilian 
oversight mechanisms (e.g., De Angelis & Kupchik: 2007; 2009).  The findings of these studies 
are included in the literature review which is the subject of Chapter 3.     
Professionalism:  My research is unique in evaluating police officers’ attitudes toward civilian 
oversight mechanisms in the context of “professionalism.”  Although some have argued that 
police resistance to civilian oversight is symptomatic of a distinctive police subculture that is 
characterized by traits such as hostility toward the public, secrecy and strong group solidarity 
(e.g., Skolnick, 1966; Niederhoffer, 1967; Westley, 1970; Kreisel, 1998), others maintain that 
there is no pan-cultural and monolithic police culture or subculture and emphasize that police 
officers have diverse attitudes and opinions on any given subject, including civilian oversight 
(e.g., Sherman, 1980; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Kreisel, 1998; Paoline, 2003; De Angelis & Kupchik: 
2007).  My research considers police officers’ resistance to civilian oversight within the 
discourse of “professionalism” and explores police officers’ perceptions of themselves as 
“professionals” who deserve the autonomy to regulate their own occupational standards and 
professional conduct through internal mechanisms. 
It is anticipated that some may baulk at my characterization of policing as a “profession.”  Thus, 
while some scholars have argued that policing should be considered a “profession” (Carlan & 
Lewis, 2009: 371; Evetts, 2003; 2006; 2012), others insist that policing is unlike occupations that 
have long been considered professions (e.g., lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, accountants) 
(Potts, 1982; Fournier, 1999; Souryal, 2003; Murphy & McKenna, 2008).  However, my study is 
not mired in the debate over whether policing is or is not a “profession” nor does it delve into the 
disparate definitions and characteristics attributed to “professionalism” or “professionalization” 
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(e.g., see Balthazard, 2010).  Rather, it takes heed of Evetts’ (2006: 134) report that debating the 
“definitional precision” of professions is “now regarded more as a time-wasting diversion...it no 
longer seems important to draw a hard and fast line between professions and occupations but, 
instead, to regard both as similar social forms that share many common characteristics.”  
Accordingly, this study focuses upon the extent to which police officers accept, tolerate or reject 
civilian oversight mechanisms and considers whether their attitudes toward these mechanisms 
are grounded in an expressed desire for professional autonomy and the internal regulation that 
other self-regulating professionals (e.g., lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, accountants) 
possess (Balthazard, 2010: 8).   
Within the sociological discourse of professionalism, there is support for this endeavour.  For 
instance, Carlan & Lewis (2009: 372) built upon Hall’s (1968) hallmarks of professionalism in 
studying the police.  According to Hall (1968) “professionalism” includes the following features: 
Belief in self-regulation...because it evinces the mentality that only colleagues 
possess the intellectual tools and expertise to judge the merits of their work...(and) 
autonomy—the freedom to make decisions without interference from others.   
Other scholars, such as Friedson (1984: 19) and Blakely (2006: 230), identified professionalism 
as including occupational autonomy and the ability to retain regulation over occupation standards.  
Moreover, in addressing police discomfort with civilian oversight mechanisms, Porter and Prenzler 
(2012: 157; see also Lewis, 1991: 171) implicitly suggested that police may perceive these 
mechanisms as corrosive of their professional autonomy:  
Historically, internal (police) investigators have been criticized for a real or 
perceived lack of independence.  Indeed, it is these criticisms that have led to 
systems of independent (civilian) oversight. However, it is often argued that not 
allowing police to handle conduct matters themselves removes internal responsibility 
for the professional standards of the organization and encroaches on the job of police, 




Other research, discussed in Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses, has found that police 
officers often claim that civilians lack the proper expertise, objectivity and knowledge about police 
work to be effective in the oversight and investigation of police conduct. 
1.4  Methods 
As outlined in Chapter 4: Methods, this project employs a mixed methods approach to assess 
police officers’ attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms, namely through the administration 
of a survey questionnaire and qualitative interviews with police officers and other key 
stakeholders.   
 
It extends the literature by comprehensively analyzing police officers’ attitudes regarding multiple 
and co-existing civilian oversight agencies (e.g., Police Service Boards, the SIU, and the OIPRD) 
in a single jurisdiction.  Moreover, its Canadian (Ontario) focus would seem useful inasmuch as 
the vast majority of previous research has been conducted in the United States.  Rather than 
presuming that the attitudes of police officers regarding civilian oversight are identical across 
jurisdictions, it is anticipated that the attitudes of Canadian police officers could differ from their 
American counterparts and reveal yet-another “continental divide” (Lipset, 1990).  Indeed, this 
seemed a distinct possibility in light of Landau’s (2000: 64) assertion that the “Province of Ontario, 
Canada, has long been considered a pioneer in the development and implementation of civilian 
review of public complaints against the police.”2   
 
In embarking upon this research, I noted that research on the evolution of civilian oversight of 
policing in Canada has focused on the attitudes and experiences of civilians rather than police 
officers (e.g., Lewis, 1991; Landau, 1994, 1996, 2000; Schulenberg & Chatterjee, 2013).  
                                                          
2 See also Lewis, 1991: 153-175.   
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Although this research reports that civilians generally believe that police cannot be trusted to 
“police themselves” (Forcese, 1999: 207; Lewis, 1999; Prenzler, 2004: 86), it is notable that 
citizens’ complaints about the quality of treatment they receive during police investigations of 
their complaints against the police are markedly similar to those voiced by police officers 
themselves; both suggest a need to recognize the import of “procedural justice” (Landau, 1994, 
1996, 2000; Watt, 1991; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007, 2009).   
 
An assessment of police experiences and perceptions of police officers in Ontario regarding 
civilian oversight mechanisms may help to improve relationships between police officers and the 
agencies that scrutinize their conduct.  My goal in conducting this research was to strengthen the 
existing systems that oversee and manage policing accountability in Ontario and, by doing so, 
strengthen the relationship between the police and the communities they serve.  
1.5  Scope of the research project 
As outlined in Chapter 4: Methods, a mixed methods sequential explanatory research design was 
employed to assess the experiences and perceptions of police officers in Ontario regarding 
civilian oversight.  This project received formal support from The Ontario Association of Chiefs 
of Police (OACP), The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB) and The 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation (CACP-RF).   
On October 24, 2013, I entered into a formal research agreement with a large Ontario police 
service to administer a survey questionnaire to their sworn membership.  The research 
agreement stipulated that the identity of the host police service and the identities of all 
participants would not be publically disclosed.  This arrangement was approved by the 
University of Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics. 
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   Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire 
The survey questionnaire was launched on January 6, 2014.  It was designed to assess the 
perceptions and experiences of police officers regarding civilian oversight mechanisms in 
Ontario.   It was composed of six sections.  Specifically, it sought to ascertain information on: 
 Section 1 – Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
 Section 2 – Civilian Oversight: General Questions 
 Section 3 – Police Services Boards 
 Section 4 – SIU 
 Section 5 – OIPRD 
 Section 6 – Professional Standards Bureau 
 
The survey was distributed to the entire sworn membership of the host police service through 
FluidSurveys, a Canadian software/survey company.  A recruitment email message (and 
subsequent reminder message) was sent to every sworn officer with the host police service, 
inviting them to participate in the survey.  On January 8, 2014, an electronic message was posted 
on the police service’s intranet site that verified the legitimacy of the study and reinforced the 
support provided by senior management and the sponsoring organizations. 
The survey questionnaire invitation was sent via email to the work email accounts of 6359 
potential respondents (all of whom are currently-serving sworn police officers).  There were 285 
potential respondents whose invitations were rejected (“bounced back”) for a variety of reasons 
(e.g., full email accounts).  As a result, the final sample frame was adjusted to 6074 potential 
respondents. 
After 44 days of availability, the survey closed on February 18, 2014.  The response rate was 
26.2% (1593 survey responses out of 6074 potential responses).  Worldwide, this represents the 
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largest known sample of survey responses to a survey that has sought information from police 
officers on their perceptions of civilian oversight (e.g., Prenzler, Mihinjac & Porter, 2013).3   
   Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews 
Police Officer Interviews: At the end of the survey questionnaire, participants were invited to 
contact the researcher to participate in semi-structured interviews by telephone or in-person on a 
voluntary basis.  The purpose of these interviews was to conduct a more detailed probe of the 
same issues and themes covered in the survey questionnaire.  Fifty-one police officers contacted 
me to express interest in participating.  Between January 6 and May 1, 2014, efforts were made 
to coordinate interviews with all interested participants.  In total, 40 semi-structured interviews 
with police officers from the host service were conducted by telephone.  All participants 
provided verbal or written consent prior to each interview.  These interviews were transcribed 
and coded for analysis using NVivo software. 
Stakeholder Representative Interviews: Requests were made with all stakeholder agencies to 
interview a representative from the organization about their involvement in the oversight of 
police officers in Ontario/Canada.  My respondents discussed the successes they have enjoyed to 
date as well as the challenges they have experienced.  During mid-to-late 2014 and early 2015, I 
conducted interviews with senior executive representatives from the following six stakeholder 
organizations: 
 The host police service 
 OIPRD – Office of the Independent Police Review Director 
 OAPSB – Ontario Association of Police Services Boards 
 CAPG – Canadian Association of Police Governance 
 CACP-RF - Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation 
                                                          
3 This claim is based on the evaluation of all known studies cited in Chapter 3: Literature Review and Prenzler, 
Mihinjac & Porter’s 2013 study which contains an analysis of research that has specifically assessed police officers’ 
attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms worldwide dating back to 1994.    
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 OACP – Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police 
 
The following stakeholder organizations declined to participate in these interviews: 
 Police Association representatives from the host police service 
 PAO – Police Association of Ontario 
 CPA – Canadian Police Association 
 SIU – Special Investigations Unit 
 
Further details regarding the planning, administration and findings from this research project are 
discussed in the following chapters. 
1.6   Conclusion of Chapter 1: Introduction and Background  
The remaining chapters in this dissertation are: 
 Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada  
 Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 Chapter 4: Methods 
 Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis 
 Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis 
 Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion 
 Chapter 8: Recommendations and Conclusions  
 
In Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada, I discuss the events that culminated in 
creation of the oversight and accountability mechanisms that currently govern police practices in 
Ontario.  This brief history is intended to illuminate the context in which civilian oversight 
mechanisms have developed in Ontario.  The events of the past few decades are, I submit, 




Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada 
This chapter provides an overview of the factors and initiatives that have culminated in the 
creation of the oversight and accountability mechanisms that currently govern police practices in 
Canada, with particular attention paid to the evolution of oversight mechanisms in Ontario.  It 
reveals that, through a culmination of significant events, governmental inquiries and legislative 
initiatives, there has been a meandering but inexorable movement towards increased civilian 
control of police conduct in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada.   
2.1 Police accountability and civilian oversight 
Goldsmith (1995: 112-113) defined police accountability as the “processes whereby the 
behaviour of police is brought into conformity with requirements of the encapsulating society.”  
He noted that police accountability is an inclusive term that encompasses “every aspect of 
administration of an agency, including, for example, its operating efficiency, its hiring and 
promotion practices, and its fiscal management” as well as “responsibility for the conduct of 
individual employees” (1995: 112-113).  Further, Goldsmith (1995: 110) emphasized that the 
public complaints procedure for a given police service is to be understood as simply one of 
several formal methods that may be employed to ensure and/or enhance police accountability.  
For example, other measures may include criminal prosecutions, internal disciplinary 
proceedings, civil suits, political initiatives and media coverage.  However, Goldsmith (1995: 
110) asserted that “debates concerning trends in, causes of, and solutions to complaints against 
police conduct in many respects have come to symbolize the entire question of police 
accountability” in democratic nations such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia and New Zealand (see also Landau, 2000: 64). 
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Miller and Merrick (2002: 1) described civilian oversight of police as a process that “involves 
people from outside the police taking a role in calling the police to account for their actions, 
policies and organization.”  Goldsmith (1999: 36) referred specifically to the “involvement of 
non-police personnel in the reception, investigation, and determination of citizens’ complaints 
about police conduct” in his preferred definition of “civilian oversight.”  Although there is 
variation in the types of police complaint systems adopted across provincial, national and 
international jurisdictions (to be later discussed in this chapter), the most common system in 
Western nations entails civilians monitoring or supervising police officer-led investigations of 
alleged misconduct (Goldsmith, 1999: 36).   
2.1.1 International context of police oversight and accountability 
The management and oversight of alleged misconduct and complaints against the police in 
Canada has undergone significant changes over the last forty years.  Landau (2000) observed that 
most of the discussion throughout the 1980s and 1990s by police scholars, police reformers and 
commissions of inquiry pertained to the effectiveness of internal versus external forms of police 
oversight.  However, she remarked that the debate has evolved to the extent that “there is no 
longer much question as to whether the public should be subject to some sort of external review 
in their handling of public complaints against the police.  Instead, current discussion centres on 
what form that review should take” (Landau, 2000: 63, emphasis added).  These sentiments were 
echoed by Paul Kennedy (Canada, 2009a: x), the chair of the Commission for Public Complaints 
Against the RCMP (CPC); according to Kennedy, “What is at issue today is no longer whether 
civilian review is desirable, but rather, how civilian involvement in investigations can be most 
effective.”   
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Kerstetter (1985: 180) summarized succinctly the paradox of citizen oversight: “the review of 
misconduct allegations is so important that it should use police expertise, but is also too 
important to be left solely to police administrative discretion.”  In many respects, “[t]he verdict is 
still out on whether citizen oversight represents an effective way to ensure police officers and 
departments provide quality services” (Wells & Schafer, 2007: 21).  However, regardless of the 
actual effectiveness of civilian-led systems, they are ultimately intended to assuage the widely-
held perception that the police cannot trusted to police themselves “even when they are perfectly 
capable of doing so, and even when they make the right decision” (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 224). 
Goldsmith (1995: 113-114) observed that in virtually every Western, English-speaking country, 
“various forms of misconduct have come to constitute a perennial problem for police 
administrators from a disciplinary as well as public relations perspective.”  Forcese (1999: 207) 
noted growing concerns by the public over the police handling of internally-led accountability 
mechanisms:    
Police misconduct, in all its forms, has precipitated numerous efforts by the public 
- most of them unsuccessful - to establish more effective control or investigative 
access to their police services.  Characteristically, the police have been allowed to 
investigate themselves, in the presumption that misconduct is rare, and that the 
investigative resources necessary for an enquiry require police expertise.  The 
public, however, have frequently mistrusted police self-investigations. 
 
Forcese (1999: 221) observed that since the 1960s, many Western nations have attempted to 
implement civilian oversight bodies that scrutinize police behaviour.  However, he noted that 
such agencies have had “mixed success, and interrupted lifespans, as they have been disliked and 
lobbied against by police officers, and deemed costly and inefficient by many politicians” 




As noted earlier, research has found routinely that police officers express a preference for 
investigations into alleged misconduct to be handled through internal rather than external 
agencies.  Yet, despite police assurances about the integrity of internal systems, many citizens 
are leery of the fairness of these systems and bristle at their lack of transparency.  For 
instance, Mendes (1999: 24-25) declared that “(t)he system of internal review of police 
misconduct is clearly designed to be kept at a low profile and work within an existing police 
collegiality or culture.”  Successive governments in Canada, at both the federal and provincial 
level, have confronted increased pressures to enact mechanisms that will simultaneously curb 
police misconduct and engender greater transparency and accountability in policing practices.  
This situation is not unique to Canada; it is also discernible in relation to the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Australia and New Zealand (Smith, 2009: 421; Porter & Prenzler, 
2012: 152). 
 
In addition, previous research has noted the development of civilian-oversight initiatives in 
the Netherlands and Sweden (e.g., McMahon, 1988: 301), South Africa (e.g., Manby, 2000), 
Israel (e.g., Herzog, 2000), the Philippines (e.g., de Guzman, 2004), Brazil (e.g., Mendes, 
1999), and other South American countries (e.g., Neild, 2000)4.  In an evaluation of different 
systems around the world, Prenzler (2004: 85) found that “there is now an accelerating trend 
for civilian agencies to go beyond review to engage directly in investigations and to have 
much greater input into disciplinary decisions.” 5   
                                                          
4 The evolution of police oversight mechanisms in nations outside of Canada is beyond the scope of this study.  The 
Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement has published a collection of links to agencies 
devoted to civilian oversight of police in the United States ( http://www.cacole.ca/resources/links/usL-eng.shtml ) 
and internationally ( http://www.cacole.ca/resources/links/interL-eng.shtml ).  
5   For a comprehensive description and accounting of civilian oversight mechanisms worldwide, see: Canada, 
Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. (2009). Police Investigating Police: Final Public Report. 
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Before delving into a brief history of the events and factors that have shaped civilian oversight 
mechanisms in Canada, I will provide a snapshot of the current status of policing in Canada, 
with a particular focus on Ontario, followed by an overview of mechanisms that typically 
govern and control police behaviour in this Canadian province.   
 
2.1.2 The current status of policing in Canada 
Policing in Canada: Policing the vast geographical expanse of Canada requires the coordinated 
efforts of federal, provincial, municipal and First Nations services.  In illustration, while “First 
Nations communities have their own municipal policing” (Council of Canadian Academies, 
2014: 5-6), the federal government’s First Nations Policing Policy “manages various types of 
arrangements including self-administered policing and the use of dedicated officers from existing 
police services such as the RCMP (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 5-6).6   
 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) “provides one-third of all public police officers in 
Canada (including the RCMP's federal police duties in eight of ten provinces in which the RCMP 
has contractual arrangements to provide police services)” (Sossin, 2007: 113-114).  Although 
municipal or provincial police (e.g., the Ontario Provincial Police [OPP]; the Sûreté du Québec 
[SQ]) provide policing in Ontario and Quebec, “residents of western and maritime Canada are 
policed either by municipal police services or by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
                                                          
Ottawa: Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP.  Retrieved November 21, 2011:  https://www.crcc-
ccetp.gc.ca/en/police-investigating-police-final-public-report 






through its municipal, provincial, or territorial policing provided under contract” (Council of 
Canadian Academies, 2014: 5).  In Newfoundland and Labrador, there is an absence of 
municipal police services.  The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary polices the major 
municipalities in this jurisdiction, with the RCMP responsible for rural policing (Council of 
Canadian Academies, 2014: 5).  Nevertheless, the vast majority of Canadians (approximately 
two-thirds) reside in locales policed by “stand-alone municipal police services” (e.g., Halifax 
Regional Police, Ottawa Police Service, Vancouver Police Department) (Council of Canadian 
Academies, 2014: 6).  “Many, but not all, municipal police services are governed by police 
commissions or police services boards, established by provincial legislation” (Law Commission 
of Canada, 2006: 84-85).  All 254 police services across Canada, including the RCMP, have 
police unions/associations that represent their officers’ interests (MacCharles, 2015).  
 
Policing in Ontario: There are approximately sixty municipal police services in Ontario which 
range widely in size and jurisdiction (Lesage, 2005: 7).  For example, Lesage (2005: 7) reported 
that the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) is tasked with policing parts of the province that lack 
municipal police services and additionally “police certain navigable waters, patrol highways, and 
maintain investigative services to assist municipal forces.”  He also noted that “(v)ast geographic 
areas of Ontario are policed neither by the OPP nor by municipal services, but by First Nations 
police services” (2005: 14).   However, in the absence of a treaty agreement, policing on reserves 




2.1.3 Mechanisms of police accountability 
There are a wide range of different mechanisms that formally govern police conduct and attempt 
to instill and enforce accountability.  Listed below are some of the most important and obvious 
mechanisms of police accountability in Canada. 
Government, legislation and police services boards 
Martin (2007: 261-2) observed that “(d)espite their common-law roots, police services are 
creatures of statute and both their scope of practice and the modes of accountability are located 
in the legislation that creates them.”  For example, in Ontario, the authority for police action 
stems from the Police Services Act (1990) and from the Minister of Community Safety and 
Correctional Services, who oversees all police services and police services boards and is also 
responsible for issuing policy directives and regulations (Martin, 2007: 261-2).   
Police services boards “fulfill a major civilian oversight role throughout Ontario” (Lesage, 2005: 
10).  Sossin (2007: 106-107) noted that police service boards “act as a buffer between political 
direction from the government on the one hand and the operational control of police 
investigations by the chief of police on the other.”  Although police services boards in Ontario 
are responsible for effective management policies for the police service, they do not dictate 
“specific operational decisions” nor the “day-to-day operation of the police force” (Sossin, 2007: 
106-107).   
As mandated by the Police Services Act, every municipality that maintains a police service is 
required to maintain a board.  The Police Services Act details the requirements for municipal, 
regional and provincial board appointees, with these requirements based primarily on the 
population of the involved community.  The boards are to represent community interests and are 
accountable to the Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services and the Toronto-
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based Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) (Ottawa Police Service, 2015).  The Ontario 
Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB) and the Canadian Association of Police 
Governance (CAPG) represent the interests of most municipal police services boards across 
Ontario and Canada, respectively.     
 
According to the OAPSB (2012: 4), there are three different types of police services boards in 
Ontario: Section 31 (Police Services Act) boards, which act as the employer of municipal police 
services; Section 10 (Police Services Act) boards, which monitor the provision of OPP (Ontario 
Provincial Police) services in those municipalities with OPP service contracts; and First Nations 
police services boards.  Lesage (2005: 11) identified the mandate of police services boards in 
Ontario as “one of oversight, general management and the setting of policy.”  Included among 
the major responsibilities of police services boards are “the appointment of police officers, the 
establishment of objectives and priorities for the police service, the establishment of policies for 
effective management of the police service, and the hiring and evaluation of the police chief and 
deputy chiefs” (Lesage, 2005: 10). 
 
Section 31(1) of the Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c. P. 15 specifies that “boards may establish 
guidelines for dealing with complaints against police, and may review the chief's administration 
of the complaints system” (OIPRD, 2015a).  For those municipalities that have contracted 
services from the OPP, “the police board's responsibilities regarding public complaints are 
limited to reviewing the detachment commander's administration of the public complaints 
system, and receiving regular reports from the detachment commander on the administration of 




Internal disciplinary mechanisms (Professional Standards Bureaus) 
 
Individual officers may be subject to internal discipline by the police service to which they 
belong for a wide range of breaches of internal policies and procedures or other forms of 
legislation.  With few exceptions, officers in Canada are subject to follow all federal, provincial 
and municipal laws and regulations.  Codes of conduct impose standards of professional conduct 
and create other forms of actionable wrongs.  For example, “misconduct,” as defined within 
Ontario’s Police Services Act, ranges from “quasi-criminal abuse of authority, withholding of 
services, or the inducement to misconduct of another officer in breach of the code of conduct of a 
municipal police service to more strictly job-related behavior concerning dress and appearance, 
firearms, personal property or money, punctuality, and the like” (Martin, 2007: 263).  The Police 
Services Act also lays out a range of potential sanctions for misconduct.  These sanctions include 
forfeiture of pay, suspension, demotion, resignation, and dismissal. 
 
Criminal and provincial legal proceedings 
 
Various scholars have noted that in countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, complaints against police officers are rarely substantiated and 
police officers are rarely charged with criminal offences (e.g., Smith, 2004: 28; Skolnick & Fyfe, 
1993: 229; Perez, 1994: 179-181).  At the cusp of the new millennium, Prenzler (2000: 662) 
noted that the “low substantiation rates by civilian review bodies of between 2 and 8 per cent 
have been described as an ‘international phenomenon’.”  As noted in Chapter 1, these findings 
are consistent with Ontario data; few officers are charged by either the SIU and OIPRD.  In 
2013/2014, for example, only 11 (3.5 percent) police officers in Ontario were charged in the 
SIU’s probe of 318 incidents (Gillis, 2015a).  Similarly, between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 
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2014, only 181 (6.7 percent) of the 2697 allegations filed with the OIPRD were “substantiated” 
with 109 deemed “less serious” and 72 adjudged “serious” (OIPRD, 2014: 27).   
 
Martin (2007: 265) remarked that “(h)olding individual police officers accountable through 
direct criminal charges, especially around the use of force, has proved largely unsuccessful” 
since, even in the exceptional cases when convictions or guilty pleas occur, the sentences do not 
“carry the severity of punishment that is usually regarded as serving a deterrent function.” 7 
 
Police officers’ actions and decisions are also “scrutinized daily in the justice system, starting 
with the review of charges performed by a crown attorney” (Martin, 2007: 265).  When police 
officers lay charges and initiate legal proceedings against citizens, their documented accounts are 
dissected by both crown attorneys and defense counsel.  The conduct of individual officers can 
also be scrutinized and challenged in open court proceedings (Bruser & McLean, 2012; Van 
Alphen, 2013).  Court proceedings and all records (e.g., notes, emails, reports) and 
documentation produced by the police become matters of public record and can potentially be 
retrieved through “freedom of information” legislation.  More than two decades ago, Stenning 
(1995: 60) asserted that “freedom of information” legislation is crucial to the “modern public 
accountability of governments” and is always coupled with “privacy legislation” which works to 
                                                          
7  According to Bruser and Henry (2010), former SIU Director, Ian Scott, “noted (in 2004) that police officers 
accused of using excessive force stood a less than one-in-five chance of facing the same level of justice as civilians 
accused of similar crimes.”  Scott wrote in 2004, “(i)t is an ineffective use of state resources to investigate, charge 
and prosecute cases in which the high probability is...acquittal.”  Bruser and Henry further reported that Scott 
proposed that some SIU cases could be more adequately adjudicated by the OCPC, “an independent oversight 
agency, where they could be fined or fired…(whereby) a commission verdict would act as a ‘deterrent’ to police 
misconduct.”  Scott’s proposal was not implemented.   
 
Roberts (2004: 23; see also Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge, 2007) reported that public opinion research conducted 
over recent decades has found that most members of the public in Canada “underestimate the severity of sentencing 
trends. This is part of a general public perspective on criminal justice that sees the system as more lenient than is in 
fact the case.” 
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balance “the need for public accountability, on the one hand with the need to protect the 
legitimate expectations of privacy of the individual citizens, on the other.” 
Civil suits 
 
Aggrieved citizens may file civil suits against individual “police officers, police authorities, and 
boards and executive bodies” (Sossin, 2007: 115-116).  However, Forcese (1999: 227) has 
emphasized that “while the police officers have the support very often of their association,” the 
cost of civil proceedings may well be prohibitive for some citizens.  He additionally cautioned 
citizens that “(t)here is also the prospect of counter-charges, and counter-suit, as was apparently 
being practiced in Toronto for a period by the police force, police association, or the municipal 
authorities.”  In observing the infrequency of successful Canadian civil court actions against 
police officers, Forcese suggested that the unfortunate message conveyed may be “that police are 
immune from prosecution for negligence and actions arising in the performance of their duty.” 
 
Nevertheless, Martin (2007: 266-267) stressed that civil suits against the police can serve as an 
important “accountability and supervisory function.”  For example, the case of Jane Doe v 
Metropolitan Toronto Police (1998), addressed the issues of whether there was a private law 
duty of care or, more specifically, whether the police had a duty to warn the public that there was 
a serial rapist operating in a particular area of the city and a duty to issue a protective warning to 
women in the area that the rapist targeted women of a certain profile (Sossin, 2007: 115-116).  In 
this landmark case, the Court held that the police owed a duty of care to the women who had 
resided in the neighbourhood that the rapist targeted and had failed in their duty to protect these 
women.  In awarding Jane Doe $220,000 in damages (which, with interest, amounted to almost 
$500,000), the Court held that the police had violated the plaintiff’s equality rights and right to 
security of person and that the police had adduced no evidence to justify these Charter breaches.   
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Coroner's inquests, investigative units, and media attention 
 
Another form of scrutiny and accountability comes into effect when deaths or serious injuries 
occur when individuals are in the custody or care of the police.  For example, in Ontario, “the 
coroner has a duty to investigate and hold an inquest into all deaths that occur while a person is 
‘detained by or in the actual custody of a peace officer” and “inquests into police-related deaths 
in Ontario have developed into significant opportunities for public scrutiny” (Martin, 2007: 267).  
In jurisdictions such as Ontario and Alberta, specialized civilian-led investigative teams (e.g., 
Special Investigations Unit [SIU] & Alberta Serious Incident Response Team [ASIRT]) become 
involved when death or serious injury occurs in police presence.  These units will be discussed 
later in the chapter.   
 
When officers are accused of wrongdoing, they may face any of the above forms of 
accountability and scrutiny, singularly or simultaneously.  For any of the above interventions, 
intense media attention may result.  As Martin (2007: 265) pointed out, “[a]ll of these sites of 
legal decision making have the potential for generating public attention and may have significant 
consequences for the individuals and police services involved.”  It remains uncertain to what 
extent, if any, media attention to acts of wrongdoing by police officers exerts a deterrent effect 
upon future acts of misconduct among police officers.  However, it is evident that news stories 
about alleged police misconduct involving the use of force are accorded prominent positioning in 
the print media and news broadcasts.  For example, in September 2015, the Toronto Star featured 
a 4-part series about police officers across Ontario who remain employed despite their 
involvement in various forms of “serious misconduct” (e.g., Poisson & McLean, 2015a, 2015b; 
McLean & Poisson, 2015a, 2015b).   
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Several recent high-profile incidents in Canada and the United States have also generated intense 
media coverage.  For example, the 2013 death of Sammy Yatim during an engagement with the 
Toronto Police Service “sparked national outrage against police use of force after a bystander 
posted a cellphone video of the shooting to YouTube” (Fatima, 2014).  The involved police 
officer, Constable James Forcillo, was acquitted of second-degree murder but found guilty of 
attempted murder.  At the time of writing, Forcillo’s legal counsel has appealed this verdict.  
This case, among others, has fueled widespread debate in Ontario about police use of force (e.g., 
firearms, conducted energy weapons) and interactions with persons with mental illness.  In 2014, 
the Honourable Mr. Justice Frank Iacobucci, a retired Supreme Court judge, produced a report 
for the Toronto Police Service which included among its recommendations: enhanced mental 
health training and protocols for police; the outfitting of officers with body-worn cameras; and 
conducted energy weapons for first responders (Mahoney & Hui, 2014).   
In the United States, there were several high-profile incidents in 2014-2015 that sparked outrage 
about the conduct of police.  In July, 2014, for example, Eric Garner, an African-American who 
the police suspected of selling “loosies” (single cigarettes), died after being arrested and placed 
in a chokehold by officers from the New York City Police Department (Baker, Goodman & 
Mueller, 2015).  Although the Staten Island, New York grand jury decided not to indict the 
officer who used the chokehold, “Mr. Garner’s final words – ‘I can’t breathe’ – repeated 11 
times became a national rallying cry” in protests around the country (Goodman, 2015).  In 
August, 2014, the police shooting of an unarmed African-American teenager, Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri sparked international attention and allegations of systemic racism in 
American policing practices.  The shooting prompted protests in the area for weeks and these 
protests were redoubled by the November 24, 2014 announcement that a grand jury had decided 
 32 
 
against indicting the police officer who had shot Brown (Buchanan et al., 2015).  These incidents 
“set off a national debate about police actions in minority communities and racial discrimination 
in the criminal justice system” (Goodman, 2015).   
In April and May, 2015 protests and violent riots erupted in Baltimore, Maryland following the 
death of a third African-American man, Freddie Gray, “who died after suffering a spinal cord 
injury in police custody” (Stolberg, 2015).  Six police officers who were involved in the arrest of 
Gray were suspended with pay pending an investigation and were subsequently charged with 
“second-degree assault, reckless endangerment and misconduct in office”; two officers face 
manslaughter charges and one officer “faces an additional charge of second-degree murder” 
(CBC, 2015).  Press coverage of this case emphasized repeatedly that Gray’s death was best 
understood “as a national symbol of police mistreatment of black men” in America and stressed 
that this incident had “renewed long-simmering tensions between residents of (Baltimore)…and 
a police force with a history of aggressive [and] sometimes brutal behavior” (Stolberg, 2015).   
These tragic incidents have captured much media attention in North America and beyond.  It 
would seem likely that the content of this coverage has impacted public perceptions of the police 
and led at least some to view the police with suspicion and distrust.  These negative perceptions 
may also be bolstered by the content of what appears on the internet.  Thus, Whyte (2009) noted 
that in “the YouTube era, a surfeit of police brutality videos instantly accessible online – a huge 
number of beatings, and occasional, sensational shootings has cast a growing shadow over police 
behaviour everywhere” (see also Goldsmith, 2010).   
2.2 Landmark events demanding police accountability in Canada 
According to Sossin (2007: 107-108), “public inquests, inquiries, reviews, and task forces 
examining police structures, activities, and/or accountability…[have] arguably become the norm 
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rather than the exception in Canada in the past generation at all levels of government and even 
within many policing organizations.”  Over the past four decades, he observed, inquiries into 
controversial policing practices have been initiated for a wide variety of reasons: “Some are 
forward-looking catalysts for policy reform.  Some are launched in order to serve political ends 
by extricating the government from a thorny controversy; other inquiries themselves become 
thorny controversies for the government.”  Yet, Sossin asserted that one of the central functions 
of such reviews, inquests and inquiries is to disentangle “problems relating to individual police 
officers and leaders from problems relating to structures, arrangements, and systems.” 
Mendes (1999: 25) noted that many of the high-profile public inquiries in Canada in the 1980s 
and early 1990s not only led to public demands for “guarantees of effect of police 
accountability” but they also provided “a catalyst for the establishment of civilian oversight 
agencies across the country” (see also Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 11).  Among the 
inquiries he credits with such impact are: “the Marin Commission in 1976, the McDonald 
Commission on the RCMP in 1980, the Marshall Inquiry in Nova Scotia in 1989, (and) the 
Harper Inquiry in Manitoba in 1991” (Mendes, 1999: 25).  Mendes directly linked these 
inquiries and commissions with the emergence of enhanced forms of civilian oversight across 
Canada. 
Not surprisingly around the same time, the provinces of Manitoba in 1987, British 
Columbia in 1989 and the province of Québec in 1990 established various forms 
of civilian oversight of policing.  The federal Parliament in an amendment to the 
RCMP Act in 1986 established the RCMP Public Complaints Commission and 
the new public complaints process became effective in 1988.  In the province of 
Ontario, the government established a ‘pilot’ civilian oversight agency in Toronto 
in 1981 which eventually was replaced by a province-wide police complaints 





These above inquiries and initiatives, among others, will be further discussed throughout this 
chapter.  The following section discusses the impact of some of the most notable inquiries and 
commissions that addressed police conduct in Canada in recent decades.   
 
Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) (hereafter the “McDonald Commission”) 
 
Roach (2007: 35) declared that the McDonald Commission (Canada, 1981a, 1981b) “represents 
Canada’s most sustained and considered examination of the proper relationship between the 
government and the police.”  The Commission was initiated by the 1976 criminal trial of three 
RCMP officers who were charged with breaking into a union office to steal documents (Roach, 
1995: 277).  The officers received an absolute discharge and this ruling, in turn, prompted 
questions about ministerial knowledge about the RCMP’s engagment in the illegal acivity 
(Roach, 1995: 277).  Later reports that the RCMP was engaged in “mail tampering, break-ins, 
theft and arson in their attention to the separatist movement in Québec” generated intense public 
criticism and severely tarnished the image of this iconic police agency (Forcese, 1999: 203).   
Alberta judge David McDonald chaired the federal public inquiry which began in 1977 and 
lasted four years (Roach, 1995: 277).  Although public attention was focused primarily on the 
scope of wrongdoing, the bulk of the Commission’s report was “devoted to assessing the 
adequacy of the RCMP’s policies and procedures and the legal and organizational framework of 
its security intelligence activities” (Roach, 1995: 277).  The Commission made distinctions 
between independent acts (and actors) and those activities that were “institutionalized 
wrongdoings” and “accepted systemic practice” within the RCMP (Roach, 1995: 277).  
Furthermore, the Commission’s investigation of knowledge by government ministers and senior 
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officials of illegal activities served as a warning to members to abstain from such conduct in the 
future (Roach, 1995: 277).    
In noting that the McDonald Commission “was not bound by legal standards of liability and 
drew a distinction between unacceptable or improper activities and those ‘not authorized by the 
law’”, Roach (1995: 278-9) observed that the scope and mandate of the Commission were 
subject to criticism:  
The McDonald commission was more successful in assessing the organizational 
deficiencies of the RCMP than in holding individuals accountable for wrongs.  Its 
organizational focus was criticized for excusing wrongful conduct by focusing on 
the larger context and making it more difficult to punish individual officers.   
 
However, Roach concluded that the Commission was nevertheless “successful in creating 
organizational responsibility for wrongdoing and advocating organizational change.”  
According to Forcese (1999: 206), the inquiry alerted Canadians to the importance of 
ensuring adequate public and government control and responsibility for policing.  He 
identified the major outcome of the Commission as “a recommendation that the RCMP be 
divested of its security/intelligence functions and that a separate agency be established.”  In 
acting on this recommendation, the Government of Canada passed an Act of Parliament in 
1984 which gave birth to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). 
   
Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (1989) (hereafter the “Marshall 
Commission”) 
A public inquiry was initiated in 1986 to examine the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall 
Jr., who was convicted of murder in 1971 (Nova Scotia, 1989).  Following the reversal of 
Marshall’s conviction in 1983 and legal proceeding against the Sydney (Nova Scotia) police 
force, three judges from outside Nova Scotia were appointed in 1986 to examine the “police 
investigation, prosecution, conviction and sentencing of Marshall and such other related matters” 
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that were deemed relevant to the inquiry (Roach, 1995: 280-284).  Although the first part of the 
Commission’s report focused on the individuals responsible for the miscarriage of justice in 
Marshall’s wrongful conviction, the second part addressed the institutional and social context of 
Marshall’s case.  The Commission’s hearings criticized almost all of the individuals involved in 
the processing of this case, including the “police, the prosecutor, the defence counsel, the trial 
judge, and the Court of Appeal.”  The Commission offered a wide range of recommendations for 
a multitude of stakeholders regarding the treatment of racial minorities in Nova Scotia.     
In addition, the Marshall Commission scrutinized two cases in which Nova Scotia cabinet 
ministers were the subject of criminal investigations and probed whether a “two tracked” justice 
system existed in Nova Scotia.  Their analysis concluded that the RCMP had failed in its 
obligation to act independently and impartially of government influence and adjudged their 
refusal to proceed with charges against the cabinet ministers without authorization from the 
Department of the Attorney General as “‘a dereliction of duty’ and ‘a failure to adhere to the 
principle of police independence’” (Roach (2007: 46-47).  Roach asserted that this report yielded 
“some of the strongest findings ever in Canada about an improper relationship between police 
and government.”    
 
Public inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People (1991) (hereafter 
“The Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry”) 
The Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry (Manitoba, 1991a, 1991b) focused attention on two 
violent events that became “signal crimes” (Innes, 2003) – the heinous rape-murder of a young 
Indigenous woman, Helen Betty Osborne and the shooting death of J.J. Harper, an Aboriginal 
man, by a Winnipeg police officer.  In relation to the former, only one of the four men implicated 
was convicted of murder (Roach, 1995: 285); a police investigation of the death of Harper 
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deemed it an “accidental” shooting.  The two judges who chaired the Manitoba Justice Inquiry 
were tasked with investigating the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the 
administration of criminal justice.  They considered the issue of systemic discrimination and 
addressed alternative methods of responding to Aboriginal persons in conflict with the law.  
These “widely publicized hearings” were “resisted strenuously by the police force and the police 
association, as sensational allegations were made that allegedly demoralized the police” 
(Forcese, 1999: 225).   
Roach (1995: 286-27) claimed that this Commission “was arguably able to hold individuals, 
organizations, and society accountable for their roles with respect to the Osborne and Harper 
deaths,” including individual officers, and the Winnipeg Police Service.  He additionally noted 
that events that had prompted their work were “portrayed as symptoms of systemic racism 
towards (A)boriginal people, and to this extent Canadian society was held accountable for the 
way in which its attitudes and actions contributed to the deaths.”  Winnipeg Police Service 
officers were accused of harbouring racist attitudes and the Service was criticized for the conduct 
of its officers in relation to Harper’s illegal arrest and the investigative methods that were used 
during the investigation of his death. 
2.2.1 Other notable Canadian inquiries and legislative initiatives 
 In 1982, the Québec Police Commission conducted an inquiry into the Trois-Rivières 
police service and “recommended that 39 charges be laid against 20 officers and former 
police officers for offenses such as armed robbery, assault, extortion, intimidation of 
witnesses, fabrication of evidence, theft, forgery, obstruction of justice, and perjury” 
(Forcese, 1999: 202).   
  
 In 1984, the Nova Scotia Police Commission examined allegations of systemic 
misconduct by police in Kentville, Nova Scotia.  As a result of this year-long inquiry, one 
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constable was dismissed, and several others were recommended for demotion or 
dissmissal, including the chief who was alleged to have tolerated excessive misconduct 
among numerous officers, including “beatings, racist remarks directed at [B]lacks, 
entrapment, unnecessary body searches, and [the] unjustified use of mace” (Forcese, 
1999: 203).   
 
 In 1992, following a highly publicized incident in which a citizen was shot by an 
armoured car guard, the government of British Columbia initiated an inquiry to examine 
all aspects of public policing and private security in the province (Law Commission of 
Canada, 2006: 98).  This inquiry, headed by Justice Wallace Oppal (British Columbia, 
1994), recommended that the role of a “Police Complaint Commissioner” be created, 
with its occupant responsible for overseeing complaints about police conduct.  This 
recommendation was acted upon and legislation toward this end was enacted in 1998 
(Canada, 2009a: 156).     
 
 APEC Inquiry, 1997 
Following the 1997 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vancouver,  
Justice Ted Hughes conducted an inquiry as a member of the Commission for Public 
Complaints against the RCMP (CPC) (Sossin, 2007: 112).  In his 2001 report (Canada, 
2001), Hughes concluded that the members of the RCMP who had provided security for 
the event had “‘succumbed to government influence’ in (their) efforts to coercively 
sequester protesters from the view of the summit delegates” (Sossin, 2007: 112).   
  
 Commission of Inquiry into Matters Related to the Death of Neil Stonechild – 
Saskatchewan, 2004 
The Commission of Inquiry Into Matters Relating to the Death of Neil Stonechild 
(Saskatchewan, 2004) was initiated in 2003 by the Government of Saskatchewan to probe 
the 1990 death of Neil Stonechild.  Stonechild, who was last seen in the custody of 
Saskatoon police, was found dead in a field outside of Saskatoon (Canada, 2009a: 6).  The 
Commission headed by Justice D.H. Wright, released its report in 2004.  The Commission 
identified “glaring deficiencies” in the investigation of the incident and found widespread 
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distrust and discord between the police and Aboriginal peoples.  This inquiry was 
influential in the April 2006 creation of a new police oversight body, the Public Complaints 
Commission. 
 
 Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007 
A public inquiry was commissioned by the Ontario Liberal government in 2003 to enquire 
into the September, 1995 death of Aboriginal protestor Dudley George; George was killed 
by an OPP officer in Ipperwash Provincial Park during an occupation over disputed land 
(CBC, 2007).  Former Justice Sidney Linden conducted a comprehensive inquiry into the 
circumstances of George’s death that lasted for almost four years (Ontario, 2007).  His 
report concluded that “(t)he federal government, the provincial government and the OPP 
must all assume some responsibility for decisions or failures that increased the risk of 
violence and made a tragic confrontation more likely” (CBC, 2007).  Linden recommended 
that the disputed land to be returned to the Stoney Point First Nation, with additional 
compensation.  He also made numerous recommendations for future governmental and 
police handling of land and treaty claims and interactions with First Nations communities.    
 
 The Taser-related death of Robert Dziekanski, 2007 
The October, 2007 death of Polish immigrant Robert Dziekanski at the hands of four 
RCMP officers at the Vancouver Airport sparked international attention after amateur 
videotaped footage of the incident was released on the internet (see Goldsmith, 2010).  
Intense debate arose over the use of Conducted Energy Weapons (CEW), the actions taken 
by the involved officers and the RCMP’s response to the event.  This incident prompted 
two formal reports by the Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the 
RCMP (CPC).  The first, RCMP Use of the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW): Final 
Report (Canada, 2008), recommended changes in relation to internal policy and procedure.  
The second, Report Following a Public Interest Investigation into a Chair-Initiated 
Complaint Respecting the Death in RCMP Custody of Mr. Robert Dziekanski (Canada, 
2009b), advanced non-binding recommendations and roundly criticized the RCMP officers 
involved for their conduct both during and after the incident (Bailey, 2009).  In addition, 
the Braidwood Inquiry (British Columbia, 2009), conducted by retired Justice Thomas 
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Braidwood on behalf of the provincial government of British Columbia, probed the use of 
CEWs in that province.  It made recommendations regarding their use and inquired into 
the circumstances of Dziekanski’s death (British Columbia, 2010).   
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, (2009) 1d S.C.R. 
66 was a landmark ruling that compels the police and the Crown Attorney to disclose all 
relevant history of misconduct, “where the police misconduct is either related to the 
investigation, or the finding of misconduct could reasonably impact on the case against 
the accused” (at para 15).  In other words, when an officer has been found guilty of 
previous misconduct which may have relevance to matters/charges brought before the 
court, the officer’s disciplinary record must be disclosed and can be scrutinized in open 
court.  On this basis, an individual officer’s credibility may be brought into question, thus 
jeopardizing the credibility of the charges at hand.  This ruling means that a finding of 
guilt for serious misconduct may profoundly affect an officer’s ability to bring charges 
and investigations before the court and may seriously jeopardize their entire career 
trajectory.   
 
 Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit (2012) 
In June, 2010, Canada hosted the G8 Summit (Huntsville, Ontario) and G20 Summit 
(Toronto, Ontario).  Considered in tandem, these summits have been described as “the 
largest security event in Canada’s history” (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41).  
Unfortunately, they were marred by “[p]roblems of coordination, leadership, and clarity of 
authority among policing groups” and by “violence, vandalism, excessive use of police 
force, and mass arrests” (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41, 70; see also Morden 
2012; McNeilly, 2012; Canada, 2012).   
 
In 2012, retired Court of Appeal Judge John Morden released an independent review 
(known widely as “The Morden Report”) of policing at the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto 
(Morden, 2012).  Morden’s report, which was commissioned by the Toronto Police 
Services Board, examined “everything from the command structure between police forces 
that weekend to the process behind the controversial decisions to kettle and mass arrest 
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protesters” (Morrow, 2012).  His report criticized “the Toronto Police Services Board for 
a fundamental misunderstanding of its responsibilities – and incomprehension of the legal 
means and political levers available to it – for securing well-functioning and democratic 
policing in the municipality of Toronto” (Kempa, 2012).  It charged that members of this 
board “knew nothing or were only dimly aware of major planning decisions before the 
G20.  In other decisions, they took no part in setting directions” (Morrow, 2012; see also 
Gee, 2012). These findings sparked ongoing debate among police leaders and civilian 
oversight/governance leaders across Canada regarding the appropriate role of police 
services boards in overseeing the operational matters of the police (Kempa, 2012; Council 
of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41-42, 63). 
Although a comprehensive treatment of events that have impacted public perceptions of police in 
Canada is well beyond the scope of this thesis, the abbreviated review of key events provided 
above is nevertheless useful.  It underscores that issues, corrosive of public trust, have been 
discerned in the practices of Canadian police forces.  The section which follows provides a brief 
summary of key events and factors which galvanized civilian oversight of police in Ontario.   
2.3  The history of civilian oversight of police in Ontario  
2.3.1 Toronto Police Service Reviews: 1970s and 1980s 
 
The origins of civilian review of police conduct in Ontario have been traced to events in Toronto 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Thus, Lesage (2005: 16) observed that the process of 
filing complaints against the police across the province during this time period was widely 
regarded as “closed and secretive, and there were major concerns about the lack of 
documentation.”  In response, civil libertarian and community groups, as well as politicians and 
the media, made public demands for greater accountability and oversight of police behaviour 




Allegations of misconduct from several minority groups about officers of the Metropolitan 
Toronto Police Force (assigned to the area of Rochdale College) prompted a 1974 inquiry into 
police complaints in Metropolitan Toronto (Lewis, Linden & Keene, 1986: 117).  Justice 
Maloney’s report (Maloney, 1975) recommended that an independent civilian commissioner of 
complaints be appointed (Lewis et al., 1986: 117).  His report was followed by several other 
inquiries of a similar nature.  In illustration: 
 In 1976, the Ontario government appointed Justice Donald Morand (Ontario, 1976) “to 
conduct a Royal Commission of inquiry into Metropolitan Toronto Police practices.  His 
report recommended that the province establish an independent civilian review agency” 
(Lewis et al., 1986: 117). 
 
 In 1976, the “Marin Commission” (Canada, 1976), a federally-commissioned inquiry led 
by Judge Rene Marin, “explored discipline, complaint and grievance processes within 
the RCMP” (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 90).  Its recommendations “included the 
concept of a civilian component in the complaints-handling process” (Lewis et al., 1986: 
117). 
 
 In 1977, stemming from concerns regarding policing and race relations that were 
expressed by organizations representing visible minorities, “The Council of the 
Corporation of Metropolitan Toronto appointed Walter Pitman to conduct a study of race 
relations” (Lewis et al., 1986: 117).  Pitman’s report (1977) also supported “an 
independent civilian role” in the review of complaints against the police (McMahon, 
1988: 305).  
 
 “In 1978, the Solicitor-General asked the Ontario Police Commission [now the Ontario 
Civilian Police Commission, OCPC, 2009] to make inquiries of Ontario police forces for 
the purpose of revising procedures for dealing with public complaints against the police” 




 In 1978, many local Boards of the Commissioners of Police (the precursor to today’s 
police services boards) voluntarily adopted a new complaint-handling procedure, 
wherein complaints against police officers were investigated by their respective service 
and overseen by the chief of that service (Lesage, 2005: 17-18).  Dissatisfied 
complainants could petition the result of the investigation to the Boards of 
Commissioners or the Ontario Police Commission. 
 
 In 1979, a Cardinal of the Catholic Church (Carter, 1979) conducted a report on “police 
minority relations” and recommended a civilian role in complaint investigations 
(McMahon, 1988: 305).  
 
The general conclusion of the above reports and initiatives was that “a civilian component 
beyond what existed had to be injected into the police complaints procedure” (Lesage, 2005: 17). 
  
In 1977 and 1979, several Bills were introduced that sought, unsuccessfully, to implement a 
“civilianized” role in the oversight of police complaints (McMahon, 1988: 305).  In June 1979, 
Justice Sidney Linden was appointed by the Attorney-General and Solicitor General of Ontario 
to study possible means of implementing a civilian component into the handling of police 
complaints in Ontario (Lewis et al., 1986: 119).  After assessing police complaint procedures in 
other jurisdictions, Linden proposed a system whereby the police would maintain control over 
the investigation of complaints, “subject to monitoring by a civilian review agency which could, 
in certain exceptional circumstances, conduct initial investigation” (Lewis, 1991: 156).  Lewis 
(1991: 156) noted that under this proposed model, a civilian body would review the police 
investigation and disposition when requested by the complainant and “an independent civilian 





2.3.2 Toronto’s Police Complaints System, 1981 to 1990 
 
As a result of the above initiatives, the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner was 
created in Toronto in 1981 (Prenzler, 2004: 90).  Following the Ontario government’s enactment 
of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints Project Act, 1981, a new complaint 
system was launched as a three-year pilot project for Toronto (Lesage, 2005: 18).  As Lesage 
(2005: 18) observed:  
Under the Act, the Toronto Chief of Police was required to set up a Public 
Complaints Investigation Bureau to receive, record, and investigate complaints 
and inquiries.  A civilian Public Complaints Commissioner would monitor and 
review the Bureau’s investigations. The Commissioner also had independent 
investigative powers.  A Public Complaints Board conducted hearings of matters 
referred to it by the Toronto Chief of Police or the Commissioner.  
 
Lewis (1991: 155) reported that although many Toronto police officers were dissatisfied with the 
functioning of their internal complaints system, a large proportion of officers were greatly 
opposed to civilian involvement in the investigation of complaints.  The president of the 
Metropolitan Toronto Police Association stated publically, “(t)he only good external system is a 
dead system” (Landau, 2000: 66).  Despite such opposition, the initiative was regarded as a 
“landmark development” (Prenzler, 2004: 90) and its lifespan was lengthened by the province’s 
enactment of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints Act, 1984.  Nevertheless, 
Landau (2000: 66) asserted that “(t)he rank and file, however, never accepted the legitimacy of a 
civilian authority.”   
 
2.3.3 Ontario’s Police Complaints System, 1990 to 1997 
In 1990, under the Police Services Act, the “Toronto” police complaints system was expanded to 
all police services in Ontario (Landau, 2000: 66).  “The Public Complaints Commissioner was 
renamed the Police Complaints Commissioner (PCC) and was given province-wide authority” 
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(Lesage, 2005: 18-19).  According to Landau (2000: 67), this system provided that all public 
complaints would be initially investigated by the police service whose officer(s) was the subject 
of the complaint.  It also gave the Commissioner limited powers to initiate a complaint or 
investigation.  Most often, however, the Commissioner simply monitored investigations through 
the review of reports submitted by the police service involved.  As Lesage (2005: 22) remarked 
of this system, which existed between 1991 and 1996, “with regional offices in Toronto, Ottawa, 
Windsor, Mississauga, Peterborough, Sudbury and Thunder Bay,” while “the PCC did have the 
ability to conduct complaint investigations, that power was used sparingly.”  Moreover, Landau 
(2000: 64-65) noted that this system “eliminated both the Commissioner and any effective 
civilian role in the handling of complaints by the public against the police.”  It is therefore not 
surprising that Goldsmith (1997) identified the creation of the delimited role as “the single-most 
retrograde step for Canada’s leadership role in civilian oversight.”  In like spirit, Justice Oppal 
described the model employed by the PCC as “the weakest form of oversight” (Landau, 2000: 
264).   
 
Landau’s (1994, 1996) research noted that two-thirds of citizens who had filed complaints 
against the police in Toronto in the early 1990s perceived the system to be unfair and were 
dissatisfied with their experience.  However, Landau’s (2000: 65-67) more recent research 
concedes that when compared to earlier decades, with their “virtual ‘hands off’ approach to 





2.3.4 Changes to Ontario’s Police Complaints System, 1997 
Changing political winds in Ontario led to modifications in the civilian oversight of police across 
the province.  The Progressive Conservative party came to power in 1995, and began close 
consultations with police officials (Miller and Merrick, 2002: 12).  Landau (2000: 70) described 
this era as characterized by “downsizing, devolution and dismantling of most public services 
within provincial jurisdiction.”  Included in these processes were the “(r)estructuring and reform 
of various aspects of policing.”  These changes were, perhaps, best exemplified by a 
commissioned report by Rod McLeod (Ontario, 1996), which recommended that the province 
devolve responsibility for the oversight of complaints against the police.  The thrust of these 
changes is also evinced by Bill 105, An Act to Review the Partnership Between the Province, 
Municipalities and the Police and to Enhance Community Safety (Bill 105, 1997), which echoed 
several of McLeod’s main themes (Landau, 2000: 70-71).   For example, Landau (2000: 71) 
discerned that Bill 105, which passed into law in November, 1997, signalled a return to an 
internal handling of complaints by individual police services, the abolition of the Office of the 
Public Complaints Commissioner and the removal of “the power from any civilian authority to 
investigate, adjudicate or even review complaints.”   
 
In its place, the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) became responsible 
for ensuring that police services complied with province-wide standards.  When required, 
OCCPS was also charged with other duties, such as “to investigate, inquire into and report on the 
conduct or performance of officers, including the chief, the administration of a municipal police 
force, the provision of police services to a municipality and the police needs of a municipality” 
(Landau, 2000: 73).  Landau (2000: 73) observed that, under this scheme a great deal of 
responsibility remained with the chief, who decided whether a particular complaint was about the 
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policies or services of the department, and whether a complaint was “frivolous, vexatious or 
made in bad faith.”   Under this arrangement, the chief was generally charged with overseeing 
the processing, investigation and adjudication of a complaint with the OCCPS functioning in a 
delimited capacity (i.e., conducting reviews) in certain circumstances (Landau, 2000: 73-75).  
This complaints system remained in place until October, 2009.  
 
2.3.5 Ontario, 1990-2009 
 
Amidst the tumultuous changes to the complaint system in Ontario, there were several other 
important initiatives throughout the province that addressed the issue of police accountability. 
2.3.6 Ontario’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU) 
The Special Investigations Unit (SIU) was created and implemented in 1990 under an 
amendment to the Ontario Police Services Act.  This agency conducts independent investigations 
and determines whether criminal charges will be laid against police officers when death, serious 
injury or sexual assault has occurred in police custody or is related to police action (Mendes, 
1999: 27).   
 
According to the Law Commission of Canada (2006: 92), the SIU is designed to act as an 
efficient “oversight mechanism to ensure accountability to the public and the respect of the 
police.”  The Police Services Act demands that police officers and police services “co-operate 
fully” with members of the SIU during their investigations.   The SIU Director, who cannot be a 
serving or former police officer, reports directly to the Attorney General of the province, rather 
than to the police service involved (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 92; Martin, 2007: 264).  
Furthermore, SIU investigators who are former police officers cannot be involved in 
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investigations that involve their former police service (Martin, 2007: 264).  According to Landau 
(2000: 77), the “powers, mandate and jurisdiction” of the SIU “by far exceed those of any 
complaints mechanisms which Ontario has ever had.” 
 
Given the broad mandate of the SIU, it is understandable why considerable tensions have existed 
between police services and the SIU since its inception.  Justice George Adams was 
commissioned to conduct two reviews (Ontario, 1998, 2003) to ensure that police services were 
complying with procedural mandates and, for example, making timely notification of incidents to 
the SIU and cooperating with that agency (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 92-93).  Ontario’s 
Ombudsman, Andre Marin, has also assessed the credibility and effectiveness of the SIU.  His  
2008 report, Oversight Unseen (Ontario, 2008), contained 46 recommendations, including a 
demand for greater transparency, independence and accountability among the SIU, the Attorney 
General and the Ontario government (Canada, 2009a: 121).  
 
In addition, the last two decades witnessed the release of several noteworthy reports that 
specifically addressd the strained relationships that exist between various racialized minority and 
other community groups and the police: 
 In 1989, the report of the Task Force on Race Relations and Policing (Ontario, 1989), 
chaired by Claire Lewis, called for a province-wide standard in addressing alleged 
misconduct and racial intolerance by the police (Lesage, 2005: 22).  In the second volume 
of this report (Ontario, 1992a), the Task Force advanced recommendations that sought to 
increase the effectiveness and success of the province-wide complaint system (Lesage, 
2005: 22).      
 
 In 1992, Stephen Lewis’ Report of the Advisor on Race Relations to the Premier of Ontario 
(Ontario, 1992b), recommended that the PCC perform initial investigations for all public 
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complaints of racist conduct by police officers and “perform mandatory reviews of chiefs’ 
dispositions of such cases” (Lesage, 2005: 22).   
 
 In 1995, the Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice 
System (Ontario, 1995) made recommendations for additional funding that would allow for 
the OCCPS to both conduct inquiries regarding police conduct and examine systemic 
issues related to police misconduct (Lesage, 2005: 22).   
 
 In 2003, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) released a report entitled Paying 
the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling (OHRC, 2003). Its recommendations were 
aimed at strengthening public confidence in the investigation and disposition of complaints 
against the police (Lesage, 2005: 25).   
 
 In 2002, the Toronto Star published a series of articles which suggested that “racial 
profiling” and discrimination which adversely targeted Black citizens were routine in the 
Toronto Police Service (Rankin, Quinn, Shephard et al., 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d).  
The Star articles also ignited an intense debate among academics, police representatives, 
minority groups and local authorities on the validity of the articles’ claims (Wortley & 
Tanner, 2003).   
 
 In 2003, the Kingston Police Service conducted a project with the assistance from the 
Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto which sought to quantify the racial 
and/or ethnic origin of all individuals stopped by Kingston police officers in “non-casual” 
situations (Kingston Police Service, 2005; Closs & McKenna, 2006: 143).  The research 
noted that young Black males were over-represented among those stopped by Kingston 
police officers - a finding that suggests the existence of a systemic racial/ethnic bias 
(Closs & McKenna: 150-151).  This project was the first voluntary initiative to test for 
racial bias by a police service in Canada and it generated considerable criticism from 
police officials across the country (Closs & McKenna: 158). 
 Retired judge George Ferguson (2004) conducted a two-year review of the Toronto 
Police Service drug squad and made recommendations “arising from allegations of police 




These above reports and initiatives amply attest to the import of research which seeks to address 
police accountability and its oversight mechanisms.   
 
2.3.7  Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario, 2005  
In 2004, Justice Patrick Lesage, former Chief Justice of Ontario, was commissioned by the 
provincial government to study the potential of implementing a system of civilian oversight of 
police complaints.  Lesage consulted with a wide range of stakeholders, including community 
groups, Aboriginal communities, senior police officials, police associations, police services 
boards, and other public representatives.   
  
Lesage’s Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario, was completed in 2005 (Lesage, 
2005).  Lesage recommended that the existing police complaint system required “significant 
systemic changes” (Doolittle, 2009).  Among his 27 recommendations, Lesage proposed that an 
independent civilian body should administer the public complaints system in Ontario and be 
responsible for the intake and allocation of the investigation of complaints (Lesage, 2005: 66).   
According to Lesage’s report, this civilian body should assess all complaints received in the 
province and then assign each complaint for investigation by either the involved police service, 
another police service, or by investigators belonging to the independent body (p. 66-73).  Other 
significant recommendations included extending the time limit for the filing of a complaint 
beyond the six month cut-off period and allowing for third-party complaints in some 
circumstances (p. 67).  Lesage also recommended that the new system continue to allow for 
complaints to be resolved on an informal basis.    
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2.3.8 Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), 2009 
 
Based largely upon Lesage’s 2005 report, the Independent Police Review Act (Bill 103) was 
introduced for first reading on April 19, 2006.  It proposed the implementation of a civilian-led 
system to oversee complaints against the police in Ontario (Martin, 2007: 268).  In May, 2007, 
this Bill became law, and planning began to amend the Police Services Act in accordance with its 
provisions (Doolittle, 2009).  On October 19th, 2009, the new system, the Office of the 
Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), was introduced and incorporated, through 
amendments, into the Police Services Act (1990).  It is described as “an independent, neutral 
arms-length agency of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General responsible for receiving, 
managing and overseeing all public complaints about the police in Ontario” and its mandate is 
“to deal with all public complaints regarding the conduct of a police officer, the policies of a 
police service or the services provided by the police” (Raising Awareness, 2012).   
 
The majority of Lesage’s recommendations were implemented in the design of this system.  For 
example, the “OIPRD will categorize complaints, send some back to the concerned force, 
investigate some on its own and send others to other police forces” (Doolittle, 2009).  At any 
point in the process, the OIPRD may assume responsibility for the investigation and disposition 
of the complaint.  Although anonymous complaints are not accepted, the Act allows for any 
member of the public to file a complaint with the OIPRD in relation to the way in which a police 
service was delivered, the policy of a police service, or the conduct of an individual police 
officer or officers (Police Services Act, 1990).  These complaints can be filed in a variety of 
formats to a police service or to the OIPRD directly (Police Services Act, 1990).   
 52 
 
2.3.9 The Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) 
With the 2007 passing of the Independent Police Review Act (Bill 103), the Ontario Civilian 
Police Commission (OCPC) (formerly OCCPS) assumed responsibility for appeals of 
disciplinary hearings (Doolittle, 2009).  “In Ontario, police services and police services boards 
are ultimately accountable to the public through the OCPC.  The OCPC reports to the Attorney 
General and its mandate and duties are set out in the Police Services Act” (“Ontario Civilian 
Police Commission”, 2015).  The OCPC is an independent quasi-judicial agency “that conducts 
inquiries into the conduct of police chiefs and hears appeals on police disciplinary matters” 
(Guly, 2015).  This agency:  
 adjudicates disputes between municipal councils and police service boards involving 
budget matters; 
 conducts hearings into requests for the reduction, abolition, creation or amalgamation of 
police services; 
 conducts investigations and inquiries into the conduct of chiefs of police, police officers 
and members of police services boards; and carries out general enforcement relating to the 
adequacy and effectiveness of policing services (“Ontario Civilian Police Commission”, 
2015).   
 
The following section provides a brief overview and classification of extant civilian oversight 
systems in Canada.   
2.4  Overview of Canadian Civilian Oversight Mechanisms 
In August, 2009, Paul Kennedy, the chair of the Commission for Public Complaints against the 
RCMP (CPC), released a report which made several recommendations for the handling of 
investigations involving RCMP members (Canada, 2009a).8  Among these was a 
recommendation proposal that all investigations involving RCMP members in an incident of 
                                                          
8 Through the enactment of the Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Accountability Act in 2014, the RCMP 
Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) replaced the Commission for Public Complaints (CPC) 
against the RCMP.  See http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=910419  
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serious injury, death and/or sexual assault be handled by an external police service or provincial 
investigative body with oversight by the CPC (Canada, 2009a: VI).  This 2009 CPC report 
followed several high profile cases that had generated intense criticism of RCMP practices, such 
as the 2005 shooting death of Ian Bush and the previously-mentioned Taser-related death of 
Polish immigrant Robert Dziekanski in 2007 at the Vancouver International Airport (Mason, 
2009).   
Kennedy’s report included a review of both domestic and international civilian oversight systems 
(Canada, 2009a) and his categorization of these systems into three models: dependent, 
interdependent, independent.  The first, the dependent model, is the traditional type of model in 
which police officers investigate the conduct of their own officers or the officers of another 
police service (Canada, 2009a: IX-X).  In this model, the police service is fully responsible for 
the investigation and administration of public complaints and the civilian body acts in a review 
capacity (Canada, 2009a: X).  Examples of the dependent model are discernible across Canada 
and include:  
 Québec -  “Québec’s oversight system, composed of the Police Ethics Commissioner and 
the Police Ethics Committee, is chiefly concerned with the potential violations of the 
Code of Ethics pertaining to police officers, special constables and highway controllers” 
(Canada, 2009a: 76). 
 
 Ontario - Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD): “is…responsible 
for the initial screening of public complaints and may establish rules and guidelines for 
police chiefs and police boards for complaints made by the public” (Canada, 2009a: 76-
77). 
 
 Manitoba – the Law Enforcement Review Agency (LERA): acts as the police oversight 
agency in Manitoba.  The agency does not conduct criminal investigations but 
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investigates allegations of “abuse of authority, false statements and lack of restraint in the 
use of a firearm” (Canada, 2009a: 77). 
 
 British Columbia – British Columbia’s Public Complaint Commissioner (PCC): oversees 
the public complaints of municipal officers in the province and manages external police 
investigations when serious injury or death of individuals occur in police custody or as a 
result of police actions (Canada, 2009a: 77-78).  
 
 Canada-wide  – “In the Canadian context, formal agreements between some local police 
forces and the RCMP allow an outside police force to handle the investigations of RCMP 
members...However, the use of an external police force for member investigations 
remains highly discretionary and inconsistently applied across RCMP divisions” 
(Canada, 2009a: 78). 
The interdependent model introduces civilians into the investigations of officer wrongdoing.  In 
this model, a civilian partner works collaboratively with the police in conducting the 
investigation and may assume an observer-type role or a more active investigative role.  
Examples of the interdependent model exist in Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the 
Yukon and are also found in other countries, such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
Australia” (Canada, 2009a: 78).  More specifically, the interdependent model is on display in: 
 
 Alberta - The Alberta Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT): offers a blended 
response of civilian, RCMP and municipal police personnel who work together to 
conduct investigations in cases of serious injury or death (Canada, 2009a: 81).  
 
 Saskatchewan - Saskatchewan’s Public Complaints Commission (PCC): has the ability 
to assume the responsibility of the police investigation at any point it feels necessary to 
do so and in that instance the police service must desist from its investigation and provide 




The independent model is a system in which civilians conduct oversight and investigations of 
alleged police wrongdoing, that are totally independent of the police.  The Ontario Special 
Investigations Unit (SIU) is an example of this type of model (Canada, 2009a: 82).  Thus,  the 
“SIU investigates the circumstances of serious injury or death as well as allegations of sexual 
assault that may have resulted from criminal offences committed by police officers.  The agency 
has full powers to investigate and charge officers with a criminal offence” (Canada, 2009a: 88). 
Appendix A identifies civilian oversight agencies which  currently operate across Canada, 
drawing upon information provided by the Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement (CACOLE, www.cacole.ca).  These agencies vary on the basis size, statutory 
authority and scope of responsibilities.   
According to Mendes (1999: 26), efforts to create sustainable police complaint systems with 
civilian oversight in Canada have been marked by purposive attempts to incorporate “the 
accountability thesis of the professional model of policing into the civilian oversight model.”  As 
such, most civilian oversight agencies in Canada “acknowledge the professional duty of police 
organisations to do the initial investigation of public complaints and, where merited, pose 
disciplinary and other measures on its officers” (Mendes, 1999: 26).  Mendes (1999; 26) further 
asserted that this approach “gives the management and indeed the whole police organisation the 
opportunity to show professional responsiveness to the communities they serve” and dampens 
the likelihood of an environment in which distrust and resentment can fester.  Nevertheless, he 
cautioned that the establishment of meaningful public trust in this arrangement is contingent 
upon several essential components.  Thus, he declared that:   
[t]he Canadian experience has…shown that the transparency of the internal police 
system is critical to public confidence and accountability.  The injection of an 
appeal to a civilian oversight system if the citizen or community is not satisfied, 
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acts as a social capital check on self-imposed accountability and professionalism 
of police forces.  This is further augmented if the civilian oversight agency has the 
power to initiate complaints and review police practices and procedures for 
systemic problems and potential systemic solutions (Mendes, 1999: 30). 
 
Allowing police to conduct initial investigations in tandem with civilian oversight and review (as 
practiced in the dependent or interdependent models) may also have the practical benefit of 
obviating the extraordinary cost of funding an entirely independent investigative body that is 
associated with the independent model.   
2.5 Success of Civilian Oversight Mechanisms: Effectiveness vs. Symbolic Function 
An assessment of the merits of police-led (internal) versus civilian-led (external) investigations 
of alleged misconduct or complaints is beyond the scope of this research.  It is nevertheless 
fitting to mention briefly the optics involved in the implementation of civilian oversight 
mechanisms.   
Despite the notable “trend to external review” of police conduct in Canada and elsewhere (e.g., 
Goldsmith, 1991; Prenzler, 2004), the effectiveness of external civilian oversight bodies 
continues to be debated.  For example, Martin (2007: 268) noted that “(m)ost citizen complaint 
and review schemes have been largely unsuccessful at reducing police misconduct or at 
increasing public accountability.”  Prenzler (2000: 662) observed that “low substantiation rates 
by civilian review bodies of between 2 and 8 per cent have been described as an ‘international 
phenomenon’.”  Goldsmith (1995: 128) maintained that there was no evidence that external 
investigations “improve significantly the substantiation rates of complaints investigated.”  In 
their assessment of civilian oversight systems in Western nations, Miller and Merrick (2002: 3) 
found that “(c)ivilian oversight does not guarantee legitimacy, and certainly there are examples 
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where oversight agencies have not enhanced confidence in the police – for example when 
oversight is not seen as independent or when it is perceived as ineffectual.”   
One significant advantage that civilian oversight mechanisms enjoy over their police-run 
counterpart mechanisms is in the public’s perception of their activities and their independence, 
transparency and objectivity.  Thus, Goldsmith (1995: 128) pointed out more than two decades 
ago that:  
[o]ne clear advantage of external participation is the substance it lends to the 
perception that investigation of complaints will be impartially carried out, a basis 
for public confidence which has continued to elude the most determined efforts of 
internal investigations departments to justify their continued dominance of 
complaints investigations. 
  
However, as Miller and Merrick (2002: 3) observed laconically, “the appearance to the 
community that complaints are dealt with in a transparent and fair way can be seen as a goal in 
its own right.”   
 
Assessing the “success” of civilian oversight mechanisms is obviously not a simple task.  For 
example, Watt (1991: 358) maintained: 
[I]t is the openness of police handling of such complaints that is essential.  While 
the internal processing of public complaints by police may well be a fair system, 
it does not intrinsically appear fair.  The perception is a poor one, and the 
injection of a civilian component into the handling of such complaints addresses 
that perception...It is the transparency of the system which engenders public 
confidence. 
 
Regardless of the actual integrity and professionalism involved in most police-led internal 
investigations, the current standards for transparency and accountability would seem rooted in an 
oft-cited aphorism that stresses the import of perception: “justice must not only be done, it must 
also be seen to be done” (as cited in Landau, 1996: 294).  However, as Thomas’ famous theorem 
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reminds us, “things that are defined as real are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 
1928: 572).   
Although there are many different factors and mechanisms that control police behaviour in 
Canada, this chapter has noted that the implementation of civilian oversight systems were most 
often spurred by some form of judicial review or inquiry into alleged police misconduct.  
However, Prenzler (2004: 90) maintains that the expansion of civilian oversight in Canada has 
been “driven less by serious corruption than by breakdowns in police–community relations and 
dissatisfaction with police handling of complaints.”   
If public inquiries, reviews, inquests and task forces on various aspects of police conduct have 
played a catalytic role in the creation of standards of accountability and transparency for 
Canadian police agencies (Sossin, 2007: 107-108), it bears emphasis that their recommendations 
are generally non-binding and many are often not fully implemented.  Nevertheless, these public 
inquiries and reviews “can and do provide a pivotal form of oversight for allegations of police 
misdeeds and have served as the catalyst for significant shifts in police structures and policies” 
(Sossin, 2007: 121).  
2.6  Recent developments pertaining to the scrutiny of policing in Ontario, Canada 
Several high profile issues and initiatives attest to the need for research on police accountability 
and civilian oversight Ontario, Canada that considers these issues in a broad context:  
 Rising policing salaries– Organizations such as the Ontario Association of Police 
Services Boards (OAPSB), the Canadian Association of Police Governance (CAPG) and 
the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) have raised concerns about the rising 
cost of policing, and in particular, the salaries of police officers.  The 2015 AMO report 
noted that “essential service status, the inability to strike, retention pay, and salary 
benchmarking have resulted in arbitration awards that do not properly account for local 
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economic circumstances and capacity to pay. The system is not sustainable” (AMO, 
2015: 16).  Efforts by local governments to rein in such costs, such as coordinated 
collective bargaining and seeking changes to costing models, remain ongoing (OAPSB, 
2014; AMO, 2015: 8).   
 Paid duties - Casey & Lorigio (2015) reported ongoing tensions between municipal 
leaders and police leaders about “paid duty” programs that allow police officers to earn 
overtime wages for work at private events.  Concerns have been raised that these 
programs may foster “the appearance of two-tier policing” and the perception that police 
services and/or municipalities rely upon these programs as revenue-generating 
opportunities (Casey & Lorigio, 2015).  The Association of Municipalities of Ontario’s 
suggestion that “many current ‘paid duty’ functions” could be “civilianized” (AMO, 
2015: 35) is no less noteworthy for, if acted upon, extant systems may be adequate in 
their breadth and fail to govern the actions of all actors who perform “policing” roles.    
 Use of force - In April, 2015, the OIPRD announced that they are undertaking an 
Ontario-wide “systemic review of use of force, lethal use of force, deescalation 
techniques and approaches in dealing with people with mental health issues, emotionally 
disturbed people and people in distress” (OIPRD, 2015b).  The review is expected to 
examine “the relationship between Ontario Police College training and training by police 
services; the content and use of ‘use of force reports’; and the interplay between 
government, mental health agencies and police services in addressing the needs of 
persons in distress, while protecting the public” (OIPRD, 2015b).   
 Gillis (2015a) reported that there has been “a dramatic increase in complaints about 
police use of force and a spike in sexual assault allegations against officers” in Ontario in 
the last decade.  He noted that statistics released by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), 
revealed that the number of incidents investigated by that agency had climbed from 137 
incidents in 2004 to more than 300 in 2014.  Investigations of “custody injury” also rose 
significantly, with concussions now recognized as potentially “serious injuries” (Gillis, 
2015a).   
 “Carding” – a practice in which police “stop, question and document people who are not 
suspected of a crime - has come under intense scrutiny as a damaging and discriminatory 
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practice” (Gillis, 2015b).  According to the Toronto Star’s analysis of the practices of the 
Toronto Police Service, “black and brown men are carded at a disproportionately high 
rate by Toronto police” (Gillis, 2015b).  This issue has caused considerable tension 
among various community groups, police leaders, and the police services board in 
Toronto and has raised concerns about “carding” by police leaders and police services 
boards across the province (Bennett, 2015).  In June, 2015, the Ontario Liberal 
government announced plans to regulate street checks for all police services across 
Ontario.  “The province has since sought input from the public, police associations and 
community groups, with the aim of implementing a standardized provincial policy” 
(Gillis, 2015b).   
 Suspension with pay - The Ontario Liberal government is currently working to reform the 
Police Services Act to allow “police chiefs the power to halt pay for suspended officers, 
which currently costs municipalities about $6.4-million a year and exacts an incalculable 
toll on public trust in local law enforcement” (White, 2015).  Ontario remains the only 
province to mandate police services to continue to pay officers facing suspensions, 
including those facing criminal charges.  Currently, “(c)hiefs can revoke a suspended 
officer’s salary only if the officer is sentenced to prison” (White, 2015).  This proposed 
initiative would provide Chiefs with the discretion to suspend police officers without pay.  
While this initiative is supported by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) 
and the Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB), those who oppose it 
include the Police Association of Ontario (PAO), the Toronto Police Service Association 
and Ontario Provincial Police Association.  Tom Stamatakis, the president of the 
Canadian Police Association, has opined that “the decision to suspend without pay should 
be made only in cases of ‘significant misconduct or guilt’” (as quoted in White, 2015).  
He additionally urged awareness that the suspension of a police officer without pay is “a 
dramatic step to take” which would predictably have a “huge impact on that officer’s 
family, future job prospects. If you’re in that situation, your career is generally over” 
(White, 2015).  The Canadian Police Association reputedly favours “placing ultimate 
discretion with an independent adjudicator rather than a chief” (White, 2015).   
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The contents of reports by both the print and broadcast media in Canada record ongoing public 
debate about the role of the police, expectations for performance and accountability, and the 
financial sustainability of modern police practices.  These issues have also prompted recent 
forums hosted by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, the Future of Policing Advisory 
Committee (FPAC) (e.g., Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) and 
the Economics of Policing summits (e.g., Public Safety Canada).9   
2.7  Conclusion of Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada 
This chapter has provided an overview of the events and initiatives that have shaped the current 
landscape of civilian oversight of policing in Ontario, Canada.  The following chapter provides a 
review of the research which has examined the attitudes of police officers toward civilian 
oversight mechanisms.   
 
  
                                                          





Literature Review and Hypotheses 
This chapter provides an overview of previous literature pertaining to police officers’ attitudes 
toward civilian oversight mechanisms, followed by discussion about the theoretical 
concepts/framework explored throughout this study.  Finally, this study’s anticipated findings are 
discussed.  
3.1 Previous academic literature regarding police officers’ attitudes 
There is a wide body of research on police officers’ attitudes toward varying issues and 
phenomena.  For instance, researchers have assessed police officers’ attitudes about various 
forms of criminal behaviour such as sexual offences (e.g., LeDoux & Hazelwood, 1985; 
Saunders, 1987; Trute, Adkins & MacDonald, 1992; Brown & King, 1998; Rich, 2005; Johnson, 
Hughes & Ireland, 2007; Page, 2008), elder abuse (e.g., Dolon & Hendricks, 1989; Payne, Berg 
& Flanagan, 2001), domestic/family violence (e.g., Buchanan & Perry, 1985; Dolon, Hendricks 
& Meagher, 1986; Edwards, 1986; Saunders & Size, 1986; Breci, 1989; Logan, Shannon & 
Walker, 2006), and drinking and driving (e.g., Frank, Fagan & Ayers, 1987). 
Researchers have additionally probed police officers’ opinions on matters such as victim 
credibility (e.g., Mulder & Winkel, 1996), crisis situations (e.g., Durand, 1988), capital 
punishment (e.g., Fagan, 1986 ), gun control (e.g., Lester, 1983; Kohn, 2005), discretion and 
arrest procedures (e.g., Blount, Yegidis & Maheux, 1992; Wortley, 2003; Payne, Time & 
Gainey, 2006; Zalman & Smith, 2007), riot activity (e.g., Kitch, 1970), undercover police work 
(e.g., Farmer, Beehr & Love, 2003), shiftwork (e.g., Lester, 1986 ), crime and violence (e.g., 
Walker, 1982; Wilson, Cullen & Latessa, 1985; Fielding  & Fielding, 1991), and police work in 
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general (e.g., Ferdinand, 1980; Ainsworth, 1981; Crawford, 1993; Brooks, Piquero & Cronin, 
1993, 1994; Violanti & Aron, 1995; Alain & Baril, 2005).  Social scientists have also conducted 
attitudinal studies which have examined male police officers’ impressions of female police 
officers and female officers’ perceptions of their occupational environment (e.g., Glaser, 1983; 
Pope & Pope, 1986; Ahmad, 2001; Sims, Scarborough & Ahmad, 2003; Sun & Chu, 2008; 
Carlan & McMullan, 2009), gays and lesbians (e.g., Bernstein & Kostelac, 2002; Lyons, 
DeValve & Garner, 2008), alcohol and drug use (e.g., Beck, Kavelak & Summons, 1982; Beck 
& Summons 1984; van Wijngaarden, Cushing, Kerns, & Dischinger, 1995; Smith, Wiggers & 
Considine, 2001), persons with disabilities (e.g., Bailey, Barr & Bunting, 2001; Beletsky, 
Macalino & Burris, 2005), and persons with mental illness (e.g., Kimhi, Barak, Gutman et al., 
1998; Patch & Arrigo, 1999; Cotton, 2004; Watson, Corrigan & Ottati, 2004).  
Some researchers have examined police officers’ attitudes toward various actions that may 
constitute police misconduct.  For instance, Lester (1996) assessed previous research that has 
surveyed officers’ opinions on use of force issues (e.g., Carter, 1985; Corbett et al., 1979, 
Brodsky & Williamson, 1985).  In general, these studies have gauged officers’ justifications and 
rationalizations for the use of force in different situations.  Several of these studies have 
employed hypothetical scenarios in order to assess officers’ readiness to use lethal force (e.g., 
Brown 1983, 1984; Waegel, 1984; Geller, 1985; Hunt, 1985; Dwyer et al., 1990).  Other studies 
have surveyed officers’ opinions on a spectrum of misconduct-related behaviour (e.g., Barker, 
1983; Hunter, 1999; Micucci & Gomme, 2005) and/or used hypothetical examples of ethical 
conundrums to assess officers’ attitudes toward a variety of acts.  For example, Pogarsky and 
Piquero (2004) tested a theory of “perceptual deterrence” in a short-term study that sought to 
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measure the relative effectiveness of perceived formal and informal sanctions upon police 
behaviour.   
However, relatively few studies have examined police officers’ perceptions of the administrative 
oversight of police misconduct and the handling of citizens’ complaints against the police.  More 
commonly, research on civilian oversight of policing has examined citizens’ attitudes and 
experiences in filing complaints against the police and/or charted the evolution of external 
review mechanisms around the world (e.g., Landau, 1994, 1996, 2000; Lewis, Linden & Keene, 
1986; Maguire, 1991; Maguire & Corbett, 1991; Corbett, 1991; Goldsmith, 1988, 1996).  I will 
now look at studies on officers’ attitudes that do exist.   
Sviridoff and McElroy (1989) conducted a study on the perceptions and attitudes of New York 
City Police Department officers toward the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB).  Using a 
focus group (N= 22 officers), they obtained officers’ views on the legitimacy and fairness of the 
complaint review system.  Their research found that officers generally believed the CCRB to be 
biased in favour of complainants and ineffective in screening out frivolous complaints.  Officers 
also took issue with the extensive length of the complaint process, with some suggesting that 
face-to-face interaction between accused officers and complainants could assist in the resolution 
of complaints (Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989: 52).  Some officers reported that, in response to their 
perception of bias in the system, they falsified their accounts of encounters that led to 
complaints.  According to De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 654), this finding suggests that 
systems of citizen oversight which are implemented without concern for the perceptions of 
officers “may actually increase the likelihood of officer perjury during complaint investigations.” 
Perez (1994: 80) studied various systems of internal and external review of police misconduct in 
various areas of the United States (i.e., Oakland, Berkley, Contra Costa County and San Jose, 
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California; Chicago, Illinois; and Kansas City, Missouri) during 1977 and 1994.   This research 
combined “direct observations of cops in action on the beat, in-depth interviews with randomly 
selected groups of officers from six jurisdictions, and a written attitudinal survey of 180 officers” 
(Perez, 1994: 76).  Only officers who worked uniform patrol (patrol officers, sergeants, 
lieutenants and captains) were included within his study.  
Perez (1994: 107-108, 143, 237, 247) found that in all of the jurisdictions he examined, officers 
vastly preferred internal investigations of police misconduct to those conducted by civilian 
personnel and deemed internal police investigators to be more qualified, experienced and 
competent than civilian investigators.  Furthermore, the vast majority of officers expressed a 
belief that internal police investigations were more “fair” than “civilian review” investigations 
(Perez, 1994: 154).  Nevertheless, Perez (1994: 247-248) observed that just over a third (35%) of 
officers believed that the ideal and most effective system of investigating alleged police 
misconduct would involve a combination of police officer and civilian investigators.  In addition, 
almost two-thirds (62%) believed that “formal hearing boards” should be made up of a 
combination of “cops and civilians.”  Although Perez (1994: 248) concluded that “police officers 
feel that civilian review does not abuse them or interfere with police organizations’ interests”, his 
research found that African-American officers expressed more support than their white 
counterparts for both “civilianizing review mechanisms” (45.1% versus 26.3%) and combined 
civilian-police hearing boards (72.4% versus 64.2%).   
Walker and Herbst (1999) reported that police officers in Minneapolis had positive impressions 
of the Minneapolis Civilian Review Agency (MCRA).  Their study was based upon a survey that 
was mailed to both civilians (N=174) and police officers (N=81) in 1998-1999 who had personal 
experience with a complaint handled through the MCRA as either a complainant or 
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subject/witness officer.  In this study, the response rate among police officers (26%) was higher 
than among civilians (17%) (Walker & Herbst, 1999: 3).  The vast majority (85-90%) of police 
officers who responded to the survey assessed the MRA positively.  Thus, they reported that they 
were treated fairly and respectfully and expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the 
investigations.  Nevertheless, it may be noted that these findings derive from a very small survey 
population with few questions posed.   
Kreisel’s (1998) doctoral dissertation has been lauded as putatively the “only systematic effort to 
examine the connection between police officer attitudes and police subcultural attitudes” (De 
Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 654).  Her study included a comprehensive evaluation of previous 
research on the “police subculture(s)”; a profile of the changing demographics of American 
police officers; and a social history of the evolution of internal and external oversight of policing.  
She administered a survey questionnaire to 814 police officers of the Albuquerque Police 
Department in New Mexico, with 357 officers (44%) responding.  The results were evaluated 
using univariate, bivariate and multivariate methods, with a socio-demographic analysis of the 
participants.   
Kreisel found that officers who demonstrated strong adherence to police subcultural values were 
more likely to evaluate negatively external forms of administrative oversight (civilian-led 
initiatives) and positively evaluate internal forms of accountability (police-led initiatives).  In 
addition, Kreisel (1998: 210) reported that while most officers supported some system of 
oversight and accountability, they generally preferred internal oversight to external oversight.  
Nevertheless, she found that not all responding officers were opposed to external forms of 
oversight, and when officers were well-informed about external oversight mechanisms they were 
more likely to be more supportive (Kreisel, 1998: 215-216).  These findings suggest that the 
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traditional depiction of a homogeneous police subculture that is strongly opposed to external 
“meddling” may be overly simplistic and misleading. 
Bobb et al. (2006) evaluated both police officer and citizen attitudes on a variety of topics related 
to policing in Pasadena, California.  Their survey for civilians was mailed to over 5000 
households throughout Pasadena and the researchers obtained a response rate of “around 20 
percent” (2006: 30).  Included in this study was a survey of all 241 sworn members of the 
Pasadena Police Department, which sought to assess their satisfaction with complaint 
investigations.  In total, 171 officers (71%) responded to the survey.  At the time of this 
investigation, the Pasadena Police Department relied solely upon internal investigations of 
complaints; this system did not involve civilian investigators nor oversight.  Among the officers 
who participated in this study, just over three-quarters (76%) reported that they had been the 
subject of at least one complaint filed against them during the course of their career.  A 
significant portion of officers who had been the subject of complaints (74%) expressed 
satisfaction with how the complaints were handled (Bobb et al., 2006: 49).  Nevertheless, the 
majority of respondents expressed the belief that it was too easy for citizens to file complaints 
against officers (Bobb et al., 2006: 48-49).   
Weisburd et al. (2000) conducted a telephone survey of 925 officers from 113 police services 
across the United States in their attempt to assess police attitudes toward internal and external 
response mechanisms.  The authors surveyed a random national sample of police officers using a 
multi-stage clustered method to select the participating police departments from a sampling 
frame of 5042 county or municipal police departments.  Included in this sample were large, 
medium and small police departments from across the United States.  The researcher attained an 
87.3% response rate. Utilizing a Likert scale, Weisburd et al. (2000:7) determined that the vast 
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majority of officers (79%) considered internal affairs to be effective in addressing abuses of 
authority.  However, simply 38% viewed citizen review boards as effective in preventing police 
misconduct and these attitudes were impacted by the “race” of officers, with African-American 
officers most likely to express this belief (70%), followed by officers from other racialized 
minorities (41%) and white officers least likely to do so (33%) (Weisburd et al.  2000: 9).   
In 1999, the Citizen Complaints Review Committee (CCRC) of the Calgary Police Commission 
(CPC) reviewed the citizen complaints process of the Calgary Police Service (CPS) (Calgary 
Police Commission, 1999: 1).  At the time of their report, citizens’ complaints about police 
conduct were investigated by the Professional Standards Section of the Calgary Police Service 
and the CPC held an auditing function.  As part of their review, 65 police officers who were 
subjects of complaints between 1996 and 1998 were surveyed by telephone regarding their 
experience with the complaints resolution process (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 84).  The 
majority of these officers felt “that there should be a mechanism to cull or refuse ‘frivolous or 
vexatious’ complaints” (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 86, 88).  Although many officers 
reported that they had been treated respectfully and with consideration during their investigative 
process, almost two-thirds (65%) believed that this process of resolving complaints took too long 
and “(m)ore than one third of officers perceived the process to be biased in favour of 
complainants” (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 84-85).  Moreover, “officers made frequent 
mention of the lack of communication during the process and delays caused undue stress” 
(Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 86).  Officers who were offered mediation generally 
accepted it (78%) and reported satisfaction with its outcome (83%).   
Finn (2001) conducted an assessment of nine American citizen oversight systems.  By examining 
the systems used in Berkley, Orange County and San Francisco, California; Flint, Michigan; 
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Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Rochester, New York; Tucson, Arizona, 
he was able to investigate civilian oversight systems that varied in terms of their configurations 
of citizen/police involvement in the review, investigation, oversight and disposition of 
complaints against police officers (Finn, 2001: vii-viii).  Finn found that while these systems 
differed, they attracted similar criticisms from police/sheriff’s department officers and union 
leaders.  According to his study, these groups commonly argued that (1) citizens should not 
interfere with police work; (2) citizens do not understand police work; and (3) the citizen 
oversight process is unfair (Finn, 2001: 109).  Finn (2001: 107-121) reported that there is 
considerable antipathy among police officers to citizen oversight, and he observed that police 
union leaders have traditionally encouraged this response.  However, he noted that not all 
officers within a given department or sheriff’s office may agree with their union’s stance.  
Moreover, he identified burgeoning support for citizen oversight bodies among some American 
police organizations.  For example, the National Black Police Association, which represents 
more than 30,000 African-American law enforcement officers, has voiced strong support for “the 
implementation and use of civilian review of police misconduct” (Finn, 2001: 118).  
Despite the common assumption that police officers are uniformly opposed to the civilian review 
of police misconduct (e.g., Brooks, 1973; Lenzi, 1974; Loveday, 1988; Wagner and Decker, 
1993), de Guzman’s (2004) review of the literature on this topic finds that police opposition is 
primarily based upon a distrust in the abilities of non-police members to carry out fair and 
competent investigations of police misconduct (e.g., Lohman & Misner, 1973; Ruchelman, 1973; 
Cantor, 1974; Kerstetter, 1985; Caiden & Hahn, 1979; Terrill, 1982; Walker & Bumphus, 1992; 
Snow, 1992).  In addition, he emphasizes that police attitudes toward civilian review are neither 
uniform nor static.  For example, he noted that some research has found that officers who are 
 70 
 
exposed to civilian review may develop positive attitudes over time, if they perceive the 
oversight system to be fair, objective and effective (e.g., Halpern, 1974; Perez, 1978 & 1994; 
Loveday, 1988).   
de Guzman’s (2004: 365) research incorporated a survey questionnaire that was administered to 
two groups of police officers from the Philippines: officers with direct personal experience with 
the “People’s Law Enforcement Board” (PLEB) (N= 206 officers) and those who lacked such 
experience (N= 635 officers).  In combining both surveys, de Guzman received a total response 
rate of 65%.  He reported that while officers expressed various perceptions about citizen review, 
those whose professional conduct had been assessed by the civilian review body held positive 
perceptions of the system.  He concluded that officers’ perceptions of the civilian board’s 
“qualities of integrity and legitimacy influence police officers to develop positive perceptions 
about the board.”  This finding is consistent with previous research (Halpern, 1974; Knoohuizen, 
1973; Kerstetter, 1985; Loveday, 1988; Perez, 1978, 1994) which has noted that officers who 
lack experience with civilian review boards are more likely to view the operation of these boards 
with suspicion and express negative opinions of their competency.  de Guzman (2001: 374) also 
determined that “police officers who are satisfied with specific measures tend to be satisfied 
overall” (e.g., “fairness”, “objectivity”, and/or “thoroughness” during investigations).   
In 2007, the city council of Seattle, Washington commissioned research to assess police officers’ 
attitudes toward the Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) and, more broadly, civilian 
oversight (Brody & Lovrich, 2007).  The researchers distributed a survey questionnaire to 
officers in coordination with a letter from the Police Chief to encourage participation, with 280 
officers out of 1,200 (23%) completing the survey.  Approximately half (46%) of these 
respondents reported that they had been the focus of an OPA-investigated citizen complaint and 
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more than half expressed dissatisfaction with the agency.  Although almost all (90%) believed 
that the process failed to weed out frivolous complaints, the “majority” of officers (percentage 
not specified by authors) who had experienced an OPA investigation “felt that they were treated 
with respect, that their rights were protected, that the investigation was thorough, and that the 
findings were fair and appropriate” (Brody and Lovrich, 2007: np).  At the same time, however, 
two-thirds reported that the investigation of the complaint(s) against them had not been carried 
out in a “timely manner” (2007: np).  Officers also complained of poor communication between 
themselves and the OPA during investigations and insufficient explanations from the OPA 
regarding the final disposition of investigations.  Almost 80% of all responding officers indicated 
they favoured a “system of internal investigations conducted by sworn personnel” (2007: np) and 
83% believed that internal investigations “in general are necessary to maintain the public trust” 
(2007: np).   
In 2005, researchers from the RAND Corporation conducted a technical report for the City of 
Cincinnati (Ridgeway et al., 2005) which attempted, in part, to survey citizens and police officers 
on their perceptions of the fairness of the complaint process and civilian oversight of the system.  
Police officers with experiential knowledge of the complaint systems were also queried on their 
perceptions of the fairness of the final disposition of the complaint that had been brought against 
them.  However, while the researchers employed multiple measures to encourage police 
participation in this study (e.g., multiple reminder postcards and phone calls), the response rate 
achieved (11%) was ruefully low.  This situation is not, unfortunately, anomalous; others have 
reported similar difficulties in conducting survey research on police officers (see also Taylor & 
Bennell, 2006; Maguire & Dyke, 2011; Duxbury & Higgins, 2012). 
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De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 651-652) characterized the growth of “police oversight 
organizations (e.g. citizen review boards, independent monitors, and most recently, police 
auditors)” as a defensive response to the “crisis in police legitimacy” which has been prompted 
by high-profile cases of police corruption and violence.  This study was undertaken during the 
implementation of a new civilian-led oversight system in Denver, Colorado.  They administered 
a 6-page survey with 80 items that included a mixture of open and closed questions.  The 
questionnaire adopted some of the questions that Kreisel had posed in her 1998 study, as well as 
others drawn from earlier research on the police.  The response rate in this study was 43%, with 
648 officers out of 1500 completing the survey; among those who participated, 373 (58%) 
reported personal experience with the complaint system.  The authors crafted different scales to 
evaluate officers’ perceptions of “quality of treatment”; “timeliness/communication”; “trust in 
internal affairs”; and “trust in citizen oversight.”  
Their investigation into police officers’ attitudes toward the police complaints system in Denver 
employed the “procedural justice perspective”; this perspective holds that:  
individuals’ satisfaction with confrontations involving institutions of formal social 
control (such as the police) are influenced more by their belief that the process of 
control is fair than by the outcome they receive...Thus, the process by which 
sanctions are imposed (procedural justice) might be as important as, or even more 
important than, the sanctions themselves (distributive justice) when it comes to 
shaping individuals’ perception of fairness (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 655). 
Although the researchers identify their study as the first attempt to apply this perspective to 
police officers’ attitudes toward complaint systems and/or civilian oversight, they acknowledge 
its repeated use by others who have examined the experience of civilians who have filed 
complaints against the police (e.g., Kerstetter, 1996; Walker, 1997; see also De Angelis, 2009).    
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De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 657) hypothesized that officers who perceived that the process 
was fair and that the “city and police command staff, the Internal Affairs Bureau, and the police 
oversight body” were legitimate would be satisfied with the complaint investigation process, 
regardless of the outcome of the complaint.  They further hypothesized that officers who avoided 
“negative evaluation as a result of citizen complaints” would also be satisfied overall with the 
citizen complaint process.  The latter hypothesis, it may be noted, assumed that officers would be 
more influenced by “distributive justice (getting the outcome they want) than by procedural 
justice (feeling the adjudicative process was fair) or by perceptions of legitimate authority” (De 
Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 657). 
De Angelis and Kupchik found that officers’ perceptions of fair treatment and trust in the 
legitimacy of command staff and internal affairs were positively associated with their overall 
satisfaction with the process.  However, they did not find that officers’ trust in citizen oversight 
had any significant or direct effect upon process satisfaction.  Furthermore, they found that 
distributive justice (the final outcome) did matter for officer satisfaction, but only by indirectly 
influencing trust in administration and perceptions of fairness and equitable treatment.  They 
determined that the best predictors of satisfaction with the process were timeliness and 
communication within the complaint process and emphasize the import of its perception as 
“timely, fair and thorough” (2007: 668).   
A second article by these investigators (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009) draws upon the same data 
set and considers how “race” and ethnicity impacts police officers’ perceptions of procedural 
justice in complaint investigations.  Their survey used both open and closed questions to assess 
officer morale, willingness to comply with commands and trust in command staff and internal 
affairs.  De Angelis and Kupchik reported weak and indirect evidence that ethnicity affects 
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compliance among police officers; Latino/a officers were found to be both less trusting of 
internal affairs than Caucasian officers and less likely to comply with decisions by command 
staff.  However, they found that officer morale, perceptions of procedural justice and rank were 
more powerful predictors of officers’ willingness to comply with command decisions than their 
“race” or ethnicity.   
Wells and Schafer (2007) assessed police officers’ attitudes toward citizen oversight in 
Carbondale, Illinois.  They administered a pen and paper survey to 90 officers, and attained a 
response rate of 84%.  This study found that officers were generally unsupportive of mechanisms 
of citizen oversight and did not view them as a viable means for preventing police misconduct.  
Consistent with Finn’s (2001) findings noted earlier, this study reports that officers held negative 
news of civilian oversight systems and charged that these systems had: “a bias against police 
personnel”; lacked the expertise necessary to evaluate officer conduct; had an adverse effect on 
officer conduct; and did not represent a meaningful improvement upon internal systems of 
processing citizen complaint against the police (Wells & Schafer, 2007: 18).  Wells and Schafer 
(2007: 17) additionally reported that “officers are particularly opposed to aspects of citizen 
oversight that grant citizens the right to ‘second guess’ the actions taken by officers.”  However, 
they conceded that the results of their study may be atypical and lack generalizability.  They 
acknowledged that they did not analyze how variables such as respondents’ rank, education, duty 
assignment, or years of service may have impacted their attitudes and failed to gather data on 
these variables.  
In their 2011 study of professionalism, ethics and management practices in policing, Maguire 
and Dyke (2011: 8) surveyed police officers from 31 Canadian Police services; out of 43,660 
potential respondents, they received 10,264 completed surveys (a 24% response rate).  Their 
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survey included a number questions pertaining to police officers’ perceptions of the impact and 
performance of Professional Standards branches.  About one-third of officers (36%) reported that 
they “had attended an information session on professional standards but those who did had 
significantly more positive evaluations of the performance of professional standards” (Maguire 
& Dyke, 2011: 10).  Thus, the authors found that “(o)nly 21% of those not attending an 
information meeting had positive views of the performance of professional standards while 
nearly twice as many (41%) of those who attended an information session had positive views 
(Maguire & Dyke, 2011: 10).  The authors concluded that attitudes toward “organizational 
programs” (e.g., Professional Standards Bureaus) can be improved through educational 
initiatives (Maguire & Dyke, 2011: 10).   
The Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI), an “independent” civilian-led 
system that has existed since 1998 to investigate complaints against the police in Northern 
Ireland (PONI, 2015), conducted an online survey in 2014-2015 to assess attitudes among 
officers who were subject of complaint investigations during this period.  “A total of 1,313 
officers were emailed the questionnaire and 507 questionnaires were returned. This represents a 
response rate of 39%” (PONI, 2015: 4).  In total, almost half (48%) of respondents expressed 
satisfaction with “how the Office handled their complaint. A further 27% of officers were 
dissatisfied and 25% of officers were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” (PONI, 2015: 7).  The 
overwhelming majority of respondents reported that they had been treated respectfully (91%) 
and fairly (81%) by the Ombudsman staff and found staff members to be knowledgeable (76%) 
and easy to understand (92%) (PONI, 2015: 7).  However, less than a third (30%) were satisfied 
with the updates they had received about the progress of the investigation and the “overall time 
taken to resolve the complaint” (31%) (2015: 7).  
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3.2  Summary of Previous Research Findings: Police officers’ attitudes toward civilian 
oversight 
Previous research has found that police officers commonly express reservations about civilian 
oversight agencies and express a preference for internal review mechanisms.  Thus, 
 Police officers have voiced concerns about the legitimacy of civilians evaluating their 
professional conduct and often assert that civilians lack the knowledge, skills and 
experience necessary to perform this task (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 
107-108; 154; 237; 247; Finn, 2001: 109; Wells & Schafer, 2007: 18). 
 
 Police officers also accuse civilian review boards of bias, perceiving these mechanisms as 
favouring complainants and disfavouring police (e.g., Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989: 42-43; 
Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 84-85; Wells & Schafer, 
2007:18). 
 
 Police officers often express a preference for (1) allegations of misconduct and complaints 
against the police to be investigated by internal affairs (i.e., police officers) investigators 
rather than civilian investigators (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 154; 
Kreisel, 1998: 210; Weisburd et al., 2000: 7; Brody & Lovrich, 2007; De Angelis & 
Kupchik, 2007: 665); and (2) “civilian review” rather than “civilian investigation”, with 
greater acceptance of civilians being involved in a “review capacity” of 
complaints/misconduct rather than in an investigative capacity (e.g., Perez, 1994: 247-248; 
Walker & Herbst, 1999: 5; Weisburd et al., 2000: 9; Brody & Lovrich, 2007).   
 
 “Procedural Justice” - Police officers have expressed dissatisfaction with specific aspects 
of the investigative process conducted by civilians.  For example, they have complained 
about the length of the investigative process and/or the lack of communication provided by 
civilian investigators (e.g., Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989: 52; Calgary Police Commission, 
1999: 84-86; Brody and Lovrich, 2007; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 668; PONI, 2015: 
7).  However, police officers tend to be more accepting of civilian oversight when they 
possess personal experientially-based knowledge of these mechanisms (e.g., Kreisel, 1998: 
215-216; de Guzman, 2004: 373-374).  Furthermore, previous research has found that 
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through personal experience and education, officers may learn to accept and trust citizen 
oversight as a viable and legitimate means of processing allegations of police misconduct 
(Perez, 1994; Kreisel, 1998; de Guzman, 2004).  This finding contradicts the stereotype of 
police culture as insular and hotly resistant to scrutiny by “outsiders.” 
 
 
3.3  Summary of Previous Methods 
To date, few have investigated the attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight.  This 
scant body of literature is based overwhelmingly on the responses of American officers to survey 
questionnaires which have employed both open- and closed-questions.  The majority of these 
survey questionnaires were administered directly to police officers at their place of work (via 
pencil and paper format) with departmental support (e.g., approval and encouragement from the 
chief of police).  These studies have varied in their use of advanced statistical analyses.   
Several researchers have reported response rates lower than 30% (e.g., Walker & Herbst, 1999; 
Ridgeway et al., 2005; Bobb et al., 2006; Maguire & Dyke, 2011).   Furthermore, population 
samples were often drastically reduced when researchers focused upon police officers with direct 
experience of their police department’s complaint system.  These reports suggest the potential 
utility of employing surveys in combination with other research methods rather than as the sole 
method of data acquisition.  
3.3.1 Timing of Research 
The attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight systems are not static; rather, they may 
be impacted by factors such as the status of a given system’s implementation: its origin; the 
history of its operation and its reputation for the treatment of police officers.  As Finn (2001: 4) 
noted, “(m)ost oversight procedures have come into existence after a high-profile case of alleged 
police misconduct (usually a shooting or other physical force incident), often involving white 
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officers and minority suspects.”  Systems that are assembled hastily in response to a high-profile 
incident of police misconduct may exacerbate rather than ameliorate tensions between citizens, 
administrators and police (Finn, 2001: 108).   
 
Wells and Schafer (2007) observed that the introduction of new oversight systems can occasion 
skepticism and unease and caution that evaluations of officers’ attitudes toward civilian oversight 
mechanisms that are conducted during a period of transition between an internal oversight 
system and an external oversight system may reflect these fears and feelings of trepidation.  As 
Dailey, Reid, Anderson & Giles (2006: 23) have suggested, “the police must be given time to 
adapt to the new systems…Skepticism is normal for any changes in procedures.  With more 
experience, it is hoped that law enforcement agencies will become more trusting of this type of 
system.”  Given that the OIPRD has been in existence since 2009 and that the SIU, police 
services boards and professional standards bureaus in Ontario have all been in existence for 
decades, one may anticipate that Ontario police officers will express attitudes toward civilian 
oversight systems that are more favourable than those expressed by other officers whose 
attitudes toward civilian review systems were probed shortly after implementation.   
 
3.3.2 The role of police unions & police leaders in opposing/supporting civilian oversight 
In previous decades, many police unions and police leaders (e.g., chiefs of police) in Canada and 
the United States opposed the introduction of civilian oversight mechanisms.  More recently, 
however, both police unions and police leaders have voiced support of civilian oversight 
mechanisms that are perceived to be unbiased and accountable. 
 
According to West (1991: 382) police unions have long maintained that “police officers possess 
unique skills, training, and experience” and warned that their professional status is threatened by 
 79 
 
civilian investigation of their conduct.  In like spirit, Lewis (1991: 171) characterized civilian 
involvement as “threatening” to “police values” as well as “management control of the force” 
and emphasized that because of these perceived threats, police would require “considerable time, 
education, and even consideration, in adapting to civilian review.”  Miller and Merrick (2002: 
11) maintain that the “failures and underperformance” of civilian oversight agencies is 
attributable, in large measure, to the negative response of police departments, police officers and 
police unions and emphasize that “a lack of cooperation with a civilian oversight agency by 
police leaders can undermine its effectiveness and challenge its legitimacy.”  More recently, 
Wells and Schafer (2007: 5) highlighted four objections commonly raised by unions and police 
leaders to civilian oversight: “1) citizen oversight is not needed; 2) citizen involvement in this 
intimate police matter contradicts police professionalism; 3) citizens are not qualified for 
oversight responsibilities; and 4) citizen oversight uniquely compromises police work.”   
 
According to Martin (2007: 260), “(p)olice officers believe they are an over-regulated 
occupation relative to others and thus, by inference, are justified in resisting efforts to strengthen 
or improve regulation and governance.”  Nevertheless, recent research suggests that unions have 
increasingly accepted the implementation of external oversight mechanisms, especially after 
“large-scale discrediting of police integrity” (Prenzler, 2009: 161).  For example, Prenzler (2009: 
187) observed that there are “a number of cases” “where union leaders have strongly supported 
reform measures, including enlarged external oversight” and reported that “[t]his support has 
been couched in terms of the reputations and welfare of the department and members and, above 
all, in terms of protecting honest police from dishonest colleagues.”  An example of such support 
is found in Ontario, where the Police Association of Ontario published a 2007 position paper on 
the legislation that would lead to the 2009 enactment of the OIPRD (i.e., Bill 103, Independent 
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Police Review Act) (PAO, 2007).  The PAO, an agency that collectively represents the majority 
of police associations across the province, declared that they were “on record as supporting 
civilian oversight of policing” (PAO, 2007: 2) and described their support for the implementation 
of the OIPRD in Ontario.  Their position paper additionally advanced constructive suggestions 
for improvements to portions of the legislation and addressed issues such as “third party 
complaints”, “independent adjudication” (by the respective chief of police where the misconduct 
is alleged), and the informal resolution of complaints (PAO, 2007:1-23). 
 
Previous research has noted that resistance to civilian oversight may also exist at the highest 
level of the police leadership hierarchy.  As West (1991: 383) observed in summarizing this 
literature:   
Police senior administrators, through the vehicle of the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police (IACP), have long argued that one of the major features of the 
professional status which they desire for their organizations is the autonomy of 
chief officers in disciplinary matters.  Consequently, they have sought the types of 
purely internal control mechanisms already exercised by the medical and legal 
professions.   
Senior police officials are often involved in the adjudication of police misconduct hearings and 
frequently possess direct knowledge and involvement in the investigations of alleged misconduct 
within their respective departments.  Therefore, they play a central role in creating and sustaining 
a localized attitude and approach to the handling of complaints and the regulation of police 
misconduct.   
Kerstetter (1985: 177) highlighted the dual concerns of police chiefs in addressing issues of 
misconduct in their departments.  Thus, he emphasized that while a chief’s primary need is for “a 
review mechanism that does not undermine his [sic] capacity to run the department,” police 
chiefs additionally have a need “to maintain personal and organizational credibility with the 
 81 
 
community at large and its influential parts, such as political and governmental elites.”  To 
accomplish these twinned tasks, Kerstetter (1985: 177) asserted that police chiefs must 
know and be able to convince these others that his [sic] officers are not abusing 
their powers.  Counterbalancing this need is a concern that the officers not be 
unduly hampered in their enforcement activities or demoralized by a review 
system that unfairly second-guesses them or abuses their rights and self-respect. 
 
However, if police chiefs must address the concerns of both internal and external stakeholders in 
a difficult balancing act, this task would seem an ever-present demand of their professional role 
in western democratic countries.  In North America, for example, high profile scandals, along 
with public inquiries and commissions which have addressed a wide variety of police 
misconduct have propelled the implementation of more stringent accountability and oversight 
mechanisms (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 651-652).  Beare (2007: 356) observed that police 
executives in many North American jurisdictions have been obliged to accept the 
implementation of accountability mechanisms as a condition of their financial and political 
relationship with government.   
Reiner (1991) conducted interviews with chief constables in England and Wales and determined 
that there was mixed support for civilian oversight mechanisms.  Reiner (1991: 215) found that 
52% rejected the idea of a fully independent system; 30% were supportive; 18% felt there were 
strong arguments for both systems.  Although the chief constables believed that internal police 
investigators were best positioned to infiltrate police culture during investigations, they 
recognized that “an independent system was essential to ensure public confidence and remove 
perceptions of bias” (Prenzler, 2004: 97).  These findings are consistent with Bayley’s (1991: vii, 
viii) observation that senior police officials may embrace forms of civilian oversight in pursuit of  
“community policing” and/or “consumer satisfaction” and as part of their “strategic vision” of 
creating an aura of accountability and “professionalism.” 
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Landau (2000: 63-64) reported that many senior police officials, including those in Ontario, 
Canada, now publically support civilian oversight as “an essential mechanism of accountability.”  
For instance, the 2013-2014 OACP president, Chief Paul Cook (North Bay Police Service), 
issued the following statement: “As police leaders, we strongly support having civilian oversight 
bodies hold us accountable. We have a duty to hold our officers accountable for their actions" 
(OACP, 2014).  However, while a 2015 report commissioned by the CACP (Canadian 
Association of Chiefs of Police) stated that “(c)ivilian police governance bodies are increasingly 
recognized as an important form of police oversight, and are being established in many 
municipalities” it cautioned that the “additional reporting requirements upon police 
agencies…[are] increasing overall policing costs” (Ahlgren, 2015: 27).  Thus, while the CACP 
recognizes the merits of sound civilian oversight mechanisms, it also urges recognition of their 
associated costs.   
Although police unions and police chiefs have voiced concern that civilian oversight 
mechanisms may compromise the “professional” status of police officers and diminish the role 
of police in regulating their professional conduct through internal systems, civilian oversight 
agencies have become more entrenched in countries such as Canada, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.  At present, both police unions and police leaders 
commonly express support for civilian oversight mechanisms in their public pronouncement but 
with the important caveat that these agencies must be objective, fair-minded and transparent in 
their mandates and practices.    
3.4  Summary of Socio-demographic analyses in previous literature 
Many of the studies cited in the literature review have incorporated some form of socio-
demographic analysis (e.g., Perez, 1994; Kreisel, 1998; Walker & Herbst, 1999; Weisburd et al., 
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2000; de Guzman, 2004; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007, 2009).  The most commonly assessed 
variables are: age, sex, “race”/ethnicity, education, rank, and policing experience.  A summary of 
their findings is provided below.   
Sex – To date, no study has found sex to be a reliable indicator of positive or negative attitudes 
toward internal or external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Kreisel, 1998: 211; Weisburd et al., 
2000: 10; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 659).  However, several recommended that future 
studies pursue possible attitudinal differences among male and female police officers in relation 
to internal/external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Perez, 1994: 203; Walker & Herbst, 1999: 6; 
Weisburd et al., 2000:10).   
Age and educational level – To date, no study has identified officer age or educational level as a 
reliable predictor of attitudes toward internal or external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Perez, 
1994: 202; Kreisel, 1998: 207-219; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 669).  Nevertheless, in that 
these variables may be associated with police officers’ rank and amount of policing experience, 
it would seem important to consider these variables.   
Rank and Policing experience – Research on the relationship between police officers’ rank 
and/or amount of policing experience and attitudes toward internal/external oversight 
mechanisms yields mixed results.  De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 663) determined that those 
who held the rank of “patrol officer” (i.e., constable) had less trust in internal affairs 
investigations than higher ranking officers.  They also found that “job tenure” was not a 
statistically significant variable in relation to attitudes toward oversight mechanisms (2007: 669).  
However, Kreisel (1998: 212-213) found evidence that more seasoned police officers were more 
accepting of external accountability mechanisms than those with lesser years of experience.  
 84 
 
In addition, there is evidence that a police officer’s rank may affect the likelihood that they will 
be the subject of a complaint.  Thus, de Guzman (2004: 368-369) found that “lower-ranking 
officers seemed more prone to receive complaints than higher-ranking ones” and Perez (1994: 
203) determined that police “officers generate the greatest majority of their complaints in their 
first years on the job.”  Research which examined the complaint-related data of a large 
northeastern American police department over 15-year period (1987-2001) (Harris, 2006, 2009) 
found that while almost 80% of officers were the subject of at least one complaint of alleged 
misconduct, the majority received their first complaint within the first three years of their career.   
Race/Ethnicity - Several researchers have reported a statistically significant relationship between 
officer “race”/ethnicity and attitudes toward internal/external systems of police oversight.  For 
instance, Weisburd et al. (2009: 9) found that African-American police officers as well as 
officers from other racialized minority groups were more supportive of civilian review boards 
than their white counterparts.  Perez (1994: 204) reported that in Oakland and Berkley, 
California, African-American officers expressed more support than their Caucasian counterparts 
for “civilianizing review mechanisms” and for combined civilian-police hearing boards.  De 
Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 663; see also 2009) found that Latino/a police officers reported 
“higher levels of trust in citizen oversight than officers of other races/ethnicities” and that “being 
Latino/a also significantly decreases officers’ satisfaction with how they feel they were treated” 
by internal affairs investigators.   
Knowledge and Experience with Civilian oversight – There is some evidence that police officers’ 
experience with a civilian-led oversight system or enhanced knowledge/understanding of their 
operations may improve their attitudes and perceptions toward these systems.  Both Kreisel 
(1998: 219) and de Guzman (2004: 374) found that police officers who identified themselves as 
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well-informed about civilian review mechanisms were more accepting of these agencies than 
others.   
3.5  Practical Importance and Theoretical Framework  
My research takes heed of the strengths and weaknesses of the body of literature reviewed and 
attempts to enhance it in a meaningful way.  Within my study, three separate but intertwined 
theoretical concepts are accorded focal attention: legitimacy, procedural justice and 
professionalism. 
3.5.1 Perceived Legitimacy of Civilian Oversight 
Police officers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of civilian oversight is central to the core 
functioning and efficacy of civilian oversight of policing.  As Wells and Schafer (2007: 3) noted 
succinctly, “(c)itizen oversight must have legitimacy in the eyes of police officers or it will fail” 
(emphasis added; see also de Guzman, 2004; Perez, 1994).  Although police officers who 
intentionally obstruct any internal/external investigation confront potentially severe penalties, 
they may refrain from cooperating fully with these investigations if they perceive the goals, 
mechanisms and/or administration of the oversight system to be illegitimate.  As Perez (1994: 
15) emphasized:  
Any formalized process can be subverted, cheated, and abused by the population 
policed.  In the case of policing the police, the subjects of the regulatory 
mechanism who might be moved to subvert it are themselves expert in the 
application of such systems.  Presumably their subversion efforts will be quite 
effective.  Thus such formal regulatory mechanisms are of limited utility when 
applied to expert regulators. 
A later section of this chapter (section 3.6.3 Anticipated attitudes toward the SIU) notes 
allegations which charge that police officers and entire police services across Ontario have 
willfully failed to comply with what is required of them during SIU investigations (Ontario, 
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2011: 2-3; Benzie, 2011; Blizzard, 2011).  My research seeks, in part, to identify whether police 
officers object to specific features of civilian oversight systems or wholly reject the notion that 
civilian oversight, or any form of bureaucratic oversight, can be effective in managing police 
misconduct (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 656).  This endeavour is consistent with de Guzman’s 
(2004: 359) exhortations for research that moves beyond simply “trusting-not trusting or like-
dislike” dichotomies.  Moreover, observing that “(t)he degree to which police officers support or 
oppose specific aspects of citizen oversight remains largely unknown,” (Wells & Schafer, 2007: 
7), I sought to provide a nuanced evaluation of officers’ opinions on the legitimacy of multiple 
civilian oversight models that currently exist in Ontario. 
In Chapter 1, I noted that “legitimacy” has been defined as “the right to rule” or “the recognition 
of the right to govern” (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 124-125; see also Evetts, 2013: 783).  The 
ongoing utility of Weber’s writings on legitimacy are acknowledged by Tyler and Fagan (2008: 
239) who argue that in contemporary times, authorities continue to derive benefits  
when they are able to obtain cooperation from the people with whom they deal 
beyond the cooperation which they can obtain via their control of the power to 
shape behavior through the use of sanctions and incentives. It is desirable to also 
be able to secure cooperation through the manner in which they exercise their 
authority. In other words, they want to be able to call upon deference to authority 
that is ‘legitimized’ in noninstrumental ways, such as via the procedures by which 
it is exercised. 
These insights are helpful in understanding the attitudes of police officers toward civilian 
oversight in Ontario.  Thus, civilian oversight agents/agencies are subject to evaluation by police 
officers on two fronts: who they are (i.e., perceived capabilities, in comparison to internal police 
investigators) and how they function (i.e., procedural justice).  The following sections discuss the 




3.5.1.1  Perceived Capabilities of Civilian Investigators and Preference for Internal Affairs  
Although previous research has noted the preference of police officers for internal, rather than 
external, investigations of complaints and alleged misconduct, I thought this finding demanded 
fuller exploration.  While this expressed preference could be construed as evidence of an insular 
and fiercely territorial police culture, it is equally tenable that police officers view themselves as 
“professionals” and believe that they possess the qualifications, capabilities, competence and 
integrity to regulate their own professional conduct.  As such, this study probed police officers’ 
opinions about internal investigators (Professional Standards Bureau) and sought to develop 
comprehensive understanding of the attitudes that police officers hold in relation to the issues of 
oversight and accountability of police behaviour.   
Perez (1994: 88-89) has observed that, “(a)lthough most cops do not like internal affairs, 
nevertheless, they defend its operations as necessary.  They argue that civilian review is unfair 
because it is operated by individuals unfamiliar with police work.”  According to Dailey et al. 
(2006: 15), police officers often take umbrage with the scrutiny of their conduct by those who 
may lack experientially-based knowledge of the demands of the profession.  Similarly, Maguire 
and Corbett (1991) have stressed that:  
Police deal with people when they are at their worst…and most citizens are 
unaware of the procedures police are trained in to address such situations. 
Consequently, police officers consider themselves professionals with a certain 
expertise and believe it is inappropriate for external parties (i.e., outgroups) to 
judge their decisions. 
Previous research has revealed that police officers frequently maintain that internal police 
investigators bring an “insider perspective” to their work that is crucial to understanding and 
evaluating police conduct.  For example, Thomassen (2002: 202) reported that internal police 
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investigators are credited by police officers with the possession of “necessary cultural 
knowledge” and they are accorded “legitimacy within the police force.”   
In like fashion, Perez (1994: 105) found that police officers often perceive internal police 
investigators to be uniquely well-equipped to conduct thorough and effective investigations.  
Thus, they commonly viewed these officers as  
particularly knowledgeable about police subcultural norms, the nuances of how 
departmental regulations are applied over time, individual beat problems, 
citywide geography and demographics, crime patterns, supervisorial techniques, 
and the executive management styles of their particular police organization and 
municipalities...Such information can be of great significance in understanding 
situations as they are presented in the form of complaints.  It can also facilitate 
obtaining information from police officers who are reluctant to cooperate with the 
investigative process.  
In contrast, police officers perceived civilian investigators to be naïve, ill-informed about the 
realities of policing, vulnerable to being “snowed” or “conned” by those under investigation, and 
less “capable of cutting to the core” of issues that could involve complex police procedures 
(Kerstetter, 1985: 149-182; Perez, 1994: 108).   
The importance of evaluating police officers’ attitudes regarding internal police investigators is 
underscored by the architecture of current policing practices in Ontario, which intertwines 
systems with civilian oversight investigations.  As previously noted, the vast majority of all cases 
reviewed and managed by the OIPRD (89.4% of cases between 2013-2014)  are “referred” 
(back) to the police service in which the complaint originated and are formally investigated by 
that service’s “Internal Affairs” or “Professional Standards Bureau” (OIPRD, 2014: 21).  
Furthermore, when police officers are investigated by civilians for alleged criminal wrongdoing, 
internal police investigators are tasked with conducting “parallel investigations” on behalf of the 
police service in question.  Indeed, Section 11 of the Police Services Act (1990; Ontario Reg. 
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267/10) requires police services in Ontario to conduct an internal investigation whenever an 
investigation by the SIU has not resulted in the laying of criminal charges.  These “parallel 
investigations” are intended to enhance investigative/administrative scrutiny of alleged 
wrongdoing by police.   Thus, internal police investigators warrant attention in this study since 
their labours complement the activities of their civilian counterparts.    
3.5.2 Procedural Justice  
Dailey et al. (2006: 15; see also Strudwick, 2003) observed that police officers’ concern for 
procedural justice echoes those of civilians: both object to “delays in being notified about 
receiving a complaint, inadequate updates about the progress of the investigation, and a lack of 
information regarding the outcome of the case.  In sum, officers too felt excluded and alienated 
from the process.”  Yet, there is a dearth of research on the quality (actual and perceived) of 
investigations conducted by civilians and how these perceptions impact relationships between 
police officers and civilian agents/agencies (Murphy & McKenna: 2008). 
Geller and Toch (1996: 320) emphasized that tending to issues of procedural justice in police 
complaints systems may yield many potential benefits: 
The potential inherent in procedural justice approaches is to significantly increase 
citizen satisfaction and officer satisfaction with the police complaint review 
systems (which neither audience generally holds in very high regard), regardless 
of which party prevails in the adjudicative process.  The ripple effect of trust and 
satisfaction or distrust and hostility spreading from citizen and officer disputants 
throughout communities and the department deserves attention from police 
administrators and local government officials.  A procedural justice variation on 
current approaches may help, even if indirectly, to increase citizen trust and the 
willingness to collaborate with police against neighborhood crime problems.   
Thus, there are larger issues at stake when considering issues of procedural justice than simple 
gripes and groans about inept or inefficient bureaucratic processes.   The real and perceived 
treatment of citizens and police officers during misconduct investigations can have profound 
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“ripple effects” well beyond the initial source of conflict and can have lasting effects on 
relationships between the police and the communities they serve.   
De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 668) have argued that identifying grievances about process-
issues is beneficial for both citizens and police officers since elements of the 
complaint/investigative/adjudicative process can potentially be improved.  Towards this end, this 
study offers practical recommendations to improve real and perceived problems and 
inefficiencies in extant accountability mechanisms. 
3.5.3 Literature regarding police professionalism and professionalization 
Although “the developing nature of police professionalism continues to be a source of major 
debate among both police practitioners and academics” (Fyfe, 2013: 408), my study will not 
participate in the debate on whether policing is best categorized as an occupation or a profession 
(Evetts, 2003: 134).  Rather, I will limit myself to pointing out some of the more interesting 
points that these debates have raised.   
In examining various models of police reform and police professionalism in the United States 
throughout the last century (e.g., predictive policing, intelligence led policing, community 
policing, new police professionalism), Sklansky (2011: 13) noted that: “[t]he rhetoric of police 
professionalism raises questions” such as: What does it mean to be a ‘professional’? In what 
ways would it make sense for police officers to be like doctors, lawyers, engineers?”  According 
to Carlan and Lewis (2009: 43-44), “most academic queries question whether police officers 
truly understand (or desire) the responsibilities associated with becoming a bona fide 
profession.”  In addition, they reported that “(m)ost academic queries regarding police 
professional status are inconclusive, but some studies do conclude that policing does not align 
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with common professional standards” or traditional definitions of professionals and professions 
(Carlan & Lewis, 2009: 43).   
While Evetts (2003: 397) declared that “policing clearly fits those definitions which emphasize 
that professions are the ‘structural, occupational and institutional arrangements for dealing with 
work associated with uncertainties of modern lives in risk societies,’” Fyfe (2013: 408) 
countered this claim and noted that when “measured against definitions of professions which 
emphasize the importance of a period spent in higher or further education, policing…does not fit 
the model nor does it have, like many professions, an established code of ethics.”  As Neyroud 
(2008: 674) observed, “the desire of the police service to be an independent profession working 
to high ethical standards deploying a recognized body of professional knowledge is an aspiration 
that remains to be achieved” since policing does not possess a universal “code of police ethics, 
there is not a well-established culture of life-long learning and reaccreditation, and policing is 
not currently a graduate profession.”  Stone and Travis (2011: 17) exhort investments in 
educational and training standards among police officers in North America, maintaining that: 
“[t]he pace of innovation and knowledge development today is simply too fast for police 
organizations to rely on recruit training and occasional specialized courses” and insisting that 
“police departments need to become learning organizations of professionals” (emphasis added).   
However, if these scholars suggest that this need is a recent development, their comments are 
markedly consistent with comments voiced by Carl Klockars (1985: 114) decades earlier:  
If police are to be true professionals…it must begin with a long period of 
education in an accredited, academic professional school at the college or 
postgraduate level, include or continue through a period of supervised internship 
and conclude with the granting of a licence without which one cannot practice 
that profession.  No true profession – neither medicine nor law, engineering, 




Stone and Travis (2011: 17) additionally point to the absence of national standards among 
policing organizations in the United States in relation to, for example, a code of ethics; 
educational requirements and accreditation and insist that “[a]chieving national coherence in this 
radically decentralized business” would help to achieve greater “accountability for crime, cost, 
and conduct; public legitimacy across social divisions and continuous innovation and learning at 
every rank would mark a watershed in policing.”  They argue that the same goal is equally 
worthy of pursuit in Canada.  However, achieving this “coherence” may be difficult in Canada, 
which has a “mixed model” of policing organizations spread across a patchwork of national, 
provincial/territorial, regional, municipal and Aboriginal jurisdictions (Stone & Travis, 2011: 
18).  As earlier noted in Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario Canada, there are ongoing 
initiatives to better coordinate approaches to policing in Canada (e.g., efficiencies within 
policing services; new models of community safety) through the Future of Policing Advisory 
Committee (FPAC) (e.g., Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) and 
the Economics of Policing summits (e.g., Public Safety Canada).10 
Cawthray et al., (2013: 187) explored efforts by the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP) and the United Nations (U.N.) to create global/universal codes of police conduct.  The 
authors found that governments in many countries around the world have introduced a range of 
measures in recent decades that seek to bolster police accountability, such as independent 
                                                          
10 See http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/ndx/snpss-eng.aspx?n=3   
 
Efficiencies within police services: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/ndx/srchrslts-
eng.aspx?gb=p&p=1 
 








civilian oversight and ethics training.  However, they also observe that “[c]odes of conduct for 
law enforcement arose as part of a professionalization trend within policing in the twentieth 
century, and they have come to play an important role in making clear what standard of behavior 
is expected of law enforcement personnel” (Cawthray et al., 2013: 189).  Thus, they emphasize 
that while codes of conduct are “associated with desires for greater accountability through the 
establishment of rule-based behavior norms that echo democratic ideals,” “[s]elf-regulating 
behavior through establishing codes of conduct is an integral part of the professionalization 
process for any profession, including the police.”   
 
Carlan and Lewis (2009) examined police professionalism by utilizing Hall’s 1968 
professionalism scale11; this scale includes the following dimensions: organizational referent, 
belief in public service, belief in self-regulation, a sense of calling and belief in autonomy.  Their 
mail survey to 16 police departments in the United States received a total of 1114 responses 
(57% response rate) and found that the majority of police officers viewed themselves as 
professionals deserving of autonomy (i.e., the ability “to make decisions without interference 
from outsiders (outsiders and even employing organizations)” and self-regulation (Carlan & 
Lewis, 2009: 41-42).   
 
According to Stone & Travis (2011:1), police leaders in the United States are increasingly 
committing themselves to a form of “new professionalism”, which is grounded in four key 
principles: accountability, legitimacy, innovation and national coherence.  They observe that 
police leaders are now accountable to multiple internal and external stakeholders, including 
“civilian review boards, city councils and county commissioners, state legislatures, inspectors 
                                                          
11 Hall’s professionalism scale was applied to police officers and police chiefs in previous studies with mixed results 
(see Regoli et al., 1987, 1989; Crank, 1990; Crank et al., 1993). 
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general, government auditors and courts” (Stone and Travis, 2011: 2) as well as citizens, 
journalists, resident associations, chambers of commerce and various community-based 
organizations.  “[T]he legitimacy of policing under the new professionalism,” they conclude, 
recognizes that “legitimacy is both conferred by law and democratic politics and earned by 
adhering to professional standards and winning the trust and confidence of the people policed” 
(Stone & Travis, 2011: 14). 
 
Several scholars observe that the professional autonomy and independence of the police has been 
challenged in Western nations.  For example, Smith (2009: 423) observed that the 
“internationally recognized principle that law enforcement officers should be accountable to the 
law” also functions as “protection against external interference in their affairs,” in countries such 
as England and Wales.  Smith (2009: 423) noted “the convention of constabulary independence” 
additionally “consolidates police autonomy and sustains police opposition to the introduction of 
accountability and regulatory reforms.”  However, the “trend to external review” in Western 
nations has weakened the mechanisms that traditionally buffered the police and provided them 
with “protection against external interference” (Goldsmith, 1991; see also Prenzler, 2004; Porter 
& Prenzler, 2012). 
Moreover, if the “appeal to professionalism is a strong current in the development of police 
organizations and is typically based on claims to exclusive ownership of an area of expertise and 
knowledge” (Fyfe, 2013: 408), changes in police policy may be perceived as status-eroding.  In 
illustration, Rowe (2007) reports that many police officers in the United Kingdom viewed the 
implementation of a “positive arrest policy” for domestic violence incidents as a measure that not 
only limited their use of discretion in applying the law but one that also “served to undermine 
their professionalism” (Rowe, 2007: 293).   
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Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf’s (2013: 225) analysis of Dutch police leaders as a professional 
group also finds that these high-ranking officers perceive that their occupational autonomy is now 
increasingly delimited.  Thus, if “[t]he main question that appears to drive the quest for 
professional control is ‘who controls the police?’” the officers in their study perceived that “police 
organizations are regulated by outside stakeholders, and this can be used to literally seize 
occupational control” (Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf, 2013: 225).   
 
The above discussion illustrates that occupational autonomy, legitimacy, discretion, expertise, 
internal/external regulation and accountability mechanisms are central issues pertaining to the 
professional status and professionalization of contemporary police officers and police leaders.  
The next section highlights the context in which challenges and changes to the professional 
status of police are rooted.   
3.5.3.1  Police Professionalism in the context of New Public Management (NPM) 
Several scholars have argued that in many Western nations, efforts to bolster the legitimacy and 
accountability of the police are related to “New Public Management” (NPM) initiatives.  
According to Den Hayer (2011: 419)  
The new public management (NPM) philosophy has been described as a move 
towards a governance approach that places emphasis on transparency, 
performance management and accountability of public sector employees and 
managers….Modern NPM was introduced to a number of western nations during 
the 1980s and formed the basis of police reform initiatives that were introduced in 
the 1990s. These early reforms and the increasing influence of globalisation since 
the 1980s have had a compounding effect on the management of the public sector 
and in particular the police.   
Key features of NPM include “implementing accountability, external controls and a performance 
management system” (Den Hayer, 2011: 428).  According to Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf 
(2013: 224), police forces are increasingly disciplined by management techniques, quality 
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models and accountability systems, coming from the New Public Management.”  Citizen-led 
oversight mechanisms, such as those examined in this study, stand as clear examples of such 
accountability structures.   
Fyfe (2013: 411) notes that while police accountability structures were “largely understood in 
terms of responsibility for the professional misconduct by individual officers” “the notion of 
police accountability now has a much broader organizational resonance.”  In detailing how NPM 
reforms have fueled changes to the way policing is organized and managed, Fyfe (2013: 411) 
observed that NPM’s redefinition of “professionalism” “around a managerial culture…has been 
facilitated in policing by the requirement for police performance frameworks monitoring a range 
of indicators, from response times to detection rates, as a way of distinguishing strong from 
poorly performing police forces and holding them to account.”  For example, in the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Canada, increased accountability mechanisms have broadened 
to include the implementation of performance management measures; these measures seek to 
ensure the efficient and economical delivery of services and include citizen-led programs that are 
thought to bolster relations between police agencies and the communities they serve (Fyfe, 2013: 
411; see also Evetts, 2011: 415).  The “commitment to community policing initiatives on both 
sides of the Atlantic also includes a strong emphasis on ensuring that police can be called to 
account by local citizens” (Fyfe, 2013: 411). 
 
Understanding the impact of NPM related initiatives provides some important context in 
assessing police officers’ attitudes toward civilian-led oversight, since such initiatives 
challenge the autonomy and control of police officers of all ranks.  As Van der Meulen & 
Noordegraaf (2013: 225) emphasized,  
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There are multiple dependencies when it comes to organizing police work and 
police management, and these dependencies…tighten collective regulative 
control.  Police work and management are clearly embedded within state-based 
systems of work control as well as systems and standards for democratic control. 
In Ontario, the primary civilian-led oversight agencies that hold police officers and police 
services accountable (e.g., Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD) have all been formed in 
the past few decades, and they are matched by parallel agencies across the country.  Not 
surprisingly, the introduction of each “regulative control” mechanism has been 
accompanied by police resistance; the mandate of each respective agency poses a direct 
challenge to the autonomy and authority of the police to regulate, organize, and manage 
their own professional conduct and practices.  
3.5.3.2  Police Professionalism: Current and future trends 
More than a decade ago, Julia Evetts (2003: 398) encouraged academics to move beyond the 
problematic definition of profession and “consider the appeal of the concepts of ‘profession’ and 
particularly of ‘professionalism’” (2003: 398).  She further noted that the police, along with 
“pharmacists, social workers, care assistants, librarians, computing experts,…and the armed 
forces are claiming to be professions and to demonstrate professionalism in their occupational 
work.”  “The expansion of the service sector and knowledge work in the developed world and 
the growth or re-emergence of professions in both developing and transitional societies,”  Evetts 
(2003: 398) reported, also furnish evidence of “the appeal of the concept of ‘professionalism’ as 
well as the strength and persistence of ‘professions’ as an occupational form.”  
 
While Evetts (2013: 778) acknowledged that the sociological analysis of professional work has 
traditionally “differentiated professionalism as a special means of organizing work and 
controlling workers and in contrast to the hierarchical, bureaucratic and managerial controls of 
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industrial and commercial organizations,” she argued that the nature of professional work is 
changing:  
[I]ncreasingly professionals (such as doctors, nurses, teachers, social workers) 
now work in employing organizations; lawyers and accountants in large 
professional service firms (PSFs) and sometimes in international and commercial 
organizations; pharmacists in national (retailing) companies; and engineers, 
journalists, performing artists, the armed forces and police find occupational 
control of their work and discretionary decision-making increasingly difficult to 
maintain and sustain. 
She additionally discerns that the focus of academic inquiries has “shifted away from the 
concepts of profession (as a distinct and generic category of occupational work) and 
professionalization (as the process to pursue, develop and maintain the closure of the 
occupational group) and towards the concept of professionalism” (Evetts, 2013: 783-784).12  
Although she noted that “concept of professionalism has an appeal to and for practitioners, 
employees and managers in the development and maintenance of work identities, career 
decisions and senses of self,” she argued that “the discourse of professionalism” that is 
“embodied in managerial literature, training materials, occupational recruitment campaigns and 
company mission statements” advances a narrative in which “occupational regulation and control 
(both internal and external forms) are now explained and justified as means to improve 
professionalism in work” (2013: 783-784).   
                                                          
12 Definitions of “professions,” “professionalization,” “professionalism,” “professional groups” and “professionals” 
abound in the scholarly literature.  However, for the sake of clarity, those deployed by Regoli et al. (1989: 47), 
which are grounded in the work of Vollmer and Mills (1966: vii-viii), outline that “Professions refers to an ideal 
type of occupational organization that provides the model for the form of the occupational organization which would 
result if any occupational group became professionalized. Professionalization is the process whereby occupations 
change characteristics in the direction of a profession. Professionalism refers to an ideology (set of attitudes) and a 
set of related activities that can be found in diverse occupational groups where members seek professional status. As 
an ideology, professionalism may induce members to strive to become professional; yet although professionalism 
may be a component of professionalization, professionalism in itself is not a sufficient cause for professionalization. 
Professional groups are associations of colleagues in an occupation where a relatively high degree of 
professionalization has taken place. Professionals are those considered by their colleagues to be members of 




This discourse is clearly discernable in policing in Ontario, where the combined impact of new 
and enhanced external controls (e.g., police services boards, SIU, OIPRD) and the continued 
“trend to external review” (Goldsmith, 1991) have fundamentally altered the way in which police 
officers and leaders think about professional accountability mechanisms and “who controls the 
police” (Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf, 2013: 225).  However, it is evident that police 
elsewhere confront similar challenges.  Thus, Fyfe (2013: 418) reported that policing is generally 
marked by an “increasing tension between a commitment to organisational professionalism with 
its emphasis on hierarchical structures of authority, accountability and target-setting, and a more 
traditional occupational professionalism, which emphasis discretionary decision-making, codes 
of ethics, and trust in practitioners.”  Nevertheless, Evetts (2013: 790) contends that these 
tensions are not unique to police and are found in many contemporary occupational contexts, 
where professionalism is being imposed “from above” as “a normative value” and used “as an 
ideological instrument and a mechanisms to promote occupational change.”  She observed that, 
“[i]n effect, professionalism is being used to convince, cajole and persuade employees, 
practitioners and other workers to perform and behave in ways which the organization or 
institution deem to be appropriate, effective and efficient” (Evetts, 2013: 790).   
Three recent studies document efforts to “professionalize” contemporary policing in Ontario.  
The first, a research project conducted by the Ontario Police College (Ontario, 2013: 3) 
investigated “ways of modernizing the policing profession in Ontario” through an examination of 
the educational requirements of police recruits in Ontario.  The study examined “the benefits and 
risks of increasing the education prerequisite for people seeking to become police officers” and 
also “the value and functions of a self-governing body for the policing profession” (Ontario, 
2013: 3) through an examination of literature and best practices.  The study reported both 
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positive and negative impacts for increasing educational standards for police recruits and also for 
the establishment of a new self-regulating governance model for policing in Ontario that was 
similar to those who govern the conduct of groups such as doctors, teachers, nurses and lawyers.  
The research garnered from this study will inform a second project phase in coordination with a 
multi-stakeholder working group and Future of Policing Advisory Committee (Ontario, 2013: 
29). 
A second endeavour was chaired by Justice Stephen Goudge and solicited the view of academic 
experts on the future of public policing models in Canada (Council of Canadian Academies, 
2014).  According to this report, “[t]he future of successful Canadian policing requires increased 
professionalization of police practice, with standardized qualification and training, consistent 
evidence-based policing, and continuous effort to improve that practice” (Council of Canadian 
Academies, 2014: 111).  It argued that enhanced and expanded civilian-led oversight 
mechanisms are central to bolstering the accountability and legitimacy of police practices in 
Canada.  The report recognized that there is renewed interest and incentive to increase the 
professionalization of the police in both an international and Canadian context.  According to 
this report, the enhancement of police professionalization demands: the development of common 
qualifications for recruits; education and training procedures that employ evidence-based 
approaches; “continuous professional development linked to accreditation and reward, which 
provides a parallel route to traditional promotion systems; and renewed emphasis on leadership 
and management development” (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 113). 
A third study, prepared by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO, 2015), contained 
various recommendations to modernize policing organizations in Ontario.  Among those 
identified as deserving of priority were: 1) changing the current arbitration system; 2) improving 
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the quality of existing governance and civilian oversight system; and 3) enabling the transfer of 
some specific police functions to civilians or security providers (AMO, 2015: 4).  The report also  
recommended that the training and education of officers be enhanced and urged “establishment 
of a centralized regulatory body for the policing profession” that “could assist in managing 
applicant qualifications, ongoing training, and licensing of officers” and would be similar to 
those regulatory bodies “that exist for physicians, lawyers, nurses, and other professionals in 
Ontario” (AMO, 2015: 6).  Thus, in distinguishing the proposed college from the Ontario Police 
College, the AMO outlined that the college that is envisaged would have “the mandate to license, 
partially-govern, and regulate the professional practice of policing by individuals” and could 
additionally “manage professional development and investigate some forms of officer 
misconduct” (AMO, 2015: 39). 
All three of these studies attest to a perceived need to modernize and “professionalize” policing 
in Ontario.  In addition, each attests to the import of perceptions and, by extension, suggest the 
potential utility of the current study.  In the final section of this chapter, I identify my anticipated 
findings.     
3.6  Anticipated Findings  
In developing the research proposal for this project, I outlined a series of anticipated findings that 
were based upon my review of the extant literature.  These anticipated findings are summarized 




3.6.1 Anticipated Findings - General  
I relied primarily upon findings from American studies pertaining to my central theoretical 
concepts (legitimacy, procedural justice, professionalism) to construct my hypotheses concerning 
general attitudes toward civilian oversight (See 3.2 - Summary of Previous Research Findings: 
Police officers’ attitudes toward civilian oversight).  I anticipated that my respondents would not 
have uniform perceptions of the desirability of civilian involvement in the oversight of police 
work.  Moreover, I hypothesized that the majority of police officers would express an overall 
preference for internal police-led investigations (Professional Standards Bureau) over civilian-
review systems and would indicate a preference for the involvement of civilians to be limited to 
“reviewing” investigatory actions rather than engaging in these actions.  Thus, I thought it likely 
that the majority of respondents would indicate either negative or neutral attitudes toward the 
involvement of civilians in overseeing police conduct.  Nevertheless, I also anticipated that there 
would be a significant proportion of officers who would express either toleration or acceptance 
of civilian-involvement in at least some instances.   
The literature review revealed that previous studies have found few socio-demographic factors to 
be strong determinants of attitudes toward internal and external oversight mechanisms (see 3.4 - 
Summary of Socio-demographic analyses in previous literature).  Authors in previous research 
studies have offered few explanations for these null findings.  As such, I speculated that officers’ 
attitudes might be primarily influenced by personal and/or witnessed experience with oversight 
mechanisms (i.e., procedural justice issues), thereby superseding the influence of most socio-
demographic factors.  I therefore hypothesized that police officers who reported personal 
experience with civilian oversight mechanisms would express more positive attitudes than those 
who lacked such experience.   
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Previous studies have not found sex or educational level to be significant determinants of 
attitudes toward internal and external oversight mechanisms, however some evidence from 
previous research has found minority “race”/ethnicity to be associated with supportive attitudes 
toward internal/external systems of police oversight.  Thus, in following both hypotheses and 
findings from previous studies, I anticipated that Ontario police officers who were female, 
visible minorities, and those with university education would express more positive attitudes 
toward civilian oversight mechanisms than males, non-visible minorities and those without 
university education.  These hypotheses were based upon speculation that females, visible 
minorities and those with university education would be more receptive to mechanisms that are 
intended to thwart systemic bias and discrimination through the promotion of objective 
investigations and oversight.   
Although no previous studies have found age to be a significant determinant of attitudes toward 
internal and external oversight mechanisms, this factor is directly connected directly to length of 
career service and rank.  I anticipated that younger, lower-ranking police officers and those with 
less police experience would express less positive attitudes toward civilian oversight 
mechanisms than older, higher-ranking, more experienced police officers.  As suggested in 
previous research, it is speculated that non-supervisors (constables) would have more frequent 
interaction with the public during calls for service, thus making them more prone to complaints 
and/or interactions (e.g., use of force) that might bring scrutiny from oversight mechanisms.   
As noted earlier, alongside the abstract concept of general acceptance/tolerance of civilian 
oversight, attitudes can be assessed for each of the various oversight agencies in Ontario: police 
services boards, SIU, OIPRD and the Professional Standards Bureau.   
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3.6.2 Anticipated attitudes toward Police Services Boards 
To the best of my knowledge, no previous research has examined police officers’ attitudes 
toward police services boards.  Police services boards in Ontario are largely detached from the 
day-to-day functioning of police operations.  As such, the majority of police officers have very 
little, if any, direct contact with members of the police services boards during their careers.  
Police services boards are most frequently in contact with senior police personnel and consult 
with these upper level officers about large-scale budgetary and administrative oversight.  Given 
that most police services boards have been in existence in Ontario for several decades, I 
hypothesized that their legitimacy would be accepted by the majority of respondents and that 
officers would express either neutrality or tolerance of the oversight provided by police services 
boards.  However, my research proposal also emphasized the need to contextualize the attitudes 
that police officers express toward police services boards and take heed of co-present events.   
At the time that I wrote my research proposal, I was aware that a number of highly-politicized 
issues had profoundly impacted relationships between police services boards and police services 
across Ontario.  As such, I anticipated that the attitudes of my respondents toward police services 
boards might be influenced by contemporaneous events.  For example, due to budgetary 
constraints across all public services in Ontario, police services are under increasing pressure to 
trim their costs and justify both their expenditures and hiring practices.  Regions and 
municipalities that are experiencing population growth are grappling with the ever-increasing 
costs of policing; the overwhelming majority of these costs (approximately 90%) derive from 
expenditures on employee wages and benefits (e.g., Grant, 2012).  Simultaneously, police 
services face pressures to provide expanded service to the growing communities they serve with 
resources that are often stretched to capacity.   
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Negotiations between police associations and police services boards in relation to collective 
agreements for both uniform and civilian personnel have reflected these tensions.  There has also 
been recurring speculation in recent years that wage and benefit freezes could be implemented 
for police officers in Ontario (D’Amato, 2012), with organizations such as the Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) voicing support for coordinated bargaining efforts that thwart 
rising police salaries across the province (AMO, 2015: 8).  I recognized that these and other 
events could impact the attitudes of my respondents in fateful ways.   
3.6.3 Anticipated attitudes toward the SIU 
When the SIU was implemented in 1990, there was a formidable degree of hostility and 
resistance among police officers and police associations; both bitterly resented the fact that 
civilians would be conducting criminal investigations into the conduct of police officers.  The 
Ontario Ombudsman (and former SIU Director between 1996 and 1998), Andre Marin, has noted 
that the SIU “faced aggressive resistance from the police community” during the 1990s (Ontario, 
2008: 12; see also Ontario, 2011: 5).  Although the level of hostility would seem to have 
somewhat abated over the passage of time, Marin’s 2011 report (Ontario, 2011: 42) observed 
that considerable resistance remained:  
Given the checkered history of the relationship between the SIU and police interests, 
and the ongoing problems related to non-compliance with the SIU’s authority, I 
made recommendations in Oversight Unseen (2008) to reinforce the integrity of the 
SIU oversight through the creation of enforcement mechanisms.  I continue to 
believe that additional incentive is necessary to ensure that the effectiveness and 
credibility of the SIU is reinforced through police compliance with regulatory 
requirements. Given the entrenched culture of resistance to SIU oversight, relying on 
the heads of police services alone to encourage cooperation is insufficient. Blatant 
non-co-operation continues to this day, and it is clear that, in at least some instances, 
police officials up the chain of command are complicit. 
However, despite Marin’s identification of an “entrenched culture of resistance to SIU 
oversight,” I hypothesized that the majority of police officers would express general tolerance of 
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the SIU’s mandate and acknowledge its legitimacy.  In short, I believed that police officers have 
become accustomed to the requirement of having a civilian-led organization conduct an 
investigation in incidents resulting in serious injury, death and allegations of police-perpetrated 
sexual assaults.  This assumption was based primarily on finding of an investigation conducted 
by two journalists with the Toronto Star and informed an article that was published by that 
newspaper on October 28, 2010 (Bruser and Henry, 2010).  This analysis of the (then) 20-year 
history of the SIU determined that police officers in Ontario were rarely charged with criminal 
wrongdoing; between 1990 and 2010, the SIU laid criminal charges in only 95 cases out of 3400 
investigations (2.8% of cases).  These figures indicate that the SIU rarely finds police officers in 
Ontario to be criminally responsible for injury, death or allegations of sexual assault.  This report 
also noted that merely 16 officers were subsequently convicted of a crime and only three officers 
were incarcerated.13  In addition, this investigative report pointed out that 47 out of their 54 full- 
and part-time investigators (87%) are former police officers.14  
I thought that both the SIU’s low charge rate as well as the backgrounds of its investigators 
might encourage at least some police officers to view this agency with lesser degrees of 
suspicion.  Thus, I anticipated that some police officers, who might otherwise be resistant to 
civilian oversight, would view the SIU favourably inasmuch as it is staffed, in the main, by 
former police officers.  Indeed, Marin’s report suggested that having such a large contingent of 
former police officers within the SIU may encourage onlookers, including police officers, to 
perceive the SIU as having a “pro-police bias” (Ontario, 2008: 88-89).   
                                                          
13 A more recent report by Gillis (2015a) has confirmed the continuation of these trends.     
14 A written request was sent to the SIU on June 21, 2014 seeking to verify the number of former police officers they 




In relation to the procedural aspects of SIU investigations, I hypothesized that police officers 
with personal experience of an investigation conducted by the SIU (whether as a subject or a 
witness) would express dissatisfaction with requirements to comply with certain features of the 
investigative process.  This prediction was additionally influenced by Marin’s 2011 report 
(Ontario, 2011: 2-3; 35-36) and its discussion of a high-profile feud between the SIU and police 
services in Ontario over the legal requirement that tasks subject and witness officers to 
immediately disclose their notes (pertaining to an incident under investigation) to the SIU.  
Marin (Ontario, 2011: 2-3) noted that until recently, some police officers in Ontario routinely 
withheld their notes from the SIU until they were vetted by legal counsel and that this practice 
contributed to a tumultuous relationship between the SIU and Ontario police officers/services.   
However, as the result of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 2011 on Schaeffer v. Wood (2011 ONCA 
716) police officers involved in a SIU investigation must submit their notes to the SIU at the end 
of their work shift, with or without consultation with legal counsel.  Furthermore, this ruling 
dictated that “subject officers” and “witness officers” involved in the same investigation cannot 
share the same legal counsel (Spears, 2012; McKay & Brannagan, 2014).  
In another widely publicized event, SIU Director Ian Scott (retired October, 2013), sent 227 
letters to Ontario police chiefs between 2008 and 2011 which noted the (alleged) lack of 
cooperation that had occurred between police services and the SIU during this period; reportedly, 
the “Toronto police service, the OPP and the Niagara, Peel, Ottawa and York police services 
were the most persistent culprits” in ignoring such requests from the SIU.  Scott received simply 
thirty-two responses to his letters and among these replies, only twenty contained “substantive 
comments” (Ontario, 2011: 36; Benzie, 2011).  News articles on the lack of response to Scott’s 
letters may have further inflamed the thorny public relationship that exists between the SIU and 
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police services in Ontario and/or encouraged each side to adopt an adversarial stance toward the 
other (e.g., Spears, 2012; Clairmont, 2012; Blizzard, 2011).   
In addition, long and reputedly “unprecedented” delays in the SIU’s investigation of cases 
represent a point of frustration for stakeholders across the province (Crosier, 2015; Gallant, 
2015).  The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards, the Ontario Association of Chiefs of 
Police and various police services have called upon the SIU to expedite investigations and, by 
doing so, to reduce the levels of stress that these investigations impose upon citizens and police 
officers across the province (Crosier, 2015; Gallant, 2015).   
In penning my research proposal, I found it difficult to predict how these types of high-level and 
highly-politicized quarrels would impact the attitudes and opinions of the officers who 
participated in my research and the questions that my questionnaire posed in relation to the SIU.  
However, I anticipated that the majority of police officers would express dissatisfaction with the 
investigative processes carried out by the SIU, while expressing tolerance or acceptance of that 
organization’s overall mandate and legitimacy. 
3.6.4 Anticipated attitudes toward the OIPRD 
Given the recent implementation of the OIPRD (2009), I anticipated that few of my respondents 
would be familiar with the agency and its practices and that the majority would lack 
experientially-based knowledge of this agency.  Although the OIPRD employs eleven full-time 
investigators; six of whom have a background in policing (OIPRD, 2014: 41), “[t]he OIPRD 
does not have jurisdiction over RCMP officers, TTC Special Constables, GO Transit police, First 
Nations police officers, court officers, campus police, provincial offences officers or special 
constables…(the OIPRD) cannot investigate, recommend or lay criminal charges” (OIPRD, 
2014: 9).   
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Moreover, as previously noted, the OIPRD functions primarily in a monitoring/reviewing 
capacity as the vast majority of investigations they oversee are “referred” back to the police 
service where the complaint originated and are investigated by that service’s Professional 
Standards branch.  For example, of the 3114 complaints received between April 1, 2013 and 
March 31, 2014, the OIPRD “screened in” (i.e., deemed worthy of investigation by the OIPRD 
Director) 1297 complaints for investigation; during this time period, there were also 27 screened 
in complaints carried over from 2012-2013 (OIPRD, 2015: 19).  Among those complaints that 
were screened in, 1209 complaints involved matters of police conduct, 22 complaints referred to 
police policies and 66 complaints raised issues about service (OIPRD, 2014: 19).  The remaining 
complaints were screened out by the OIPRD for a variety of reasons (e.g., “not in the public 
interest”, “better dealt with under another act/law”, “frivolous”, ”over six months and other 
criteria not met”) (OIPRD: 2015: 16).  Of the 1324 complaints “sent for investigation” during 
this time period, 89.4% (1183) were referred to police services for investigation (1094 
complaints about conduct; 89 complaints regarding policy and service) (OIPRD, 2014: 21).    
The OIPRD retained 136 (10.3%) conduct complaints for investigation and 5 complaints were 
referred to police services boards (OIPRD, 2014: 21).   
 
The 2011 OIPRD report (OIPRD, 2011: 21) sheds some light on how investigations are handled 
once they are “referred” to a police service: 
When a police service investigates a conduct complaint, the investigating officer 
liaises with the complainant and the OIPRD.  The OIPRD’s case management, 
investigations and legal services work together to manage and oversee referred 
complaints.  Case coordinators track the referred investigation as it progresses and 
coordinate with police service liaison officers as well as complainants to ensure 
that all directions, timelines and notice requirements are met. 
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The 2014 OIPRD Annual Report documented that wrongdoing by police was “substantiated” in 
only a small number of cases between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014: 2516 of 2697 
allegations (93.3%) were unsubstantiated and 181 (6.7%) were “substantiated”; this finding 
coincides with Prenzler’s (2000: 662) assertion that “low substantiation rates by civilian review 
bodies of between 2 and 8 per cent have been described as an ‘international phenomenon.’”  In 
addition, the 2014 OIPRD annual report noted that among the 181 cases that were substantiated, 
109 were deemed “less serious” and 72 were adjudged “serious”) (OIPRD, 2014: 27).  It also 
outlined that the former type of complaint “may be resolved informally if everyone agrees or, if 
Informal Resolution fails, the chief can resolve the matter through a disposition without a 
hearing”; in contrast, in cases of “serious” conduct matters, the chief must hold a disciplinary 
hearing (OIPRD, 2014: 27).   
Aware that the vast majority of investigations remain in the hands of the Professional Standards 
branches of police services, I anticipated that many officers would express general tolerance 
and/or acceptance of the overall legitimacy and mandate of the OIPRD.  Further, I hypothesized 
that respondents with experiential knowledge of an OIPRD investigation would express 
dissatisfaction with the speed of the investigative process.  My hypothesis was supported by De 
Angelis and Kupchik’s (2007) report that found that officer satisfaction with the complaint 
process was strongly influenced by its “timeliness.”  Thus, I interpolated that the increases in the 
time allotted for the resolution of cases by the OIPRD would be reflected in officer reports of 
dissatisfaction with the speed of the investigative process.  According to the 2011 OIPRD report 
(OIPRD, 2011: 23), the time allotted to screen, assign, investigate and resolve all complaints 
increased from 90 days to 120 days.  This report additionally acknowledged that while the 
OIPRD aims to notify officers of a (disciplinary) hearing within six months, “(m)ore complex 
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investigations take longer and as a result time extensions are often requested” (OIPRD, 2011: 
23).  The 2014 annual report specified that the OIPRD has made more concerted efforts in recent 
years to organize their investigations through stringent performance management tools (OIPRD, 
2014: 38-39). 
3.6.5 Anticipated attitudes toward the Professional Standards Bureau 
My purpose in evaluating police officers’ attitudes regarding Professional Standards officers was 
multifaceted.  Although previous research has noted repeatedly that officers prefer internal 
versus external investigations of complaints and alleged misconduct, I thought it important to re-
assess this finding in a systematic manner by directly asking police officers their opinions about 
the performance and treatment issued by internal investigators.  As previously noted, internal 
police investigations are often closely intertwined with civilian-led investigations of complaints 
and alleged misconduct.  For example, police services in Ontario are required to conduct 
“parallel investigations” when the SIU has invoked their mandate and no charges have been laid.  
Further, since the majority of complaints and allegations of misconduct are referred back to 
police services by the OIPRD for investigation and resolution, I recognized that most police 
officers who have faced an investigation of their conduct will have had contact/interaction with 
their own Professional Standards personnel rather than the OIPRD.  Moreover, given that prior to 
2009, Professional Standards officers were almost exclusively responsible in Ontario for the 
investigation of complaints and allegations of misconduct that did not meet the mandate of the 
SIU, I anticipated that many of the experiences that my respondents would report would address 
their interactions with Professional Standards officers.   
I additionally anticipated that the majority of my respondents would indicate a general tolerance 
and/or acceptance of the work carried out by their service’s Professional Standards Bureau.  This 
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belief was based on the assumption that most police officers recognize that the processing and 
resolution of complaints and allegations of misconduct is an ineluctable feature of modern 
policing.  While I expected that most police officers would express dissatisfaction with facets of 
the investigative process (e.g., timeliness, communication, notification of resolution), I 
hypothesized that respondents would express greater levels of satisfaction with the investigative 
process carried out by Professional Standards as compared to the SIU or OIPRD, since internal 
investigations pose fewer physical and/or bureaucratic barriers than those conducted and/or 
overseen by an outside agency.   
3.7  Conclusion of Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses 
My review of the literature stressed the potential utility of research which examines the attitudes 
of Ontario police officers toward civilian oversight mechanisms.  In the following chapter, I 






This chapter provides an overview of the research methods utilized in this study.  The discussion 
centers around the planning and implementation of the chosen research design - a mixed methods 
sequential explanatory design – and includes details about both the administration of Phase 1 – 
Survey Questionnaire and Phase 2 – Semi-Structured interviews.  
4.1  Mixed Methods Research 
 
My perception of shortcomings in the research which has addressed my topic led me to seek a 
comprehensive approach that would allow a better understanding of police officers’ attitudes 
toward civilian oversight mechanisms.  More specifically, I noted that the majority of these 
studies focused exclusively on a single “police complaints system” and only one (Perez, 1994: 
80) had employed a combination of attitudinal surveys, interviews and direct observation.   
I utilized a mixed methods research approach, which “involves the collection and analysis of 
both qualitative and quantitative data” that are “mixed, or combined in some way” in a single 
study or series of studies (Punch, 2014: 302; see also Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007: 5; Lanier 
and Briggs, 2014: 192).  Creswell & Plano Clark (2011: 5) pointed out,   
Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as 
well as methods of inquiry.  As a methodology, it involves philosophical 
assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis and the mixture 
of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases of the research process.  
As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or series of studies.  Its central premise is that the 
use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better 
understanding of research problems than either approach alone.   
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Punch (2014: 302-303) noted that a variety of terms have been used to describe mixed methods 
research, such as ‘multimethod’, ‘integrated’, ‘blended’, ‘combined’, ‘multitrait-multimethod 
research’, ‘methodological triangulation’, ‘multimethodological research’ and ‘mixed model 
research’.  Today, “mixed methods” is widely recognized as “an umbrella term to cover 
multifaceted procedures of combining, integrating and linking the different types of methods and 
data” (Punch, 2014: 302-303).   
Broadly speaking, the attraction of mixed methods research is that it provides the researcher with 
an opportunity to embrace “the best of both worlds” (Lanier & Briggs, 2014: 189).  As Punch 
(2014: 303) observed, “(t)he fundamental rationale behind mixed methods research is that we 
can often learn more about our research topic if we can combine the strengths of qualitative 
research with the strengths of quantitative research while compensating at the same time for the 
weakness of each method” (see also Creswell et al., 2003: 211).  He noted that while quantitative 
analysis is invaluable in “conceptualizing variables, profiling dimensions, tracing trends and 
relationships, formalizing comparisons and using large and perhaps representative samples,” 
qualitative analysis is equally invaluable in furnishing “sensitivity to meaning and to context, 
local groundedness, the in-depth study of smaller samples, and great methodological flexibility 
which enhances the ability to study process and change” (Punch, 2014: 304).   
Notwithstanding the positive features associated with mixed methods research, there has been 
historical opposition and skepticism about this research approach (see Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998).  Denzin’s (2010) examination of the evolution of mixed methods research over the past 
half-century observed that this approach has received waves of support and opposition.  
According to Denzin (2010; see also Punch, 2014: 303-304) “the current war between evidence-
based methodologists and the mixed methods, interpretive, and critical theory schools” is simply 
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the latest “paradigm war between quantitative (QUAN) and qualitative (QUAL) methodologies 
and was prefigured by the “postpositivist war against positivism (1970-1990)” and the 1990-
2005 “wars between competing postpositivist, constructivist, and critical theory paradigms.” 15 
 
However, if methodological purists on both sides of the qualitative-quantitative spectrum insist 
that the axiological, ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions associated 
with quantitative and qualitative research are incompatible and incommensurable and that it is 
folly to suppose these methods can be married, Denzin (2010: 419) describes some evidence of 
“mixed methods advocacy” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007: 14).  For example, he noted that 
mixed methods research is now described in handbooks and textbooks as a viable research 
approach endorsed by major professional societies in the social sciences and featured in journals 
such as the Journal of Mixed Methods Research (JMMR).   
According to Punch (2014: 304), the gradual acceptance of mixed methods research in recent 
decades has required “the field of research methods to move past the either/or methodological 
thinking of the paradigm wars period” and necessitated a “willingness to embrace multiple 
paradigms” and “the subsequent emergence of pragmatism as the underlying philosophical 
approach, with stress on the idea that the methods used in research should be determined by the 
questions asked” (Punch, 2014: 304).  Punch identifies “the essential idea of pragmatism” in this 
context as the ability to “to reject the either/or choices and the metaphysical concepts associated 
with the paradigm wars, and to focus instead on ‘what works’ in getting research questions 
answered.”  In other words, the choice of which methods are used (quantitative, qualitative or 
                                                          
15 Further discussion about the philosophical underpinnings of these “paradigm wars” exceeds the scope of this 
study and will be limited here (see Blaikie, 1991; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 2003; Denzin, 2010 for fuller 
treatments of this issue).   
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mixed methods) should be entirely driven by the specific research question(s) being asked 
(Punch, 2014: 304; see also Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003: 7; Denzin, 2010: 422; Wheeldon: 
2010; Feilzer, 2010; David & Sutton, 2011: 294).  Although some suggest that researchers are 
unlikely to attain equal proficiency in both qualitative and quantitative methods, Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2003: 44-45) have suggested this problem may be addressed through “a team 
approach or with a model that presumes minimal competency in both quantitative and qualitative 
design.” 
Despite the growth and gradual acceptance of mixed methods research, caution remains around 
the purpose, design and execution studies employing this approach.  For instance, in Bryman’s 
(2006; 2008) analysis of 232 journal articles that utilized mixed methods research (published 
between 1996 and 2003), “the most common rationale for using mixed methods was 
enhancement to augment the research findings though collecting qualitative or quantitative data” 
(David & Sutton, 2011: 297).  In summarizing his findings, Bryman (2008: 96-99) noted that 
researchers did not always clearly identify why mixed methods is useful nor describe it in 
consistent ways.  Indeed, Bryman reported a lack of understanding of how mixed methods 
research should be done and a notable absence of exemplars.  In addition, Hesse-Biber (2010: 
213) cautioned that the publication of mixed methods research may continue to be stifled by 
ongoing concerns about incommensurable philosophical barriers or by disciplinary barriers (e.g., 
an absence of training in these methods or a favouring of research that is methodologically 
“pure” by funding agencies).   Nevertheless, Hesse-Biber (2010: 210-213) concluded that, 





4.1.1 Research Design: Mixed Methods Sequential Explanatory Design 
In seeking to provide a detailed and comprehensive evaluation of police officers’ attitudes and 
experiences regarding civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario, I followed a mixed methods 
research design called Sequential Explanatory Design (see Ivankova, Creswell & Stick, 2006 for 
a discussion of how to prioritize, implement and integrate methods using this approach).  Punch 
(2014: 310) detailed that this “is a two-phase mixed methods design, where the researcher uses 
qualitative data to explain, or to build upon, initial quantitative results.  The first phase is 
quantitative, the second phase is qualitative.”  This approach is often used when “qualitative data 
are needed to explain significant (or non-significant) results, outlier results or surprising results” 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007: 71-2 as quoted in Punch, 2014: 310).  In surveying previous 
literature that has employed this research design, Ivankova, Creswell & Stick (2006: 5) found 
that its commonly-reported advantages “include straightforwardness and opportunities for the 
exploration of the quantitative results in more detail” with its disadvantages noted to be the 
“lengthy time” and significant expenditure of resources that this type of research may require 
researchers to invest in gathering and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data.   
In adopting this approach, my study was divided into two distinct phases.  During Phase 1: 
Survey Questionnaire, I administered an internet survey questionnaire to a large single data 
source (police service).  During Phase 2 – Semi-Structured interviews, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with police officers and other stakeholders to enhance my understanding of 
the complicated network of civilian oversight mechanisms that exist in Ontario and how police 




4.1.2 Research Agreement and Stakeholder Support 
 
Prior to the project’s launch, I solicited support/endorsement from a variety of stakeholders 
across Ontario and Canada.  Between May and October, 2013, I sought formal support from the 
agencies listed below in Table 4-3.  I sent a letter to each agency outlining the research project 
and requesting their consideration.  In approaching these agencies, I sought to obtain a formal 
declaration of support for my study and/or the opportunity to interview a representative from 
each agency in the second phase of my research project.  This endeavour was often time-
consuming and necessitated multiple rounds of correspondence.  
My quest for stakeholder support for this project was primarily motivated by my desire to 
conduct a fair-minded and non-partisan study.  I believed that the objectivity of my project 
would be enhanced by seeking the involvement of all stakeholder agencies and obtaining their 
input and insights.  Given that the survey tasked its participants with evaluating the performance 
of Ontario’s multiple civilian-led oversight agencies (Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD), I 
thought it only fair to provide these agencies with an opportunity to participate in the study and 
contribute meaningfully to the discussion of the topics of inquiry.  Second, I anticipated that 
stakeholder support might encourage potential respondents to participate in the questionnaire 
and, in doing so, to respond to the questions it posed in a thoughtful and considered way.  This 
assumption derived from previous research which has noted that official sponsorship from 
stakeholder agencies may increase response rates and encourage survey participation.  For 
example, Dillman et al. (2014: 29) determined that sponsors can affect the decision of 
respondents to respond to the survey “by making it more rewarding to do so and by lending 
legitimacy to the survey and inducing trust.”   
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Although I was able to obtain formal declarations of support from the Ontario Association of 
Chiefs of Police (OACP), the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation 
(CACP-RF), and the Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB), I was less 
successful in obtaining support from other agencies (see Table 4-3).  Although the OIPRD and 
the CAPG (Canadian Association of Police Governance) declined to provide formal letters of 
support/endorsement, both allowed me to interview a senior executive representative.   
Table 4-3: Stakeholder Support and Participation 
Stakeholder agency Requested to provide a 
formal declaration of support 
Requested to provide 
a representative for 
Phase 2 interviews 
Host police service 
 
Research agreement obtained  Participated 
Host police service Association 
 
Declined Declined 
PAO – Police Association of Ontario 
 
Declined Declined 
CPA – Canadian Police Association 
 
Declined Declined 
OACP – Ontario Association of 
Chiefs of Police 
 
Letter of support provided  Participated 
CACP – Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police – Research 
Foundation 
 
Letter of support provided  Participated 
SIU – Special Investigations Unit 
 
Declined Declined 




OAPSB - Ontario Association of 
Police Services Boards 
 
Declaration of support 
provided 
Participated 
CAPG – Canadian Association of 
Police Governance  
 
Declined Participated 
CACOLE  - Canadian Association for 






4.2  Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire 
 
An internet-based survey questionnaire was the primary quantitative methodological tool 
employed during this study.  According to Dillman et al. (2014: 301), "[s]urveys that are 
completely electronic, relying only on e-mail contacts to obtain internet responses, are the fastest 
growing form of surveying occurring in the United States, as well as throughout most of the 
world.”  Web survey questionnaire responses allow data to be gathered from “large numbers of 
people in a very short amount of time”, usually at a very low cost, “especially when e-mail is the 
only form of communication with sample members” (Dillman et al., 2014: 301; see also Furlan 
& Martone, 2012: 91; Stopher, 2012: 385; Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 47).  With web 
survey questionnaires, typical variable costs associated with mail and telephone and in-person 
surveys are absent.  Thus, by employing a web survey, I did not have the burden of paying for 
questionnaire printing, postage costs, delivery, return and data entry, call centre personnel and 
administration, the remuneration of interviewers and so on (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 91-92; 
Stopher, 2012: 385).16 
 
The “fast data capture turnaround” (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 94) of web surveys reduces the lag 
time between “the moment the respondent returns the questionnaire and the moment it is 
received” and ready for analysis (Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 45).  In addition, this quick 
turnaround time allows researchers to flexibly adapt the survey’s administration: “Response rates 
can be monitored over time.  Action can be undertaken if the response is lower than expected” 
(Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 45-46). 
 
                                                          
16 Furlan & Martone (2012: 92) note the fixed costs of a web survey typically include: “hardware (servers and 
researchers’ terminals); data collection and management software; internet connection and bandwidth; scripting and 
analysis team; web community or panel management (when available).”   
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Another positive feature of web surveys that proved to be immensely beneficial in this study 
derives from its ability to affordably cover a population that is dispersed across a wide 
geographical area.  Assuming equality in internet access, this feature “positively affects the 
representativeness of the sample, as rural respondents have theoretically the same probability of 
being selected for the interview as urban respondents” (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 95; see also 
Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 47).   Similar to mail surveys, web surveys also allow 
respondents to complete the survey at a time that is convenient to them and eliminates the need 
to coordinate the schedules of respondents and investigators (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 95; see 
also Stopher, 2012: 385).  Web surveys also allow for complex skip patterns to be embodied in 
the questionnaire design/layout and “hidden completely from the respondent” (Stopher, 2012: 
385).  This was especially useful for my purposes.   
Bethlehem & Biffignandi (2012: 42) enthused that web surveys which are administered to 
targeted and “closed” populations have the potential for great success: 
If the target population is a closed population (employees of a company, or 
students at university), there is often a sampling frame containing the email 
addresses of all members of the population.  In such situations, there is no 
difference between the target population and the sampling frame.  There are no 
coverage problems.  This is the ideal case for a web survey. 
However, a potential drawback of web-based surveys is low response rates (Stopher, 2012: 385).  
Noting that the response on web-based surveys is lower than that of postal surveys, some 
recommend the use of mixed mode survey delivery (e.g., web, mail, telephone, in-person) as an 
alternative method of contact and survey administration (e.g., Dillman et al., 2014; Bethlehem & 
Biffignandi, 2012: 51).  This was not an option for my project due to the organization/population 
being researched.    
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Throughout all stages of planning, constructing and administering the survey questionnaire for 
this study, I employed a “tailored design” strategy.  As recommended by Dillman et al. (2014: 
16), “tailored design” 
refers to customizing survey procedures for each survey situation based upon 
knowledge about the topic and sponsor of the survey, the types of people who will 
be asked to complete the survey, the resources available, and the time frame for 
reporting results.  Tailored design is a strategy that can be applied in the 
development of all aspects of a survey to reduce total survey error to acceptable 
levels and motivate all types of sample members to respond within resource and 
time constraints.   
In seeking to reduce the four sources of survey error (coverage, sampling, nonresponse and 
measurement), this approach seeks to “build positive social exchange and encourage response by 
taking into consideration elements such as survey sponsorship, the nature of the survey 
population and variations within it, and the content of the survey questions, among other things” 
(Dillman et al., 2014: 16).  The “social exchange perspective,” which lies at the heart of the 
tailored design approach,  “assumes that the likelihood of responding to a questionnaire, and 
doing so accurately, is greater when the person trusts that the expected rewards for responding to 
a survey will still outweigh the anticipated costs of responding” (Dillman et al., 2014: 17).   
 
I utilized FluidSurveys, an online Canadian survey company, to create and administer the survey.  
Among the many benefits of this software, it contains a feature that allows for the seamless 
transfer of the data collected to an SPSS/PASW file for analysis.  During September and 
October, 2013, the survey questionnaire was pre-tested (i.e., cognitive interviews) with five 
police officers to work out formatting issues and optimal question wording (see Dillman et al., 
2014: 241-249).   
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Appendix C contains a copy of the survey questionnaire.  Below is an overview of the survey 
sections: 
 Section 1 – Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
 Section 2 – Civilian Oversight: General Questions 
 Section 3 – Police Services Boards 
 Section 4 – SIU 
 Section 5 – OIPRD 
 Section 6 – Professional Standards Bureau 
 
Since few police officers have direct interaction with the Ontario Civilian Police Commission 
(OCPC) (as compared to the other civilian oversight agencies featured in this study), I elected to 
not assess police officers’ attitudes toward the OCPC and focus solely on the central civilian 
oversight agencies in Ontario.     
Efforts to minimize survey error were considered throughout the design, administration and 
analysis of the survey questionnaire.  According to Dillman et al. (2014: 3), “survey error can be 
thought of as the difference between an estimate that is produced using survey data and the true 
value of the variables in the population that one hopes to describe.”  In expanding upon this 
topic, Dillman et al. (2014: 9) observed: 
Reducing total survey error involves careful survey planning, sample selection, 
questionnaire design, implementation, and data analysis.  It is about 
simultaneously controlling all four sources of error to the extent practical and 
possible, within the time, cost, and other constraints of the survey.  Survey error 
cannot be completely eliminated, but with diligence to all four types it can be kept 
to reasonable levels.  
All efforts were made to reduce the four typical sources of survey error: coverage, sampling, 
nonresponse, and measurement (Dillman et al., 2014: 3-10; see also Groves, 1989; and Nicolini 
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Dalla Valle, 2012).17  The impact of these four errors is discussed throughout the subsequent 
section.   
 
4.2.1 Data Source 
It was determined that the ideal data source would derive from a single large police service in 
Ontario in order to maximize the sample frame and facilitate comparison to extant studies.  In 
May, 2013, I presented my research proposal to the police service that would ultimately host my 
survey and a formal research agreement with that service was reached on October 24, 2013.  The 
research agreement stipulated that the identity of the participating police service would not be 
publically disclosed, nor would the identity of the involved participants.  This arrangement was 
also supported and approved by the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.   
As a result, I was able to distribute my survey questionnaire to the sworn membership (police 
officers) of the host police service and invite these individuals to further participate in 
interviews.  Formal data gathering, Phase 1 – Survey Questionnaire, began early in 2014.  The 
sample frame of potential respondents that was initially provided was 6359 sworn police officers 
                                                          
17 As Dillman et al. (2014: 3-4) explicated:  
1. Coverage Error “occurs when the list from which sample members are drawn does not accurately represent 
the population on the characteristics(s) one wants to estimate with the survey data…A high quality survey 
sample requires that every member of the population has a known, nonzero probability of being sampled, 
meaning they have to be accurately represented on the list from which the sample will be drawn.  Coverage 
error is the difference between the estimate produced when the list is inaccurate and what would have been 
produced with an accurate list”;  
2. Sampling Error “is the difference between the estimate produced when only a sample of units on the frame 
is surveyed and the estimate produced when every unit on the list is surveyed.  Sampling error exists anytime 
we decide to survey only some, rather than all, members of the sample frame”; 
3. Nonresponse Error “is the difference between the estimate produced when only some of the sampled units 
respond compared to when all of them respond.  It occurs when those who do not respond are different from 
those who do not respond in a way that influences the estimate”; 
4. Measurement Error “is the difference between the estimate produced and the true value because respondents 
gave inaccurate answers to survey questions.  It occurs when respondents are unable or unwilling to provide 
accurate answers, which can be due to poor question design, survey mode effects, interviewer and respondent 




who were actively serving in Ontario.  No civilians from the host police service participated in 
this study. 
One significant drawback of maintaining the anonymity of the police service that participated in 
my study is that I cannot discuss this police service’s organizational structure and culture.  In 
addition, under the terms of my agreement with the police service that agreed to host my study 
by providing me with access to their sworn members, I cannot furnish my reader with statistics 
on the numbers of alleged misconduct/complaints/charges processed by the SIU or the OIPRD in 
relation to this service or the number of internal investigations that were launched by the host 
police service’s Professional Standards Bureau.  Nevertheless, I appreciated greatly the police 
service’s willingness to assist me with my research and thought their stipulations reasonable.  I 
did not seek participation from my own police service, the Waterloo Regional Police Service 
(N= 777 sworn officers; December, 2015), to avoid any real or perceived conflict of interest. 
Obtaining access to a sample frame of thousands was a formidable achievement; as noted earlier, 
previous research on the attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight have based on 
much smaller sample frames.  For example, Kreisel (1998), obtained 357 completed pen/paper 
surveys from a potential pool of 814 police officers (a 44% response rate) in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico; De Angelis and Kupchik (2007) achieved a 43% response in their mail survey of police 
officers in Denver, Colorado with 648 of a possible 1500 completing their survey.  Most 
recently, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) used an emailed 
survey questionnaire and obtained 507 completed surveys from 1,313 officers (a 39% response 
rate) (PONI, 2015: 4).   
While designing the research project, I recognized that obtaining a high rate of response from the 
target population would likely be challenging.  I was aware that internet-based surveys have 
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lower response rates than those conducted by other methods.  Although well-administered mail 
and telephone surveys typically garner response rates of 50% to 70% (Dillman et al., 2009: 236; 
440-457), the response rates obtained in internet based surveys are typically lower.  For example, 
Maguire and Dyke (2011:8) surveyed police officers regarding issues of ethics and 
professionalism using an internet-based questionnaire and received 10,264 completed surveys 
from 43,660 potential respondents across 31 participating police services (a 24% response rate).  
Duxbury and Higgins (2012: 2) surveyed police officers and civilians regarding work-life 
conflict and employee wellness and received 7091 completed surveys across 25 participating 
police services.  Although these researchers did not report their response rate, it would seem 
likely that it was relatively modest.  Nevertheless, I decided that conducting an online survey 
questionnaire was the most appropriate manner in which to conduct my survey, given the large 
sample frame of potential respondents. 
 
4.2.2 Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire – Data Collection 
Formal data collection began in January, 2014.  Based upon the conditions outlined in the 
research agreement, the survey questionnaire was administered solely by the participating police 
service.  I had no direct access to the survey during its period of administration (January 6, 2014 
to February 18, 2014).  Table 4-4 outlines significant dates in the data collection process.     
Throughout the design and administration of the survey, I sought to reduce both sampling error 
and nonresponse error.  However, as described below, inasmuch as the participating police 
service controlled the administration of the survey questionnaire, there were several factors 
which inhibited my ability to mitigate the probability of unnecessary sampling and nonresponse 
error.   
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The survey questionnaire was launched on January 6, 2014 when the hosting police service sent 
out a recruitment email to all sworn police officers.  Appendix B contains a copy of the 
recruitment letter.  This recruitment email introduced the project and invited police officers to 
click on an internet link which brought them to the survey questionnaire.  The cover page for the 
survey questionnaire acted as a formal information and consent letter.  No material incentives for 
participation were offered to potential respondents (see Dillman et al., 2014: 30-31, 330).  The 
survey questionnaire invitation was sent to the work email accounts of 6359 potential 
respondents (all currently serving sworn police officers).  There were 285 potential respondents 
whose invitations were rejected (“bounced back”) for a variety of reasons (e.g., full email 
accounts, leave of absence for a variety of circumstances).  As a result, the final sample frame 
was downsized to 6074 potential respondents.   
 
Table 4-4: Survey Questionnaire – Data collection 





January 6, 2014 Date of survey launch:  
1st recruitment message 
sent by email to all 
potential respondents. 
Sample frame of 6359 
downsized to 6074 to 











January 27, 2014 Date of 1st reminder 
message sent by email 
to all potential 
respondents. 
The hosting police 
service agreed to send 





February 18, 2014 Date of survey closing. The survey was open 






In calculating an estimated coverage error, 4.5% (285 police officers) of the entire population 
(original sample frame: 6359 police officers) did not receive an invitation to complete the 
survey.  Considering the exclusive access I obtained to this “difficult to reach” population, this 
estimated coverage error is relatively low.  Furthermore, as described in 4.3 - Phase 2: Semi-
Structured Interviews: Police Officers, all of the respondents in the downsized sample frame 
(6074) had an equal opportunity to participate in both Phase 1 – Survey Questionnaire and Phase 
2: Semi-structured interviews.  Those who declined to participate in the survey questionnaire 
were automatically directed to the last page of the survey, which contained the advertisement for 
Phase 2. 
On January 8, 2014, the hosting police service posted a message on their intranet to verify the 
legitimacy of the study and to reinforce the support provided by senior management and the 
sponsoring organizations.  The hosting police service agreed to send one reminder message to 
those police officers who had not accessed/completed the survey.  The single reminder message 
was sent on January 27th, 2014.  The contents of the reminder message largely mirrored those in 
the first email recruitment message.  Although I asked that additional reminder messages be sent, 
this request was declined; the hosting police service informed me that due to their concern with 
“survey burnout,” their practice was to send out only a single reminder.  In consequence, while 
Dillman et al. (2014: 331-336) recommend that internet survey researchers send out several 
reminder messages that vary slightly in their wording and tone, I was unable to act on their 
advice.   
In order to maximize the likelihood that police officers would participate in the survey, the 
questionnaire purposely excluded any tracking features.  I thought it important that all 
respondents knew that their identity and responses would be anonymous and my “tailored design 
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method” (Dillman et al., 2009; 2014) was geared toward this end.  I appreciated that my potential 
respondents might ordinarily be wary of completing a survey that was made available through 
their employer’s email system and which queried them on topics that could be perceived as 
personally and/or politically sensitive.  As a result, I did not incorporate some of the recruitment 
techniques that Dillman et al. (2009; 2014) recommend (e.g., personalized correspondence; the 
use of tracking numbers as a facilitator of targeted follow up “reminder messages”).  The survey 
was open for 44 days (i.e., January 6, 2014 to February 18, 2014); the hosting police service 
provided me with the de-identified data after this period had elapsed.  The response rate was 
26.2% (1593 survey responses out of 6074 potential responses).18  Although the response rate is 
not stellar, my study can legitimately boast of a sample size that, to date, is the largest ever 
collected worldwide (e.g., Prenzler, Mihinjac & Porter, 2013) among studies that have surveyed 
police officers on their attitudes toward civilian oversight.  Moreover, in light of the restrictions 
highlighted above (e.g., a single reminder message; the absence of material inducement for 
participation) and the unique nature of this study and target population, the sampling error and 
nonresponse error were deemed to be acceptable.  Nevertheless, Chapter 5: Survey 
Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis acknowledges minor concerns in relation to the 
over/underrepresentation among older and younger police officers.   
In regards to measurement error, I made proactive efforts during the development phase to 
create a clear, concise and user-friendly survey questionnaire.  In doing so, I followed best 
practice guidelines for question format, organization and layout (e.g., Couper, 2009; Tourangeau 
et al., 2013; Dillman et al., 2009; 2014).  As noted earlier, the survey questionnaire was also pre-
                                                          
18  This response rate is similar to that found in research referenced earlier: Walker and Herbst (1999) (26%); Brody 
& Lovrich (2007) (23%); and Maguire and Dyke (2011) (24%).   
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tested with five individuals prior to its implementation in order to address formatting issues (see 
Dillman et al., 2014: 342-345).   
The survey was constructed to: (1) allow comparison across categories and (2) distinguish 
general from specific perceptions and experiences regarding the various oversight agencies.  
Skip logic functions (also known as "conditional branching" or "branch logic") were 
incorporated into the survey design in order to allow respondents to record general perceptions 
about a given oversight agency and, if applicable/desired, describe their personal experience with 
a given agency.  The total duration of an individual respondent’s experience in completing the 
survey was variable and reflected each individual’s decision to elaborate upon their comments 
and/or disclose their involvement with the various agencies.  Respondents had as much time as 
they wanted to complete the survey.   
In the analysis of the survey questionnaire results, there was not any significant evidence of 
response bias (a type of measurement error “in which estimates are systematically shifted one 
way or another” [Dillman et al., 2014: 7]).  There were no major or recurring irregularities, 
anomalies or outliers that signified that survey respondents were confused or challenged by any 
of the question organization or wording.  Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate 
Analysis contains a thorough discussion of missing data.  Although it is not a direct measure of 
measurement error, a missing value analysis in SPSS confirmed that item-non response data was 
MCAR (Missing Completely At Random) and largely negligible per survey section, ranging 
from 0.0 to 1.7%.  This demonstrates, albeit with a crude measure, that very few respondents 





4.2.3 Open-Ended Survey Questions  
Each section of the survey concluded with an invitation to “please include any additional 
comments”; this feature allowed respondents to provide unstructured commentary about the 
topic addressed in that section (e.g., Civilian Oversight: General Questions, Police Services 
Boards, SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau).  In total, survey respondents provided 
1550 responses to these open-ended questions.  The number and length of responses varied per 
section and respondents provided an assortment of interesting and insightful comments.  Table 4-
5 provides a summary of the number of comments per section and the number of corresponding 
themes/codes that were developed.   
Table 4-5: Summary of open-ended commentary from Phase 1 – Survey Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Section 







General Attitudes toward Civilian 
Oversight 
385 total 31 
Police Services 
Boards 
Respondents governed by a police 
services board 
 
110 217 total 21 
Respondents NOT governed by a 
police services board 
 
107 13 
SIU General Questions about the SIU 249 378 total 26 





General Questions about the OIPRD 157 252 total 23 






General Questions about the 
Professional Standards Bureau 
159 318 total 26 
Respondents with Professional 
Standards Bureau experience 
 
159 27 
 1550 total 199 total 
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I utilized an approach known as “themeing the data” (Saldana, 2013: 175-183) in analyzing the 
comments of my respondents.  As Saldana (2013: 175) outlined, a theme is “an extended phrase 
or sentence that identifies what a unit of data is about and/or what it means” and “an outcome of 
coding, categorization, and analytic reflection, not something that is, in itself, coded.”  Thus, 
“(l)ike coding, thematic analysis or the search for themes in the data is a strategic choice as a part 
of the research design that includes the primary questions, goals, conceptual framework and 
literature review” (Saldana, 2013: 177). 
Saldana (2013: 177) has suggested that themeing the data is “more applicable to interviews and 
participant-generated documents and artifacts, rather than researcher-generated field notes.”  
This approach is not intended to be “an expedient method of qualitative analysis.  It is just as 
intensive as coding and requires comparable reflection on participant meanings and outcomes” 
(Saldana, 2013: 177).  As Saldana (2013: 180) described, this approach may be employed with or 
without the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS).  He 
highlighted an approach used by Smith and Osborn (2008) that closely mirrors the method I 
employed, which includes cutting and pasting the survey questionnaire commentary into a three 
column table in a word processor (Microsoft Word).  In this method, “the center column of a 
page contains the interview transcript data; the left column provides working space for initial 
notes, key words and shorter codes; while the right column contains the final themes for 
analysis” (Saldana, 2013: 180).   
Whenever a sentence or passage contained multiple themes, I utilized a traditional coding 
method called “simultaneous coding,” which is “the application of two or more different codes to 
a single qualitative datum, or the overlapped occurrence of two or more codes applied to 
sequential units of qualitative data” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81; see also Saldana, 
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2013: 81).  In combination with the above method, I also created “analytic memos” to keep track 
of those passages/quotations that were instructive or important to capture for future use, as well 
as observations and insights about the study (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2013: 96).   
In Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis, the predominant themes that emerged 
from the open-ended responses are presented in each respective section, with examples of 
verbatim quotations displayed to demonstrate the general thrust of the theme to the reader. As 
Tourangeau et al. (2013: 120) stressed, “open questions in Web surveys can add richness to 
closed questions and yield answers that were not anticipated by the researchers (see also Dillman 
et al., 2014: 128-134).  Researchers such as O’Cathain & Thomas (2004) and Burg et al. (2015) 
have also discussed the value of analyzing these sources of data in mixed methods research with 
some form of systematic coding strategy and careful attention to non-response bias.  Aside from 
being generally interesting and informative, the themes that emerged from these open-ended 
questionnaire responses served to alert me to police officers’ wide range of experiences and 
perceptions and informed the content of the interviews I conducted during the second phase of 
my research.  Some survey respondents expressed strong feelings in recounting their experiences 
with and perceptions of various civilian oversight mechanisms (e.g., stress, resentment, 
frustration); the question format allowed me to capture these intense emotions.  These body of 
data also provided useful in my development of a “provisional ‘start list’” for coding the semi-






4.3 Phase 2: Semi-Structured Interviews: Police Officers 
 
Semi-structured interviews were the second research method used in this project.  In total, I 
conducted 40 interviews with police officers by telephone.  In following the mixed methods 
sequential explanatory design model, the semi-structured interviews occurred after respondents 
had an opportunity to complete the survey questionnaire.  As Lanier and Briggs (2014: 191) 
pointed out, semi-structured interviews are “often chosen when the researcher has some 
knowledge of the topic (at least enough to prepare questions in advance), but wants to allow 
flexibility to probe for clarification on responses and diverge from the present questions.”  
Additionally, Punch (2014: 144) observed, interviews provide “a very good way of accessing 
people’s perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations and constructions of reality.  It is also 
one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding others.”  
I anticipated that interviews would provide a source of rich detail and introspection that would 
not otherwise be obtained through the survey questionnaire responses alone.  Given that my 
project sought to identify the attitudes, perceptions and experiences of police officers in Ontario 
toward civilian oversight mechanisms, I thought that interviews were an important method of 
data collection.   
Although the topical areas and questions were planned in advance, the flexibility intrinsic to this 
interviewing format allowed me to change the sequencing of questions and also to eliminate 
those that were made redundant by the early-expressed response of my interviewees.19  This 
approach facilitated an easy flow of conversation and a lively and engaging dialogue.  This was 
expected inasmuch as semi-structured interviews allow interviewers to expand upon the 
                                                          
19 Appendix D contains a copy of the semi-structured interview questions/script that I employed during my interview 
with police officers 
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questions they pose and/or seek clarification from those they interview (Lanier and Briggs, 2014: 
191).   
Given that I had no direct access to the individual work email addresses for the sample frame of 
potential survey respondents, I had to develop a strategy for soliciting participation for Phase 2 
during the administration of the survey questionnaire.  Towards this end, the final page of the 
survey questionnaire invited police officers to participate in “in-person or telephone interviews” 
about the topics that the questionnaire raised and provided my contact information (both 
telephone and email address).  Active consent allowed my respondents to exercise agency and 
decide for themselves, without any form of pressure or inducement, whether they wished to 
participate in an interview. 
Not all interview participants were required to fill out a survey questionnaire.  Those who 
declined to participate in the survey questionnaire were automatically directed to the last page of 
the survey, which contained the advertisement for Phase 2.  Between January 6, 2014 and 
February 18, 2014, a total of 51 police officers contacted me and expressed interest in being 
interviewed.  As the volunteers trickled in, I kept a registry of all volunteer contact information.  
Although I considered developing a strategy to interview a quota sample of these officers, I 
ultimately decided to pursue interviews with all of the police officers who had contacted me and 
furnish all of these individuals with the Information and Consent form for Phase 2.  Between 
January 6, 2014 and April 29, 2014, I released recurring waves of available dates/times for 
interviews in order to accommodate the assorted shift schedules of those who contacted me.   
Forty police officers from the host police service were interviewed in total.  Eleven of the 
individuals who had originally expressed interest in being interviewed later declined to 
participate.  I sent all participants a Participant Feedback Letter to thank them for their 
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participation and to inform them of the progress of my research.  All of the interviews with 
police officers were conducted by telephone and were audio-recorded, with the permission of 
each interviewee, for accuracy and transcription.  The average length of the telephone interview 
was 25.35 minutes, with the shortest 17 minutes and the longest 45 minutes.  Table 4-6 contains 
a summary profile of those who participated in Phase 2 and Table 4-7 provides a tally of the 
results obtained.  






Rank Age Education Length 
in 
minutes 
OFF #1 Female 23 Sergeant 50 Some University 36 
OFF #2 Male 33 Senior Officer 54 High School 
Graduate 
43  
OFF #3 Male 9 Constable 32 University 
Graduate 
45  
OFF #4 Male 33 Staff Sergeant 54 Some University 19 
OFF #5 Male 20 Staff Sergeant 47 University 
Graduate 
19 





OFF #7 Male 12 Constable 41 University 
Graduate 
25 
OFF #8 Male 26 Staff Sergeant 45 High School 
Graduate 
21 
OFF #9 Male 26 Staff Sergeant 47 University 
Graduate 
26 
OFF #10 Male 12 Constable 37 College Graduate 23 





OFF #12 Male 15 Constable 49 College Graduate 22 
OFF #13 Male 26 Staff Sergeant 52 Advanced Degree 18 
OFF #14 Male 24 Detective 
Constable 
47 College Graduate 22 
OFF #15 Male 3 Constable 25 College Graduate 24 
OFF #16 Male 14 Constable 37 University 
Graduate 
24 
OFF #17 Female 19 Sergeant 48 Some University 19 
OFF #18 Female 19 Staff Sergeant 45 University 
Graduate 
34 





OFF #20 Male 34 Constable 55 High School 
Graduate 
27 
OFF #21 Male 10 Constable 52 College Graduate 18 
OFF #22 Male 15 Sergeant 43 College Graduate 28 
OFF #23 Male 17 Constable 60 University 
Graduate 
36 
OFF #24 Male 22 Sergeant 47 Some College 21 
 
OFF #25 Male 10 Constable 34 College Graduate 30 
OFF #26 Male 29 Constable 50 College Graduate 17 
OFF #27 Female 28 Sergeant 49 College Graduate 26 
OFF #28 Female 21 Senior Officer 50 College Graduate 18 
OFF #29 Male 20 Constable 41 College Graduate 21 
OFF #30 Female 18 Constable 48 Advanced Degree 25 





OFF #32 Male 28 (+4) 32 Staff Sergeant 53 High School 
Graduate 
19 
OFF #33 Male 27 Staff Sergeant 50 University 
Graduate 
35 
OFF#34 Male 13 Constable 39 Some University 26 
OFF #35 Male 10 Constable 34 Some University 26 
OFF #36 Male 25 Constable 46 College Graduate 30 
OFF #37 Male 30 Sergeant 54 University 
Graduate 
28 
OFF #38 Male 24 Sergeant 45 University 
Graduate 
20 
OFF #39 Male 14 Constable 44 College Graduate 25 
OFF #40 Male 20 Detective 
Constable 
38 Advanced Degree 22 
 
The semi-structured interview script was designed to follow the general topics and themes 
addressed in the survey questionnaire (e.g., attitudes and perceptions of civilian oversight in 
general, followed by questions pertaining to the various oversight agencies).  It employed the 
following headings: Preamble; socio-demographic profile questions; general questions about 
civilian oversight; questions about police services boards; questions about the SIU, OIPRD, and 
Professional Standards Bureau; general concluding questions.  Appendix D contains a copy of 
the semi-structured interview questions/script for police officers.  In Chapter 7: Semi-Structured 




Table 4-7: Breakdown of respondent profiles from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police 
Officers 
Sex of Interviewees Male 33 
Female 7 
 
Highest Level of 
Education 
High School Graduate 4 
Some College 1 
College Graduate 13 
Some University 5 
University Graduate 14 





Detective Constable 5 
Sergeant 7 
Staff Sergeant 8 
Senior Officer 2 
Average Years of 
Experience 
20 
Average Age 45.5 




Although all police officer interviewees were offered the option of conducting in-person or 
telephone interviews, all elected to be interviewed by telephone.  This method of interviewing 
was both efficient and cost-effective.  As Shuy (2003: 175-193) reported, the benefits of 
telephone interviews include reduced interviewer effects, increased uniformity and 
standardization in questioning, enhanced researcher safety and cost-efficiency.  Palys (2003:155-
159) identified some additional benefits, such as reduced travel costs over a potentially wide 
geographic area and providing a controlled environment (e.g., volume and quality).  However, 
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both Palys (2003: 157-159) and Shuy (2003: 175-193) acknowledged that telephone-based 
interviews cannot furnish interviewers with visual cues of their respondents’ reactions and may 
be less conducive than face-to-face interviews to the development of rapport between 
interviewers and their respondents.   
4.3.1 Inductive & Deductive Coding Strategy for Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews: 
Police Officers 
I utilized a blend of inductive (analysis without pre-determined ideas) and deductive (analysis 
with pre-determined ideas) strategies in coding and analyzing the interview data.  Punch (2014: 
170) described the benefits of this approach:  
In the search of regularities in the social world, induction is central.  Concepts are 
developed inductively from the data and raised to a higher level of abstraction and 
their interrelationships are then traced out.  But while induction is central, 
deduction is needed also, since…theory generation involves theory verification as 
well.  This sort of qualitative analysis is a series of alternating inductive and 
deductive steps, whereby data-driven inductive hypothesis generation is followed 
by deductive hypothesis examination, for the purpose of verification.  
Based upon the clear themes that emerged from the literature review and the results from the 
survey questionnaire (including open-ended commentary), I utilized a deductive approach in my 
initial assessment of the interview data from police officers.   
A “provisional ‘start list’” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81-82) emerged from several 
sources.  To wit:  
 The conceptual framework for this project that was developed during my research design 
and proposal stages;  
 My familiarity with the interview material, since I was the interview facilitator and I 
personally transcribed each interview;  
 The semi-structured interview script, which provided a sound basis from which to separate 
and organize the various overarching topical areas (e.g., the various oversight agencies).  
This format additionally imposed a consistent template for each interview, while allowing 
for flexibility;  
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 My experience in coding and analyzing the open-ended commentary from the survey 
questionnaire also allowed me to discern patterns in the comments of my respondents. 
 
With a robust “provisional ‘start list’” of core topical categories in hand, I transitioned to more of 
an inductive approach, whereby I developed codes/nodes as they emerged from the data.   
The analysis of Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews involved the use of Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS).   I employed the NVivo10 computer program 
utilizing both First and Second Cycle coding techniques listed below (e.g., Saldana, 2009).  
“NVivo is the most widely used software in most social sciences disciplines” (Punch, 2014:199).   
The level of coding detail varied between words, sentences and small paragraphs.  Simultaneous 
Coding was used whenever applicable (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81, 85-86).  Table 4-
8 provides a list of the First Cycle coding techniques that I utilized throughout this study and a 
brief description of each of coding method which draws upon the writings of Miles, Huberman & 
Saldana (2013: 75-81) and Saldana (2013: 69-144).   
I also utilized the memoing feature in NVivo whenever a particular idea, sentence or passage 
struck me as particularly useful or illuminating.  A “memo”, as defined by Glaser (1978: 83-84) 
is “the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst 
while coding” and may be “a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages”; nevertheless, “it exhausts 
the analyst’s momentary ideation based on data with perhaps a little conceptual elaboration” (as 
quoted in Punch, 2014: 177).  The memoing feature in NVivo allowed me to keep track of 
important passages/quotations, as well as general and specific thoughts, observations and 
insights about the study.  As Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2013: 96) observed, “Analytic 
memos can also go well beyond codes and their relationships to any aspect of the study – 
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personal, methodological, and substantive.  They are one of the most useful and powerful sense-
making tools at hand.” 
Table 4-8: First Cycle Coding Techniques 
Exploratory 
Methods 
Holistic Coding: “applies a single code to a large unit of data in the corpus, rather than 
line-by-line coding, to capture a sense of the overall contents and the possible categories 
that may develop”; “most applicable when the researcher has a general idea of what to 
investigate in the data” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 77; see also Saldana, 2013: 
142). 
Provisional Coding: “begins with a ‘start list’ of researcher-generated codes, based on 
what preparatory investigation suggests might appear in the data before they are 
collected and analyzed”; “can be revised, modified, deleted or expanded to include new 
codes” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 77; see also Saldana, 2013: 144). 
Grammatical 
Methods 
Attribute: “the notation of basic descriptive information such as the fieldwork setting, 
participant characteristics or demographics, data format, and other variables of interest 
for qualitative and some applications of quantitative analysis”  (Miles, Huberman & 
Saldana, 2013: 79; see also Saldana, 2013: 69). 
Subcoding: “a second-order tag assigned after a primary code to detail or enrich the 
entry” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 80; see also Saldana, 2013: 77). 
Simultaneous Coding: “the application of two or more different codes to a single 
qualitative datum, or the overlapped occurrence of two or more codes applied to 
sequential units of qualitative data” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81; see also 
Saldana, 2013: 81). 
Affective 
Methods 
Emotion Coding  - “this method labels the emotions recalled and/or experienced by the 
participant or inferred by the researcher about the participant…It also provides insight 
into the participants’ perspectives, worldviews, and life conditions” (Miles, Huberman & 
Saldana, 2013: 75; see also Saldana, 2013: 105). 
Values Coding: “the application of three different types of related codes into qualitative 
data that reflect a participant’s values, attitudes and beliefs representing his or her 
perspective or worldview.  A value (V:) is the importance we attribute to ourselves, 
another person, thing or idea.  An attitude (A:) is the way we think and feel about 
oneself, another person, thing or idea.  A belief (B:) is part of a system that includes 
values and attitudes, plus personal knowledge, experiences, opinions, prejudices, morals 
and other interpretive perceptions of the social world” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 
2013: 75; see also Saldana, 2013: 110).   
Evaluation Coding: “applies primarily nonquantitative codes into qualitative data that 
assign judgments about merit, worth or significance of programs or policy”; 
“appropriate for policy, critical, action, organizational and evaluation studies, 
particularly across multiple cases and extended periods of time” (Miles, Huberman & 
Saldana, 2013: 76; see also Saldana, 2013: 119). 
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After completing First Cycle coding on all 40 interviews, it was evident that the structured 
format of the interviews provided a sound platform to introduce Pattern Coding as a Second 
Cycle technique.  Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2013: 86) have explained the link between First 
and Second Cycle coding methods (see also Miles, Huberman, 1994: 69; Saldana, 2013: 209-
213): 
First Cycle coding is a way to initially summarize segments of data.  Pattern 
coding, as a Second Cycle method, is a way of grouping those summaries into a 
smaller number of categories, themes, or constructs…Pattern codes are 
explanatory or inferential codes, ones that identify an emergent theme, 
configuration, or explanation.  They pull together a lot of material from First 
Cycle coding into more meaningful and parsimonious units of analysis.  They are 
a sort of meta code.   
Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2013: 86) highlighted several of the important functions of Pattern 
Coding, such as condensing large amounts of data into a smaller number of analytic units and 
laying the groundwork for cross-case analysis by surfacing common themes and directional 
processes.  Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion presents the 
culminated results of this coding analysis.   
4.4   Phase 2: Semi-Structured Interviews: Stakeholder Representatives 
Following the completion of the interviews with police officers, I contacted all of the relevant 
stakeholders and requested of each that I be allowed to conduct semi-structured interviews with a 
senior representative from their organization.  These interviews were intended to provide a 
counterbalance to the information gleaned from police officers about their attitudes, perceptions 
and experiences pertaining to civilian oversight mechanisms.  These interviews were all 
conducted after the police officer interviews were completed to allow me to incorporate some 
preliminary findings throughout each respective conversation.  The interview script varied for 
each interview, as attempts were made to tailor the questions and dialogue as carefully as 
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possible to the stakeholder agency/representative, including the knowledge gained from Phase 1 
and Phase 2 interviews with police officers.   
I interviewed six individuals in total during this phase.  One interview was conducted in-person, 
four interviews were conducted by telephone and one interview was a written Question/Answer 
format, followed by an unrecorded telephone conversation.  Table 4-9 summarizes the 
organizations that participated by providing me with access to a senior executive representative 
as well as the interview method used, whether or not the interview was recorded and the length 
of the interview.  Although the majority of these interviews were conducted in the summer of 
2014, one was conducted in early 2015. 
Table 4-9: Summary of results from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Stakeholder 
Representatives 
Agency Method Length of 
recorded 
interview 
The participating police service 





OACP – Ontario Association of Chiefs of 




OAPSB – Ontario Association of Police 






CACP-RF - Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation 




CAPG – Canadian Association of Police 





OIPRD – Office of the Independent Police 
Review Director (Senior Executive 
Representative) 
Declined formal interview but 
provided written responses to a 
written version of the 
interview script and consented 
to a non-recorded telephone 
conversation.   
 
I transcribed the totality of the recorded interviews.  I analyzed the six stakeholder interviews 
using the coding/themeing strategy that was outlined earlier in section 4.2.3 Open-Ended Survey 
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Questions.  I thought doing so appropriate inasmuch as the purpose of these interviews was to 
explore findings and themes that derived from the survey.  I employed NVivo software as an aid 
to the organization and analysis of this body of data.  The five predominant themes of my 
interviews with stakeholder representatives are presented in Chapter 7: Semi-Structured 
Interviews: Findings and Discussion. 
4.5   Ethics Approval 
I received formal clearance to carry out the project from the University of Waterloo’s Office of 
Research Ethics (ORE) on September 24, 2013.  I encountered no significant barriers in 
obtaining ethics approval for this project, since the pool of involved participants consisted of 
adult professionals who were free to decide whether they wished to participate in my study and 
whether their participation would be limited to answering questions from a survey questionnaire 
or also include answering questions in a semi-structured interviews.   
Throughout the course of the project, respondents were free to abstain from participation, to 
withdraw at any time and to decline answering any question.  The anticipated risk of harm to 
participants was deemed to be low.  However, cognizant that the topics addressed in the 
questionnaire and interviews might evoke feelings of stress and/or distress in some of my 
respondents, I ensured that the information/consent letter that was provided to all respondents 
made reference to counselling services that are available to all members of the host police 
service through its Employee Assistance Program.   
4.6  Reflections on “Insider Status” 
Unlike others who have conducted research on this topic, I am an active police officer.  This 
status impacted my research design in a number of ways.  In advance of contacting any 
stakeholder agencies to seek support, I informed the Chief of the Waterloo Regional Police 
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Service and the President of the Waterloo Regional Police Association about my planned project.  
I anticipated that some stakeholders would seek to verify my professional status and reputation 
and later learned that this, in fact, had been the case.   
 
In approaching potential participants and agencies, I identified myself as both an officer with the 
Waterloo Regional Police Service and a PhD Candidate at the University of Waterloo.  My frank 
disclosure of my dual status stemmed from my desire to be forthright with my respondents.  I 
believe that my ability to enter into a research agreement with the police service that hosted my 
study and obtain endorsements from several stakeholders may have been eased by my “insider 
status.”  I think it equally possible that my standing as an active police officer may have served 
to discourage the participation of other stakeholders.  While I can only speculate as to why some 
may have refrained from participating, it is possible that these agencies may have doubted my 
ability to be objective.  However, this is simply speculative and I am unable to comment 
knowledgeably on the reasons why, for example, all three police association organizations (local, 
Police Association of Ontario, Canadian Police Association) decided against participating in this 
project.  Moreover, I wish to stress that regardless of their decision, all of the stakeholder 
agencies responded to my requests in a way that was courteous and cordial.   
In contemplating how my dual roles may have impacted the quality of the data I collected, I 
believe that my status as a police officer may have eased my ability to establish rapport with the 
40 police officers I interviewed.  In virtually all of these interviews, the conversational tone was 
relaxed and casual.  I further believe that our shared knowledge facilitated discussions that were 
linear and covered much terrain in a relatively short amount of time. 
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4.7    Conclusion of Chapter 4: Methods 
This chapter has provided an overview of the research methods employed throughout this study.  
Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis provides a detailed overview of the 




Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis  
This chapter provides a profile of the officers who answered my survey and provides a first look 
at their attitudes and cognitions about civilian oversight.  The next chapter deals with index 
construction and provides the multivariate analysis.    
5.1  Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
The first section of the survey questionnaire asked respondents about themselves and their 
policing career.  Table 5-10 provides a summary of the respondents’ socio-demographic details.  
Some provincial and national sample-population data are presented below in illustration of the 
representativeness of the sample frame from the host police service.   
Sex: Males accounted for approximately four-fifths (79.8%) of the survey sample with females 
accounting for the remaining fifth. The percentage of female representatives is close to the 
average percentage of active female police officers in police services across Ontario (18.7%) and 
across Canada (19.9%) (Statistics Canada, 2012: 28).  
Age: The sample frame was generally reflective of police services in Canada.  The vast majority 
of respondents (80.7%) were between 34-54 years old.  When compared to available national 
data, this sample is slightly underrepresented by police officers under 35 years of age.  Thus, 
according to Statistics Canada (2012: 13):  
Across Canada, police officers aged 60 years and over accounted for less than 1% 
of all police officers, while those between 50 and 60 years of age represented 15% 
...The largest cohorts were officers aged 30 to 40 years (35%) and those aged 40 
to 50 years (35%). Officers aged between 20 and 30 years represented 14% of all 
officers, while less than 1% of officers were under 20 years of age. 
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Education: 41.6% of respondents identified themselves as college graduates and roughly a third 
(30.7%) said they were university graduates.  In addition, roughly a fifth reported their 
completion of either “some college” (9.1%) or “some university” (11.2%) coursework.   These 
findings are generally consistent with data from a study conducted by the Ontario Police College 
(Ontario, 2013) which investigated the educational attainments of all police officer recruits 
between 1996 and 2012 and found that “36.0% of all OPP and municipal police service recruits 
completed a university degree prior to attending OPC; 46.8% completed a college diploma; and 
17.2% completed neither” (Ontario, 2013: 10).  These figures can also be compared with data 
from Statistics Canada’s 2011 National Household Survey, which found that 28.9% of Ontarians, 
25-64 years old, have a university degree and 23.6% have a college diploma (Ontario, 2013: 10).  
These findings suggest that the educational attainment of the police officers in my sample is 
slightly higher than that of the average Ontarian.   
Policing experience: Only 18.2% of respondents said they had less than 10 years of police 
experience, with 3.7% having less had than 5 years of service and 14.5% possessing between 5 
and 9 years of experience.  Almost half (49.5%) of respondents had between 10 and 24 years of 
experience.  Meanwhile, more than a quarter (25.4%) had between 25 and 29 years of 
experience, which suggests that the survey may slightly underrepresent newer police officers and 
slightly overrepresent officers with considerable career experience.   
Rank: Almost two-thirds (63.9%) of my respondents were at the “Constable” rank (63.9% total); 
47.4% were Constables and 16.5% were Detective Constables.  Sergeants accounted for 22.9% 




Community size: Over a quarter (27.8%) serve communities with less than 25,000 people.  
Slightly more than a third (36.5%) reported that they serve communities of 25,000 to 100,000 
inhabitants and 17.7% work in larger communities (i.e., more 100,000 people).  The remaining 
17.9% selected “Don’t Know / Not Applicable”; their choice of this option suggests that these 
officers may work in a centralized or specialized capacity. 
Community composition: Almost two-thirds of respondents (59.9%) described the community 
they serve as “A mix of rural and urban” while 23.3% work in a “Mostly rural” setting.  Only 
6.1% of respondents described working in a “Mostly urban” setting, and 10.6% selected “Don’t 
know / Not Applicable” with the latter again suggesting that they served in a centralized or 
specialized role.   
Police Association support: The vast majority of respondents (89.1%) reported supporting their 
police association.  However, roughly the same proportion (84%) indicated they do not regularly 
attend police association meetings. 
Table 5-10: Socio-demographic details 
  N Percentage 
Sex  Male 1219 79.8 
Female 309 20.2 





18-24 2 .1 
25-34 201 13.1 
35-44 546 35.6 
45-54 691 45.1 
55-64 87 5.7 
65 or over 6 .4 






High School graduate 73 4.8 
Some College 139 9.1 
College graduate 637 41.6 
Some University 172 11.2 
University graduate 469 30.7 
Advanced Degree completed 
(e.g., Masters, PhD) 
29 1.9 
Other 11 .7 






1 - 4 years 57 3.7 
5 - 9 years 222 14.5 
10 - 14 years 259 16.9 
15 - 19 years 259 16.9 
20 - 24 years 240 15.7 
25 - 29 years 389 25.4 
30 years or more 105 6.9 
Total 1531 100.0 
 
Rank Police Constable 724 47.4 
Detective Constable 252 16.5 
Sergeant 350 22.9 
Staff Sergeant 108 7.1 
Senior Officer 90 5.9 
Other 4 .3 










Less than 5,000 62 4.0 
5,001 - 25,000 365 23.8 
25,001 - 50,000 259 16.9 
50,001 - 75,000 181 11.8 
75,001 - 100,000 119 7.8 
100,001 - 200,000 77 5.0 
More than 200,000 195 12.7 
Don't Know / Not Applicable 274 17.9 




Mostly rural 356 23.3 
A mix of rural and urban 914 59.9 





Don't Know / Not Applicable 162 10.6 





Yes 1361 89.1 
No 93 6.1 
I don't know 74 4.8 






Yes 237 15.5 
No 1285 84.0 
I don't know 7 .5 
Total 1529 100.0 
 
Ethnic/Cultural Origins variable 
Respondents were asked “What were the ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors?”  In 
posing this query, I intentionally used an open-ended question rather than a checklist, 
recognizing that some might self-identify with multiple groups.  I also followed the wording 
used by Statistics Canada in their 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (see also Statistics Canada, 2003; 
Reitz et al., 2009: 24-25).  As Table 5-11 illustrates, respondents could answer this question in 
novel ways.  A coding strategy was therefore developed to identify the first, second and third 
ethnicity listed by respondents; since respondents rarely identified more than three ethnicities, 
the ethnicity references beyond the third were infrequent and were not coded.  Table 5-55 (see 
Appendix E) displays fifteen examples of combinations chosen by my respondents and includes 
their corresponding codes.   
In total, 17 different codes were established, with some references only mentioned once or twice 
(e.g., New Zealand, South Africa).  All references to origins typically associated with the United 
Kingdom or “Anglo Saxon” status were combined under a single code “British” (English, Irish, 
Scottish, "Anglo Saxon"), which proved to be the most frequently chosen ethnic identity.  
References to all other (non-British) European countries were coded as “All other European”, 
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which was the second most cited ethnicity.  The third most popular was French/French Canadian 
origins. 
Table 5-11: Cultural Origins Variable 


























All other European 339 21.3 142 8.9 21 1.3 
Not Specified 221 13.8 1118 70.1 1502 94.3 
French/French 
Canadian 
144 9.1 88 5.5 15 .9 
Canadian 112 7.0 26 1.6 12 .8 
Caucasian 
("White") 








13 .8 2 .1 * * 
Caribbean 12 .8 4 .3 * * 
Asian (Chinese, 
Japanese, Korean) 
12 .8 1 .1 * * 
South Asian 
(Indian, Pakistani) 
7 .4 * * 1 .1 





4 .3 13 .8 3 .2 
Middle Eastern 
(incl. "Arabic") 
3 .2 1 .1 1 .1 
American 2 .1 5 .3 1 .1 
South African * * 2 .1 * * 
New Zealand * * 1 .1 * * 
Total 1593 100.0 1593 100.0 1593 100.0 




To summarize this sprawl of ethnic identities, I constructed the variable “Visible Minority 
Status” based upon a respondent self-identifying as: South American, First Nation/Aboriginal 
(incl. Metis), Middle Eastern (incl. "Arabic"), Caribbean, Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean), 
"African" (incl. "Black", African Canadian) or South Asian (Indian, Pakistani).  Using this 
recoding, 8.7% of respondents were deemed to be visible minorities and 91.3% were therefore 
identified as non-visible minorities (see Table 5-56 in Appendix E).   
In comparison, the 2006 Canadian Census reported that visible minorities in Canada make up 
16% of the total national population and 22.8% of the Ontario population (Statistics Canada, 
2006); it should be noted that the Canadian Census does not include Aboriginal peoples in their 
definition of “visible minorities.”  My findings can also be compared with the 2012 Police 
Administration Survey (Statistics Canada, 2012: 15) which found that 9% reported being a 
member of a non-Aboriginal visible minority group and 5% reported being an Aboriginal 
person” (Statistics Canada, 2012: 15).20  However, in this study, one-third of individual police 
officers or police services did not disclose ethnic/racial status (Statistics Canada, 2012: 15). 
5.2   General Questions about Civilian Oversight 
The second section of the survey asked respondents questions about civilian oversight in general 
terms.  Figure 5-1 (and Table 5-57 in Appendix E) provides a summary of the responses 
regarding “General Questions about Civilian Oversight.”  The survey revealed positive attitudes 
toward civilian oversight in general terms among a majority of respondents.  For example,  
                                                          
20   According to Statistics Canada’s 2011 National Household Survey, the largest contingent of Aboriginal people in 
Canada reside in Ontario (21%; 301,425), which represents 2.4 % of the total population in Ontario:  
https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-011-x/2011001/tbl/tbl02-eng.cfm 
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 63% of respondents agreed that civilian oversight helps to ensure accountability of policing 
(19.5% disagreed). 
 61.8% of respondents reported that they believe civilian oversight maintains public trust in 
policing (17.9% disagreed). 
These were among the most general questions posed in the survey about civilian oversight and 
the results suggest that the majority of respondents support oversight by non-police personnel in 
broad terms.   
Figure 5-1: General Questions about Civilian Oversight 
 
Several of the survey questions in this section sought to determine the degree to which 
respondents perceive civilian oversight to be biased against the police, or to what extent civilian 
oversight challenges police officers’ sense of professionalism/professional autonomy.  The 
findings below suggest there to be tacit support for the involvement of civilians in the oversight 
of policing. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT ENSURES ACCOUNTABILITY
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT MAINTAINS PUBLIC TRUST IN…
SATISFIED IF CIVILIAN INVESTIGATORS ARE FORMER…
PREFERENCE FOR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ONLY
PREFERENCE FOR "CIVILIAN REVIEW" ONLY
CIVILIANS ARE INCAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING POLICE…
ONLY POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD INVESTIGATE…
CIVILIANS ARE BIASED AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT INFRINGES ON PROFESSIONAL…
KEEP CIVILIANS OUT OF POLICE OVERSIGHT
CIVILIANS HAVE NECESSARY SKILLS
Responses by percentages
General questions about civilian oversight
Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Don’t Know
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 57.1% of respondents disagreed with the statement that civilians should be kept “out of 
police oversight.”  Only 17.9% agreed with that statement. 
 Only 34.7% of respondents agreed that “Alleged police misconduct should only be 
investigated by police officers”; 40.8% disagreed with that statement. 
 Furthermore, only 25.7% of respondents agreed with the statement, “Civilians are biased 
against police officers”; 37% of respondents disagreed with that statement. 
 44% of respondents disagreed with the statement that “Civilian oversight infringes upon 
the professional status of police officers.”  Only 24.6% of respondents agreed with that 
statement. 
These results illustrate support for civilian oversight in general terms.  Furthermore, the results 
do not suggest widespread concern regarding bias against police, nor widespread concern that 
civilian oversight poses challenges to police officers’ sense of professionalism/professional 
autonomy.   
However, this battery of questions does reveal some concerns about the perceived capabilities of 
civilians involved in the investigation of police officers.  For example: 
 54.9% of respondents indicated that they do not believe that civilians possess the skills 
necessary to investigate alleged police misconduct.  Only 15.2% of respondents felt that 
civilians do possess such skills. 
 Respondents were split on their assessment of the capability of civilians to “understand 
police work”: 34.8% indicated they do not feel civilians understand police work, while 
37.1% disagreed with that statement. 
These responses are consistent with the findings of past research which has found that police 
officers commonly believe that civilian investigators are ill-equipped to grasp the complicated 
nuances of police work (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 107-108, 154, 237, 247; 
Finn, 2001: 109; Wells & Schafer, 2007: 18). 
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Previous research has noted that most police officers would prefer civilians to be involved in a 
“review capacity” rather than an “investigative capacity” (e.g., Perez, 1994: 247-248; Walker & 
Herbst, 1999: 5; Weisburd et al., 2000: 9; Brody & Lovrich, 2007).  These studies have 
additionally found that most police officers would prefer that police officers (rather than 
civilians) investigate alleged police misconduct (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 
154; Kreisel, 1998: 210; Weisburd et al., 2000: 7; Brody & Lovrich, 2007; De Angelis & 
Kupchik, 2007: 665).  These preferences were echoed by my respondents.  For example:  
 46.6% of respondents reported that they would prefer that civilians only “review 
allegations of police misconduct (not investigate)”; less than a third (30.1%) disagreed. 
 48.7% of respondents agreed that they would prefer that their “police service's Professional 
Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police 
misconduct”; 27.8% of respondents disagreed.   
Furthermore, a majority of respondents were accepting of oversight investigations involving 
former police officers: 61.5% of respondents agreed that if civilian investigators were former 
police officers, they would not mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct (12% 
disagreed).  This question, in particular, suggests that police officers may be more accepting of 
civilian-led investigation and oversight if they are aware of the professional accomplishments of 
these investigators and made aware that their investigative skills were honed in policing.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses, six of the eleven investigators 
employed by the OIPRD are former police officers (OIPRD, 2014: 41) and this is also true of 
more than four-fifths of SIU investigators (Bruser & Henry, 2010).   
At the end of this block of questions, the questionnaire prompted, “please include any additional 
comments.”  This invitation was taken up by 385 respondents whose comments were examined 
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and coded for common themes.  In total, 31 different themes/codes were developed for this block 
of responses.  Table 5-12 provides examples of the most commonly cited themes.   
Table 5-12: Example open-ended commentary: General Attitudes toward Civilian Oversight 
Most common themes 
(from 385 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 
1. Questions about civilian 
investigators’ training 
(N=89, 23.1% of all 
comments voiced) 
“Properly trained investigators 
(civilian) are capable of 
investigating police involved 
incidents however the real 
problem is finding civilians with 
enough experience investigating 
serious incidents. Training is a 
basis for investigating however as 
a 29 year member, having 
received copious amounts of 
training, my real expertise was 
truly developed over time 
investigating thousands of cases. 
Also it should be a combination 
police/civilian investigatory 
body...not one or the other.” 
 
“The issue is, where do 
trained investigators into 
criminal misconduct gain their 
experience and skills? Good 
investigators take years to 
train. How do you hire a 
civilian and trust they are 
going to be competent? My 
experience is most are not 
competent. It really shines 
through during interviews. I 
want the best investigator. 
Police, civilian I don’t care.” 
 
2. Questions about 
civilians’ qualifications 
(N=86, 22.3%) 
“Investigators must have 
previous police experience in 
order to understand the situations 
police officers are put in and the 
decisions they have to make 
sometimes in seconds that later 
take months to investigate.” 
 
“My concern would be how 
much experience does a 
civilian have to complete a 
thorough investigation. A 
course at OPC (Ontario Police 
College) does not make an 
investigator, experience does.” 
 
3. Expressions of support 
for civilian oversight 
(N=74, 19.2%) 
“I do not care who investigates 
misconduct as long as the 
individual has the ability and 
knowledge to do so effectively. 
Civilian oversight is extremely 
important as we are not living in 
a police state. Regardless of how 
well misconduct is investigated, if 
there's no civilian oversight there 
will always be room for criticism 
which ultimately brings the 
public’s opinion of police actions 
into question. The policing 
community cannot live in its own 
bubble.” 
 
“I do believe that civilian 
oversight is necessary and that 
it only benefits police and 





4. Expressions that 
investigative 
qualification is 
subjective and varies for 
both civilians and police 
(N=70, 18.2%) 
“I believe investigators, be they 
uniform or civilian, need to be 
open minded unbiased individuals 
who possess a good knowledge of 
the law, common sense, a strong 
degree of integrity, honesty, 
values and impartiality and who 
are willing to do the right thing 
for the right reason. We need to 
be professional in our conduct 
and the public should not expect 
or be offered anything less. We 
need public trust and respect to 
effectively do our jobs.” 
 
“Some civilians (much like 
police officers) have more 
common sense than others, so 
therefore it's hard to paint 




is essential (N=31, 
8.1%) 
“Investigations need to be 
completed by trained 
investigators, period. Retired or 
seconded police officers with 
extensive experience and training 
would be the most credible 
investigators. If police knew that 
investigations would be done 
fairly, without bias, they would 
have no issue with civilian 
investigators, in my opinion.” 
 
“I feel it is all about 
education. To be involved as 
an investigator, the person 
should have a suitable insight 
to the background about what 
they are investigating. There 
are many different angles to be 
considered and there needs to 
be extensive training.” 
 
“Investigators are not bred in 
classrooms, they acquire their 
skills through years of actually 
doing the task. Qualified and 
respected investigators are 
essential to the outcome of the 
investigation.” 
6. Support for a 
combination of police 
and civilian oversight 
(N=30, 7.8%) 
“I believe it should be a 
combination of civilian and police 
officers that investigate 
misconduct. You would have the 
impartiality of the civilian but the 
expertise/experience/knowledge 
of an active police officer.” 
 
“It should be a combined 
effort between police and 
civilian. They could do one 
investigation or two separate, 
then combine them to form a 
final agreement. If you have 
done your job properly, you 
should have nothing to fear 
from a group of people looking 
into it. A combined police and 
civilian team would give the 
proper balance, in that the 
police know what and how 
things are to be done. The 
civilian provides the check and 
should have final say as to the 
outcome. As I believe it should 





Concluding comments and summary: General Questions about Civilian Oversight 
It should be noted that for many questions in this section, significant numbers of respondents 
selected the “neither agree nor disagree” category.  Nevertheless, while the above findings are 
generally consistent with the patterns reported by earlier researchers (and reviewed in Chapter 3: 
Literature Review and Hypotheses), my respondents had a slightly more positive view of civilian 
involvement in oversight/investigative roles than one might have expected from previous 
research.  
Despite these positive evaluations, many respondents expressed reservations about civilians’ 
investigative qualifications and capabilities.  Furthermore, consistent with the findings of 
previous research, outlined in Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses, the majority of my 
respondents indicated a preference for civilians acting in a “review capacity” rather than 
investigative role.  They also preferred that investigations into alleged officer misconduct be 
conducted by former or currently serving police officers.  The subsequent sections on individual 
civilian side to show more 
openness.” 
7. Expressions that 
civilians don’t 
understand police work 
(N=28, 7.3%) 
“I think non-police personnel, not 
including former police officers, 
do not understand police 
subculture. I think one needs to 
experience policing to understand 
this subculture. This 
understanding would aid in police 
oversight investigations.” 
 
“Civilians are incapable to 
[sic] understanding the 
mindset of a Police officer. 
The tactics and training that 
we rely on to make our 
decisions, can’t be explained 
to anyone unless they have 
been through the same 
training. I wouldn't call a guy 
off the street to investigate why 
my lights aren't working in my 
house...I would call an 
electrician or someone that 




civilian oversight agencies help to cross-validate and elucidate these findings with greater 
precision. 
5.3  Police Services Boards 
The third section of the survey asked respondents various questions about police services boards.  
Almost two thirds (59.8%) of respondents reported that they were currently governed by a police 
services board (see Table 5-58 in Appendix E).  The remaining 35.2% indicated they were not 
currently governed by a police services board and 5% of respondents selected “I don’t know.”  
These respondents were re-directed to questions covered in Table 5-61 and Table 5-62 in 
Appendix E (Respondents NOT governed by a police services board). 
5.3.1 Respondents governed by a police services board  
Figure 5-2 provides a summary of responses from respondents currently governed by a police 
services board (59.8% of total respondents; see Table 5-59 and Table 5-60 in Appendix E).  The 
major findings of these materials are summarized below. 
General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of police services boards 
A majority of respondents who were governed by a police services board reported that they 
understood (78.2%) and respected (65.1%) the mandate of these boards and believed them 
necessary (57.2%).  
  
Perceived impact of police services boards 
When queried about the impact of police services boards, almost half of my respondents (49.3%) 
perceived that police services boards did not affect them very much (27.2% disagreed).  
However, while a quarter (24.6 percent) perceived the oversight provided by their police services 
board as “mostly political window dressing,” more than a third (35.6%) believed otherwise.  
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When asked if these boards “infringe on the professional status of police officers,” 10.7% agreed 
and almost half (47%) disagreed.   
 
Perceived performance of police services boards 
Respondents were slightly more critical of the performance of their respective police services 
board (and their individual members) in a variety of circumstances.  For example, approximately 
a third agreed that their police services board is effective in their oversight role (33.9% agreed; 
24.4% disagreed); is trustworthy (32% agreed; 19.9% disagreed); and responsive to the concerns 
of their detachment (34% agreed; 20.5% disagreed).  However, fewer respondents (19.4%) 
agreed that police services board members are qualified to carry out oversight of their 
detachment (31.1% disagreed).  
Figure 5-2: Respondents governed by a police services board: General questions 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
I RESPECT THE MANDATE OF MY POLICE SERVICES BOARD
THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD IS NECESSARY
MY POLICE SERVICES BOARD DOESN’T AFFECT ME MUCH
POLICE SERVICES BOARD'S OVERSIGHT IS WINDOW…
MEMBER OF THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD LISTEN TO…
THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD IS EFFECTIVE
I TRUST THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD
MEMBERS OF THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD ARE…
POLICE SERVICES BOARDS INFRINGE ON PROFESSIONAL…
Responses by percentage
Respondents governed by a police services board: General questions
Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Don't Know
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At the end of this block of questions, respondents received an invitation to “please include any 
additional comments.”  This invitation yielded 110 total responses, all of which were coded for 
distinguishing themes.  In total, 21 different themes/codes were developed for this block of 
responses.  Table 5-13 displays examples of the leading themes.   
Table 5-13: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents governed by a police services board 
Most common themes  
(from 110 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 
1. Police Services Board 
members don’t 
understand police work 
(N=25, 22.7% of all 
comments voiced) 
“I have attended Police Services 
Boards (meetings) for my 
detachment and have been both 
shocked and dismayed by the 
complete lack of knowledge on 
the part of the board members in 
relation to policing. I have had 
board members ask me quite a 
number of basic questions that 
have demonstrated that they 
certainly are not in tune with 
what policing entails or how the 
work is carried out.” 
“There should be mandatory 
training set up for Police 
Services Boards. In theory 
they're a good idea but without 
the members truly knowing 
what their role and authorities 
are they can become useless 
and just do the chief's bidding.” 
2. Police Services Board 
members are more 
worried about fiscal 
accountability than 
police work (N=16, 
14.5%) 
“In today's financial 
accountability it is difficult to 
deal with Police Boards. They 
have limited power and/or not 
interested in addressing the real 
issues they should be addressing 
on policing such as staffing, 
buildings and community 
relations. They want to keep 
policing at a cheap rate and taxes 
down even if they made bad 
choices in town development or 
economic development. They 
often interfere with the day to day 
operations of the police service 
and do not have a great public 
connection with the citizen of the 
town. They are for show and very 
little for the police officer or the 
citizen they serve. They need to 
get more involved in the service 
delivery at the contract level and 
not be the town watchdog for 
taxes.....They need to be there for 
“The police service board here 
concerns itself more with 
budgetary decisions.” 
 
“The police service board 
protects the tax payers and is 
necessary to ensure the area is 
getting the service it pays for. I 
personally don't know who is on 
my police service board nor 
does that affect me, I'm sure it 
does effect some of the reasons 
why we do certain things.” 
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the public safety aspect and the 
wellbeing of the officers serving 
their communities.” 
3. Police Services Board 
members need better 
training about police 
work (N=16, 14.5%) 
“The PSB are not trained. I spend 
a large portion of my time 
educating them on both their 
roles and our issues. Filling the 
PSB with members who are 
trained and have skills and 
experience would make their 
oversight better. I ask for their 
input on issues within the 
community and the police but 
they do not provide any due to the 
lack of understanding. The 
members are satisfied to have me 
produce a report and do not ask 
the serious hard questions. They 
have become much more involved 
recently with the billing reform 
but not the daily business of 
policing their communities.” 
“They may know ABOUT our 
jobs, but they often do not 
KNOW the details of the work 
we do. If these organizations 
are responsible for overseeing 
the police detachment, they 
ought to be closely familiar 
with what our work involves.” 
4. I have no contact with 
Police Services Board 
members (N=15, 13.6%) 
“I've been in the same 
detachment area for 8 years. I've 
never met a member of the police 
services board nor have I been at 
a meeting.” 
“I am not aware of what my 
Police Services Board does at 
my detachment. No one has 
ever talked to me about it and I 
have never asked.” 
5. Police Services Boards 
support/reflect/connect 
community and police 
(N=14, 12.7%) 
“I am lucky to work in a 
detachment that has an excellent 
relationship with our Police 
Services Board. We are extremely 
well supported. Although the 
members of the Board do not 
necessarily always understand 
the workings of the detachment, 
there is always good and open 
conversation and consultation. 
Decisions are made to ensure 
positive results for our officers 
and the community.” 
“The police services board, for 
the most part, is made up of 
people who are interested in the 
safety of their community. Their 
hearts are in the right place 
and they are supportive of our 
service.” 
 
“The police service board does 
not affect the day to day 
operation of the detachment. It 
is more there to bring up 
concerns of the community and 
to make police aware of issue 
from the public regarding crime 




5.3.2 Respondents NOT governed by a police services board  
Respondents who were not governed by a police services board (35.2% of total respondents) 
were directed to a sub-set of general questions about police services boards.  Figure 5-3 provides 
summaries of the responses from this section (see Table 5-61 and Table 5-62 in Appendix E).   
A solid majority of respondents (76.4%) indicated that they understood the mandate of police 
services boards in Ontario and believed these boards were necessary (58.2%).  Nevertheless, just 
over half (52.3%) agreed that police services boards promote accountability of policing and only 
8.2% agreed that “Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to oversee police work,” 
with almost half (48.7%) disagreeing with this statement.  However, while 14.8% perceived that 
“Police Services Boards infringe on the professional status of police officers,” more than a third 
(38.8%) of the respondents who were not governed by a police services board expressed 
disagreement with this statement.   
Figure 5-3: Respondents NOT governed by a Police Services Board: General Questions 
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At the end of this block of questions, respondents were directed to “please include any additional 
comments” they saw fit to make.  This invitation resulted in 107 responses, all of which were 
examined and coded by common themes.  In total, 13 different themes/codes were identified for 
this block of responses.  Table 5-14 displays examples of the most common themes.   
Table 5-14: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents NOT governed by a police services 
board 
Most common themes  
(from 107 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 
1. Police Services Board 
members have little police 
knowledge/experience 
(N=21, 19.6% of all 
comments voiced) 
“Police services boards are 
composed of people who know 
nothing about the intricacies of 
policing and have no beneficial 
input into the accountability 
process of police. They are 
important though to assist the 
police in understanding the 
unique problems within a 
community and assist with 
strategies to correct social 
problems which may not be 
police problems.” 
 
“I believe that it is very difficult 
for a person with no policing 
and or security background to 
judge a police officer’s action 
months after the incident 
occurred. Police are required to 
make split second 
decisions…boards take months 
to make the same decision.” 
 
“Police must be accountable to 
the public that they serve. Police 
Services Boards are a necessary 
public mechanism integral to 
ensuring police accountability. 
They are a valuable asset to 
ensuring overall accountability to 
the public, setting strategic 
direction, ensuring fiscal 
responsibility, and providing 
effective oversight. Having said 
this, it must be clearly understood 
that they are comprised of elected 
and appointed civilians whom do 
not possess the requisite skills 
and knowledge to effectively 
direct the operations of a police 
force. In addition, it is not 
uncommon for board members to 
have political 
aspirations/agendas that are not 
consistent with the effective day-
to-day operations of a police 
service.” 
2. Police Services Board 
members don’t understand 
police work (N=19, 
17.8%) 
“Police service boards are 
comprised of civilians, who for 
the most part don't understand 
what it's like to work the street. I 
don't see a board of non-doctors 
telling doctors how to do their 
job.” 
“As little or no training is 
provided to Police Service Board 
members, they cannot possibly 
have an accurate concept of how 
police policies apply to incidents 
and individuals.” 
3. Police Services Boards are 
too political (N=19, 
17.8%) 
“Many are just local officials 
with no background in policing 
and some have little background 
in local politics and make 
decisions based on what is 
financially good for their 
“I find that these positions are 
more political appointments and 
not really community members 
engaged in the community with a 
goal to ensure adequate and 
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municipality. Some even have 
grudges against policing.” 
effective delivery of policing 
services.” 
 
“Police Service Boards are a 
necessary check and balance for 
police services/detachments. 
However, the system is hampered 
by a political appointment system 
that doesn't always recruit the 
best candidates for the 
positions.” 
4. Police Services Boards 
should not be involved in 
police operations (N=14, 
13.1%) 
“Police Service Boards are 
necessary to provide guidance to 
our management teams on what 
they feel are the community 
priorities and to assist in the 
setting of financial decisions. 
They must truly understand that 
they cannot direct the day to day 
activities of the police of 
jurisdiction.” 
“PSBs do not oversee operational 
matters, only administrative. They 
are qualified to perform this 
function.” 
 
“Police Services boards are an 
essential link between the 
community and the Police agency 
of jurisdiction. They should not 
dictate policy or SOPs (Standard 
Operating Procedures) within the 
Police Service.” 
5. Civilian oversight is 
necessary (N=13, 12.1%) 
“They are very IMPORTANT 
and INTEGRAL part of Criminal 
Justice System as they provide 
checks and balances in routine 
policing.” 
 
“Another ‘must have’ in modern 
policing.” 
“PSB or similar board is 
necessary to have community 
input into policing service 
delivery.” 
 
Concluding comments and summary: Police Services Boards 
It is noteworthy that among both sub-sets of respondents (i.e., those with or without Police 
Services Boards), significant proportions of respondents selected the “neither agree nor disagree” 
category.  This finding indicates that among many respondents, these boards did not evoke 
strong positive or negative emotions. 
The findings reflect general (and somewhat passive) acceptance of the role and mandate of 
police services boards in Ontario; in comparison to the SIU and OIPRD, police services boards 
are long-established oversight institutions in Ontario.  Despite many written comments which 
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opined that police services boards should absent themselves from the “day to day”/“operational” 
functioning of policing, the overall findings suggest that police officers did not perceive police 
services boards as a major threat to their sense of themselves as professionals or to their 
professional autonomy.  I anticipated these results with the reasoning that police officers would 
find them unobtrusive inasmuch as police services boards only rarely have personal interaction 
with individual police officers and most often provide macro-level governance and oversight.  
However, my findings also indicate that many respondents do have significant concerns about 
the qualifications of police services board members or, more specifically, the lack thereof and 
question the efficacy of the oversight they provide.  For example, many respondents perceived 
that board members lacked substantive training/knowledge/experience. 
5.4  Special Investigations Unit (SIU) 
The fourth section of the survey asked respondents various questions about the SIU.  Table 5-15 
(and Table 5-63 in Appendix E) provide summaries of general questions that were posed about 
the mandate and general functioning of the SIU. 
Questions about the SIU’s mandate and general practices 
Several questions sought to determine respondents’ general knowledge about the SIU.  The 
results reveal that many officers do not have a clear understanding of the background of SIU 
investigators.  Although the vast majority of my respondents (98.1%) reported that they 
understood the mandate of the SIU, a significant percentage reported that they were uncertain of 
the qualifications possessed by its members.  For example, the majority did not know how many 
SIU investigators are former police officers or provided estimates that were inaccurate.  More 
than a third (37.4%) responded that they simply did not know the answer to this question. 
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In addition, while the majority of respondents gave accurate estimates of the SIU’s “clearance by 
criminal charge rate” (less than 20% of SIU investigations), 15.1% of respondents were 
inaccurate in their approximations and 27.4% acknowledged frankly their lack of knowledge and 
selected “don’t know.”  Although the SIU has published clearance by charge rates below 5% in 
all their Annual Reports since 2001, 42.5% my respondents were unaware of these trends.   
Almost two-thirds of respondents (64.8%) felt that their organization had provided them with 
adequate information about the composition of the SIU and its workings.  Nevertheless, it would 
seem that police officers in Ontario might derive benefit from receiving additional education 
about the composition of the SIU and its workings. 
Table 5-15: General Knowledge about the SIU 
Regarding the SIU, 
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5.4.1 General Questions about the SIU 
 
Figure 5-4 summarizes various general questions that were posed about the SIU (see Table 5-64 
in Appendix E for exact wordings).  Below are summaries of some highlights from this section.  
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Many responses in this section were positioned in the neutral “neither agree nor disagree” 
category. 
General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of SIU 
A majority of respondents said that they support the mandate and purpose of the SIU.  Although 
about a quarter of my respondents perceived that the SIU is “biased against the police,” almost 
40% of respondents expressed some degree of wariness.  More specifically: 
 77.6% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of the SIU (only 8.4% disagreed). 
 64.3% agreed that the SIU helps to ensure accountability (16.5% disagreed). 
 47% of respondents disagreed with the statement, “I trust the SIU” (20.2% agreed). 
 38.8% disagreed with the statement, “The SIU is biased against the police” (23.6% agreed). 
 
Perceived impact of SIU 
Results were mixed for respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the SIU, with responses 
divided almost in equal thirds (including the neutral category).  Less than a fifth of respondents 
perceived that the SIU encroaches upon the professional status of police officers. 
 37.7% of respondents agreed that the “SIU is effective in their oversight of policing in 
Ontario” (29.1% disagreed). 
 45.8% of respondents disagreed that the “SIU infringes on the professional status of police 
officers” (18% agreed). 
 
Perceived qualifications of SIU investigators 
Results were again split with roughly similar percentages of officers perceiving that SIU 
investigators are objective when they conduct investigations (29.3%), 25.8% disagreeing and the 
remainder neutral.  Just over a third of officers (35.2%) agreed that “SIU investigators are 
qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct” with the majority neutral (45.5%) and 19.3% 
disagreeing with this statement. 
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Organizational Support for SIU 
A majority of respondents perceived that their organization and police association generally 
supports the work of the SIU. 
 64.8% agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about the SIU 
(20.9% disagreed). 
 71.8% agreed that their police organization supports the work of the SIU (only 3% 
disagreed). 
 41% agreed that their police association supports the work of the SIU (only 14.4% 
disagreed). 
Figure 5-4: General questions about the SIU 
 
 
At the end of this block of questions, respondents once again had the option to “include any 
additional comments” and 249 respondents did so.  In total, 26 different themes/codes were 
developed for this block of responses.  Table 5-16 displays examples of the most common 
themes. 
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Table 5-16 : Example open-ended commentary: General Questions about the SIU 
Most common themes  
(from 249 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 
1. SIU investigations are 
politically influenced 
(N=71, 28.5% of all 
comments voiced) 
“I believe the SIU caves into 
public pressure. An officer should 
never be charged with murder 
when using lethal force when he or 
she believes that he or she is using 
that force to protect his or her life. 
The officer may be criminally 
responsible for a death, but 
murder should never come into the 
equation unless there is evidence 
to prove the officer intentionally 
set out to take someone's life.” 
“I support oversight as long 
as the investigators are 
competent, impartial and 
treat everyone fairly. I do not 
support the SIU when they 
support public smear 
campaigns for political gain. 
I also do not support an SIU 
that appears to have a 
political mandate. I would 
support an SIU who 
completes a fair unbiased 
investigation void of political 
interference.” 
2. Comment about SIU 
Director (N=42, 
16.9%) 
“Ian SCOTT is definitely biased 
against the police and has shown 
his dislike for police over and over 
in investigations. His position is 
that police officers have less rights 
than citizens under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which has now resulted in police 
not being afforded the right to 
speak to a lawyer prior to 
completion of duty notes. Every 
citizen in Canada, police or not, 
should be entitled to consult with a 
lawyer if they are being 
investigated criminally (which is 
SIU's mandate to see if criminal 
charges are warranted).” 
“The former head of SIU 
created a very negative image 
for officers and policing in 
general. The controversy over 
officer making notes after 
speaking to legal counsel 
became a point of contention 
for me as a police officer and 
hearing his remarks in the 
media caused my respect for 
the SIU to decrease greatly.” 
 
3. I accept the SIU 
(N=33, 13.3%) 
“The SIU has a mandate to ensure 
that police are held accountable 
for any abuse of their authorities. 
A better understanding of the 
skills, training, and background of 
the investigators, could potentially 
improve the relationship between 
front line officers and the SIU.” 
“I have no issue with the SIU. 
I just wish they'd stand up for 
Officers. The reason why the 
SIU doesn't lay many charges 
is because the Officers do the 
right thing most of the time. 
Why can't they stand up to the 
public and media and say that 
so the public doesn't have 
some impression that there's 
always some kind of cover-
up?” 
4. SIU helps maintain 
accountability (N=24, 
9.6%) 
“I have twice been the subject 
officer in an SIU investigation. On 
both occasions I found the 
“SIU is there to justify to the 
public that police took the 
right actions in those 
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investigators to be capable and the 
investigation done in a fair and 
frank manner. ” 
situations and to hold police 
responsible if they didn't.” 
5. Questions about 
qualifications of SIU 
investigators (N=23, 
9.2%) 
“I have extremely high concerns 
with the training of SIU 
investigators. I have seen first- 
hand many negligent evidence 
gathering techniques. I take issue 
with these people criticizing and 
dissecting over the course of weeks 
and months the decision an officer 
has only seconds to make. ” 
“I was a full time criminal 
investigator for 8 years and 
have first-hand experience 
working in conjunction with 
SIU on criminal 
investigations. I have 
attended their offices with 
regards to meetings and the 
transfer of physical evidence, 
etc. I can honestly say I was 
sorely disappointed in the 
quality of their investigators 
and investigative techniques 
(ie. visible lack of 
continuity/security of 
evidence, poor investigative 
techniques and 
methodologies, etc.). The 
experience did nothing to 
boost my confidence in this 
system which is clearly here 
to stay, for better or worse. ” 
6. SIU requires 
competent 
investigators to be 
trusted (N=21, 8.4%) 
“The mandate of the SIU is 
important. Police need to have 
oversight to ensure and maintain 
public trust but you have to have 
competent investigators to ensure 
that is happening.” 
“Again it comes down to 
competent people which 
promotes trust.” 
7. SIU investigations 
challenge police 
officers’ rights under 
the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (N=20, 
8%) 
“I believe in the SIU and the work 
they do. I do not believe that police 
officers should have some of their 
rights taken away from them just 
because they are police officers. 
(Legal counsel before making 
notebook statements) Police 
officers are still Canadians and 
should be given the same rights 
anyone else is. ‘Police are the 
people and the people are the 
Police’.” 
 
“With the recent Supreme 
Court decision about officers 
completing notes after 
speaking with a lawyer being 
struck down, I believe this 
was mostly the SIU pushing 
that case. I disagree that 
police officers should not be 
afforded the same rights as 
anyone else in this country. 
Civilians can talk to a lawyer 
before providing a statement, 
so police should be able to 
speak to a lawyer before 






Determining level of personal experience with the SIU 
As detailed in Table 5-65 (see Appendix E), almost half of my respondents (46.6%) reported that 
they had personal experience with the SIU as either a witness and/or subject officer.  These 
respondents were invited to answer a series of questions about these experiences (see Table 5-66 
in Appendix E).  Those who lacked such experiences (53.4%) were re-directed to the next section 
in the survey questionnaire. 
Respondents with personal experience with the SIU were divisible into the following strata: 
subject officers (15.1%); witness officers (58.1%); both subject and witness officers (26.8%). 
5.4.2 Respondents with personal experience with the SIU  
Figure 5-5 summarizes my respondents’ reported experiences with the SIU (46.6% of total 
respondents; see Table 5-66 in Appendix E).  Below are some highlights from this section. 
Perceived treatment by SIU staff 
A majority of respondents said they were satisfied with their treatment by SIU staff.  More 
specifically, more than three in five (61.7%) were satisfied with the level of courtesy that they 
received from the SIU’s staff (17.4% were dissatisfied) and more than half (54.3%) perceived the 
questions that they had been asked had been fair-minded; only a minority of officers reported 
dissatisfaction on those bases (14.2%).   
Perceived quality of SIU investigation/investigators 
A majority of respondents were also satisfied with the impartiality shown by SIU staff: 49% of 
respondents were satisfied with the objectivity of the SIU investigator(s) (19.8% were 




Perceptions of the quality of communication during SIU investigation 
A majority of respondents were satisfied with the quality of communication at the outset of the 
SIU investigation.  However, respondents were far less satisfied with the level of communication 
that occurred during the course of the investigation and at its conclusion.  For example,  
 68.9% of respondents were satisfied that they were promptly notified of the SIU 
investigation (17.3% were dissatisfied). 
 53.7% were satisfied that the SIU investigative process was explained to them (30.7% were 
dissatisfied). 
 59% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of 
the SIU investigation (20.6% were satisfied). 
 43.2% were dissatisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the investigation 
(37% were satisfied). 
 
Perceptions of features of the SIU investigative process 
Although a majority of respondents were satisfied with the timing of their initial SIU interview, 
many respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the speed and overall length of the SIU 
investigation.  Thus,  
 52.9% were satisfied that they were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated 
(21.7% were dissatisfied). 
 40.6% were dissatisfied with the speed of the SIU investigative process (38.5% were 
satisfied). 
 46.4% were dissatisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the SIU investigation 




Figure 5-5: Personal experience with SIU: Satisfaction matrix results 
 
One hundred and twenty-nine respondents accepted the invitation to “include any additional 
comments” and twenty-six different themes/codes emerged from these responses.  Table 5-17 
furnishes examples of the most common themes. 
Table 5-17: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents with SIU experience 
Most common themes  
(from 129 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 
1. Poor communication by SIU 
(N=36, 28% of all comments 
voiced) 
 
“If I had not had the support of 
detachment members I would 
have fallen apart. The SIU 
never made contact with me at 
all. I had to constantly ask what 
was happening to my 
supervisor who also did not get 
any communication. It was the 
worst experience I have ever 
had in my life. I got the 
impression that I was a 
statistic. It was devastating.” 
“During one investigation I was 
not contacted after I had been 
cleared of any charges for 
months and only found out when 
I contacted them.” 
1. 2. SIU investigation/resolution 
took too long (N=33, 25.6%) 
“One matter took SIU 2.5 years 
to complete and clear my 
“The former police officers 
conducted a professional 
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2.  partner and I. This was unjust. I 
cooperated fully in this matter.” 
 
investigation, but it took way too 
long and once interviews were 
conducted there was a black 
hole of time, information, and 
communication between SIU and 
officers.” 
3. 3. Not notified of resolution 
(N=21, 16.3%) 
“Was switched from a Witness 
officer to a Subject without 
notification. Read the news 
article stating that I was a 
Subject officer and the outcome 
in the same article before I was 
notified by the SIU or my 
Supervisors. When asked if 
anything can be done to assist 
this from happening in the 
future I was advised that it was 
my association’s issue (????).” 
“Found out I was cleared by the 
SIU from an article in the local 
paper and later by my S/Sgt. 
Never contacted by the SIU upon 
completion so I called them and 
asked for documentation I was 
cleared and the case closed. Was 
advised they don't provide that 
and the case is never "closed" in 
case further information is later 
received. More than a little 
disheartening and stress 
inducing.” 
 
4. 4. Poor communication by SIU 
– no updates (N=21, 16.3%) 
5.  
“You can have the best 
investigators in the world on a 
file, but if it's not conducted in 
a timely fashion the impact it 
has on those involved is not 
pleasant. Further, the SIU 
allows for the initial press 
release, albeit minimal content 
at best, which is front page 
news. "Police Shoot Man after 
Police Pursuit" captures the 
headlines with a closure that 
the police are being 
investigated. Then nothing is 
released for months and 
months. Finally, a release goes 
out buried on page 12 that SIU 
clear police of any wrongdoing. 
Point is public opinion has 
already been carved out 
regardless of the outcome.” 
 
“In my situation, the SIU never 
attended the scene. They 
requested and received my notes 
through my service, without my 
knowledge or consent, never 
spoke to me about the 
investigation, never interviewed 
me and took about 6 months to 
inform me that I did nothing 
wrong.” 
 
“I have yet to have been told of 
the results of any of the SIU 
investigations that I have been 
involved in. All of those have 
been as a witness officer.” 




“I don't feel that their 
investigation, questions or 
understanding of the event was 
very thorough. I felt in some 
instances that their mind was 
made up and they had limited 
understanding of the area of 
investigation (they did not have 
a local understanding). I felt 
“I learned the outcome through 
the media. I did not provide an 
interview because my lawyer felt 
that the investigator had already 




that they have invoked their 
mandate and proceeded 
criminally with charges that 
were provincial offences at 
best.” 
 
Concluding comments and summary: SIU 
Given that the SIU has been existence since 1990, it is readily understandable why the vast 
majority of my respondents (98.1%) would report that they both understood its role and mandate 
and accepted its role in promoting police accountability in Ontario.  A majority of respondents 
that they generally accept the mandate of the SIU and its role in attempting to ensure 
accountability of policing in Ontario.  Furthermore, most respondents reported satisfaction with 
the level of objectivity, professionalism and fairness shown by SIU investigators.  Nevertheless, 
respondents also reported a variety of concerns and, at times, expressed these concerns with 
vehemence.  In particular, they perceived inefficiencies in relation to the speed and length of 
investigation and inadequate communication, both during the investigation and in informing 
officers of the SIU’s decision.    
5.5  Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) 
The survey asked respondents various questions about the OIPRD.  Table 5-18 provides 
summaries of the answers obtained to the general questions posed about the mandate and general 
functioning of the OIPRD (see also Table 5-67 in Appendix E).   
Questions about the OIPRD’s mandate and general practices 
Of the various oversight agencies, my respondents were most likely to report that they lacked 
understanding of mandate and general practices of the OIPRD.  Approximately two thirds of 
respondents said that they understood the mandate of the OIPRD; 23.1% indicated they did not 
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and 8.5% selected “don’t know.”  When compared to the other oversight agencies, this was the 
lowest reported score for this question. 
When asked about the general mandate and practices of the OIPRD, a large proportion of 
respondents indicated they know very little about the oversight agency.  For instance,  
 69.5% reported that they “don’t know” what proportion of OIPRD investigators are former 
police officers (the correct response is 41% to 60%: OIPRD, 2011: 38; OIPRD, 2014: 41)  
 59.6% reported that they “don’t know” what proportion of OIPRD charges are cleared by 
criminal charge (35.2% of respondents selected the correct category, “Less than 20%”). 
 60.5% reported that they “don’t know” what proportion of OIPRD charges are cleared by 
Police Service Act charge (25.6% of respondents selected the correct category, “Less than 
20%”). 
 
These findings demonstrate a lack of general knowledge about the practices of the OIPRD, 
especially when compared to the reported knowledge of the other oversight agencies.   
Table 5-18: General Knowledge about the OIPRD 
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5.5.1 General Questions about the OIPRD 
Figure 5-6 provides a summary of respondents’ answers to the general questions that were posed 
about the OIPRD (see Table 5-68 in Appendix E).  Although many officers selected “neither 
agree nor disagree” and “don’t know” to the questions posed, this section yielded some 
noteworthy findings which are summarized below.   
General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of OIPRD 
Two-fifths of respondents said that they both respected the OIPRD’S mandate and roughly one-
third recognized its role in holding police officers accountable.  Although only a minority of 
respondents expressed trust in the OIPRD, few perceived this agency as biased against the 
police.  More specifically:    
 41.9% of respondents said they respect the mandate of the OIPRD (14.9% disagreed and 
24.4% selected “don’t know”). 
 36.5% agreed that the OIPRD helps to ensure accountability (18.9% disagreed and 24% 
selected “don’t know”). 
 28.8% of respondents disagreed with the statement, “I trust the OIPRD” (16.8% agreed 
and 24.8% selected “don’t know”). 
 25.8% disagreed with the statement, “The OIPRD is biased against the police” (14% agreed 
and 28.4% selected “don’t know”). 
 
Perceived impact of OIPRD 
Almost half of respondents perceived that the OIPRD was either ineffective in their oversight of 
policing in Ontario (23.5%) or felt that they lacked information on its efficiency (29.3%) and 
simply “don’t know.”  Meanwhile, only 12.9% of respondents felt that the OIPRD infringes on 






Perceived qualifications of OIPRD investigators 
A small majority of respondents indicated they are unsure about the objectivity and 
qualifications of OIPRD investigators.  More specifically:  
 32.2% reported that they “don’t know” if the OIPRD is objective when they conduct 
investigations (19.2% agreed and 16.1% disagreed). 
 41.9% of respondents reported that they “don’t know” if “OIPRD investigators are 
qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct” (17.3% disagreed and only 11.2% 
agreed). 
 
Organizational Support for OIPRD 
A small majority of respondents said that they felt sufficiently educated about the OIPRD and 
also that their police service and association supports the work of the OIPRD. 
 37.2% of respondents agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them 
about the OIPRD (35.3% disagreed). 
 50.4% agreed that their police organization supports the work of the OIPRD (29.7% 
selected “don’t know” and only 2.6% disagreed). 
 36.5% of respondents reported they “don’t know” when asked if their police association 




Figure 5-6: General questions about the OIPRD 
 
 
Table 5-19 shows the common themes to the “include any additional comments” probe.  Twenty-
three themes/codes were developed for this block of responses. 
 
Table 5-19: Example open-ended commentary: General Questions about the OIPRD 
Most common themes  
(from 157 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 
1. I don’t know much 
about the OIPRD 
(N=27, 17.2% of all 
comments voiced) 
“I don't know anything about 
OIPRD.” 
 
“Heard of them, but do not 
recall their mandate or 
involvement with my 
organization.” 
“I know absolutely nothing about 
the OIPRD.” 
 
“I know little about OIPRD, only 
that this is another area where 
the public can go to further their 
complaint when they are not 
happy.  The appeal process for 
OIPRD for the public seems to be 
never ending which results in 
stressors on the officer for a very 
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long time even in minor 
complaints.” 
2. Too many frivolous 
complaints (N=17, 
10.8%) 
“OIPRD makes it easier for the 
public to make false, minor or 
vindictive complaints against 
officers. The public is able to 
hide behind the ease of reporting 
to a distant OIPRD rather than 
directly against the officer and 
his service.” 
“It seems that frivolous 
investigations are increasing with 
respect to the OIPRD. It may be 
due to the ease that civilians can 
enter complaints and/or an 
improper review of cases; cases 
that go forward are sometimes a 
waste of everyone's time.” 




“OIPRD oversees our 
Professional Standards Bureau 
investigation when investigation 
is required. I am not aware of 
anyone from OIPRD 
investigating misconduct beyond 
the initial assessment stage.” 
 
“It is my opinion that the work 
of the OIPRD could or is done 
by the Internal Professional 
Standards investigators. I do not 
believe that this group has had 
any significant impact, other 
than public perception, on police 
misconduct.” 
“OIPRD seems to be a bit of a 
farce. They oversee the 
investigations but conduct very 
few of them. I feel they should be 
conducting the investigations that 
they receive complaints about - 
not picking and choosing which 
ones they want to do. Their 
process largely continues with 
‘police investigating police’.” 
4. I have never heard of 
the OIPRD (N=11, 
7%) 
“I have never heard of this 
organization.” 
 
“I have no idea who OIPRD 
are.” 
 
“I have no idea what the 
acronym OIPRD is or what this 
organization even is.” 
 
“I have no knowledge of the 
OIPRD'S mandate or who they 
are made up of.” 
“I have never even heard of the 
‘Office of the Independent Police 
Review Director’.” 
 
“I do not know what the OIPRD 
is.” 
 
“No idea what this body is or 
what it does.” 
 
“Never heard of this 
organization.” 
5. There are too many 
oversight bodies 
(N=10, 6.4%) 
“At what point, does the civilian 
oversight become duplicitous? 
OIPRD, SIU, OCCOPS. In 
addition to that, police officers 
are subject to the professional 
standards of their service. What 
other profession has that level of 
oversight?” 
 
“I understand the concept of an 
independent group that will 
“How many layers of 'oversight' 
do we need? A person can answer 
shop until they get the result they 
want. There should be oversight 
but I hardly think we need all 
these different agencies in 
addition to professional 
standards. It starts to get 
ridiculous when there are all 
these different bodies to answer 
to and then someone needs to do 
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assist an individual who may 
have been mistreated by the 
police, I am not sure of the 
credentials of the investigators 
with this organization, and I 
believe that another independent 
body to oversee complaints 
coupled with the SIU and a 
services on PSB, undermines the 
professional status of police.” 
a PhD study to figure out if/why 
the cops are disillusioned with 
civilian oversight!” 
 
“With the OIPRD we've reached 
a redundant degree of civilian 
oversight. How many 
organizations are required to 




Determining level of personal experience with OIPRD 
 
Table 5-20 provides a breakdown of respondents with/without personal experience with the 
OIPRD.  Approximately one quarter (27.3%) of respondents said that they had personal 
experience with the OIPRD as either a witness or subject officer (or both).  These respondents 
were invited to answer a series of questions about their experience with the OIPRD (Table 5-69).  
The remaining 72.7% of respondents were re-directed to the next section in the survey 
questionnaire. 
The 27.3% of respondents who indicated they had personal experience with the OIPRD were 
divided in the following strata: subject officers (51%); witness officers (20.1%); both subject and 
witness officers (28.9%). 
 
About one third (30.5%) of respondents said that OIPRD investigators were the primary 
investigators for their case(s).  In turn, investigators from the respondents’ own Professional 






Table 5-20:  Personal Experience with the OIPRD 
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5.5.2 Respondents with personal experience with the OIPRD  
 
Figure 5-7 provides a summary of the answers elicited by questions about respondents’ personal 
experience with the OIPRD (27.3% of total respondents) (see Table 5-69 in Appendix E).  Below 
I summarize some highlights from this section. 
Perceived treatment by OIPRD staff 
A majority of respondents reported courteous treatment and satisfaction with the fairness of the 
investigators’ questions.   
 37.9% were satisfied that they were treated courteously by the OIPRD staff (14% were 
dissatisfied). 






Perceived quality of OIPRD investigation/investigators 
A majority of respondents reported satisfaction with the objectivity of the involved investigators 
and the investigation itself.   
 44.1% of respondents were satisfied with the objectivity of the investigator(s) (19.1% were 
dissatisfied). 
 45% were satisfied that the investigation was unbiased (20.1% were dissatisfied). 
 
Perceptions of the quality of communication during OIPRD investigation 
The majority of respondents were satisfied with the initial notification of the investigation and 
notification of its ultimate outcome.  However, some were dissatisfied with the information that 
they received about the investigative process.  Almost half of respondents were dissatisfied with 
the level of communication provided throughout the investigation.   
 55.1% of respondents were satisfied that they were promptly notified of the OIPRD 
investigation (25.3% were dissatisfied). 
 39.6% were dissatisfied with the way in which the OIPRD investigative process was 
explained to them (38.9% were satisfied). 
 48.8% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress 
of the OIPRD investigation (27.2% were satisfied). 
 50.2% were satisfied with the way in which they were informed of the results of the OIPRD 
investigation (30.5% were dissatisfied). Note: This compares to 59% of respondents who 
were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the 
SIU investigation (20.6% were satisfied).   
 
Perceptions of features of the OIPRD investigative process 
A slight majority of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with elements related to the timing and 
speed of the investigative process.  Only a third (33.6%) were satisfied that they had been 
interviewed soon after the OIPRD investigation commenced and 34.3% were dissatisfied with its 
timing.  In comparison, 52.9% who were involved in SIU investigations were satisfied that they 
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were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated and simply 21.7% were dissatisfied.  
Similarly, simply 35.9% percent were satisfied with the speed of the OIPRD’s investigative 
process (with 39.2% dissatisfied) and 30.9% were satisfied with the amount of time it took to 
complete the investigation (with 43.8% dissatisfied).   
Figure 5-7: Personal experience with OIPRD: Satisfaction matrix results 
 
 
At the end of this block of questions, respondents were again invited to “include any additional 
comments”, with 95 respondents doing so.  Fifteen different themes/codes were developed for 
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Table 5-21: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents with OIPRD experience 
Most common themes  
(from 95 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 
1. Poor communication by 
OIPRD (N=29, 30.5% of all 
comments voiced) 
“The OIPRD doesn't 
communicate whatsoever with 
officers. I continuously needed 
to contact the PSB to find out 
the status of my investigation. 
It's unacceptable to allow 
unreasonable delays in these 
types of investigations. It is 
stressful for all involved officers. 
It took several months to review 
the complainants appeal.” 
“Investigation took 8 months to 
finish and I had to call them to 
find out the status of the 
investigation.” 
2. Frivolous complaint (N=28, 
29.5%) 
“An investigation was 
conducted and the claim was 
found to be unfounded. The 
complainant didn't like that and 
went to the OIPRD. The OIPRD 
accepted the complaint and I 
have still not heard what they 
are doing with it. That was a 
year ago!” 
 
“A complete waste of time. It 
was a clear attempt to avoid a 
traffic ticket and was not even 
filed by the complainant. It was 
a feel good investigation to 
make the complainant feel like 
they got me in trouble.” 
3. Notified of complaint after it 
was resolved (N=17, 17.9%) 
“Didn't even know I was being 
investigated until I received the 
notice from the OIPRD that I 
was cleared and the complaint 
unsubstantiated.” 
“I did not know about the 
investigation until after the fact 
when everything was done and 
decided on, even though I was 
the only involved officer.” 
4. Exonerated (N=17, 17.9%) “I was not informed until after 
the investigation was completed 
and deemed unfounded. I was 
never informed or interviewed 
and later received 
correspondence with the 
investigations results.” 
“I was cleared of any 
wrongdoing at every occasion 
however the long delays 
between steps added a lot of 
pressure on both my 
professional and personal life.” 
5. Slow investigation (N=16, 
16.8%) 
“Took a very long time to 
complete the investigation.” 
 
“These investigations start with 
notification, then nothing. They 
just hang over your head and 
little is said about what's 
happening, until a request for a 
Duty Report is sent then nothing 
again, then a letter telling you 
that it is done.” 
“Again, the amount of time it 
takes to process these 
complaints is not fair to any of 
the parties involved. If my 
investigations took as long I 
would certainly be questioned 





Concluding comments and summary: OIPRD 
For many questions in this section, significant proportions of respondents selected the “neither 
agree nor disagree” and “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” categories.  There were also a large 
number of respondents who selected the “don’t know” category for knowledge-related questions 
and general questions about the OIPRD.  A significant number of respondents expressed 
dissatisfaction with elements of the investigative process (e.g., speed, length, poor 
communication).   
Only a small proportion of respondents (27.3%) reported personal experience with the OIPRD, 
and among those respondents, 69.5% reported that their principal investigators were from their 
own Professional Standards Bureau.  These findings signify limited exposure to OIPRD 
investigators among most police officers in this study (N=124).   
Given that the OIPRD has only been in existence since 2009, it is understandable why 
respondents would be less familiar with the mandate and practices of the OIPRD than the SIU 
and police services boards.  My findings suggest a need for police officers to receive enhanced 
education about the OIPRD and its practices.   
5.6  Professional Standards Bureau  
The final section of the survey asked respondents various questions about their police service’s 
Professional Standards Bureau.  Table 5-22 (and Table 5-70 ) provide summaries of the answers 
received to the general questions that were posed about the mandate and general functioning of 





Questions about the Professional Standards Bureau’s mandate and general practices 
Almost all my respondents (96.5%) perceived themselves to be knowledgeable about the 
mandate of the Professional Standards Bureau.  However, a lesser percentage possessed accurate 
information on how many investigations are cleared by Police Service Act charges and criminal 
charges.     
 Only 53.8% of respondents were aware that that less than 20% of their Professional 
Standards Bureau’s investigations are cleared by criminal charge or charges under the 
Police Services Act.  Meanwhile, 35.2% indicated that they “don’t know.” 
 31.6% of respondents correctly perceived that less than 20% of their Professional Standards 
Bureau’s investigations are cleared by Police Service Act charge.  37.6% said that they 
“don’t know.” 
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5.6.1 General Questions about the Professional Standards Bureau 
 
Figure 5-8 provides a summary of the answers respondents provided to the general questions 
posed about the Professional Standards Bureau (see Table 5-71 in Appendix E).  Among this 
section’s major findings were:     
General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of the Professional Standards Bureau 
A significant majority of respondents indicated strong confidence in the mandate and purpose of 
their Professional Standards Bureau.    
 86.9% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of their Professional Standards 
Bureau (only 3.2% disagreed). 
 83% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau helps to ensure accountability (only 
6% disagreed). 
 52.8% of respondents agreed with the statement, “I trust my police service’s Professional 
Standards Bureau” (21.1% disagreed). 
 61.1% disagreed with the statement, “My police service’s Professional Standards Bureau 
is biased against the police” (only 12.4% agreed). 
 
Perceived impact of the Professional Standards Bureau 
A significant proportion of respondents perceived the Professional Standards Bureau as effective 
and non-threatening to the professional status of police officers.  
 71.1% of respondents agreed with the statement, “My police service’s Professional 
Standards Bureau is effective in their oversight of my organization” (only 9.2% disagreed). 
 63.1% of respondents disagreed with the statement, “My police service’s Professional 
Standards Bureau infringes on the professional status of police officers” (only 10.1% 
agreed). 
 
Perceived qualifications of the Professional Standards Bureau investigators 
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A substantial proportion of respondents indicated approval of the qualifications and objectivity 
of Professional Standards Bureau investigators.   
 56.9% of respondents agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau is objective when 
they conduct investigations (only 14.3% disagreed). 
 74% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau investigators are “qualified to 
investigate alleged police misconduct” (only 6.5% disagreed). 
 
Organizational Support for the Professional Standards Bureau 
The vast majority of respondents perceived that their organization and police association are 
generally supportive of work of the Professional Standards Bureau. 
 72.7% agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about their 
Professional Standards Bureau (only 14.3% disagreed). 
 85% agreed that their police organization supports the work of their Professional Standards 
Bureau (only 1.2% disagreed). 
 62.9% agreed that their police association supports the work of their Professional Standards 
Bureau (only 7.2% disagreed) 
 
Figure 5-8: General questions about the Professional Standards Bureau 
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When invited to “include any additional comments” about the Professional Standards Bureau, 
159 respondents took the opportunity to do so.  Their responses were examined and coded by 
themes and 26 different themes/codes were developed for this block of responses.  Table 5-23 
displays examples of the most common themes. 
Table 5-23: Example open-ended commentary: General Questions about the Professional 
Standards Bureau 
Most common themes  








15.7% of all comments 
voiced) 
“PSB investigators come from 
CIB (Criminal Investigations 
Bureau) and they know all the 
angles when it comes to cops 
misbehaving. They are able to 
easily investigate criminal 
behaviour and know the right 
questions to ask and what 
evidence to look for. They are 
easily able to establish motive or 
the lack of it and determine when 
officers are genuinely doing their 
jobs.” 
“It has been my experience that 
the investigators are qualified. 
They are experienced and skilled 
investigators. I have found them 
to be impartial yet at times heavy 
handed. I have the impression 
we are harder on our own then a 
civilian oversight would be. We 
spend far more on resources to 
ensure a far more thorough 
investigation is completed than 
we would do on a civilian. We 
want to ensure that the 
investigation will withstand 
public scrutiny and civil 
litigations. We have greater 
depth in resources than OIPRD 
and SIU. We have far better 
investigators who have access to 
the resources including 
surveillance, forensics, 
interviewing etc.” 
2. PSB investigators are 
politically influenced 
(N=18, 11.3%) 
“PSB is the lesser of two evils, 
however, they appear to conduct 
politically motivated 
investigations at the whim of 
management. I was investigated 
in such a manner and have no 
trust for PSB.” 
“Politics play a role in any 
internal investigation. Who you 
know and how you are 
connected.” 
3. Officers vying for 
promotion go to PSB 
(N=16, 10.1%) 
“PSB investigators are officers 
seeking a promotion or detective 
designation. They cannot be 
trusted and are in the role for 
themselves and their careers.” 
 
“Regardless of a member's 
position in the organization, 
sometimes their work outcomes 
are directed by their career 
development plans, which can 




“PSB is a stepping stone for 
promotion.” 
4. PSB investigators 
biased (N=10) / Some 
PSB investigators 
biased (N=6) (10.1%) 
“As with anything some PSB 
investigators are good, fair and 
others are biased against police. I 
have noticed that some higher 
ranking officers who have come 
out of PSB are blatantly biased 
towards road officers.” 
“Not that I have experienced it, 
but I've heard of officers who 
were investigated and felt that 
the investigator was biased 
against them as the investigator 
was a former co-worker whom 
they didn't get along with. Also, 
with people wanting to be 
promoted I think there is a need 
to show that they've held people 
accountable and a need to show 
their KSAs (Knowledge, Skills & 
Abilities).” 
5. I respect PSB 
investigators (N=10, 
6.3%) 
“I know a great deal of these 
investigators. I have been a 
subject officer as well as 
conducted the investigations 
myself and I have a great deal of 
time and respect for most of these 
investigators.” 
“I know many of the 
investigators and they are all 
well respected within our 
organization.” 
 
“PSB comprised of competent 
investigators whose primary 
objective is to hold officers 
accountable for their actions 
ensuring a professional police 
image.” 
 
Determining level of personal experience with the Professional Standards Bureau 
Table 5-72 (see Appendix E) provides a breakdown of respondents with/without personal 
experience with the Professional Standards Bureau.  71.2% of respondents reported personal 
experience with their Professional Standards Bureau as either a witness, subject officer or both – 
the highest proportion of respondent involvement with an oversight agency in this study (59.8% 
for Police Services Boards; 46.6% for SIU; 27.3% for OIPRD).   These respondents were invited 
to answer a series of questions about their experience with the Professional Standards Bureau 
(see Table 5-73 in Appendix E) with those who lacked such experience (28.8%) were re-directed 
to the next section in the survey questionnaire (conclusion). 
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Respondents who reported personal experience (71.2%) with their Professional Standards 
Bureau were divided into the following strata: subject officers (23.1%); witness officers (23.4%); 
both subject and witness officers (53.5%).   
5.6.2 Respondents with personal experience with the Professional Standards Bureau  
Figure 5-9 summarizes the answers that respondents provided to questions about their 
experience with their police service’s Professional Standards Bureau (see Table 5-73 in 
Appendix E).  Some highlights from this section appear below. 
Perceived treatment by Professional Standards Bureau staff 
The majority of respondents were satisfied with their treatment by Professional Standards Bureau 
staff, reporting that it was courteous (71.2%) and that the questions that the Professional 
Standards Bureau’s investigators had posed were fair (64%).  Only a minority expressed 
dissatisfaction with the level of courtesy they had received (16.5%) or the fairness of the 
questions asked 15.9%).   
 
Perceived quality of Professional Standards Bureau investigation/investigators 
A majority of respondents were satisfied with the objectivity of the Professional Standard 
Bureau’s investigators (62.6%; with 20.2% dissatisfied) and perceived it to be unbiased (61.6%; 
with 21% expressing dissatisfaction).   
 
Perceptions of the quality of communication during Professional Standards Bureau investigation 
Although a slight majority of respondents were dissatisfied with the level of communication 
during investigations, a majority of respondents were satisfied with the quality of communication 
at both its outset and conclusion.  Thus,  
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 69.6% of respondents were satisfied that they had received prompt notification of the 
Professional Standards Bureau investigation (18.1% were dissatisfied). 
 59.8% were satisfied that the Professional Standards Bureau investigative process was 
explained to them (24.1% were dissatisfied). 
 42.3% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress 
of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation (38.6% were satisfied).  
 55.2% were satisfied with the way in which they were informed of the results of the 
investigation (30.1% were dissatisfied) (Note: this differs from SIU finding). 
 
Figure 5-9: Personal experience with Professional Standards Bureau: Satisfaction matrix results 
 
 
Perceptions of features of the Professional Standards Bureau investigative process 
A slight majority of respondents expressed satisfaction with elements related to the timing and 
speed of the investigative process.  
 57.4% were satisfied that they were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated 
(23.4% were dissatisfied). 
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 48.3% were satisfied with the speed of the Professional Standards Bureau investigative 
process (32.6% were dissatisfied) (Note: this differs from SIU & OIPRD findings). 
 42.2% were satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the Professional Standards 
Bureau investigation (36.9% were dissatisfied) (Note: this differs from both SIU & OIPRD 
findings). 
 
Respondents were again invited to “include any additional comments” and 159 did so.  Twenty-
seven different themes/codes were developed for this block of responses, with Table 5-24 
furnishing examples of the most common themes. 
Table 5-24: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau 
experience 
Most common themes  
(from 159 responses) 
Exemplar quotations 




(N=32, 20.1% of all 
comments voiced) 
“Last investigation seemed to 
take forever to hear the results, 
during this time is added stress on 
us. The quicker the result, the 
better to relieve stress, whether it 
is being cleared or disciplined.” 
“Very slow process. Very little 
information provided to me 
regarding the progress of 
investigation. Only notice 
received was a letter at the 
end.” 
2. Negative experience 
with PSB (N=26, 
16.4%) 
“It should be noted that in my 
PSB-related case, I was cleared 
of any wrong-doing. My negative 
responses are not rooted in being 
charged or convicted. I was a 
new officer at the time and I was 
treated poorly and unfairly.” 
“As a witness officer I was 
treated like a subject officer.” 
 
“I do not trust the PSB as a 
result of being ‘railroaded’. 
Police officers are big, easy 
targets. Some are certainly 
guilty of wrongdoings, some are 
not. Just because someone says 
you did it, doesn't mean you 
did.” 
3. Officers not notified of 
status/outcomes in PSB 
investigations (N=23, 
14.5%) 
“I have only been asked for duty 
reports from PSB through email. 
It would be nice to actually 
receive a phone call and be kept 
informed of the status of the 
investigation, most importantly 
the outcome.” 
 
“I was not contacted by anyone in 
person to discuss the results.” 
 
“As a witness officer, I have 
been asked several times to 
submit my notes to the PSB 
investigators regarding 
occurrences. I have never been 
interviewed and never been 




4. PSB investigation took 
too long (N=19, 11.9%) 
“With the workload of the PSB, 
investigations do take time to 
complete. They are very thorough 
in their process and need to be. 
The challenge here is that subject 
officers are left waiting and 
wondering. The subject officer is 
stressed over the incident 
regardless and this does take a 
toll on the member.” 
“For the most part I have no 
complaints regarding my 
involvement with the PSB. My 
only complaint was with one 
instance where it took 1.5yrs 
for them to come back and tell 
me that the complainant didn't 
have a basis for a complaint 
against me.” 
5. PSB necessary (N=16, 
10.1%) 
“I have no issues with PSB - they 
are very good at what they do and 
I trust them completely.” 
 
“I have no issue with respect to 
the job that PSB does. It is a 
necessary evil in any professional 
group and they do their difficult 
jobs very well.” 
“Our Professional Standards 
Officers are very competent 
investigators. I have no issue 
with the process and I do not 
feel that the system is Biased 
against our officers whether 
they are a witness or a subject 
officer.” 
 
Concluding comments and summary: Professional Standards Bureau 
Overall, a majority of the officers provided favourable evaluations of the mandate and core 
practices of the Professional Standards Bureau.  Among all oversight agencies examined in this 
study, perceptions of the Professional Standards Bureau were, across the board, the most 
positive.  This finding was anticipated and consistent with findings reported in previous research.  
However, while officers from the host police service have largely positive perceptions of their 
organization’s Professional Standards Bureau, they did perceive room for improvement re: 
providing officers with timely and regular updates about the status of an investigation. 
5.6.3 Concluding comments for descriptive results from the survey questionnaire 
The descriptive results presented above are encouraging for they suggest that the majority of 
respondents accept civilian oversight.  Nevertheless, a majority of respondents reported a 
preference for police-led misconduct/complaint investigations (e.g., Professional Standards 
Bureau) and many raised concerns about the qualifications of those who are tasked with the 
oversight and investigation of police.  Respondents additionally perceived inefficiencies, 
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redundancies and process-related issues with each individual oversight agency (Police Services 
Boards, SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau).   
5.7  Conclusion of Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis 
This chapter provided a profile of officers who answered my survey questionnaire and provided 
an overview of their attitudes toward civilian oversight.  The following chapter, Chapter 6: 
Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis, engages in a more detailed statistical analysis of 





Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis 
In this chapter the focus shifts to a multivariate analysis.  Factor analysis was used to examine 
relationships between variables in the survey questionnaire, followed by binary logistic 
regression and linear regression.  A final multivariate linear regression model is presented at the 
end of the chapter.  I shall begin with the treatment of missing data to explain complexities in the 
data set that shaped decisions regarding analysis techniques.   
6.1   Missing Data 
I took a multifaceted approach to handle three different types of missing data in the data sample: 
respondent breakoffs, user-defined/non-eligible responses, and item-non-response.   
6.1.1 Respondent breakoffs 
There was a gradual drop-off in the base of respondents who completed the survey questionnaire 
in its entirety.  Breakoffs ranged from a low of 60 near the beginning of the survey to a high of 
145 toward its end.  This reflects a 9.1% total drop from the original respondent base of 1593 
who first accessed the survey.  Table 6-25 summarizes how the breakoffs gradually accumulated.  
This breakoff rate is not unusual, especially among web-based survey questionnaires that offer 
no incentives for their completion.  For example, Peytchev (2009:75), reports that meta-analysis 
of large web surveys reveal median breakoff rates of 16% and 34% (Musch & Reips, 2000; 
Lozar-Manfreda & Vehovar, 2002).21 
 
                                                          
21  Peytchev (2009: 75) noted that breakoff in survey questionnaires has received little attention in scholarly 
literature.   
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6.1.2 User-defined/non-eligible missing data 
 
The design of the survey questionnaire created user-defined/non-eligible missing data.  For 
example, when survey respondents said that they lacked personal experience with a particular 
oversight agency (i.e., Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD, and the Professional Standards 
Bureau), automatic skip logic functions moved them along to the next block of pertinent survey 
questions.  Although this feature worked well as a funneling device, it left large portions of data 
blank across the entire dataset; Table 6-25 summarizes non-eligible responses throughout the 
data sample.   
 
It was important to distinguish such user-defined/non-eligible missing values from the other 
forms of missing data (breakoffs or item nonresponse) and find a suitable treatment for this form 
of missing data.  I was cognizant that listwise deletion would otherwise reduce the working data 
set below 300 cases (since SPSS would only retain cases from the minority of respondents 
[17.5%] who reported experience with all oversight agencies).  Had this occurred, the result 
would be an artificial and limiting re-definition of the study population.   
I used the dummy variable adjustment method described by Cohen & Cohen (1985).  “This 
method involves creating two variables that correspond with the variable that is missing data: a 
binary dummy variable and a variable that replicates the observed values with a constant” 
(McKnight, P. et al., 2007: 170).  This procedure retains cases that would otherwise be dropped 
through listwise deletion.  For example, a binary indicator was created and coded 1 for 
respondents who did not have experience with the SIU, and coded 0 for those who did.  Next, 
respondents with missing values (no SIU experience) were assigned an arbitrary value (999).  As 
Acock (2005: 1017) noted, “(w)hen the model is estimated, the regression estimates will be the 
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same as they were using listwise deletion, and the indicator variable will represent how much 
those with missing values differ on the mean of the outcome variable.”  This process was 
repeated with the sections that addressed the other agencies.  
Although some charge that this method produces biased parameter estimates (e.g., Jones, 1996; 
Allison, 2002, Acock, 2005: 1017; McKnight, P. et al., 2007: 170), others (e.g., Williams, 2015: 
5; Allison, 2002: 87; Allison 2010: 639) argue compellingly that its use is appropriate in specific 
circumstances, such as the one that I encountered (i.e., with non-eligible data throughout a data 
sample).  For example, Allison (2002: 87) emphasized that while:  
the dummy variable adjustment method is clearly unacceptable when data are 
truly missing, it may still be appropriate in cases where the unobserved value 
simply does not exist.  For example, married respondents may be asked to rate the 
quality of their marriage, but that question has no meaning for unmarried 
respondents. Suppose we assume that there is one linear equation for married 
couples and another equation for unmarried couples.  The married equation is 
identical to the unmarried equation except that it has (a) a term that corresponds to 
the effect of marital quality on the dependent variable and (b) a different intercept.  
It is easy to show that the dummy variable adjustment method produces optimal 
estimates in this situation. 
 
6.1.3 Item non-response missing data 
Item non-response missing data was only a minor problem in my dataset.  A missing value 
analysis in SPSS confirmed that such item-non response data was MCAR (Missing Completely 
At Random) and largely negligible, ranging from 0.0% to 1.7%.  Table 6-25 provides a summary 
of such missing data.  The relevant literature commonly commends that imputation methods such 
as “multiple imputation or expectation maximization” provide “the best results” (e.g., Stopher, 
2012: 460, see also Little & Rubin, 2002).  Although I considered and utilized multiple 
imputation (MI) procedures in an exploratory analysis, this method proved cumbersome and ill-
suited to the complicated structure of the dataset (e.g., user-defined missing data; skip logic 
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issues).  Expectation maximization (EM) proved to be a suitable method to impute the small 
amount of item non-response missing data.   
 
Acock (2005: 1018) described EM as an approach that creates a new data set in which all 
missing values are imputed with “maximum likelihood values” and noted that this approach 
“injects a degree of random error to reflect uncertainty of imputation.”  As outlined by Grace-
Martin (2015), EM imputation, which uses the expectation-maximization algorithm, is an 
iterative procedure which “uses other variables to impute a value (expectation), then checks 
whether that is the value most likely (maximization). If not, it re-imputes a more likely value. 
This goes on until it reaches the most likely value.”  Although Grace-Martin (2015) cautioned 
that this approach is only suitable when the percentage of missing data is less than 5%, she 
suggested that EM imputations are ideal when factor analysis or regression techniques are going 
to be used because they preserve the relationship with the other variables. 
 
In identifying EM as a modern “third generation” approach to resolving missing data issues in 
survey research, Karanja, Zaveri & Ahmed (2013: 748) asserted that EM serves to “resolve the 
issue of missing data by either eliminating variables with missing data or ‘filling-in’ the missing 
items in a process that reduces the variability of the sample space - an essential trait in complete 
and random sample spaces.”  According to these researchers, one of the key strengths of this 
approach is that it is “geared toward alleviating or minimizing the effects of lack of variability in 
the imputed data set” (Karanja, Zaveri & Ahmed, 2013: 748-749). 
 
I utilized the SPSS MVA (missing value analysis) module to impute missing values using the 
EM method across the data set.  Once all missing data were adequately processed, I then 
proceeded to statistical analyses. 
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6.2   Factor Analysis 
I early thought that questions pertaining to “General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight” (e.g., 
“Civilian oversight of policing helps to ensure accountability”; “Civilian oversight maintains 






Section 1 - Socio-
Demographic 
Questions  
68 cases 0.3% to 0.7% N/A 
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0.0% to .6% 893 had experience 
(599 declared no 
experience or “I Don’t 
Know) 








Section 4 - General 
Attitudes Toward SIU 
114 cases 0.1% to 0.9% N/A 
Respondents with SIU 
Experience 




































0.6% to 1.7% 
 





public trust in policing”, etc.) were linked to attitudes toward the specific oversight agencies and 
could potentially serve as dependent variables in higher order statistical analyses.  Therefore, 
exploratory factor analysis was used to examine the relationships within the various blocks of 
questions and to assess prospects for further analysis.   
As Davis (2013: 138) observed, the point of factor analysis is to “take several correlations and 
reduce a bulky conglomeration of variables into hopefully meaningful components, or factors.”  
The purpose in doing so is to “find a structure in the relationships between variables, reducing 
the number of variables into a smaller number of components” (Davis, 2013: 138).  Similarly, 
Buckingham and Saunders (2004: 5F) emphasized that “[f]actor analysis allows us to see 
whether a number of different observed variables appear to be linked through a common 
association with one or more underlying factors.”  
 
As Kent (2001: 129-130) explained, factor analysis “recognises that when many variables are 
being measured some of them may be measuring different aspects of the same phenomenon and 
hence will be inter-related.”  Factor analysis reviews the correlation between each variable 
involved in the analysis and all the other variables and “groups together those that are highly 
inter-correlated with one another, and not correlated with variables in another group.  The groups 
identify ‘factors’ that are in effect ‘higher order’ variables” (Kent, 2001: 129-130).    This 
technique serves to reduce or eliminate redundancy when two or more variables are measuring 
the same construct.  As Kent (2001: 129-130) observed, “(t)he factors themselves are not directly 
observable, but each has a ‘factor loading’ which is the correlation between the variable and the 
factor with which it is most closely associated.”  This process is advantageous because it reduces 
a large number of variables into a more manageable set of factors that can be further analyzed. 
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Following Field (2009: 639-672) and Davis (2013: 138-149),  I analyzed each block of questions 
in SPSS using the following selections: Principal components analysis, KMO and Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity, correlation matrix, scree plot, unrotated analysis followed by rotated analysis 
(direct oblimin).  Cases were excluded by listwise deletion, sorted by size with a suppression of 
small coefficients (< 0.4).  The component matrix was the primary source of interpretation for 
this analysis. 
 
Enhanced interpretability of factors is possible through a technique called rotation, which is 
intended to clarify factor structure.  According to Field (2005: 3), “(r)otation maximizes the 
loading of each variable on one of the extracted factors whilst minimizing the loading on all 
other factors.  Rotation works through changing the absolute values of the variables whilst 
keeping their different values constant.”  SPSS offers a variety of rotation options.  Field (2009: 
644) has suggested that direct oblimin should be selected when there are theoretical grounds to 
suppose that factors might correlate.  Although I consistently ran both unrotated and rotated 
analyses, only rotated results (direct oblimin) are reported in this chapter.   
 
I conducted exploratory work to examine the strength of each attitudinal scale: 
 General Questions about Civilian Oversight: General Attitudes 
 Respondents Governed by a Police Services Board: General Attitudes 
o Respondents Not Governed by Police Services Boards: General Attitudes 
 SIU – General Attitudes 
o Respondents with SIU Experience (Satisfaction) 
 OIPRD – General Attitudes 
o Respondents with OIPRD Experience (Satisfaction) 
 Professional Standards Bureau: General Attitudes 
o Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau Experience (Satisfaction) 
 
I computed the Cronbach alpha score for each scale to estimate the internal consistency of 
associated scale items and to determine if it was justifiable to interpret the scores that were 
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aggregated together (Field, 2009: 674-676).  As an aid to analysis, I also inverted some 
individual scale items according to positive/negative wording. 
 
I conducted factor analysis for the various attitudinal blocks from the survey questionnaire 
(Sections 6.2.1 through to 6.2.9).  Table 6-35 presents a summary of the factor analysis results 
for all sections.   
6.2.1 Factor Analysis: General Questions about Civilian Oversight – General Attitudes 
 
For this scale, I recoded eight variables to align the entire scale in the same positive direction 
(see Table 6-74 in Appendix F).  The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale 
(.793) revealed that the original eleven items fit together well.  However, this procedure 
suggested that the Cronbach alpha score may be improved by the deletion of two conditional 
items: “I would prefer civilians only review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate)”; 
“If civilian investigators were former police officers, I wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged 
police misconduct.”  “Conditional items” are variables which posed an option or condition for 
respondents’ consideration and/or acceptance (e.g., “I would prefer…”, “If…I wouldn’t 
mind…”).   
 
I began with an unrotated factor analysis using the full 11-item scale, followed by a rotated 
factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale: Table 6-75 in Appendix F).  I 
next removed the two conditional items from the scale, which raised the Cronbach alpha score to 
.815.  I then applied a rotated factor analysis using the 9-item scale using direct oblimin (see 


















RECODE Civilians are incapable of 
understanding police work. 
.659  
RECODE We should keep civilians out of 
police oversight. 
.768  
Civilians have the necessary skills to 
investigate police wrongdoing. 
 
 .593 
RECODE Alleged police misconduct 
should only be investigated by police 
officers. 
.663  
RECODE Civilians are biased against 
police officers. 
.652  
RECODE I would prefer that my police 
service's Professional Standards Bureau 
investigators exclusively handle 




RECODE Civilian oversight infringes 













13.657 % of 
variance 
explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
2 components extracted. 
 
 
As Table 6-26 shows, Factor 1 explains 41.578 % of variance and I interpreted it to represent 
“General attitudes toward civilian oversight.”  Factor 2 (13.657 % of variance explained) is 
interpreted to represent “Conditional attitudes toward civilian oversight”; relevant items for this 
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factor pertain primarily to the perceived investigative skills possessed by civilian investigators 
and the perceived significance of civilian-led oversight mechanisms (i.e., public trust and 
accountability).    
 
The dependent variable used in later multivariate analysis emerged from this analysis: the 
primary factor analysis score for “General attitudes toward civilian oversight.”  Figure 6-1 
is a histogram of the distribution for this variable. 
 
Figure 6-1: Histogram of Dependent Variable: Factor Analysis score for General Attitudes Toward 
Civilian Oversight 
 
6.2.2 Factor Analysis: Respondents Governed by a Police Services Board - General 
Questions 
 
For this scale, I recoded three variables to align the entire scale in the same direction (see Table 
6-76 in Appendix F).  The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this 9-item scale 
(.878) revealed that these items fit well together.  However, it also suggested that the Cronbach 
alpha score could be improved by the deletion of one item: “My detachment's Police Services 
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Board doesn't affect me very much.”  The removal of this item produced a slightly higher score 
(.893), verifying the reliability and internal consistency of this reconfigured 8-item scale.   
 





I respect the mandate of my Police Services Board. .656 
The Police Services Board is necessary. .738 
The Police Services Board is effective in their 
oversight of my detachment. 
.819 
I trust the Police Services Board. .819 
Members of the Police Services Board are qualified to 
carry out their oversight of my detachment. 
.816 
Members of the Police Services Board listen to the 
concerns of my detachment. 
.752 
RECODE_PSBs Infringe On Professional Status of 
Police 
.707 
RECODE_PSB_Mostly Window Dressing .751 
4.612 
Eigenvalue; 
57.652 % of 
variance 
explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 







I first undertook an unrotated factor analysis using the 8-item scale, and then a rotated factor 
analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale: Table 6-27).  Explaining 57.652 % of 
variance, I interpreted it to represent “General attitudes toward police services boards” (among 
those respondents governed by police services boards). 
 
6.2.3 Factor Analysis: Respondents Not Governed by Police Services Boards – General 
Attitudes 
 
Before conducting factor analysis, one scale item for Respondents Not Governed by Police 
Services Boards was recoded to align the scale items in the same direction (see Table 6-77 in 
Appendix F).  The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale (.816) reveals that 
these items fit together well.  My unrotated factor analysis used the full 4-item scale and was 
followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: 
Table 6-28).  Explaining 65.027% of variance, I interpreted it to represent “General attitudes 
toward police services boards” (among those not governed by police services boards). 
 




Police Services Boards are necessary in Ontario. .862 
Police Services Boards help to ensure accountability in 
policing. 
.893 
Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to 











65.027 % of 
variance 
explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 component extracted. 
 
6.2.4 Factor Analysis: SIU – General Attitudes 
Before conducting factor analysis, two scale items for SIU – General Attitudes were recoded to 
align the entire 11-item scale in the same direction (See Table 6-78 in Appendix F).  The results 
from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale (.836) reveals that these items fit together 
well.  However, this procedure suggested that the Cronbach alpha score could be improved by 
the deletion of several items which pertained to organizational/association support for SIU.  To 
wit:  “My organization has sufficiently educated me about the SIU”; “My organization supports 
the work of the SIU” and “My police association supports the work of the SIU.” 
 
The elimination of these three items from the scale improved the Cronbach alpha score (.860) 
and simplified and improved the factor analysis score.  The unrotated factor analysis used the 8-
item scale and was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component 
matrix scale below: Table 6-29).  The factor explains 51.208 % of variance and is interpreted to 










I respect the mandate of the SIU. .650 
The SIU helps to ensure accountability. .729 
The SIU is effective in their oversight of policing in 
Ontario. 
.808 
I trust the SIU. .795 
RECODE_SIU is Biased Against Police .696 
The SIU is objective when they conduct investigations. .772 
SIU investigators are qualified to investigate alleged 
police misconduct. 
.653 





51.208 % of 
variance 
explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
 
6.2.5 Factor Analysis: Respondents with SIU Experience 
The results from the Cronbach alpha analysis of this 11-item scale (.908) revealed that these 
items fit together well.  None needed to be deleted.  I therefore conducted an unrotated factor 
analysis using the 11-item scale, followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see 
component matrix scale below: Table 6-30).  
Factor 1 explains 52.080 % of variance and is interpreted to represent “Satisfaction with SIU.”  
This analysis produced two additional factors of lesser consequence (Factor 2: 12.541 % of 
variance explained; Factor 3: 9.862 % of variance explained).  Although these factor scores 
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pertain to matters of procedural justice (e.g., perceptions of communication and efficacy during 
SIU investigations), they both ultimately proved too difficult to apply clear and meaningful 
interpretations.   




1 2 3 
That you were promptly notified of the SIU 
investigation? 
.618  .611 
That the SIU investigation process was 
explained to you? 
.657  .584 
That you were interviewed soon after the 
investigation was initiated? 
.699   
That you were treated courteously by the 
staff of the SIU? 
.777   
With the objectivity of the SIU 
investigator(s)? 
.807   
With how fair the investigators' questions 
were? 
.720 -.410  
That the investigation was unbiased? .760   
With the speed of the investigative process? .739 .452  
That you were kept informed of the progress 
of the investigation? 
.748 .499  
With the amount of time it took to complete 
the investigation? 
.727 .510  
That you were told about what happened as 




















9.862 % of 
variance 
explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 




6.2.6 Factor Analysis: OIPRD – General Attitudes 
Before conducting factor analysis, two scale items for OIPRD – General Attitudes were recoded 
to align the entire 11-item scale in the same direction (See Table 6-79 in Appendix F).  Although 
the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale (.948) revealed that these items fit together well, 
the results suggested that deletion of a single item – “My organization has sufficiently educated 
me about the OIPRD” – would improve the Chronbach alpha score.   
 
Factor analysis and Cronbach alpha analysis furnished justification for the removal of two 
additional items which also pertained to organizational/association support for OIPRD: “My 
organization supports the work of the OIPRD”; “My police association supports the work of the 
OIPRD.” 
The reduced 8-item scale improved the Cronbach alpha score to .957 and simplified/improved 
the factor analysis score.  I then conducted sequentially an unrotated factor analysis and a rotated 
factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: Table 6-31).  Factor 1, 
77.109% of variance explained, is interpreted to represent “General attitudes toward OIPRD.” 
 




I respect the mandate of the OIPRD. .869 
The OIPRD helps to ensure accountability. .895 
The OIPRD is effective in their oversight of policing in 
Ontario. 
.916 
I trust the OIPRD. .912 
RECODE_OIPRD is biased against police .874 
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The OIPRD is objective when they conduct 
investigations. 
.883 
OIPRD investigators are qualified to investigate alleged 
police misconduct. 
.802 








Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
 
 
6.2.7 Factor Analysis: Respondents with OIPRD Experience 
The results from the Cronbach alpha analysis of this 11-item scale (.925) indicated that these 
items fit together well and therefore none were deleted.  The unrotated factor analysis used the 
11-item scale and was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component 
matrix scale below: Table 6-32).  
Factor 1 (57.344 % of variance explained) is interpreted to represent “Satisfaction with 
OIPRD.”  A second factor score of lesser consequence was also produced (Factor 2: 12.904 % 
of variance explained).  Although this second factor score pertains to procedural justice issues 
(e.g., perceptions of communication and impartiality during OIPRD investigations), assigning a 















That you were promptly notified of the 
OIPRD investigation? 
.639 .458 
That the OIPRD investigation process was 
explained to you? 
.623 .576 
That you were interviewed soon after the 
investigation was initiated? 
.779  
That you were treated courteously by the 
staff of the OIPRD? 
.723  
With the objectivity of the investigator(s)? .812 -.416 
With how fair the investigators' questions 
were? 
.775 -.484 
That the investigation was unbiased? .776  
With the speed of the investigative process? .831  
That you were kept informed of the progress 
of the investigation? 
.774  
With the amount of time it took to complete 
the investigation? 
.831  
That you were told about what happened as 













Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
2 components extracted. 
 
 
6.2.8 Factor Analysis: Professional Standards Bureau – General Attitudes 
Before conducting factor analysis, two scale items for Professional Standards Bureau – General 
Attitudes were recoded to align the entire 11-item scale in the same direction (see  
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Table 6-80 in Appendix F).  The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale 
(.885) indicated that these items fit together well but suggested that the Cronbach alpha score 
would be improved by the deletion of one item: “My organization has sufficiently educated me 
about our Professional Standards Bureau.” 
 
Factor analysis and Cronbach alpha analysis supported the removal of two additional items from 
the scale: “My organization supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau”; “My 
police association supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau.”  These eliminations 
improved the Cronbach alpha score (.890) and simplified/improved the factor analysis score.  An 
unrotated factor analysis was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see 
component matrix scale below: Table 6-33).  Factor 1, explaining 57.288 % of variance, is 
interpreted to represent “General attitudes toward Professional Standards Bureau.” 
 
 




I respect the mandate of my police service's 
Professional Standards Bureau. 
.717 
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau helps 
to ensure accountability. 
.801 
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is 
effective in their oversight of my organization. 
.821 
I trust my police service's Professional Standards 
Bureau. 
.825 
RECODE_Professional Standards Bureau Biased 
Against Police 
.677 
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is 




My police service's Professional Standards Bureau 
investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police 
misconduct. 
.726 
RECODE_Professional Standards Bureau Infringes 




57.288 % of 
variance 
explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
 
6.2.9 Factor Analysis: Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau Experience 
The results from the Cronbach alpha analysis of this 11-item scale (.932) confirmed that these 
items fit well together and therefore none were deleted. The unrotated factor analysis employed 
the 11-item scale and was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see 
component matrix scale below: Table 6-34). 
Factor 1 (59.620 % of variance explained) is interpreted to represent “Satisfaction with 
Professional Standards Bureau.”  A second factor score of lesser consequence was also 
produced (Factor 2: 11.090 % of variance explained).  Although this factor score pertained to 
procedural justice issues (e.g., perceptions of efficiency and impartiality during investigations), 











That you were promptly notified of the 
Professional Standards Bureau 
investigation? 
.767  
That the Professional Standards Bureau 
investigation process was explained to you? 
.746  
That you were interviewed soon after the 
investigation was initiated? 
.756  
That you were treated courteously by the 
staff of the Professional Standards Bureau? 
.793  
With the objectivity of investigators from 
the Professional Standards Bureau? 
.827 -.418 
With how fair the investigators' questions 
were? 
.781 -.425 
That the investigation was unbiased? .772  
With the speed of the investigative process? .773 .414 
That you were kept informed of the progress 
of the investigation? 
.780 .413 
With the amount of time it took to complete 
the investigation? 
.773 .441 
That you were told about what happened as 













Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
2 components extracted. 
 
 






Table 6-35: Summary of Factor Analysis Results 
Group Of Survey Questions Assessed Factor Analysis Results 






Factor 1 – explains 41.578% of the variance among this 
group of variables – “General Attitudes Toward Civilian 
Oversight” 
Factor 2 – explains 13.657% of the variance among this 
group of variables – “Conditional Attitudes Toward 
Civilian Oversight” 
POLICE SERVICES BOARDS 
Respondents Governed By Police 
Services Boards 
Factor 1 –  explains 57.652% of the variance among this 
group of variables – “General Attitudes Toward Police 
Services Boards” 
Respondents Not Governed By Police 
Services Boards 
Factor 1 –  explains 65.027% of the variance among this 
group of variables –  “General Attitudes Toward  Police 
Services Boards” 
 
SIU – SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT 
SIU - General Attitudes Factor 1 –  explains 51.208% of the variance among this 
group of variables – “General Attitudes Toward SIU” 
 
SIU – Respondents With SIU Experience 
 
Factor 1 –  explains 52.080% of the variance among this 
group of variables – “Satisfaction With SIU” 
Factor 2 –  explains 12.541% of the variance among this 
group of variables – no clear meaning 
Factor 3 –  explains  9.862% of the variance among this 
group of variables – no clear meaning 
    
OIPRD – OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW DIRECTOR 
OIPRD – General Attitudes Factor 1 –  explains 77.109% of the variance among this 
group of variables –  “General Attitudes Toward OIPRD” 
OIPRD – Respondents With OIPRD 
Experience 
Factor 1 –  explains 57.344% of the variance among this 
group of variables –  “Satisfaction With OIPRD” 
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Factor 2 –  explains 12.904% of the variance among this 
group of variables –  no clear meaning 
   
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU 
Professional Standards Bureau – General 
Attitudes 
  
Factor 1 –  explains 57.288% of the variance among this 
group of variables –  “General Attitudes Toward 
Professional Standards Bureau” 
Professional Standards Bureau – 
Respondents With PSB Experience 
Factor 1 –  explains 59.620% of the variance among this 
group of variables –  “Satisfaction With Professional 
Standards Bureau” 
Factor 2 –  explains 11.090% of the variance among this 
group of variables –  no clear meaning 
 
 
6.3  Binary Logistic Regression and Linear Regression Analysis  
Following the factor analysis for each survey section, and in preparation for a final multivariate 
linear regression model, I next conducted binary logistic regression and linear regression analysis 
(for binary and continuously distributed dependent variables, respectively) to determine the 
associations between the socio-demographic variables and attitudinal variables for each of the 
various oversight agencies.   
As an aid to analysis/interpretation, the socio-demographic variables were recoded into binary 
dummy variables.  Table 6-36 provides a summary of these recoded variables and their binary 
configurations.  These variables would later serve as independent variables in the final 
multivariate linear regression model.  As noted earlier in 6.1.2 - User-defined/non-eligible 
missing data, the dummy variable adjustment method (Cohen and Cohen, 1985) was used in 
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The results of the linear regression and binary logistic regression analysis of the socio-
demographic variables for each oversight agency are provided below.22 
Regression Analysis: Police Services Boards 
Table 6-37 displays the logistic regression analysis results for respondents who indicated 
experience with police services boards (D.V.: Police Services Board Experience Binary).  
                                                          
22 Within these tables, only the statistically significant variables are presented in each respective summary table.   
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Education and community size were significant predictors, signifying that university education 
and working in larger communities (or in a specialized/centralized role) correspond with a 
heightened likelihood that respondents worked under the structure of a police services board.  
The remaining predictors were not significant predictors in this model. 
Table 6-37: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with Experience with Police 
Services Boards 
Model 1 - Binary Logistic Regression 
      
95% C.I.for  
      EXP(B) 
Model Coefficients B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Constant 
 
-1.017 .200 .000 .362   
University Education 
 
.237 .118 .044 1.268 1.006 1.598 
Community Size – 
Over 100,000 or N/A 
1.478 .127 .000 4.385 3.419 5.623 
       







   
N: 893 
1768.240 .133 .179 
 
 
   
 
I ran two linear regression models pertaining to police services boards.  Table 6-38 displays 
results for respondents who indicated experience with police services boards (D.V.: Gen. 
Attitudes – Police Services Boards - Experience), wherein officers who ranked above constable 
and those who served in communities with populations over 100,000 were slightly more 
favourable to police services boards, but the effect is slight (R² = .038).  Community 
Composition (Mixed or Urban) was a significant predictor of a decrease for the dependent 
variable.  Model 2 (not displayed) pertained to respondents who indicated non-experience with 
police services boards (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes Police Services Boards Non-Experience; N: 599).  
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This model produced a negligible R² = .020, with no significant predictors (p<.05) for the 
dependent variable. 
Table 6-38: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward Police Services Boards: Respondents 
With Experience 
 









(p < .050) 
Constant .081 .119  .684 .494 
Rank – Above 
Constable 
.161 .073 .081 2.211 .027 
Community Size – Over 
100,000 or N/A 




-.219 .079 -.096 -2.783 .006 






N: 893 .194 .038 .026 .98423007  
 
 
Regression Analysis: SIU 
Table 6-39 displays the logistic regression analysis results for respondents who indicated 
experience with the SIU (D.V.: SIU Experience Binary).  In this model, sex and community size 
were significant predictors, thus being female and working in a larger community or in a 
specialized/central role increased the likelihood that an officer had experience with the SIU.  The 





Table 6-39: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with SIU Experience 
Model 1 – Binary Logistic Regression 
     95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Model Coefficients B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Constant 
 
-.115 .187 .539 .892   
Sex - Female 
 
.679 .139 .000 1.972 1.500 2.592 
Community Size – 
Over 100,000 or N/A 
.283 .122 .020 1.327 1.045 1.685 
       







   
 
N: 688 
1959.466 .027 .036 
 
   
 
Table 6-40 displays the linear regression analysis results for attitudes toward the SIU.  Model 1 
(D.V.: Gen. Attitudes - SIU) produced R² = .027, meaning that the socio-demographic variables 
only accounted for 2.7% of the variance for this dependent variable, the primary factor analysis 
score for general attitudes toward the SIU.  Sex (Females) and rank (non-Constables) were 
significant predictors (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable. 
Similarly, the model summary for Model 2 (D.V.: Satisfaction - SIU) produced R² = .026, 
meaning that the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 2.6% of the variance for this 
dependent variable, the primary factor analysis score for Satisfaction - SIU.  Sex (Females) and 







Table 6-40: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward SIU 









(p < .050) 
Constant -.200 .092  -2.163 .031 
Sex - Female .273 .067 .109 4.085 .000 
Rank – Above 
Constable 
.234 .058 .117 4.035 .000 








.163 .027 .020 .99406958  
 









(p < .050) 
Constant -.022 .137  -.161 .872 
Sex - Female .285 .113 .100 2.522 .012 
Rank – Above 
Constable 
.175 .085 .088 2.060 .040 






N: 688 .162 .026 .011 .99472550  
 
Regression Analysis: OIPRD 
Table 6-41 displays the logistic regression results for respondents who indicated experience with 
the OIPRD (D.V.: OIPRD Experience Binary).  In this model sex, rank and community size were 
significant predictors.  Simply put, this indicates that being female, a police supervisor and 
working in a larger community (or in a specialized/centralized role) increased the likelihood that 
an officer would have experientially-based knowledge of the OIPRD.  The remaining predictors 




Table 6-41: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with OIPRD Experience  
Model 1 – Logistic Regression 
     95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Model Coefficients B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Constant 
 
.630 .211 .003 1.877   
Sex – Female .757 .174 .000 2.133 1.515 3.002 
Rank – Above Constable .351 .132 .008 1.421 1.096 1.842 
Community Size – Over 
100,000 or N/A 
.587 .145 .000 1.798 1.355 2.388 
       




   
 
N: 399 
.186 .034 .024    
 
Table 6-42 displays the linear regression analysis results for attitudes toward the OIPRD.   
Model 1 (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes - OIPRD) produced R² = .030, meaning that the socio-
demographic variables only accounted for 3.0% of the variance for this dependent variable, the 
primary factor analysis score for general attitudes toward the OIPRD.  Sex (Females) and Visible 
Minority Status were significant predictors (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable. 
The model summary for Model 2 (D.V.: Satisfaction - OIPRD) produced R² = .049, meaning that 
the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 4.9% of the variance for this dependent 
variable, the primary factor analysis score for Satisfaction - OIPRD.  Rank (non-Constables) was 
a significant predictor (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable, while Age (respondents 











Table 6-42: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward OIPRD 
 









(p < .050) 
Constant -.168 .093  -1.802 .072 
Sex - Female .366 .067 .147 5.464 .000 
Visible Minority Status .242 .091 .071 2.645 .008 
Model Summary R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 






.174 .030 .023 .98781961  
 









(p < .050) 
Constant -.095 .173  -.546 .585 
Age – Over 45 -.312 .139 -.155 -2.246 .025 
Rank – Above Constable .383 .109 .190 3.503 .001 
      
Model Summary R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 





.221 .049 .023 .98953330  
 
 
Regression Analysis: Professional Standards Bureau 
Table 6-43 displays the logistic regression analysis results for respondents who indicated 
experience with the Professional Standards Bureau (D.V.: Professional Standards Bureau 
Binary).  Sex, rank, community composition and non-attendance at police association meetings 
were significant predictors.  Accordingly, being female and infrequent attendance at police 
association meetings corresponded to increasing odds that they would have experience with the 
Professional Standards Bureau.  Meanwhile, police supervisors and respondents who worked in 
mixed or urban communities correspond to decreasing odds that they would have experience 
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with the Professional Standards Bureau.  The remaining predictors were not significant 
predictors of experience in this model. 
Table 6-43: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with Experience with the 
Professional Standards Bureau 
Model 1 – Binary Logistic Regression 
 95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Model Coefficients B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Constant 
 
-.752 .212 .000 .471   
Sex - Female 
 
.747 .142 .000 2.111 1.598 2.787 
Rank – Above Constable 
 
-.381 .131 .004 .683 .528 .884 
Community Composition – 
Mixed/Urban 
 
-.295 .143 .040 .745 .562 .986 
Do not regularly attend 
police association meetings 
.389 .178 .029 1.475 1.040 2.092 
       







   
 
N: 1030 
1631.434a .051 .073 
 
   
 
Table 6-44 displays the linear regression analysis results for attitudes toward the Professional 
Standards Bureau.  The model summary for Model 1 (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes – Professional 
Standards Bureau) produced R² = .058, which indicates that the socio-demographic variables 
accounted for 5.8% of the variance for this dependent variable, the primary factor analysis score 
for general attitudes toward the Professional Standards Bureau.  Rank (non-Constables) was a 
significant predictor (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable and non-support for the 
police association was a significant predictor of a decrease for the dependent variable.   
Model 2 (D.V.: Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau) produced R² = .034, indicating that 
the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 3.4% of the variance for this dependent 
variable, the primary factor analysis score for Satisfaction - Professional Standards Bureau.  Sex 
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(Females) and rank (non-Constables) were significant predictors (p<.05) of an increase for the 
dependent variable, while non-support for the police association was a significant predictor of a 
decrease for the dependent variable.   
Table 6-44: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward Professional Standards Bureau 









(p < .050) 
(Constant) -.166 .092  -1.813 .070 
Rank – Above Constables .410 .058 .204 7.120 .000 
Non-Support for Police 
Association 
-.364 .086 -.113 -4.230 .000 
Model Summary R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 







.242 .058 .051 .97766533  
 









(p < .050) 
Constant -.092 .111  -.831 .406 
Sex - Female .174 .086 .065 2.012 .045 
Rank – Above Constable .245 .070 .121 3.519 .000 
Non-Support for Police 
Association 
-.374 .102 -.118 -3.662 .000 
Model Summary R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 






.186 .034 .024 .98655959  
 
Summary of Binary Logistic Regression and Linear Regression Analysis 
Throughout this sub-section, the R Square and Nagelkerke R Square scores were more or less 
negligible, indicating that the socio-demographic variables did not have much of an impact for 
the selected dependent variables.  These findings are consistent with previous research 
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(presented in Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses).  The most common predictor 
variables were Sex (Females) and Rank (non-Constables).  The variables were associated with 
positive attitudes toward civilian oversight in relation to each of the agencies examined.  
However, it bears emphasis that these results do not enhance our understanding of the role that 
socio-demographic factors play in the assessment of attitudes toward the various oversight 
agencies.   
6.4  Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight 
Following the regression analyses above, a final multivariate linear regression model was created 
in order to determine which variables were significant predictors for respondents’ overall 
attitudes toward civilian oversight.  The dependent variable in this analysis was the primary 
factor analysis score for General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight (Table 6-26; see page 220-
222).  Figure 6-1 displays a histogram of the distribution for this variable (see page 222). 
 
Independent variables in this analysis included all socio-demographic variables, primary factor 
analysis variables for each oversight agency and primary factor analysis variables for satisfaction 
with oversight agencies based on personal experience, including the affiliated binary variable to 
carry out the aforementioned dummy variable adjustment method.  As previously explained, this 
procedure allowed for the retention of cases that would otherwise be dropped through listwise 
deletion.  Many of the variables were recoded into binary dummy variables to assist with 
analysis and interpretation (see Table 6-36).  
Before settling on a final model with all relevant variables included simultaneously, variables 
were grouped and entered in stages (hierarchically).  Table 6-45 shows how the 18 variables 
were grouped (Models 1-8).  In Table 6-46 the coefficient results for each model are displayed 
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(see Table 6-81 in Appendix F for an alternative, more reader-friendly, version of this table).  For 
each model, the unstandardized coefficient column displays the B value and standard error in 
parenthesis; the standardized coefficient column displays the beta (β) value.  In assessing the 
model summary results for the various stages (Models 1-8), Table 6-45 illustrates strikingly that 
the most significant contribution to the R² scores occurred in Model 3 with the introduction of 
the primary factor analysis variable for General Attitudes toward the SIU (R²  .253).  Thereafter, 
variables entered in models 4-8 provided very little additional strength to the R² score.  In short, 
this illustrates that the primary factor variable for General Attitudes Toward the SIU was the 
most impactful variable in this multivariate regression analysis.  The model summary for Model 
8 produced R² = .264, F (18, 1285) = 25.256, p < .001, therefore accounting for 26.4% of the 
variance for the dependent variable.   
Table 6-45: Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Development of Final 






Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .285 .081 .076 .956 
2 .287 .082 .076 .956 
3 .503 .253 .247 .863 
4 .504 .254 .247 .863 
5 .508 .259 .251 .861 
6 .511 .261 .253 .860 
7 .513 .263 .254 .859 
8 .514 .264 .254 .859 
 
Model 1 introduced the socio-demographic variables that were incorporated in all eight of the 
regression models.  Three socio-demographic variables were ultimately removed from the 
analysis as they were consistently found to be statistically insignificant across all models: visible 
minority status, mixed/urban community composition, and non-support for police association.  
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Although the variable for community size (over 100,000) was not statistically significant in any 
of the eight models, it was retained as it provided a small contribution to the R² scores.  As 
outlined in Chapter 5, 8.7% of survey respondents were identified as possessing visible minority 
status and several American studies have reported statistically significant relationships between 
officer “race”/ethnicity and attitudes toward internal/external systems of police oversight 
(Weisburd et al., 2009; Perez, 1994; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007; 2009).  Thus, my hypothesis 
that respondents with visible minority status would serve as a predictor for positive acceptance of 
civilian oversight was not realized.   
 
Two of the socio-demographic variables were consistent predictors of a decrease for the 
dependent variable (positive attitudes toward civilian oversight): females and respondents who 
did not regularly attend police association meetings.  Considering that the vast majority of survey 
respondents (84%) reported that they do not regularly attend association meetings, the 
interpretation of this finding is unclear.  In Models 3-8, female respondents were a significant 
predictor of a decrease in support for civilian oversight.  This finding is contrary to previous 
research wherein no known studies have found sex to be a predictor of attitudes toward civilian 
oversight of policing.  Nevertheless, I incorrectly hypothesized that female police officers, who 
accounted for 20.2% of the respondent pool, would express more positive attitudes than their 
male counterparts.  There are no previous findings or known theoretical foundations to explain 
why female police officers would serve as predictors of less tolerant attitudes toward civilian 
oversight mechanisms.   
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Table 6-46: Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Mode1 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
N=1285 for all models 
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Satisfaction – Professional 
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           .000 
(.000) 
-.055 
Satisfaction – Professional 
Standards Bureau – 
BINARY 
   
           .073 
(.171) 
.033 
R /  R² /  Std. Error of Est. .285  /  .081 /  .956 .287  / .082 / .956 .503  /  .253 /  .863 .504  /  .254 /  .863 .508  /  .259 /  .861 .511  /  .261 /  .860 .513  /  .263 /  .859 .514  /  .264 /  .859 
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Career experience over 20 years was a significant predictor of positive attitudes toward civilian 
oversight across all models but the first two.  Across all eight models, rank higher than constable 
(sergeants, staff sergeants, senior officers) and university education were also significant 
predictors of positive evaluations of civilian oversight.  These findings were consistent with my 
hypotheses that police officers with more career experience, higher educational attainment and 
senior rank would perceive civilian oversight favourably.  The variable for older respondents 
(over 45) only remained statistically significant in the first two models.  Although no previous 
research has identified officer age as a reliable predictor of attitudes toward internal or external 
oversight mechanisms, age clearly played some role in positive evaluations of civilian oversight 
in this study, since it is evident that many respondents with senior rank and career experience 
beyond 20 years would be older individuals.   
 
Model 2 displays the introduction of the variable for attitudes toward police services boards (held 
by respondents with personal experience).  This variable did not serve as a predictor for general 
attitudes toward civilian oversight as it was statistically insignificant across Models 2-8.   
 
Model 3 shows the introduction of the variable for positive attitudes toward the SIU.  By far, this 
proved to be the most impactful variable across all models in predicting positive attitudes toward 
civilian oversight.  As highlighted above, this marks a dramatic jump in the R² score which is 
also is sustained in subsequent models.  It is also noted that the variables for females and 
respondents with career experience over 20 years became statistically significant in this and 
subsequent models.  In Model 4, the variable assessing satisfaction with the SIU among 
respondents with experience was introduced.  This variable was statistically insignificant in this 




Model 5 displays the introduction of the variable for attitudes toward the OIPRD, which proved 
to predict positive evaluations of civilian oversight in this and subsequent models.  Model 6 
introduced the variable for satisfaction with the OIPRD based on personal experience, which was 
also a very weak significant predictor of positive evaluations of civilian oversight in this and 
later models.  Although very feeble, this finding was consistent with my hypothesis, based 
primarily on previous research (Kreisel, 1998; de Guzman, 2004), that police officers who 
reported personal experience with civilian oversight mechanisms would express more positive 
attitudes than those who lacked such experience.  Note, however, that this finding did not surface 
for either the SIU or Professional Standards Bureau.  
 
In Model 7, the variable for attitudes toward the Professional Standards Bureau was introduced, 
followed by the variable for personal satisfaction with this investigative body (Model 8).  Both of 
these variables proved to be statistically insignificant predictors of attitudes toward civilian 
oversight.   
 
Model 8 displays the final model with all 18 variables combined.  Although the final multivariate 
regression analysis model did not produce overwhelmingly impactful results (R² = .264; 26.4% 
variance explained), the results are nevertheless enlightening and summon important insight into 
the distinction between attitudes toward the SIU and the other oversight agencies.  In this final 
model, attitudes toward police services boards and the Professional Standards Bureau were not 
predictors of positive evaluations of civilian oversight overall.  Females and respondents who did 
not regularly attend association meetings remained significant predictors of decreased support 
for civilian oversight.  In short, police officers’ overall positive evaluations of civilian oversight 
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were primarily driven by their positive assessment of the SIU, and to a lesser extent, their rank, 
education, length of career service and attitudes toward the OIPRD. 
6.4.1 Summary of Multivariate Regression Analysis results 
 
Several enlightening and encouraging findings emerged from the final multivariate linear 
regression model.  Apart from a very minor finding involving police officers’ 
satisfaction/experience with the OIPRD, this analysis revealed that officers’ attitudes toward 
civilian oversight were not considerably influenced by personal experience with oversight 
agencies (i.e., procedural justice) as I anticipated.   
 
To date, no known previous research has directly identified educational level as a reliable 
predictor of attitudes toward internal or external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Perez, 1994: 202; 
Kreisel, 1998: 207-219; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 669).  As such, the findings in this study 
are promising, since a growing number of police officer recruits in Ontario possess university or 
college credentials (Ontario, 2013: 13; 50)23.  De Lint (1998) noted that a four year university 
degree has been touted as a prerequisite for police work in Ontario, with “a liberal arts 
education…understood to impart” increased sensitivity to the import of “liberal freedoms” and 
“the rule of law.”  It is possible that police officers with university education may be more 
receptive to civilian-led accountability mechanisms based on such ideals, or their more positive 
attitudes may be attributed to a broader knowledge about the inner-workings of oversight 
agencies (e.g., low clearance rates, many former police officers involved).  Although the current 
                                                          
23 30.7% of respondents in this study were university graduates; 11.2% had “some university” coursework 
completed (41.9% combined).   According to the Ontario Police College (Ontario, 2013: 10), 36% of all OPP and 




minimum educational requirement for constables in Ontario remains a high school diploma, the 
vast majority of present-day police officer recruits in Ontario possess post-secondary education 
and there is mounting evidence that officers with university education have advantages in 
promotional processes across the province (Ontario, 2013: 22; 60-63).   
 
It was also encouraging to learn that more experienced officers and those with rank were found 
to be more accepting of civilian oversight overall.  These findings are generally supported in 
previous research, wherein De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 663) found that the rank of “patrol 
officer” (i.e., constable) had less trust in internal affairs investigations than higher ranking 
officers and Kreisel (1998: 212-213) found evidence that more seasoned police officers were 
more accepting of external accountability mechanisms than those with lesser years of experience.  
One explanation for this finding that is supported in previous research (de Guzman, 2004: 368-
369; Perez, 1994: 203; Harris 2006, 2009) is that higher ranking officers (supervisors) receive 
fewer complaints against them than non-supervisors (constables), therefore they would face less 
scrutiny of their professional conduct from oversight mechanisms.  This finding again highlights 
the need to bolster education and awareness among new recruits and front-line officers about the 
personnel and practices related to civilian oversight mechanisms in order to de-mystify concerns 
and reduce unnecessary anxiety (e.g., provide information about low clearance/charge rates, 
employment of former police officers, intense involvement of Professional Standards Bureau). 
 
More experienced police officers and supervisors (sergeants, staff sergeants, senior officers) 
have the potential to play a key role, both formally and informally, in shaping the attitudes and 
perceptions of civilian oversight mechanisms among their peers and subordinates.  In Ontario, 
police supervisors are responsible for both the intake of public complaints about police conduct 
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and for ensuring that the appropriate agency is notified (e.g., Professional Standards Bureau, SIU 
or the OIPRD).  Thus, supervisors play a crucial role in the initial management of complaints and 
also the management of employees who are subjects/witnesses in internal/external investigations.  
Given that the vast majority of public complaints and SIU investigations are ultimately cleared or 
resolved without charge or penalty, it is possible that supervisors’ first-hand knowledge of the 
typical outcome of these investigations serves to buoy their positive evaluation of both the SIU 
and OIPRD.   
 
Furthermore, it’s likely that many experienced officers and those with rank above constable 
would be aware that the vast majority of SIU investigators are former police officers, which may 
further ease their comfort with this agency.  Considering that most police officers with long 
tenure (more than 20 years) would have started around the time of the SIU’s implementation in 
Ontario (1990), many would have witnessed the positive evolution of this agency over the last 
couple decades.  As previously outlined in Chapter 3, although there was initially negative 
opposition toward the SIU during its initial inception, it is believed that much of that strong 
hostility has lessened over time.  This interpretation is also supported by the content of the 
interviews I conducted.  While these interviews are discussed in greater depth in the following 
chapter, it is noteworthy that the harshest criticisms of the SIU were voiced by interviewees who 
referenced investigations that had occurred in the first decade of the SIU’s existence (1990-
2000).  
 
As noted earlier, relationships between Ontario’s police officers/services and the SIU have been 
often tension-filled and this was especially true in the early- to mid-1990s.  Although tensions 
still persist and there remain significant concerns related to procedural justice issues, this study’s 
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finding suggests that many officers have grown to accept the legitimacy of the SIU’s mandate to 
investigate the most serious allegations against police officers (instances of bodily harm/death 
and allegations of sexual assault) with the most serious consequences (e.g., serious criminal and 
Police Service Act charges, significant career and reputational ramifications) in order to satisfy 
the public’s demand for transparency and accountability.   
 
Lastly, the finding that positive attitudes toward the OIPRD help to predict overall positive 
evaluations of civilian oversight is also encouraging.  Considering that many officers in this 
study and previous research have expressed greater comfort for complaint investigations to be 
handled by internal investigators, these findings may be partially explained by the fact that the 
vast majority of complaint investigations remain in the hands of Professional Standards Bureau 
investigators.  Similar to the above comments regarding the SIU, it is conceivable that more 
experienced police officers and supervisors would be aware of the inner-workings of this agency 
and the fact that the vast majority of complaint allegations are cleared as unsubstantiated or are 
resolved informally.   
6.5 Conclusion of Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis 
The next chapter, Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion directs focal 
attention to the semi-structured interviews that I conducted with 40 police officers from the 
participating police service and 6 senior executive representatives from various stakeholder 





Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion 
This chapter provides analysis and discussion of the semi-structured interviews that were 
conducted with 40 police officers from the participating police service, followed by analysis and 
discussion of the semi-structured interviews conducted with 6 senior executive representatives 
from various stakeholder agencies.   
7.1     Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police Officers   
As outlined in Chapter 4: Methods, a total of 40 police officers from the host police service were 
interviewed by telephone between January 6, 2014 and April 29, 2014.  Interview participants 
were encouraged, but not in any way compelled, to discuss their personal experience(s) (if any) 
with the various oversight agencies.  The semi-structured format worked well, providing each 
interview with a basic organization and simultaneously affording flexibility.  To avoid 
redundancy and ease the flow of the dialogue, planned questions were modified, repositioned or 
eliminated as necessary.     
Chapter 4: Methods also provided an overview of the coding procedures utilized in this section.  
As noted therein, I utilized NVivo software to analyze and code the interviews using a number of 
First Cycle coding techniques (holistic, provisional, attribute, subcoding, simultaneous, emotion, 
values, and evaluation coding), followed by Second Cycle coding (pattern coding) (Miles, 
Huberman & Saldana, 2013; Saldana, 2013).  The major themes that emerged from Phase 2 
interviews with police officers are presented below: acceptance of civilian oversight; 





7.1.1 Theme 1: Acceptance of Civilian Oversight 
The most prominent theme to emerge from Phase 2 was an overall acceptance of the need for 
civilian-led oversight initiatives.  While a number of respondents specifically referred to civilian 
oversight as a “necessary evil”, several remarked that civilian-led oversight mechanisms rarely 
evoke criticisms among their peer group.  As many interviewee responses suggest, civilian-led 
oversight mechanisms have become entrenched features of contemporary policing.  For instance, 
one officer explained,  
Honestly, I don't think officers even think about it until they are faced with a 
complaint or a colleague that they know of is faced with a complaint. I think that 
they don't really understand the process until they are either involved in it or they 
know somebody that's directly involved in it. (Officer #27) 
As another officer expressed, “people don’t typically talk about it” as long as “it is done fairly” 
(Officer #11).  Others described civilian oversight as “something that we are kind of getting used 
to” or “just the way it is” (Officer #18).   
Although respondents raised a variety of constructive criticisms about general or specific aspects 
of oversight/investigation by non-police personnel during the course of their interviews, virtually 
all almost invariably indicated their overall acceptance of civilian-led scrutiny in some form and 
acknowledged the need to satisfy the communities they served by providing transparent and 
accountable police practices.  These findings confirm those established in Phase 1: Survey 
Questionnaire, where a majority of survey respondents indicated overall acceptance of civilian 
oversight initiatives.   
 
In particular, interviewees perceived that civilian oversight initiatives were necessary and that 
the public did not trust the police to police themselves through internal oversight mechanisms 
alone.  Civilian oversight demonstrates accountability to the public in part to “escape the 
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perception” that police officers will simply “cover up” for one another (Officer # 24).  As Officer 
#9 explained (a Staff Sergeant with 26 years of experience), a robust and collaborative 
commitment to maintaining accountability is essential in present-day policing:  
Who is going to police the police? People think that they are above it when they 
are wearing the uniform or when they are doing the job. I am huge, huge, huge on 
accountability. I think you need a good cross section of civilians and officers and 
your peers and everybody but accountability, if you don’t have accountability, 
that’s where you get into problems in life in general. It has become bigger than 
any issue itself. It’s one of those necessary evils, if you will. Who is going to 
police the police? Ourselves as well as civilian agencies and a cross section 
thereof. 
Some interviewees also argued that an “outside view” may help to challenge the negative 
impressions that members of the public may develop through interactions with the police 
during the course of their regular duties (e.g., arrests, violation tickets). 
I think it is necessary for it to work. The police are already going to be on the 
negative by impression of the public because when we deal with them more times 
than not it’s on a negative basis. In order to support public confidence and public 
belief in what the police are doing there, especially for the silent majority, you need 
to have that outside view. (Officer #11) 
As these quotations above demonstrate, many interviewees perceived that civilian oversight 
initiatives were necessary, citing the public’s lack of trust in the police to police themselves 
through internal oversight mechanisms alone.   
7.1.1.1   Concerns about civilians’ qualifications and their understanding of police work 
Many respondents expressed acceptance of civilian oversight mechanisms with an important 
caveat: that these individuals be qualified to perform an investigatory role and objective.  As 
Officer #14 explained (a Detective Constable with 24 years of experience), he is “okay with it as 
long as they have the proper training.”  Similarly, the following officer outlined the conditions 
by which he would find civilian oversight acceptable:  
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I certainly don't disagree with it in principle. I think it really depends on who the 
people are…and what kind of understanding, insight or background they may 
have with regard to police activity, police structure, police politics, those kinds of 
things…With the civilians being involved, I am okay with, however, if they are 
provided with the proper training and tools to understand the complexity of our 
job. (Officer #34) 
Several other interviewees raised concerns about civilians’ understanding of police work and 
their qualifications to scrutinize police conduct.  Although the vast majority of interviewees 
indicated acceptance of the need for outside scrutiny, many raised concerns that civilians don’t 
understand “how our world is from our perspective” (Officer #17). 
 
As the following officer noted, civilian investigators may also not have appropriate training or 
experience dealing with a “traumatic situation”:  
I think sometimes they might not fully understand what the officer is going through 
as far as a traumatic situation, or just kind of the training we have... Like firearms 
training, just for example. You know you are there for a split second and you have 
to determine whether you are going to shoot or whether you are not going to shoot. 
Courts go over it a million times with a fine tooth comb and they don't understand. 
I don't know each individual investigator, like civilian investigator, but I don't know 
how much training they have and I don't think they would have enough as far as 
understanding just the physics behind it. The action verses reaction. You hear 
people say “Why don't you just shoot them in the arm?” or “Why don't you shoot 
them in the leg?”, “Why did you have to shoot them 'X' amount of times?”  You 
know it's the fight or flight response, your auditory exclusion and all that going on. 
They don't always fully understand. It seems that, all of these things are going on 
physiologically with you, that there are many reasons why you can't necessarily 
just shoot the gun out of the hand because it's not the movies. (Officer #35) 
 
Similarly, another officer argued that “you have to have the right ‘KSAs” to understand 
the “dynamics” of what officers face:  
You have to be open-minded, you have to have the right KSAs; knowledge, skills 
and abilities…I'm not saying that everybody could, but I personally feel that it 
should be someone with a policing background to understand the dynamics of 
what we face, to understand the pressure that is mounting from the public side 
from everything from what we get paid, to what makes front page news, to news 
videos that are usually one-sided. I don't think I'm completely opposed to it could 
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never be a civilian, I just really feel we should be focusing on people that have 
policing in their background. (Officer #18) 
These excerpts reflect a commonly-expressed perception that “outsiders” who are charged with 
scrutinizing and evaluating decisions made by police officers do not and cannot ever fully 
understand the role of a police officer and the culmination of their job-specific training, 
knowledge and experience.   
This skepticism surfaced frequently in interviews, as many interviewees emphasized the need for 
“set standards” to ensure civilian investigators are doing “the proper job” (Officer #36).  The 
following excerpt from Officer #27 (a Sergeant with 30 years of experience) is representative of 
the concern which many interviewees raised: 
Well, I guess in fairness, my concerns are because I think as a police officer, I 
have a sense of what…a conventional investigation should involve and I also 
think I have a sense of, for example, a police officer having been someone who 
has learned over a period of time with progressively more difficult investigations, 
to be a good investigator. And I guess what I am getting at there is that I think 
that both the SIU and the OIPRD are ultimately tasked with some fairly 
complicated investigations and because they haven't progressively learned to 
investigate, in my estimation, they can run into some difficulties. (Officer #37) 
This statement reflects the commonly-held perception that police officers are best equipped to 
handle complex and serious investigations due to the “KSAs” they acquire through their training 
and years of experience.  Thus, many interviewees opined that investigations of police conduct 
should emulate the same standards that police demand of themselves in their investigations (e.g., 
training; adherence to best practices and rules of evidence). 
Many respondents emphasized that a police-specific background and/or police-specific training 
were essential prerequisites of a competent civilian investigator (such as that offered at the 
Ontario Police College or equivalent).  In illustration, Officer #7, a Constable with 12 years of 
experience, stated:  
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There should be some type of mandated prior experience or educational program 
that someone has to pass if they want to start running criminal investigations 
against a police officer.  Square number 1, you are an ex-police officer, okay, you 
know how to run a criminal investigation and so on and so forth.  If they are 
hiring a civilian who comes from a non-criminal-investigative background, what 
on earth is the qualification and training at SIU to achieve that level of being able 
to lay criminal charges against a police officer who has committed an offense in 
the course of their duties?  That obviously boggles my mind, that somebody can 
run a criminal investigation without having a criminal investigative background. 
(Officer #7) 
As the above excerpts demonstrate, many interviewees expressed serious concerns about 
civilians holding powerful oversight/investigative roles without possession of police-specific 
experience or training.  These concerns frequently seemed to be grounded in a fear that civilian 
overseers would neither understand nor accept the reasoning that police employed in arriving at 
the decisions they made, and that this would be especially true in relation to use of force 
situations (e.g., shootings, injuries caused during arrests).  
On occasion, interviewees would point to the former occupation of the SIU/OIPRD civilian 
investigators in emphasizing their supposed unsuitability or direct my attention to the diverse 
backgrounds of those who occupied these roles.  For instance, interviewees identified civilian 
investigators as a former department store security guard, housewife, Special Constable at 
Canada’s Wonderland, mechanic, Brinks security guard, and investigator in a government 
ministry (e.g., the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour, and Ministry of 
Immigration).  These references were often made in a pointedly dismissive fashion, casting such 
previous career experience as inadequate preparation for conducting serious investigations 
involving police officers.   
It was also suggested that the application of common sense alone should result in a preference 
for seasoned police officers over those with lesser degrees of investigative experience.  As a 
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Constable with 34 years of experience emphasized:  
Hey, I don't care what police service, anywhere in Canada, the States, any 
frigging country, you go in and say, "Okay. Here's your special investigator," and 
he's got five year experience as a security guard doing loss prevention at Wal-
Mart, or you've got two investigators come through the door that have 20 years 
experience with the Toronto homicide squad. Where's your feeling on who's going 
to do the most thorough investigation? (Officer #20) 
 
Consistent with the findings of my survey, interviewees commonly perceived that oversight 
agencies, such as the SIU and OIPRD, would be most suitably staffed by former police officers 
with substantial investigative skills.  Again, Officer #20 urged attention to how the SIU has 
evolved over the years:  
I think they've realized that they've taken on retired police officers for a reason, 
because there is a skill set there…You have to be an investigator…I think they 
realize that, and I don't know if they're still hiring former police officers, but even 
the ones they have there, if they can pass on what they've learned over the years to 
the new guys that aren't police officers, it may help. You cannot get away from 
experience, from actually doing the job. (Officer #20) 
Another officer pronounced the hiring of former officers by these agencies as “an 
excellent thing” and maintained that 
Out of all the civilians you are going to have, I believe that [employing] former 
police officers is a good thing, because they do have that training, they have some 
of the same experiences. They can relate to that somewhat. (Officer #35) 
These officers, along with many others, perceived that former or retired police officers possess 
the “KSAs” and experience necessary to make sound evaluations of the conduct of police 
officers.   
However, this perception was not uniformly endorsed by my interviewees and several 
emphasized that former police officers should have been thoroughly vetted before they were 
hired by an oversight agency in order to ensure that each possessed the requisite skills and 
experience.  Thus, one interviewee stressed that overseeing agencies must “review what the 
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officers' histories were with the police services” and, in elaboration noted:  
I know a couple officers complained about some of the SIU were officers that 
were completely dysfunctional on the job and there they are doing the SIU thing. 
(Officer #39) 
 
Another, in discussing an investigator with one of Ontario’s oversight agencies, 
remarked:  
He used to be a sergeant up in ***, and to be perfectly blunt…the guy was fuckin’ 
incompetent…He wouldn't know how to investigate his way out of a paper bag…I 
think they really need to put an effort into recruiting experienced homicide 
investigators, major sexual assault investigators, people who have actually done 
that work previously, rather than taking sort of the first guy who shows up at the 
door. I'm sure he did very well in the interview. I'm sure he presented himself very 
professionally, and they looked at his career path and said, ‘Well, he's a retired 
sergeant, that must mean something.’…He may be a very good administrator, but 
it doesn't necessarily mean that he knows how to investigate a homicide. (Officer 
#1) 
The comments of my interviewees suggested consistently that police officers have very high 
expectations of those who are scrutinizing their professional conduct.  Although those 
individuals with police-specific training and experience are often favoured, the vast majority of 
police officers stressed above all that those tasked with examining alleged misconduct must be 
highly capable and highly trained investigators who possess the equivalent knowledge, skills and 
abilities as active police professionals.  Such findings are entirely consistent the findings of 
previous research reviewed earlier in Chapter 3. 
As Phase 1 revealed, knowledge about the staffing and performance (clearance by charge rates) 
of the SIU and OIPRD was lacking among many survey respondents.  A majority of survey 
respondents indicated that they felt sufficiently educated about the SIU and OIPRD by their 
police service, yet many were uncertain about how many former police officers worked at these 
agencies and there was limited knowledge by many respondents about the general trends in 
clearance by charge rates for each agency.   
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These findings suggest a need to educate police officers about the specifics of each civilian 
oversight agency.  For instance, it may be beneficial to provide officers with information on the 
training courses that SIU and OIPRD investigators receive, especially if they are similar to the 
investigative training courses that police officers take at the Ontario Police College or elsewhere.  
It would seem equally beneficial for officers to know precisely how many former police officers 
work for the SIU and OIPRD and the percentage of investigations by these agencies which result 
in criminal or Police Services Act charges.  Possession of this knowledge could serve to dispel 
misperceptions of the staffing and functioning of these oversight agencies and promote trust in 
those who conduct investigations that may impact fatefully upon the careers of police officers.   
 
7.1.2 Theme 2: Professionalism 
The themes of professionalism and professional status arose frequently in Phase 2 interviews 
with police officers.  Many interviewees perceived that police officers are held to a higher 
standard than those in many other occupations and professions.  As one officer stated, “I don't 
know of any other profession that gets examined the way that we are - publicly, internally and 
externally” (Officer #18).  As the following officer explained, police officers are “treated 
differently” because of the “nature of what we do”:  
We stand sort of apart from all other professions because of the nature of what we 
do…All police officers are held to a higher standard by the public…so the 
expectation is set very high, and as a recruit it’s explained to you this is why we 
have civilian oversight, and this is why you will be treated differently than a 
member of the public if you do something wrong. (Officer #1) 
Police officers also perceived their occupational role as unique, challenging and multifaceted and 
suggested that the high standards the public demands of police officers in relation to both their 
personal and professional conduct implicitly recognizes the multiple important services they 
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provide (e.g., emergency response, public safety, law enforcement, crime prevention and 
investigation).  For example, one interviewee who thought police oversight important described 
policing as “a unique career” and emphasized that “what we do is different.  There is no other 
real job that does the kind of things that we do, that sees the kind of things that we do.” (Officer 
#35).     
Others detailed their perceptions of what makes policing unique and, in doing so, directed 
attention to the powers that police officers possess.  As one officer described, “I don’t think 
there’s any other profession that gets examined internally and externally the way policing 
does…We are a different occupation…We also have the powers and the weapons that, I guess, 
justify that accountability” (Officer #20).  Another officer acknowledged the incredible, yet 
justified, scrutiny that officers face in carrying out their day-to-day duties:  
I have yet to come across any other individuals from any other walk of life who 
experience the same scrutiny that we do in policing. And I don't for a second 
suggest that it is necessarily inappropriate…You know, certainly as a police 
officer you are king of the hill. There is nobody more powerful than you on the 
street. And that's bar none. You have the right to take people's liberty away from 
them at a moment's notice. (Officer #37) 
Similarly, another officer boldly acknowledged the necessity for civilian oversight in 
consideration of the enormous power held by police officers, which includes the potential 
use of lethal force:  
 You know what? I think we should be held to a higher standard. We are based 
and entrusted through laws enacted by the members of this country and members 
of the public to take a life if necessary, and that's not something that should be 
taken lightly. I think there is a definite need for oversight. (Officer #8) 
Many expressed similar views and, in noting the substantial power and privilege police officers 
possess in their complex occupational roles, regarded civilian oversight as both necessary and 
desirable.   
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Yet, while many interviewees commonly acknowledged the need for high levels of 
accountability and scrutiny, some expressed resentment and frustration, opining that police 
officers faced greater scrutiny than other occupational groups.  A perception of expectations 
from the public and the media’s appetite for scandal-mongering sensationalism could fuel 
feelings of resentment.  As one officer put it, “cops are more under the gun than a lot of other 
groups” in describing that members of other publically-funded occupations are not “nearly on the 
hot seat as much as we are” (Officer #30).  Another officer described that police officers are 
“held to an impossible standard” by the public, the media and both internal and external 
oversight mechanisms (Officer #40).  A Staff Sergeant with 20 years of experience further 
elaborated on these concerns:   
I think it's one of the toughest professions just because of the accountability that 
comes with the job.  I think that's even more so because we've become the service 
of last resort for everyone, as other services get cut, I think police officers were 
always over the years expected to be many different things.  Social worker, 
paramedic, all that kind of stuff to a small degree.  But now I think that comes in 
even more play because there's other government agencies that have been cut 
back for whatever reason, and now the police officer is expected to be able to be 
all those things.  Always professional.  Always making the right decision, and the 
scrutiny is so high.  Again, not to say that's a bad thing, it's just a reality that 
there's cameras and stuff everywhere so scrutiny is extremely high. A lot of times 
we're judged in the media unfairly based on what people get to see over and over 
again, and not actually being in the situation and make a decision with 
information had at the time.  So I think that makes it a truly unique profession 
because, take a doctor for example, that makes a mistake.  It's usually not as 
public unless it's some kind of a horrendous mistake, and then they're not really 
thrust into the media over it like we are.  We sell papers because of the mistakes 
we make on a daily basis. (Officer #5) 
 
Police officers in Canada, like many public/governmental sector occupations across the country, 
have encountered ever-increasing demands for accountability, transparency, financial 
sustainability and improved performance standards in recent decades (see Chapter 2).  These 
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increased demands have made many officers feel that their conduct is increasingly scrutinized 
and susceptible to intense and sometimes unduly harsh criticism.   
A handful of interviewees opined that police officers face higher levels of both internal and 
external scrutiny than other occupational groups and pointed to the internal mechanisms that 
regulate other professionals.  For instance, one interviewee expressed frustration that other 
professions investigate “their own” (e.g., doctors, nurses, teachers), yet, in “policing we are 
professional investigators, yet we can't do investigations”:  
I feel that needs to be brought up and how it's just so frustrating that we can't 
investigate ourselves. Yet that’s what we do our whole lives. They'll trust me to 
investigate or go to a crime scene where three people have been murdered and 
they trust me to do that impartially. Yet as soon as a police officer is being 
investigated for sexual assault, all of the sudden we're useless investigators. 
(Officer #39) 
Despite the frustrations and challenges cited above, the vast majority of interviewees expressed 
overall acceptance of the need for civilian oversight mechanisms and believed them necessary to 
satisfy public demands for accountability.  
7.1.3 Theme 3: Procedural Justice 
Throughout Phase 2, issues of procedural justice (e.g., perceptions of fair and respectful 
treatment, investigative efficiency, timely communication about the status/outcome of 
investigations) surfaced fairly frequently with interviewees providing a host of criticisms about 
their experiences with each oversight agency.  However, a macro-analysis of the interviews with 
police officers makes it clear that one antagonism is particularly bothersome for interviewees: 
inadequate communication about the status of SIU, OIPRD and Professionals Standards Bureau 
investigations.   
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This finding is consistent with the results from Phase 1, where a series of questions probed a 
variety of procedural justice issues for all oversight agencies (e.g., prompt notification of the 
investigation; explanation of the investigative process; timely investigation; courteous treatment; 
objectivity and fair treatment by investigators; speed and length of the investigation; updates 
about status/outcome of investigation).  That analysis revealed that one commonality shared 
among survey respondents with personal experience with the SIU, the OIPRD and the 
Professional Standards Bureau is that a majority were dissatisfied with the extent to which they 
were kept informed of the status of their investigation. 
 
It is important to clarify that the impact of poor communication should be viewed on a 
continuum.  To illustrate, two interview excerpts are provided below.  The first excerpt stems 
from a police officer’s annoyance that his own Professional Standards Bureau failed to update 
him on their investigation of a low-level complaint.  The second records the reflection of a police 
officer who was involved in a fatal shooting investigated by the SIU and his belief that the poor 
communication practices of this agency caused the victim’s family additional anguish: 
Yeah.  I think they could do a better job of keeping people up to date with what's 
going on.  I also understand that you don't need to Chicken Little all this stuff 
either.  Okay, the investigation is ongoing.  When it's done we'll tell you…I can 
understand process and that it just takes a while. (Officer #4) 
It [communication] was kind of sporadic. At the beginning it was all rush, rush, 
rush and then it was pretty much nothing for quite some time. What was going on 
with them internally, I don't know. Just thinking of it from the perspective of the 
family of the person that I shot and killed, it's so unfair to them as well because 
here they don't have a person in their family anymore, even though they disowned 
this particular person because of mental health problems. He tried to kill his wife 
and stuff before. It's so unfair for that family as well because they don't know. 
They're not given an update and how they get closure until they're told what 
happened, right? (Officer #38) 
My interviewees commonly perceived that, regardless of the severity of the act or incident under 
investigation, those under investigation should receive regular updates on the status and 
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anticipated outcome of the investigation.  Several remarked on multiple occasions that this 
standard should also apply equally to investigations by police, with those involved in an incident 
informed of its progress.  
The following excerpt from an interview transcript is included as a quintessential example of 
how police officers can have confidence in the quality, speed and length of an investigation 
conducted by an oversight agency, yet remain dissatisfied with the frequency of communication 
that this body provides.  In this case, the interviewee commented upon a Professional Standards 
Bureau investigation:  
Interviewee: Police officers investigating police officers, they know what it's 
about. They understand. They went and did the interviews. You know, there was 
an issue involving handcuffing. They went through the protocol for handcuffing, 
they went through, you know, your block training. This is what's taught for 
handcuffing. 
Facilitator: Yeah. You were treated well then? 
Interviewee: I was, yeah.  
Facilitator: Okay. What was your impression of the quality of the 
investigations or the investigators themselves?  
Interviewee: I thought they were all well-done…Yep. I was never dissatisfied 
with any of them. 
Facilitator: Okay. Then what about the level of communication while one of 
these investigations are going on? You mentioned that they take too long. Is there 
anything you could recommend for change in internal PSB investigations? 
Interviewee: I think that if it's something that's going to take some time, then I 
really don't know if it's too much to ask for a monthly update.  You know, for 
every 30 days or something that's more appropriate than going 4 months between 
your notification and your interview.  I think that that's probably too long myself. 
Because you have placed that officer into a stressful position. They know that 
there's an investigation taking place. They know, in general, terms of what it's 
about. At that same time, they don't know what's going on with it.  I think that if 
we were a member of the public and the police were investigating something we 
were involved in, if we were a victim, or whatever the case may be, I think the 
public expects a little bit more than, you know, not hearing from the officer in 
four months. (Officer #6) 
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This example demonstrates the stress that may be caused by the “fear of the unknown” during 
the course of an investigation.  Notwithstanding the positive aspects of the investigation or the 
skillfulness of its investigators, the failure to regularly communicate the status of investigations 
may causes stress and unnecessary aggravation for those who are otherwise satisfied with other 
aspects of the process.   
Police officers’ feelings of frustration and annoyance may be compounded if they perceive the 
quality of communication to be lacking and/or if they perceive that those in charge of their case 
(investigators or administrators) are indifferent or insensitive to their situation as the subject of a 
complaint.  The following interview excerpts highlight the reaction of two officers to 
investigations conducted by the OIPRD:  
Facilitator: Now, can you tell me about the process of communication. 
Interviewee: There wasn't any. 
Facilitator: There wasn't any? How long did it take to be resolved, or? 
Interviewee: I was found ... I'm trying to think of the words they used. [The 
other officer] found out way before I did…So, I called up the OIPRD…I said, 
"Here's the problem, what's going on?" I said, "[The other officer] was found not 
guilty." He goes, "well it was unsubstantiated." I go, "No no no, he's not guilty. 
Let's be honest, he is not guilty of anything here." I said, "Unsubstantiated means 
nothing, he is not guilty of any wrongdoing." He said, "Oh, yeah, no, you're … 
you're clear too." I said, "Well thanks for getting a hold of me." Then I asked him, 
I said, "What recourse do we as police officers have?" I said, "You know if I do 
something wrong, I'll take the hit…Totally take hit, I got no problem. I said, "But 
when something like this happens," and the guy's got my file in front of him. He's 
looking at it, I said, "What recourse do we have as police officers when this 
frivolous complaint comes in, and I have to go through eight months of garbage? 
Stress on me, stress on my family." Right? I said, "Sleepless nights." I said, "What 
recourse do we have?" (Officer #5)  
I had an investigation with OPRID...And it was just regarding a traffic stop. A 
general traffic stop and the person accusing me of being racist and discriminatory 
and it was unfounded. But the tone of the letter when I finally got it from them was 
that of ... The way I felt the tone of the letter was ... It wasn't like, "No, it's 
unfounded officer. Keep up the good work." It was more of a tone, "You're lucky. 
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This time. Because we know you did something wrong, we just couldn't prove 
it."…The tone of the letter…it just angered me. I was so angered about the way 
the tone is and maybe it's me looking into it and I feel that people are out to get 
you, but the tone was ... And other officers I've talked to said the same thing when 
they've been investigated.  They just felt it was the tone of things was, "Well, 
you're lucky. We just couldn't get the evidence. But we will next time."  (Officer 
#39) 
 
The issues of procedural justice that surfaced throughout Phase 2 confirm that regular and timely 
communication stands as a cornerstone for effective oversight investigations.  As De Angelis and 
Kupchik (2007: 668) emphasized, these issues of procedural justice must be recognized as 
worthy of exploration: they are the primary feature of a complaint-related inquiry that can be 
reasonably altered and improved. 
7.1.3.1 Stress faced while under investigation 
 
Another notable theme that surfaced, which is also directly related to procedural justice, 
pertained to the stress which some police officers experience while under investigation by the 
various oversight agencies.  This theme was also noted by the officers in their open-ended 
written commentaries (Chapter 5).  Interviewees frequently mentioned that the prolonged period 
of being under investigation by the SIU, OIPRD and Professional Standards Bureau had been 
stress-inducing and caused them to worry about the fate of their career and the erosion of their 
personal and professional reputation.  Officer #3, a constable with nine years of experience, 
highlighted the effects of such stress:  
I think from the very nature of what we do, we’re sent out there to fail. You only 
get called into the collision after it’s happened. You only get called to the 
domestic after it’s happened. You only get called … I can go on and on and 
on…Inevitably, somebody’s going to be displeased with what you do…You’re just 
going to be critiqued about what you do and then that goes to a justice official 
who then puts you under a microscope over a period of days or that civilian 
oversight body that puts you under the microscope for months and they critically 
comb through your conduct. I think you have high pressure situations, proud 
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people who are looking to do good things. I think it’s inevitable that emotions 
overflow too and so I think when you end up pushing down and pushing down and 
pushing down on these people, the pressure cooker gets to the point where people 
end up breaking and that’s where we end up with stress injuries. (Officer #3) 
Similarly, Officer #34, a constable with 13 years of experience, described how the stress 
of oversight investigations may cause officers to “second guess” themselves:  
I was made to feel that by this investigator that I had done something wrong. So 
you are now turning someone who is a professional who is trying to protect society, 
you know, and turn the tables on them and tell them that they are now the criminal. 
It is a very bad situation to be in. It is not like a police officer who is off duty and 
decides to go steal candy from a store, or steal things, you know what I mean? It's 
a police officer who is doing their job and trying to keep society safe, and in the 
interim, the tables are now being turned on them and so what you have is officers 
second-guessing themselves all the time now as to what they can and cannot do, 
and it is not good. (Officer #34) 
 
These remarks hint powerfully at the intense pressure and stress that some police officers 
experience while under investigation for incidents that occur while on duty.  Typically, police 
officers’ decisions that are made in the “heat of the moment” are scrutinized over weeks and 
months by supervisors, oversight agencies, courts and the media.  This dynamic serves as a 
source of stress and resentment for some police officers who feel unfairly scrutinized by others 
who dissect their actions and evaluate them with the benefit of hindsight and the luxury of 
prolonged contemplation.   
Several interviewees recounted episodes of stress that they had endured and/or witnessed in 
relation to SIU investigations of the use of lethal force (shooting) investigations.  In addition to 
the stress that these violent encounters provoked in and of themselves, interviewees discussed 
how the stressfulness of these incidents was exacerbated by an investigative process that could 
sprawl over lengthy periods of time.  The following two excerpts highlight these views: 
Oh, I think it's a major stressor. It's probably one of the biggest stressors that comes 
with this job, is dealing with the civilian oversight. I've seen officers get so nervous, 
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officers that are seasoned, and then they become subject to an SIU investigation. 
They just turn into different people. They get nervous, and they just turn into 
different people. It's a major stressor, a huge stressor and something that teachers, 
doctors, they just don't have that level of second guessing. (Officer #31) 
 
I don't expect it to be perfect, and I don't expect that every officer is going to love 
whatever body they put in place that's going to have that oversight. There's always 
going to be issues to a certain degree and in certain cases, but I really think effort 
needs to be made to improve upon it the way it is today, because I don't think you'd 
find an officer out there who really has a lot of faith that if they were involved in a 
shooting incident and the SIU comes in, honest to God, those are about the scariest 
moments in anyone's career. Sitting there, “Oh my God, what are they going to do 
to me? What's going to happen to me now?” You know? (Officer #1) 
These remarks highlight the “fear of the unknown” that may arise during the course of prolonged 
SIU investigations, where police officers’ uncertainties about their career role, career trajectory 
and personal and professional reputations are scrutinized and stand in potential jeopardy.  This is 
especially true during SIU investigations when the potential career and financial consequences 
are profoundly serious (e.g., criminal charges, incarceration, Police Services Act charges, civil 
litigation). 
Media sensationalism also surfaced as a recurring source of stress among interviewees.  About a 
quarter of my respondents reported that the media’s treatment of police actions induced feelings 
of frustration and served as a source of stress.  The following two quotations illustrate these 
sentiments:  
The vast majority of articles they report on the news, newspaper, social media, 
whatever about police, what are they? Negative because that's what interests 
public. They don't hear about the other 99 incidents that day that the police did 
right.  Again, that skewed perception anytime they see something on the TV. "Oh, 
yeah. The cops screwed up again. Oh, yeah. Cops screwed up again" versus, 
"Okay. You didn't hear about the baby’s life that we saved today, the person that 
was in a burning car that we pulled out of that car today or just the every-day 
things. We stopped that person from speeding today who may have went down the 
road and crashed into a car carrying your daughter to school and killed her." 




I think a lot of the times with the public, we run into knee jerk reactions, trial by 
YouTube, and they allow emotions to run their critical thinking. (Officer #3) 
As illustrated by these observations, police officers recognize both traditional media and social 
media sources as having a powerful impact in shaping public perceptions of police and police-
related events.  Most interviewees indicated a general acceptance of public interest in police-
related events and also recognized public demand for the greater accountability and transparency 
of police actions.   
However, it was also evident that they felt beleaguered by media portrayals which framed 
complex events in overly simple and misleading ways.  Thus, interviewees noted that high 
profile events that trigger an SIU investigation (e.g., most incidents involving serious injury or 
the use of lethal force) routinely thrust police officers/services into the glare of the media’s 
(negative) spotlight.   
Yeah, how about not making us guilty before we're actually found guilty. How 
about let the process take care of itself, and go from there. If the guy did 
something wrong then go ahead. (Officer #12) 
I would like to see a little more control over what the paper gets before officers 
get...hung out to dry before the investigation's complete…Then, when the 
investigation's complete and the officer is exonerated, there's a three line blurb on 
page 23…. We all know that the good news doesn't sell and bad news sells. 
(Officer #17) 
The above statements convey the feelings of powerlessness and frustration that officers may 
experience over their inability to mitigate the negativity which imbues the media’s coverage of 
tragic events.  These feelings can be especially intense when an investigation of an incident by 
an oversight agency clears an officer of any wrongdoing but media interest in the incident has 
long passed.  
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It is noteworthy that once the SIU investigative mandate is been invoked, police services in 
Ontario are restricted from making public comments about an ongoing SIU investigation and can 
only acknowledge the involvement of the SIU and provide a skeletal report on the incident.  
These restrictions frustrate many stakeholders, including police officers, who may be required to 
endure months of imposed silence before the SIU provides a public statement on the incident:  
If that initial media release had some basic details out there in the public right 
away it seems to me it would take away a lot of this scrutiny or perceived bias that 
the SIU is not charging people and stuff like that.  If they just put it out there in the 
media right away that the gentleman was armed, the officers were assaulted, they 
responded with lethal force as is legal and justified, and then let the chips fall where 
they may.  Let the SIU run their investigations. But by not saying anything this tight-
lippedness that I see at the higher levels seems to tarnish things and lets the media 
run wild with it for a while. (Officer #7) 
Several interviewees recounted their personal experience of facing intense media scrutiny as the 
subject officer in police shootings, and emphasized how the frustration they experienced was 
compounded by the fact that they could not counter the one-sided, and often speculative, 
narrative if the incident that was disseminated by the media.  For example, the following excerpt 
illustrates one interviewee’s stressful experience after a high-profile fatal shooting: 
It’s nice that they’re looking at PTSD but they’re only looking at the tip of the 
iceberg. The trauma isn’t always from looking at these terrible scenes…In my 
personal situation, the media’s slagged me like crazy every day, coming to the 
house, interviewing your neighbours, bothering your neighbours. They’re 
publishing inaccurate information and you have no recourse. (Officer #3) 
Although the majority of police officers accepted the need for independent investigations to be 
conducted by the SIU, many recounted feelings of isolation and frustration that were catalyzed 
by the media’s skewed report of an incident and prolonged by a lengthy SIU investigation. 
7.1.4 Theme 4: Specific oversight agency issues 
Interviewees provided feedback about particular features and practices of each of the oversight 
agencies focused upon in this study.  The commentary was generally reflective of the insights 
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garnered in Phase 1, which again served to reinforce the specific role and mandate that each 
respective agency plays in the overarching oversight system in Ontario.  
7.1.4.1   Special Investigations Unit  
The SIU was mentioned more frequently than the other oversight agencies and discussions about 
SIU investigations generated the most impassioned dialogue among interviewees.  As previously 
discussed, this is likely attributable to the fact that SIU investigations are triggered by already 
dramatic situations (e.g., the use of force causing serious injury and sometimes death) and also 
because the potential consequences of an SIU investigation are the most impactful for officers’ 
careers and reputations.  This is consistent with the findings from Phase 1: Survey 
Questionnaire, where attitudes toward the SIU were identified as the most impactful factor that 
contributed to police officers’ overall attitudes toward civilian oversight.   
Interviewee comments about the SIU most frequently referenced negative experiences with 
investigations by this oversight agency.  The following quotations reflect these sentiments: 
I've had a few experiences with SIU where I've just found their whole investigative 
process to be shoddy, and this just again, directly related to situations we've been 
in in my unit with…all we do is collision reconstruction…On a couple of events 
where they've been involved it's just been several glaring issues where I'm thinking 
I was quite surprised that they treated their investigation the way they did and that 
was how they did day-to-day stuff. I just thought it was very poor quality…Some of 
the equipment that they are using is very outdated…Talking with my peers and 
whatnot, it always seems to be common threads. To me, if they were investigating 
me, I'd be very concerned that things might be overlooked and I wouldn't have a 
whole lot of confidence that things were being done right. (Officer #24) 
 
 
I don't know if it's a lack of resources or a lack of their ability to recognize or 
having not been subject to cross examination and exclusion of those pieces (of 
evidence). I just see overall that they don't subscribe to the same standards as what 




The most common criticisms that interviewees made of the SIU alleged: disorderly investigative 
techniques; poor evidence gathering and retention; and the employment of underqualified 
investigators.  The harshest criticisms stemmed from interviewees who recounted investigations 
that occurred in the first decade of the SIU’s existence (1990-2000).  Many interviewees 
conceded that SIU investigations have, for the most part, improved over recent years, with 
improved investigative techniques, streamlined internal processes and the employment of more 
highly-qualified investigators (who are often former police officers).   
Nevertheless, a fair number of interviewees expressed disappointment with the quality of SIU 
communication in relation to the status of investigations.  Similar concerns also surfaced in 
Phase 1, where a majority of survey respondents complained that they were not provided with 
frequent updates about the status of their SIU investigation and some maintained that they were 
never directly informed of the ultimate resolution of their case.  The comments of my 
interviewees echoed these complaints: 
Before the three and a half, four months that they chose to allow their investigation 
to run before they sent a letter. That's three and a half, four months of stress, but it 
was unneeded in my opinion.  So story goes on. Our PSB won't clear you until SIU 
clear you. So I do three and a half, four months before SIU clears me, another 
month and a half before PSB phones me and says, "Yeah, we're clearing you as 
well." And then six months later I get a letter saying that, “You've received a 
commendation for lifesaving” – because we lifted the car off the guy who had rolled 
it and saved his life. So that was my take on them.  They all take their sweet time to 
clear and there's really no reason for it. (Officer #25) 
I think it's a lot of second guessing. It's the worry about the second guessing that 
gets them all upset. A lot of them have done the right things. They're just worried 
because everything goes dark. When the SIU becomes involved everything 
becomes silent and dark and super secretive. That's what sends the officers 
getting upset. There's no information flow coming from SIU or any of the people 
that are superiors at the time. (Officer #31) 
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Although the vast majority of SIU investigations do not result in criminal or Police Services Act 
charges against officers, it is apparent that the process of being the subject of an ongoing 
investigation is a stressful experience for many officers.  It was clear that most interviewees did 
not understand the reasons why SIU investigations could entail extraordinary delays or result in 
the cessation of “information flow.”  As one interviewee commented in exasperation, “I don't 
know whether reports sit on somebody's desk waiting for the final approval, or what the deal is 
there, but I think that the length of time is too long” (Officer #27).  According to many 
interviewees, such stress could be reduced with more regular updates on the status of 
investigations and their anticipated resolution. 
Despite the above criticisms, however, a fair number of interviewees recounted positive 
experiences with SIU investigations and SIU investigators.  For example:  
The way I was treated from the SIU was quite respectful. No issues with them investigating… 
I understand the process and I actually agree with the process. It’s fine. (Officer #24) 
 
My understanding now is pretty much most of the individuals who are providing the service 
to the SIU are former police officers with excellent credentials who are very well 
experienced in violent crime and the investigation in violent crime. I have no question about 
their level of expertise. On any one particular perspective, you may disagree with them but 
there are forums for that in terms of airing that and addressing those. That could be looked 
after. (Officer #2) 
The above comments were voiced by interviewees who were satisfied with their respective 
experiences with the SIU (quality of investigators, the investigation itself and the quality of 
communication) and their respect for the mandate of the SIU overall.  More generally, 
interviewees who reported overall satisfaction with the SIU praised its investigators as 
accomplished and competent.  In these situations, interviewees described what seemed to be a 
solid working relationship between the SIU and the SIU liaison officers from their respective 
police service which ensured that lines of communication flowed effectively.  
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7.1.4.2   Police Services Boards 
In contrast to perceptions of the SIU, feedback regarding police services boards was generally 
positive.  Similar to the response-base in Phase 1, a majority of interviewees reported that they 
had worked, currently or previously, under the command of a police services board and accepted 
them, reasoning that these boards represented the community and communicated its interests.   
These sentiments are reflected in the comments of two of my interviewees: 
Well, again, all I would say is that I have never been opposed publicly to having 
the community involved in any aspect of policing and I think in some respects, they 
are the customers and I’m not a big fan of that model of us being kind of a business. 
I've never seen us that way given the way we are a service provider. But, at the 
same time, I've never been opposed to having input from, again, whether it be local 
politicians or representatives of the community for that matter. I don't think it is a 
negative. It’s necessary, we have to accept it. (Officer #37) 
 
To me, it's all about advocacy. In all reality, if you're not involved in your own 
community that you're policing, you have problems in the first place. (Officer #6)  
 
These findings are generally consistent with those garnered in Phase 1, wherein a majority of 
respondents deemed police services boards to be necessary and expressed an overall respect for 
the mandate of police services boards. 
Most interviewees were quite vague in describing their perceptions of the qualities and 
qualifications that police services board members should ideally possess.  Thus, while some 
emphasized that police services board members should be well-informed about police practices, 
others simply voiced a preference for persons who were “good”, “qualified”, “professional” or 
simply “the right people” (Officer #9).  Nevertheless, their comments did make clear that the 
“right people” was an expansively-defined category which included all who were well-educated, 
thoughtful and fair-minded:  
I think it is a good buffer and filter from the general public and other outside 
agencies to service…if they are properly educated and understand our 
responsibilities….Where I am currently now, my division now, I do see the police 
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services board and know what their concerns and expectations are, and if utilized 
properly, they can be a very good tool. However, you have to have a good group of 
people in there or else it can be a complete waste of resources and dysfunctional. 
(Officer #34) 
 
If they're a professional…If they're in there for the right reasons and they have a 
truly strong desire to be part of it, I think it's a good arrangement because it allows 
us to see what the civilians feel. Because sometimes what we think is important, 
might not be important to them. So I feel as long as they don't have vested interests, 
that it is a good thing. (Officer #39) 
My interviewees commonly perceived less-than-ideal police services board members as persons 
who sought to advance their own personal or political agenda instead of demonstrating a genuine 
commitment to the provision of sound oversight and accountability.   
Many interviewees described the relationship between police services boards and police officers 
as one where priorities and expectations were in a constant process of negotiation.  For the most 
part, this relationship was described as positive and constructive, tempered by mutual recognition 
and respect for the roles and responsibilities of both parties.  The following excerpts describe this 
ebb and flow of communication: 
They want to know what the police are up to, because their tax money is going 
towards us. They want to bring concerns to us. They may want to have what they 
deem as priorities addressed by us. So that seems to me like a normal community 
relationship between the police and the community. I mean, unless they started 
having unrealistic expectations, but hopefully, they would be set straight by the 
people who represent the police in those meetings. I haven't had the sense that the 
police services board groups have been unreasonable or unrealistic. (Officer #30) 
 
I have no issues about the police service board. We get along very well. We have 
good interaction. We have good feedback. They ask for certain information. I give 
it to them. They ask questions about certain things or they may want to do some 
things, and I explain to them, "Okay. You can do this, or you can't do this, but we 
could do this to maybe, further to the goal that you're looking towards." I think the 
input from them, I find it valuable. (Officer #8) 
 
In general, interviewees described the relationship between police services boards and police 
services as positive, healthy and viable.  Nevertheless, some perceived police services 
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boards/members as overly-politicized or thought police services boards irrelevant and perceived 
that they had little impact on the working lives of police officers.  Although many interviewees 
reported that they welcomed the questions, input and recommendations of police services boards, 
they felt that these agencies should not dictate or direct operational decisions.   
7.1.4.3   Office of the Independent Police Review Director  
Of all the oversight agencies mentioned by interviewees in Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: 
Police Officers, the OIPRD attracted the least commentary.  When referred to by my 
respondents, mention of the OIPRD was most commonly made in the context of relaying 
negative experiences during OIPRD investigations.  For example, the following two officers 
characterized the skills of civilian investigators as lacking:  
The two people that were here, that interviewed me in regards to my incident, were 
from the Ministry of Health – two females that just came from the Ministry of 
Health. They have no idea. I brought the president of my branch with the 
association here, because I was the detachment rep at the time for my detachment. 
I had him come and when they left he said, "Oh my God, they have no clue what 
they are doing." I said, "No." It was two and a half hours of just nonsense, and 
asking the same question over and over again. They just…they have no idea. Like 
I said Ministry of Health. What the hell do they know about what we do?  (Officer 
#12) 
 
You know what, they tried their best. The one guy was a retired Hamilton cop and 
he was a retired guy doing his best. The other guy was on the military police, I think 
he said. They did their best. Sometimes your best isn’t good enough. I put that down 
to openness and willingness.  They need to have accountability too. There needs to 
be an open dialogue with these people. I have been on the other side. I have been 
an investigator for PSB and investigating other officers. It is not fun. It is not the 
place you want to be. You don’t make any friends and no matter how hard you try 
or no matter what you do, it’s just not going to be a good thing. Where I sympathize 
with them, they tried the best they could.  (Officer #9) 
While the comments of the first interviewee provided above are brusquely dismissive of the 
qualifications of OIPRD investigators and the second more empathetic, both serve to illustrate 
 267 
 
the tensions that can arise between police officers and civilians who investigate and oversee 
allegations of misconduct.   
A second recurring issue raised in relation to the OIPRD pertains to complaints of inadequate 
communication during the course of complaint investigations.  The first of the following two 
excerpts record an interviewee’s perception that OIPRD investigators were unskilled in 
conducting interviews and were uninterested in acquiring the full facts of an event; the second 
interviewee directs attention to a communication void that persisted throughout an investigation 
and left the officer involved “in the dark”:   
I'm trying to explain to them what had happened. You're walking them through 
everything, and they're not interested at all about what I have to say, it's all about 
the complaint. It's all about the complaint, and when they said, "Oh, do you have 
any questions or anything?" I said, "Well, there's two and half hours of my life I'll 
never get back." I said, "That was a waste of my time." I said, "You're still not 
interested in what I had to say." I said, "That's fine." I said, "Maybe next time you 
can try and act like you really care."  (Officer #12) 
 
None, I wasn’t notified about anything. I wasn’t updated. It was in the dark.  Last 
second, they had to meet all their last second deadlines. It was exceedingly poorly 
done. That was probably the biggest fire point for me. (Officer #9) 
These examples highlight the conflict that can arise during the course of investigations when 
police officers feel that their perspective does not hold equal weight to that of the complainant, 
and also the tension that can arise when police officers feel they are not kept sufficiently 
informed about the status of their investigation.   
However, other interviewees were far more positive in their evaluation of the OIPRD.  There 
were several references that were complimentary of the OIPRD Director’s thoughtful approach 
and commitment to seeking effective resolutions:   
I know Mr. McNeilly's philosophy. He wants a resolution. Nobody wins at the end 
of hearing. He wants an amenable resolution whether that was what was asked 
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for in the first place or something else that anybody can live with, that's the goal. 
(Officer #2) 
A second interviewee voiced appreciation for an innovative online tracking mechanism that 
permitted individuals who were involved in an OIPRD complaint/investigation (citizens and 
police officers) check on its status: 
I think that OIPRD is pretty good with that because they assign a number to it; 
you can go on-line anytime, put the number in, it'll tell you where the 
investigation's at…I find that actually speaking directly to somebody there is 
difficult. As far as tracking your complaint, it's set up online…It doesn't tell you 
much, it just tells you that it's being reviewed or a file been closed. If they decide 
not to investigate, then you have to wait for the letter that comes; then they tell 
you why it's been closed or whatever the case is. (Officer #27) 
Another interviewee (Officer #29) spoke positively of his email exchanges with the OIPRD and 
his ability to obtain information in this way about the status of an investigation in which he was 
involved.  Although Officer #16 also reported the use of email for the same purpose, this 
interviewee noted the difficulties that he had experienced in doing so due to confusion over 
which agency (the OIPRD or Professional Standards Bureau) was ultimately responsible for the 
investigation.   
A fair number of interviewees were aware that the vast majority of OIPRD investigations are 
referred back to the originating police service’s Professional Standards Bureau for investigation.  
The following excerpts illustrate the inherent paradox of this dynamic:  
I get frustrated that these people are doing it from arm’s length.  They don’t see 
how it really works in the field.  To me, I’m sorry.  It’s all about smoke and mirrors.  
Let’s face it, OIPRD in the end, when a complaint comes in they just send it to our 
Professional Standards Branch and they look at it anyways. (Officer #33) 
 
I've had no issues there because quite frankly, OIPRD, when they get a complaint, 
they send it back to our PSB to investigate. I don't think the public realizes that. 
We're still investigating ourselves…Quite frankly, I think it covers two things off 
from my perspective…you've got trustworthy, dedicated investigators to deal with 
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these things who have a good perspective on things to do the investigation properly, 
and you've got the civilian oversight on the other side. (Officer #8) 
Although the majority of police officers in this study indicated a preference for investigations to 
be handled by internal police investigators (See 5.2 - General Questions about Civilian 
Oversight), the desired-for situation may have paradoxical effects.  Thus, while knowledge of the 
fact that “OIPRD investigations” are generally conducted by the referring agency may bolster 
officer confidence in internal oversight mechanisms, it may also lead to dismissive assessments 
of the OIPRD, with that agency perceived of as politicized “window dressing” and merely a 
civilian-led facade for police-led investigations.   
7.1.4.4   Professional Standards Bureau 
Consistent with findings from Phase 1, a majority of interviewees from Phase 2 expressed 
satisfaction with the quality of investigators/investigations affiliated with their Professional 
Standards Bureau.  For example, the following two excerpts illustrate officers’ perceptions that 
they were treated fairly and in a forthright manner by professional investigators: 
My personal dealings with them have been professional and I've never felt 
railroaded or anything negative. They've done their jobs and in cases where I've 
been under investigation, [I was] exonerated. I had confidence, because it shows 
that they actually did a thorough investigation, as opposed to taking something at 
face value and saying "OK, guilty because this civilian says something was done." 
But through investigation, it actually came out, so I have a degree of confidence 
with our PSB, I feel comfortable with them. (Officer #36) 
I’ve been treated fairly well by our professional standards. I’ve been investigated 
by them a couple of times. I never really had any issue with what they were doing. 
(Officer #40)  
These comments above reflect the views held by many interviewees who expressed comfort and 
confidence with the work of the Professional Standards Bureau.   
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There were a handful of interviewees, however, who voiced negative comments about this 
oversight mechanism and maintained that its investigations were, for example, driven by internal 
politics or were overly-critical or excessively harsh or slow or failed to provide officers with 
timely status updates.  Nevertheless, the vast majority of interviewees praised the quality of 
investigations conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau and lauded the host police service 
for its efforts to improve the quality of the Professional Standards Bureau’s investigators and 
investigations.  For example:  
One comment I'm going to make about our Professional Standards Bureau is that 
we have really raised the bar, I would say, in the last ten years. It used to be a 
dumping ground for wayward officers, I don't know if your police service was the 
same, but now, I find it's very different. They're taking in lots of high-fliers. 
They're taking people with crime backgrounds.  It is as it should be. It is, because, 
if you were to be investigated, you want the most capable police officer just as we 
would want the most capable people in SIU, OIPRD or the police services boards. 
(Officer #28) 
I've dealt with Professional Standards Bureau and I have had no issues 
whatsoever with regards to the way I've been treated by them. They've always 
been very professional. They're there to do the right thing. I know from years ago 
there was a perception among people that they were just out to get people, much 
like the SIU is, right? I don't think that those perceptions are correct. (Officer 
#38) 
Most interviewees perceived the Professional Standards Bureau to be comprised of qualified, 
competent and professional investigators who, in the main, conduct timely and efficient 
investigations and provide officers with timely communication and feedback.     
In comparison to the comments that respondents voiced about the other oversight agencies, most 
interviewees expressed a greater level of respect for Professional Standards Bureau investigators.  
They generally esteemed these investigators and praised the manner in which they conducted 
themselves and carried out their investigations.  For example:  
These guys were as professional as they can get, and especially after I had given 
them my duty notes and my explanation of what was done, when and why.  When I 
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did receive feedback from them or contact for clarification, there was no 
antagonism, no nothing. It was straight, professional, almost even pleasant 
speaking with them. (Officer #23) 
Yeah, I’m quite satisfied with our PSB investigations. I was just talking to our 
prosecutor today and he was saying that they’re up at about 97% are resolved in 
one way or another before it ever goes to trial.  And I think that’s positive 
because there’s some agreement with everybody going on there at that point. It’s 
less confrontational and more cooperative. (Officer #13) 
These perceptions are consistent with the findings of my survey as well as surveys conducted 
with others; both record that police officers often perceive internal police investigators as 
competent and well-qualified to carry out their tasks efficiently.   
Given that the Professional Standards Bureau plays a crucial role in the operation of civilian-led 
oversight mechanisms, the positive perceptions that officers have of this body must be 
considered an encouraging sign.   Professional Standards Bureaus serve as vital links between 
police services and all civilian-led oversight mechanisms across Ontario.  For example, they 
perform the following functions: 
 Frequent liaison with civilian-led agencies such as SIU, OIPRD and OCPC to filter 
the flow of investigations, status updates and resolutions. 
 Parallel investigations to SIU investigations, and the majority of referrals from the 
OIPRD. 
 Independent investigations on behalf of other police services.  
 With the assistance of the Professional Standards Bureau, many “customer service 
contacts” are diffused or mediated locally without ever evolving into official public 
complaints that are referred to the OIPRD. 
As a critical linchpin in the network of civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario, it is essential 
that Policing Standards Bureaus across the province maintain a high level of trust and 
accountability among both their own police officers and the various oversight agencies.  This 
will allow for the effective balance of internal discipline and public trust.   
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7.1.5  Conclusions from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police Officers 
Most of the prominent themes that emerged from police officers’ interviews in Phase 2: Semi-
structured interviews: Police Officers were consistent with the results from Phase 1: Survey 
Questionnaire.   
The vast majority of police interviewees perceived that civilian-led oversight mechanisms 
promoted public trust in the police and heightened perceptions of police accountability to the 
communities they serve.  However, many interviewees expressed concerns about the knowledge, 
skills and abilities (“KSAs”) of civilian investigators and administrators and doubted their 
capacity to understand police work without police-specific experience, training and education.  
Although these concerns were voiced in relation to all civilian-led oversight agencies, they were 
most often expressed in relation to the SIU.  Respondents recognized that SIU investigations 
were fateful and stressed that the consequentiality of these investigations made it imperative that 
they were conducted impeccably by investigators of the highest calibre.   
The most significant source of frustration for interviewees related to poor communication by all 
oversight agencies (SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau).  In particular, police officers 
lamented the lack of status updates they received during the course of investigations.  A majority 
of interviewees expressed acceptance of the role of police services boards in representing the 
interests of the community.  However, they believed that these boards should be composed of 
persons who were well-educated and fair-minded.  Many interviewees recounted negative 
perceptions and experiences with the OIPRD and its affiliated investigators.  Lastly, the vast 
majority of interviewees who referenced Professional Standards Bureau recounted extremely 
positive perceptions and experiences regarding the effectiveness of the affiliated investigators 
and investigations.  These findings were, by and large, consistent with results from Phase 1.   
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Some of the themes that emerged strongly during the interviews with police officers were not 
directly captured in the quantified portion of Phase 1, but did surface in the open-ended 
commentary sections.  For instance, a number of interviewees opined that police officers are held 
to a higher standard than members of other occupational groups and professions.  Nevertheless, 
the majority acknowledged a need for this high level of scrutiny and accountability.  Police 
officers additionally noted the stress experienced by officers whose conduct is scrutinized by 
investigators and recognized the fatefulness of these investigations.  They also identified the 
negative depictions of police actions that are disseminated by traditional and social media forums 
as an additional source of stress.  On various occasions, officers noted frustration that while 
events that exposed officers to stigma were construed as wildly “newsworthy,” an officer’s 
exoneration was considered far less deserving of media coverage.     
 
7.2 Phase 2: Semi-structured Interviews: Stakeholder Representatives 
In total, six individuals, all senior executives, participated in Phase 2.  Table 7-47 provides 
summary of the involved representatives.   
Table 7-47: Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Stakeholder Representatives 
Agency Method 
The participating police service 
(Senior Executive Representative)   
In-person 
OACP – Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police 
(Senior Executive Representative)  
Phone 
OAPSB – Ontario Association of Police Services Boards  
(Senior Executive Representative) 
Phone 
CACP-RF - Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – 
Research Foundation (Senior Executive Representative)  
Phone 
CAPG – Canadian Association of Police Governance 
(Senior Executive Representative) 
Phone 
OIPRD – Office of the Independent Police Review Director 
(Senior Executive Representative) 






As noted in Chapter 4: Methods, while all six stakeholder representative interviews were 
transcribed and analyzed, my coding strategy with these interview was far less rigorous than the 
method I used in coding the responses of police officers.  Using NVivo software, I employed an 
approach called “themeing the data” (Saldana, 2013: 175-183) and simultaneous coding (Miles, 
Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81, 85-86) to analyze the interviews for confirming and 
disconfirming evidence.  The following five major themes emerged from this analysis.   
7.2.1 Theme 1: Relationships between police leaders and civilian-led oversight agencies 
Largely mirroring the findings from Phase 1 and Phase 2 interviews with police officers, senior 
representatives from the CACP-RF, OACP and the host police service accepted that to fully 
satisfy the public’s demand for transparency and accountability, civilian-led oversight and 
investigative agencies were necessary.  However, these interviewees made it clear that police 
acceptance of civilian-led oversight mechanisms and trust in the ability of these agencies to 
fulfill their important oversight roles are contingent upon the staffing of these agencies with 
highly qualified personnel:  
We've always been very supportive of the need and the importance of civilian 
governance and oversight. The caveat for that of course is that there needs to be a 
couple of principles that would go along with that. For instance, a clear definition 
of the governance body's purpose and outcomes, well-defined functions and 
responsibilities. There needs to be an appropriate corporate culture. There should 
be transparent decision-making. That governance team needs to be a strong one, 
and there needs to be accountability to the stakeholders, which is the community. 
(OACP representative) 
I don't have a particular concern with it. I think it is the fundamental basis of our 
policing ability is the trust of our community and that provides a very clear 
mechanism to allow that trust to be tested and measured. I do have concerns 
sometimes however if they have the prerequisite background to adequately review 
it, but as a concept I am totally in favor of it.  (CACP-RF representative) 
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Senior representatives from the OIPRD, OAPSB and CAPG reported that relations between the 
policing community and oversight agencies have generally improved and been strengthened over 
recent decades and that most police officers’ attitudes have grown more positive and accepting of 
scrutiny by external agencies.  
However, several remarked that, despite the overall positive acceptance of civilian-led oversight, 
some police officers in Ontario, including those who are senior police leaders, resist this 
development:  
My attitude has changed quite a bit as a senior executive in (our service). We 
value our relationship with both organizations, the OIPRD, SIU, and it’s really 
important for us to have an effective relationship with them….I see a lot of change 
in our younger members, too, and I give that credit to the Ontario Police College 
and the training that’s done, recruit training with our members...the importance 
of conduct, the importance of behavior, the importance of the legislation that we 
were operate under…I still see some negative attitudes toward both in policing 
and at the executive level. The eyes are shut, the ears are shut and the reluctance 
to accept the role and responsibility of the SIU and OIPRD is there. I think the 
majority are, I think most are in favour, the majority support the need for such 
independent oversight in investigation but there are a minority of officers that just 
don’t accept it at all, at the senior executive level. (Host police service 
representative) 
Stakeholder representatives reported that friction points between some police leaders and the 
civilian-led investigative agencies primarily surround issues of process, mandate and scope of 
responsibility, while conflicts with police services boards and their umbrella organizations (e.g., 
OAPSB, CAPG) typically revolve around financial issues and political maneuvering. 
The senior representative from the CAPG observed that the quality of relationships between 
police leaders and the various oversight agencies often reflect the willingness and capability of 




I think, again, that varies tremendously depending on the individuals involved, 
and the tone that's often set. Like so many things in life, it's about relationships, 
and how people put in a certain position of power and authority choose to set out 
to exercise their mandate, and what kinds of relationship building they set out to 
do...I think that a big key is that relationship piece, and I think where you have 
individuals, say police leadership from the service point of view, along with an 
oversight body leadership that's very attuned to the importance of that 
relationship, being cordial and respectful, and open communication, you see 
things run as smoothly as they can. But there always going to be blips along the 
way. When you have certain severe situations, or extreme situations, or difficult 
situations, where a great deal of tension has been created, things can go sideways 
fairly easily, I think by virtue of the importance of assumptions, and the nature of 
the decision making authority. (CAPG representative) 
These insights aptly reflect several high profile public disputes among oversight agency leaders 
and police leaders in Ontario24 as well as ongoing conflicts that arise about financial and 
administrative issues that periodically arise with police services boards across the province.   
7.2.2 Theme 2: Recognition of the unique nature of police work as compared to other 
occupations/professions.   
Almost all stakeholder representatives perceived policing as a unique profession and, in doing 
so, singled out the abilities of police to use lethal force and to restrict personal liberties: 
First of all, I think there's very good reason why policing needs to be held 
accountable differently than some of those other professions. That is police are 
the only ones that can have the authority and the protections under the [Criminal] 
Code for taking the ultimate citizen rights, in terms of use of force and use of 
deadly force. Happily, that's only in very unique cases and small in number in the 
big picture of things, but they have to be held to that accountability. (OACP 
representative) 
It all comes back to the uniqueness about police…The right to suspend your 
Charter rights and freedoms and use force in the process, right?  That’s the whole 
premise for having a more robust oversight system. It’s complicated by police not 
having the right to strike as well, and other rights are suspended - like the police 
are compelled to give testimony. Nobody else is. (OAPSB representative) 
                                                          
24 See Chapter 3: Literature Review (3.8.4.  Anticipated attitudes toward the SIU) for discussion about recurrent 
tensions between the SIU Director and police leaders in Ontario.   
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The perception that police are held to a “higher standard” than other occupational groups 
accorded with findings from both Phase 1and Phase 2 interviews with police officers.   
Representatives from the OACP, CACP-RF and the host police service generally accepted that 
intense scrutiny was and would continue to be a staple of contemporary policing.  However, they 
also perceived that the demands placed upon police officers were expanding continuously.  
Nevertheless, if these demands could occasion frustration, several stakeholder representatives 
saw civilian oversight initiatives as both a mirror of broad societal values and as responsive to 
the public’s demand that those in positions of power and/or authority be held accountable for 
their actions: 
A police officer is the most powerful person in Canada. We are the only ones in 
Canada that have the ability to take another person’s life if need be. We are the 
only persons that have the ability to arbitrarily detain and take someone's 
freedom away. We have a huge amount of power to wield, so it makes perfect 
sense that there should be a civilian oversight…Our power is based on legislation 
but it is also based on trust. (CACP-RF representative) 
I think that as Canadians, we are a very, for the most part, thoughtful, law-
abiding, respectful, balanced society. For the most part, I think that most 
individuals…would view the roles of the police, very, very seriously and 
respectfully, while at the same time, being very mindful of the level of power and 
authority. Because of the nature of our society, we put checks and balances in 
place, that are fairly consistent to our values. I think it's tough. I think people are 
recognizing more and more, the profession of policing is very complex. The level 
of training, the resources that need to be invested in training, hiring, recruiting 
the best.  Continuing to support individuals in those roles is critical. And, at the 
same time, we need to keep a watch on how things are going. (CAPG 
representative) 
These excerpts attest to a somber awareness that policing, and most public sector resources 
across Ontario and across Canada more generally, face ever-increasing demands for 
accountability and transparency.  These findings are also consistent with those expressed in both 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 interviews with police officers, wherein the majority of survey respondents 
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and interviewees recognized the necessity of civilian oversight and its import in promoting the 
public trust in policing.  
 
7.2.3 Theme 3: Police Services Boards: Tensions and transitions 
Issues pertaining to the role and functioning of police services boards surfaced quite regularly 
throughout these stakeholder interviews.  There was a general consensus that the processes 
related to training and appointing police services board members require serious attention.  The 
representatives from the OAPSB and CAPG both acknowledged that the composition of police 
services boards varies greatly across Canadian provinces (e.g., size, qualifications of members, 
appointment process), and noted that the training provided to board members was equally varied: 
 One of the key areas that we need to provide greater support to our membership, 
is around governance training…concern around qualifications and selection 
process…Typically, again the model varies from province to province, some 
police forces and commissions have a mix of provincial and municipal 
appointees, some have members of council on the boards of commissions…All 
those different models create different kinds of issues and perspectives.  But when 
it comes to the specifics and participation in the selection process, that really is a 
municipal and/or provincial responsibility to ensure that there is a rigorous and 
thorough recruitment process, training process, and selection process….The 
bigger municipalities have the benefit of having fairly sophisticated HR 
machinery that kicks into place with credible processes, etc., or these things have 
been outsourced to external recruitment firms, those kinds of things. For smaller 
organizations, it's a little bit more difficult. And then when you move towards 
training, that's an area that we really want as an organization to expand again. 
(CAPG representative) 
I wholeheartedly agree with professionalizing police board membership.  There’s 
lots of obstacles to it at the moment, but basically recruiting for excellence, 
compensation for excellence, training for excellence, resourcing for excellence 
and legislating for excellence. We are not doing any of those things right now… 
The model [at present] is based on representation, not necessarily even on 
competence. (OAPSB representative) 
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The above excerpts are powerful statements from agencies that prioritize and coordinate issues 
on behalf of police services boards across Ontario and across Canada.  Both perceived that 
inconsistencies in governance practices (e.g., appointment, recruitment, training) result in 
differing levels of sophistication in the oversight provided in communities across the province 
and across the country.  Both also predicted that there will be changes in the methods by which 
police services board members are trained, educated and appointed (e.g., municipal, regional and 
provincial appointments) to remedy such irregularities.   
Police leaders from the host police service, the OACP and the CACP-RF also expressed 
concerns over the inconsistent qualifications of police services board members and opined that 
some police services board members may lack the requisite knowledge and expertise to be truly 
effective in their role as overseers of police: 
I’d like to see a qualifying process to sit on a police service board based on either 
competency-based or a KSA based approach, rather than an appointment…I 
don’t know how the province appoints people to police service boards…but 
regionally and municipally, I know it’s generally based upon who’s elected to 
council and who’s elected to a body of governance of some sort and then one 
person at large perhaps in the community…At my level I’m still unaware of 
whether there’s a qualifying level of knowledge or experience that a person is to 
have….Managing the finances of a police service and the governance of that is at 
a board of director level, as I’d equate them to, is very important.  Board of 
directors are generally selected based on their experience, based on their success 
or in their own industry, what they’re doing and I don’t see that at police service 
boards and I think that’s part of the problem. (Host police service representative) 
Where there seems to be friction and tension at boards, it's when individual board 
members enter into a discussion at a board meeting, from the point of view of 
trying to apply business perspective to policing. Policing is not a business, it's a 
public service. The other tension point is when it's a political thing that is coming 
through in the board discussions, as opposed to what's the appropriate policing 
for their community. (OACP representative) 
Our board here has actually identified that themselves saying in a lot of cases 
they are taking a look over things and in some cases rubber stamping as opposed 
to actually taking that active interaction with the community, bridging the 
community and the police service. I think that there is probably some work to be 
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done but at the same time I think that there is also a danger that if they become 
too involved then without the prerequisite background it can cause a lot of angst 
for a lot of chiefs. (CACP-RF representative) 
Although the concerns expressed by these police leaders come from a different vantage point, 
their views about the inconsistent qualifications and the impact of appointment processes are 
generally in-line with those expressed by representatives from the OAPSB and CAPG.   
The above issues converge on the appropriate role of police services boards in relation to the 
operations of their respective police service.  An oft-cited report by Justice Morden (Morden, 
2012) has brought these issues to the forefront.  This report raised questions and criticisms about 
the Toronto Police Services Board’s role in the planning of the G20 Summit in Toronto (2010).  
Known widely as “The Morden Report,” this document catalyzed debates about how involved 
police services boards across Canada should be in the planning and decision-making processes of 
police service operations.  The two interview excerpts which follow attest to the vibrancy of this 
ongoing debate:  
I think Morden’s actually a direction on which police services boards will go. I 
think Morden’s pretty clear on the fact that police service boards themselves need 
to assume a greater role and responsibility in the direction of their police services 
and he doesn’t get into the operational questions: The who, what, where, why, 
and when of what you’re doing. Morden gets into more or less into the concept in 
regards to the actions of, what our actions are, what the preparations, planning, 
and actions of our police service are going to be. (Host police service 
representative) 
The biggest single issue is that, and then this is one where, say, the chiefs and the 
boards are in disagreement over, and I don’t mean just along those dividing lines, 
there’s disagreement amongst the chiefs, there’s disagreement amongst the 
boards, and that is all about the boards’ role vis-à-vis operations.  I’m sure 
you’re familiar with that tome written by Justice Morden. (OAPSB 
representative)   
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The “Morden Report” and its discussion of the appropriate role of police services boards in 
relation to police operations surfaced in all stakeholder interviews.  The contours of the 
appropriate roles and responsibilities of police services boards in relation to police operations 
remain unresolved among police leaders and many in the civilian oversight and policing 
communities across Canada (Kempa, 2012; Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41-42, 63). 
7.2.4 Theme 4: Acknowledgement of poor/infrequent communication during SIU, OIPRD 
and Professional Standards Bureau investigations 
Results from Phase 1 and Phase 2 interviews with police officers made clear that many police 
officers were dissatisfied with the practices of oversight agencies in relation to their conveyance 
of status updates and the results of investigations.  These issues were also raised during Phase 2 
stakeholder interviews.  For example:  
The only thing that I would comment on is we are having some issues with the length 
of time to get decisions and so just using the same principles as the criminal court 
about swift access to justice and not having too much time and all, I think those are 
the same principles that should be applied under policing pieces. We have one 
particular file here that we have been waiting, I think it is four years for a decision. 
That is just not right. (CACP-RF representative) 
Although the senior representative from the OIPRD described some investigative delays as 
“unavoidable,” he acknowledged that his agency had received complaints which alleged undue 
delays in the completion of investigations.  The OIPRD representative additionally expressed 
frustration with the delays (and multiple rounds of requests) that can occur when arranging 
interviews between OIPRD investigators, the involved officers and their respective legal counsel 
and/or association representative(s).   
The senior representative from the host police service acknowledged police officers’ concerns 
over the stress and frustration caused by investigative delays and sparse/sporadic 
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communication, but simultaneously emphasized that the process was inherently time-consuming 
and could not be rushed:  
Members under investigation want it over with quick and now. They fail to 
remember that when we do investigations, we take just as long as SIU…if not 
longer sometimes. They fail to understand that even at the end of the 
investigation, the court process, if there is a court process, it could take as long... 
It’s a frequent complaint, how long it takes for the SIU to complete their tasks and 
complete their investigations but they fail to quite often remember it takes us 
under similar circumstances just as long to complete investigations. (Host police 
service representative) 
The senior representative from the host police service also noted that their police service waits 
for the SIU to complete their own parallel investigation (otherwise known as a “Section 11” 
investigation, Ontario Reg. 267/10), a feature which undoubtedly prolongs the overall process 
and likely compounds police officers’ sense of stress and frustration.  Thus, this stakeholder 
representative provided context to the investigative delays and “poor communication” that many 
police officers complained of in Phase 1 and Phase 2 interviews with police officers.  
7.2.5 Theme 5: Current and future trends pertaining to civilian oversight initiatives 
Stakeholder representatives provided a number of thoughtful observations on the system of 
civilian-led oversight of policing as it exists in Canada and Ontario in particular and on how both 
are likely to evolve.  Their remarks stressed the higher principles that civilian oversight 
initiatives are designed to fulfill.  The following excerpts highlight their perspectives: 
This sounds corny to a lot of people but if we truly believe in the preamble in the 
Police Services Act about representing our communities -“the people are the 
police, the police are the people” - if we believe in that, one of the founding 
principles behind modern day policing in North America, it really leads us to 
believe that we’re here for our constituents which is the public and why should 
they not have oversight over us? (Host police service representative) 
The OIPRD’s mandate promotes and encourages the “professional” status of 
police officers. Civilian oversight for the policing profession in an accountable 
and transparent manner recognizes the significant and important role and 
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contribution that police officers provide the public. It is pivotal to our democratic 
society and reflects the dynamic and interdependent relationship in the policing 
profession. The public needs the police and the police needs the public. (OIPRD 
representative) 
Despite an assortment of constructive criticisms offered by each respective stakeholder 
representative, there was a general consensus that the scope of the current network of civilian-led 
agencies offers an essential provision to our society in maintaining accountability and public 
trust regarding the services provided by the police.  Such findings are generally consistent with 
the views of the majority of police officers in Phase 1 and Phase 2.   
 
In looking to the future of civilian oversight, several interviewees commented on the recent 
provincial and national initiatives that seek to tackle issues of economic sustainability and 
efficient police service delivery, such as FPAC (Future of Policing Advisory Committee) (e.g., 
Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) and the Economics of 
Policing summits (e.g., Public Safety Canada).  These types of initiatives have opened the door 
to redefining the role of police officers and police services in the modern era.  The following 
excerpts highlight my respondents’ perception that the time is ripe to alter and enhance modern 
policing services: 
 I think we're in a time of real flux and change…What we're seeing is an evolution 
in our society of the way public services, in general, are delivered. As we look 
generally at, affordability of our health care system, our community services, our 
policing, our education systems, I think we're in the part of a major societal kind 
of change…I think the majority of people on the CAPG and probably the majority 
of our membership would say, "Integrated service delivery is where we're going, 
it's got to be where we're going." That's not to say, that there aren't certain key 
policing functions that we still need to train for, respect, and maintain…I think 
we're moving so fast that, I think people feel generally…open to new ways of 
doing business. They have to be. (CAPG representative) 
 I’ve been exposed to police and paramilitary police from around the world and 
we have got great cops in Ontario. I don’t see anybody’s oversight system as 
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robust as ours, I agree with you there, although there probably are some that 
would rival it in different ways. We have put a lot of focus on the future of 
policing, but…the oversight system…there’s a ton of room for improvement. The 
opportunity is now. The citizenry deserve it. We can have a way better system. If 
we change the oversight and public safety system, we don’t have to do it 
overnight, but we bring those into the 21st century, we will have far safer 
communities, even though they are now, we’ll have healthier communities, and I 
think overall it can cost us less. Not sure if it will, but it can. (OAPSB 
representative) 
Given the widespread concerns about the sustainability of the current funding models for 
policing in Ontario (and beyond), there are serious ongoing discussions at the provincial and 
national level about the core functions that police officers provide to their respective 
communities and to community health and safety as a whole.  As reflected above, systems of 
governance, accountability and civilian-led oversight are central to such discussions.   
7.2.6 Conclusions from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Stakeholder Representatives 
The stakeholder representative interviews in Phase 2 were an invaluable component of this 
research.  Although the absence of representatives from the SIU and the various police 
association agencies left some gaps in the overall dialogue, the assemblage of stakeholder 
representatives was wide-ranging and provided some crucial perspectives from persons 
positioned in the senior executive level of policing in Ontario.  
Throughout these six interviews, police leaders and oversight agency representatives made clear 
that, like the officers who participated in the survey, they also desired to deliver efficient and 
accountable police services to the public.  However, historically speaking, the relationships 
between police officers and oversight agencies has been often defined by tension and constant 
negotiation.  It surfaced in these interviews, (and also throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2 interviews 
with police officers) that the senior executive leaders hold tremendous sway in setting the tone for 
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their respective organization, which in turn greatly determines the quality of cooperation and 
communication between agencies. 
The majority of stakeholder representatives acknowledged the complicated and unique nature of 
police work and the immense challenges inherent in ensuing accountability through oversight 
while simultaneously respecting the operational autonomy of police leaders.  This healthy 
tension was especially obvious during discussions about the role and functioning of police 
services boards.  There was widespread recognition among the majority of interviewees that the 
ways in which individuals are appointed to police services boards across the province warrants 
examination.  Several stakeholder representatives also acknowledged the harmful impact that 
poor communication (e.g., infrequent status updates) can have upon police officers during the 
course of prolonged oversight investigations.  Finally, the current and future status of civilian-led 
oversight of policing was discussed within the context of the delivery of efficient, sustainable 
and accountable public services.  
 
7.3 Conclusion of Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion 
The findings from this section both complemented and largely confirmed the majority of 
findings from Phase 1 and Phase 2 interviews with police officers, with added senior executive 
perspective on the functioning of civilian-led oversight mechanisms in Ontario.  The final 
chapter concludes and advances a series of recommendations that are intended to strengthen 




Conclusions and Recommendations 
This concluding chapter provides a summary of this study’s key accomplishments.  It is followed 
by a discussion of its findings, followed by a re-examination of the research questions and the 
theoretical framework.  Recommendations for stakeholders are also provided, followed by a 
discussion of limitations and considerations for future research.   
8.1    Summary of Key Findings & Contributions 
Before revisiting this study’s research questions and theoretical foundations, the key findings and 
significant research contributions will be briefly discussed.   
Mixed Methods approach – This study has made a unique and meaningful contribution to the 
body of existing literature by utilizing a mixed methods sequential explanatory design to 
investigate police officers’ attitudes to issues of civilian oversight.  It employed a survey 
questionnaire as well as interviews with police officers and key stakeholders.  As demonstrated 
throughout Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire and Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews, this 
methodological approach provided a wealth of information on the topic of interest.  The survey 
questionnaire was quite successful in garnering responses across a wide spectrum and the semi-
structured interviews added depth and richness to the insights gained from the survey 
questionnaire.   
Historically, police officers have been a difficult population for academic researchers to access, 
which may explain the relative dearth of research on the topic under investigation.  In Phase 1, 
the online survey questionnaire received a response rate of 26.2% (1593 survey responses out of 
6074 potential responses).  To the best of my knowledge, my survey of attitudes of police 
officers toward issues of civilian oversight is based upon a sample that is larger than samples 
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amassed by any other survey, worldwide, that has been conducted on my topic to date.  In Phase 
2, 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with police officers from the participating 
service by telephone.  In addition, I conducted interviews with senior executive representatives 
from 6 key stakeholder organizations.   
Expansion of research into a Canadian context – This research endeavour was the first to 
explore the issue under inquiry in a Canadian context.  It is hoped that others will augment my 
efforts with energies directed to exploring the issues involved along municipal, regional, 
provincial/state, national, and international lines.  Given that Ontario is considered a global 
leader in the civilian oversight of police officers (Landau, 2000: 64), these investigations may be 
of interest to persons and organizations at both a national and international level.  This project 
both complements and expands upon previous research efforts and, in doing so, contributes to 
sociological/criminological research on policing, the regulation of police conduct and the 
sociology of professions.  While previous researchers have focused narrowly on a single police 
complaints system/agency, my research assessed police officers’ attitudes toward multiple 
civilian oversight agencies.  I believed that this particular feature of my research design may 
promote an enhanced and nuanced understanding of the attitudes of police officers in Ontario 
and it may also serve as a launching point for future research.   
Socio-demographic variables – The linear regression and binary logistic regression analyses 
revealed that the various socio-demographic variables utilized in this study had, with just a few 
exceptions, very little impact on attitudes toward the various oversight agencies.  However, the 
final multivariate regression analysis revealed some interesting and encouraging results. 
Unexpectedly, females and officers who did not regularly attend police association meetings 
were associated with less favourable attitudes toward civilian oversight.   Meanwhile, officers 
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with supervisory rank, long-tenure (i.e., more than 20 years) and university education were 
associated with more favourable attitudes toward civilian oversight.   
Civilian Oversight - General - The majority of police officers in this study indicated acceptance 
of civilian-led oversight mechanisms in order to maintain the public’s expectation of 
transparency and accountability.  However, I established that this acceptance is not unqualified 
and officers emphasized a need for oversight agencies to be staffed by competent and capable 
investigators and administrators with sufficient knowledge, training and experience.  These 
findings were generally consistent throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2.  However, these results were 
slightly more positive than findings reported in previous research and they counter the stereotype 
of police as resistant to all forms of civilian oversight.  The final multivariate regression analysis 
revealed that police officers’ overall positive evaluations of civilian oversight were primarily 
driven by their positive assessment of the SIU, and to a lesser extent, their rank, education, 
length of career service and attitudes toward the OIPRD. 
Police Services Boards – The finding that the topic of police services boards did not evoke 
strong sentiments among survey respondents suggests a general (and somewhat passive) 
acceptance of their role and mandate among police officers in Ontario.  However, many police 
officers expressed significant concerns about the qualifications of police services board members 
and the efficiency of the oversight they provide.  Both police officers and stakeholder 
representatives noted the inconsistent ways in which police services board members are trained, 
educated and appointed (e.g., municipal, regional and provincial appointments).  Stakeholder 
representatives also recognized the ongoing debate on the most appropriate role of police 
services boards in relation to the operations of their respective police service as well as ongoing 
tensions related to the financial sustainability of policing in Ontario and across Canada.   
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Special Investigations Unit – A majority of survey respondents indicated that they generally 
accept the mandate of the SIU and its role in attempting to ensure accountability of policing in 
Ontario.  Furthermore, a majority of respondents reported satisfaction with the level of 
objectivity, professionalism and fairness shown by SIU investigators.  However, my respondents 
also perceived investigative inefficiencies in relation to the speed and length of investigations 
and in regards to the communication of developments and the outcome of investigations and the 
same concerns were reiterated in the semi-structured interviews. 
The use of multivariate regression analysis led to the identification that respondents’ positive 
attitudes toward the SIU served as the most impactful factor that contributed to respondents’ 
positive attitudes toward civilian oversight.  This finding makes both practical and intuitive sense 
since the most serious matters (e.g., instances of bodily harm/death and allegations of sexual 
assault) with the most serious consequences (e.g., serious criminal and Police Service Act 
charges, significant career ramifications) fall under the scope of the SIU’s mandate. 
   
Office of the Independent Police Review Director – The vast majority of survey respondents 
indicated that they know very little about the practices of the OIPRD.  Among those respondents 
who reported personal experience with an OIPRD investigation, a significant number expressed 
dissatisfaction with elements of the investigative process (e.g., speed, length, poor 
communication).  These comments were echoed in the semi-structured interviews, as were 
negative evaluations by police officers regarding the skills of civilian investigators and negative 
interactions that occurred during the course of their respective investigations.  In the final 
multivariate regression analysis, positive attitudes toward the OIPRD were also found to be a 
factor that contributed to officers’ positive attitudes toward civilian oversight in general.  
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Professional Standards Bureau – A majority of respondents provided favourable evaluations of 
the mandate and most practices of the Professional Standards Bureau.  Across the board, the 
responses were more positive than for any of the civilian-led oversight agencies examined in this 
study (Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD).  The only significant topic of dissatisfaction related 
to this oversight body pertained to inadequate updates about the status of investigations.  A 
significant majority of police officers in this study also expressed respect for the quality of 
investigators in their Professional Standards Bureau and satisfaction with the investigations they 
conduct.   
8.1.1 Revisiting Anticipated Findings 
In Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses, I outlined a series of anticipated findings that 
were developed during my research proposal phase and based primarily on the findings of 
previous research.  I was generally correct in anticipating that the majority of respondents would 
indicate a high level of comfort with the mandate and practices of their own Professional 
Standards Bureau.  However, I underestimated how many police officers would indicate a 
positive acceptance of civilian oversight overall.   
Consistent with the findings of previous research, my research found that most socio-
demographic variables were not strong predictors of positive or negative attitudes toward the 
various oversight agencies.  Female respondents and supervisors (non-constables) did, as 
anticipated, exhibit slightly more positive attitudes for most of the varying oversight agencies in 
the linear and logistic regression analyses.  In the final multivariate regression analysis, I did not 
anticipate that non-regular attendance at police association meetings and being female would 
emerge as predictors of less favourable attitudes toward civilian oversight in general.  Neither of 
these findings are explained by the extant literature and both merit exploration in future research.  
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However, I did anticipate that university education, supervisory rank and long career tenure 
(more than 20 years of experience) would serve as predictors of more favourable attitudes toward 
civilian oversight.    
I was correct in anticipating that the majority of respondents would not dispute the legitimacy of 
police services boards and that a majority of respondents would express either neutrality or 
tolerance of the oversight that police services boards provide.  I was also generally accurate in 
anticipating that the majority of respondents would acknowledge the legitimacy of the SIU and 
indicate acceptance of its mandate.  Further, I was correct in anticipating that the majority of 
respondents would express dissatisfaction with many of the investigative practices carried out by 
the SIU.   
In relation to the OIPRD, I was correct in anticipating that many respondents would be mostly 
unfamiliar with the agency’s mandate and practices.  However, I underestimated the extent to 
which police officers would hold negative views about the OIPRD’s investigative practices, 
especially considering that the vast majority of cases are investigated by the host police service’s 
Professional Standards Bureau.  Lastly, I was correct in anticipating that the majority of police 
officers would express acceptance of the legitimacy and mandate of the Professional Standards 
Bureau.  Thus, I accurately predicted that respondents would express dissatisfaction with some 
facets of the investigative process (e.g., timeliness, communication, notification of resolution), 
but would nevertheless regard the Professional Standards Bureau more positively than either the 




8.2       Revisiting the Research Questions and Key Theoretical Concepts 
 
This section re-examines the study’s central research questions and elaborates upon key findings 
within the context of this study’s theoretical framework.   
The broad and overarching research question of this project was: What are the attitudes, 
perceptions and experiences of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian oversight 
mechanisms?  This question was answered through the three specific research questions related 
to the central theoretical concepts explored throughout this study: legitimacy, procedural justice 
and professionalism.   
8.2.1 Legitimacy  
To what extent do police officers accept the legitimacy of the various civilian 
oversight agencies in Ontario (e.g., Police Service Boards, the SIU and the 
OIPRD)? 
 
The findings of my study indicate that the vast majority of police officers do accept that civilian-
led oversight agents and agencies possess “the right to rule” in principle.  However, this 
acceptance is largely conditional upon oversight agencies being staffed by qualified and capable 
investigators and administrators with sufficient knowledge, training and experience.  Moreover, 
my respondents’ perceptions of the various oversight agencies varied, with the Professional 













 63% of respondents agreed that civilian oversight helps to ensure accountability 
of policing (19.5% disagreed). 
 
 61.8% of respondents reported that they believe civilian oversight maintains 




Respondents WITH Police Services Boards: 
 65.1% of respondents reported that they respect the mandate of their police 
services board (only 4.6% disagreed). 
 
 57.2% agreed that their police services board is necessary (16.6% disagreed). 
Respondents WITHOUT Police Services Boards: 
 58.2% of respondents agreed that police services boards are necessary in Ontario 
(only 12.9% disagreed). 
 
 52.3% of respondents agreed that police services boards help ensure 
accountability of policing (21.1% disagreed). 
 
SIU  77.6% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of the SIU (only 8.4% 
disagreed). 
 
 64.3% agreed that the SIU helps to ensure accountability (16.5% disagreed). 
 
OIPRD  41.9% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of the OIPRD (14.9% 
disagreed and 24.4% selected “don’t know”). 
 
 36.5% agreed that the OIPRD helps to ensure accountability (18.9% disagreed 





 86.9% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of their Professional 
Standards Bureau (only 3.2% disagreed). 
 
 83% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau helps to ensure 
accountability (only 6% disagreed). 
 
The findings in Table 8-48 may be usefully contemplated in tandem with Table 8-49.  The latter, 
which provides a summary of survey responses from Phase 1, reveals that that while the majority 
of respondents (74%) perceive police investigators from the Professional Standards Bureau to be 
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qualified to scrutinize alleged police misconduct, their perceptions of civilian investigators and 
administrators from the SIU and OIPRD are less positive.   
Table 8-49: Summary of survey respondents’ impressions of civilian administrator/investigator 






 54.9% of respondents indicated that they don’t deem civilians to have the 
necessary skills to investigate alleged police misconduct.  Only 15.2% of 




Respondents WITH Police Services Boards: 
 Only 19.4% agreed that police services board members are qualified to carry 
out oversight of their detachment (31.1% disagreed).  
 
Respondents WITHOUT Police Services Boards: 
 49.7% disagreed that “Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to 
oversee police work (only 8.2% agreed). 
 
SIU  35.2% agreed that “SIU investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police 
misconduct” (19.3% disagreed). 
 
OIPRD  41.9% of respondents reported that they “don’t know” if “OIPRD investigators 
are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct” (17.3% disagreed and 





 74% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau investigators are 
“qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct” (only 6.5% disagreed). 
 
 
Simply put, while the majority of my respondents accepted civilian-led oversight in principle, 
many were skeptical of civilians’ abilities to oversee, scrutinize and investigate police conduct.  
These concerns also impacted survey participants’ perceptions of the effectiveness of each 
respective agency.  As the results in Table 8-50 illustrate, while the Professional Standards 
Bureau was positively evaluated, many survey respondents doubted the effectiveness of the other 




Table 8-50: Summary of survey respondents’ perceptions of civilian oversight agency effectiveness 




 33.9% agreed that their police services board is effective in their oversight role 
(24.4% disagreed). 
 
SIU  37.7% of respondents agreed that the “SIU is effective in their oversight of 
policing in Ontario” (29.1% disagreed). 
 
OIPRD  29.3% reported that they “don’t know” if “the OIPRD is effective in their 





 71.1% of respondents agreed with the statement, “My police service’s 
Professional Standards Bureau is effective in their oversight of my organization” 
(only 9.2% disagreed). 
 
 
This study revealed that police officers can lack accurate knowledge of the qualifications of 
those who staff civilian oversight agencies and the most common outcomes of their investigators.  
As indicated by Table 8-51, when survey respondents were asked a series of questions about the 
SIU, OIPRD and the Professional Standards Bureau, their responses revealed that while most 
were reasonably knowledgeable about the mandate and practices of their Professional Standards 
Bureau, many lacked knowledge about the staffing and practices of the SIU and, most especially, 
the OIPRD.    
Table 8-51: Summary of respondents’ knowledge about oversight agency mandate and 
performance (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire) 
SIU 64.8% of survey respondents agreed that their police organization has sufficiently 
educated them about the SIU (20.9% disagreed). 
 
Almost all respondents (98.1%) indicated they understand the mandate of the SIU, 
however the majority of respondents reported they didn’t know how many SIU 
investigators are former police officers; 37.4% indicated they “don’t know”, and the 
remaining respondents provided varying responses to this question.  Bruser and Henry 
(2010) determined that approximately 87% of SIU investigators are former police 
officers. 
 
A majority of respondents correctly identified the SIU’s approximate “clearance-by-
criminal-charge rate”: 57.4% of respondents indicated that they believe that less than 
20% of SIU investigations are cleared by criminal charge.  However, the remaining 
42.5% selected different responses, including 27.4% who selected “don’t know.”  
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Since 2001, the SIU has published clearance-by-charge rates below 5% in all their 
Annual Reports.   
 
 
OIPRD Only 37.2% of respondents agreed that their police organization has sufficiently 
educated them about the OIPRD (35.3% disagreed). 
 
64.8% indicated that they understand the mandate of the OIPRD.  However, a large 
proportion of respondents indicated they know very little about the oversight agency.  
For instance:  
 69.5% reported that they “don’t know” what proportion of OIPRD investigators 
are former police officers (the correct response is 41% to 60%: OIPRD, 2011: 
38; OIPRD, 2014: 41).   
 59.6% reported that they “don’t know” what proportion of OIPRD charges are 
cleared by criminal charge (35.2% of respondents selected the correct category, 
“Less than 20%”). 
 60.5% reported that they “don’t know” what proportion of OIPRD charges are 
cleared by Police Service Act charge (25.6% of respondents selected the correct 
category, “Less than 20%”). 
 
These findings demonstrate a lack of general knowledge about the practices of the 
OIPRD, especially when compared to the reported knowledge of the other oversight 





72.6% agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about their 
Professional Standards Bureau (only 14.3% disagreed). 
 
Almost all respondents (96.5%) indicated they understand the mandate of the 
Professional Standards Bureau, however results varied for respondents’ knowledge 
about how many investigations are cleared by Police Service Act and criminal charges:  
 
 53.8% of respondents reported that they believe that less than 20% of their 
Professional Standards Bureau’s investigations are cleared by criminal 
charge.  35.2% indicated that they “don’t know.” 
 31.6% of respondents reported they believe that less than 20% of their 
Professional Standards Bureau’s investigations are cleared by Police 
Service Act charge.  37.6% indicated that they “don’t know.” 
 
 
These findings suggest that there may be an “education and knowledge gap” and that many 
police officers are not well-informed about the staffing, performance and practices of the various 
oversight bodies (e.g., the considerably low clearance by PSA charge or Criminal Code charge 
for the SIU, OIPRD and Professional Standards Bureau, province-wide).  Increasing and 
enhancing the education that is provided to police officers about these oversight agencies may 
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improve police officers’ perceptions of their import and strengthen their trust and confidence in 
the efficacy and legitimacy of these agencies.     
8.2.2 Procedural Justice 
How do police officers feel about the processes involved in having their 
professional conduct overseen, managed and investigated by civilians in Ontario? 
The majority of survey respondents indicated that they perceived that they were treated 
courteously, fairly and objectively by investigators from the SIU, OIPRD and their Professional 
Standards Bureau.  These are encouraging findings, as they speak to the professional demeanor 
of the staff members of these agencies.  Furthermore, for the SIU and Professional Standards 
Bureau, a majority of survey respondents were satisfied that they were promptly notified of the 
investigation and that the investigative process was explained to them.   
The major process-related sticking points for survey respondents pertained to the following four 
issues: being kept informed of the progress of the investigation; being told what happened as a 
result of investigation; the speed of the investigative process; and the amount of time taken to 
complete the investigation.  Table 8-52 provides a summary of survey respondents’ concerns 
pertaining to these four areas.   
Table 8-52: Summary of survey respondents’ concerns about oversight investigation process-
related issues (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire) 
SIU  59% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the 
progress of the SIU investigation (20.6% were satisfied). 
 
 43.2% were dissatisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the 
investigation (37% were satisfied). 
 
 40.6% were dissatisfied with the speed of the SIU investigative process (38.5% 
were satisfied). 
 
 46.4% were dissatisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the SIU 




OIPRD  48.8% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of 
the progress of the OIPRD investigation (27.2% were satisfied). 
 
 50.2% were satisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the 
investigation (30.5% were dissatisfied).  
 
 39.2% were dissatisfied with the speed of the investigative process (35.9% 
were satisfied). 
 
 43.8% were dissatisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the 





 42.3% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of 
the progress of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation (38.6% were 
satisfied).  
 
 55.2% were satisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the 
investigation (30.1% were dissatisfied).   
 
 48.3% were satisfied with the speed of the Professional Standards Bureau 
investigative process (32.6% were dissatisfied).  
 
 42.2% were satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the 
Professional Standards Bureau investigation (36.9% were dissatisfied).  
 
 
The above table reveals that many respondents were largely dissatisfied with the process-related 
practices the SIU and OIPRD, while attitudes regarding the Professional Standards Bureau were 
mostly positive.  These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the factors that impact 
police officers’ sense of trust and confidence in oversight mechanisms.  
Procedural justice issues essentially boil down to perceptions of respectful communication.  In 
short, how police officers are treated and how they perceive they are treated during 
investigations cannot be ignored.  When these issues are not properly attended to, the void 
creates a breeding ground for mistrust and resentment.  As one of my interviewees observed, this 




I think the same with anything, communication could always be better but I think 
that's where we all fall down.  As managers, or even investigators, to let people 
who really need to know what's going on because sometimes we hold stuff too close.  
I would put that as a general recommendation for all of us. (Officer #5) 
 
There are many reasons why police officers under investigation by the various oversight 
agencies may receive very little or infrequent communication (e.g., a lack of progress to report; a 
need to respect the integrity of the investigation; competing demands upon investigators; a 
simple lack of time).  Nevertheless, these findings suggest that oversight agency investigators 
should strive to improve the quality and frequency of communication with police officers who 
undergo oversight investigations.     
8.2.3 Professionalism  
To what extent does civilian oversight challenge police officers’ sense of 
professionalism (i.e., professional autonomy and self-regulation)? 
In Chapter 1: Introduction and Background, I noted that my study would seek to explore 
officers’ resistance to civilian oversight within the discourse of “professionalism” and consider 
the extent to which police officers accept, tolerate or reject civilian oversight mechanisms on the 
basis that they inhibit the professional autonomy and internal regulation of occupational 
standards enjoyed by other self-regulating professionals.  The findings presented in Chapters 5-7 
demonstrated that this was a worthwhile pursuit.   
The results from Phase 1 revealed that efforts to directly probe respondents’ perceptions about 
police “professionalism” were not entirely straightforward.  For example, Table 8-53 provides a 
summary of results from Phase 1 pertaining to perceptions about oversight agencies’ 
infringement on police officers’ “professional status.”  In isolation, these results suggest that 
most respondents, by and large, accept that civilian-led oversight mechanisms do not pose a 
significant threat to the “professional status” of police officers.       
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Table 8-53: Summary of respondents’ impressions of oversight agency infringement on police 






 44% of respondents disagreed with the statement that “Civilian oversight 






Respondents WITH Police Services Boards: 
 47% disagreed that police services boards “infringe on the professional 
status of police officers” (only 10.7% agreed). 
 
Respondents WITH Police Services Boards: 
 38.8% of respondents disagreed that “Police Services Boards infringe on 
the professional status of police officers” (only 14.8% agreed). 
SIU  45.8% of respondents disagreed that the “SIU infringes on the professional 
status of police officers” (18% agreed). 
 
OIPRD  31.2% disagreed with the statement “The OIPRD infringes upon the 






 63.1% of respondents disagreed with the statement, “My police service’s 
Professional Standards Bureau infringes on the professional status of police 
officers” (only 10.1% agreed). 
 
 
However, a more nuanced picture emerged when respondents were asked a series of 
conditional/preferential questions.  For instance, a significant proportion of respondents indicated 
that they would prefer that civilians “review” rather than investigate police conduct, or 
alternatively, that Professional Standards assume responsibility for such investigations entirely:   
 46.6% of respondents reported that they would prefer that civilians only “review 
allegations of police misconduct (not investigate).”  Comparatively, 30.1% of 
respondents disagreed. 
 48.7% of respondents agreed that they would prefer that their “police service's 
Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations 
regarding alleged police misconduct”, versus 27.8% of respondents who disagreed.  
These results suggest that many respondents were uncomfortable at the prospect of being 
evaluated and scrutinized by “outsiders.”  This discomfort was also evinced by officer preference 
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for internal police-led investigations.  However, consistent with the findings of previous 
research, 61.5% of respondents reported that if civilian investigators were former police officers, 
they would not object to “civilian” investigations of their alleged misconduct.   
As indicated by Table 8-54, although many police officers do not “trust” civilian oversight 
agencies, a significant number of respondents perceive their own Professional Standards Bureau 
as trustworthy.  Table 8-54 below summarizes these results.  




 32% agreed with the statement, “I trust the Police Services Board” (19.6% 
disagreed). 
 
SIU  47% of respondents disagreed with the statement, “I trust the SIU” (20.2% 
agreed). 
OIPRD  28.8% of respondents disagreed with the statement, “I trust the OIPRD” 




 52.8% of respondents agreed with the statement, “I trust my police service’s 
Professional Standards Bureau” (21.1% disagreed). 
 
The insights that were shared by police officers in the semi-structured interviews in Phase 2 of 
my research were helpful in understanding why police officers may perceive that civilian 
oversight mechanisms impacts their “professional status.”  For example, interviewees noted the 
scrutiny that police officers face on a daily basis from a variety of sources (e.g., internal and 
external oversight, the “general public”, courts and other legal mechanisms, traditional media 
and social media forums) and suggested how this relentless scrutiny, coupled by the media’s 
equation of “bad news” with newsworthiness, could catalyze feelings of resentment, 
defensiveness, frustration or defeat.  Many interviewees also emphasized the immense stress that 
they experienced while facing parallel investigations and multiple layers of scrutiny.  This stress 
is often compounded when the investigations of civilian-led oversight agencies and an officer’s 
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Professional Standards Bureau are prolonged and fail to provide the officer with updates on the 
status of these investigations. 
Many interviewees perceived that civilian-led accountability mechanisms hold police officers to 
a “higher standard” than those imposed on other occupational/professional groups.  However, 
many thought that the imposition of a higher standard was legitimate, inasmuch as police hold 
extraordinary powers to use force and restrict civil liberties.  They believed that the police’s 
possession of these powers made them unique among professions/occupations and as setting 
them apart from those with self-regulating conduct and internal disciplinary mechanisms. 
The most predominant theme from Phase 2 was police officers’ overall acceptance of the 
necessity to partially relinquish control of their accountability mechanisms in order to appease 
the public’s desire for transparency and accountability.  To borrow a phrase that appeared in both 
the written survey comments and during several interviews, many police officers perceived 
civilian oversight as a “necessary evil” which serves to satisfy a public perception that police are 
not trusted to hold themselves accountable through internal oversight mechanisms alone.  
However, their acceptance of external oversight agencies was conditional upon their staffing by 
competent, qualified, experienced and well-trained individuals.  
Recognizing that police officers perceived themselves to be “professionals” aids in 
understanding their responses to civilian oversight mechanisms.  However, it is recommended 
that future research endeavors continue to develop this theoretical area with more precision and 
rigour.   
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8.2.4 Conclusion of Theoretical Evaluation 
Throughout this study, three separate but intertwined theoretical concepts were explored: 
legitimacy, procedural justice, and professionalism.  These concepts were immensely valuable in 
evaluating the attitudes and perceptions of police officers from several key vantage points.  An 
individual police officer’s attitudes and perceptions about civilian oversight are informed by 
many factors, including their career experience and the randomness of their encounters (personal 
and/or witnessed) with civilian oversight mechanisms.  Throughout the course of a given career, 
individual attitudes and perspectives will evolve, as will the mandates and practices of the 
oversight agencies/mechanisms.  Yet, efforts to expand the base of knowledge about the 
interactions and relationships between police officers and the various oversight agencies in 
Canada has been largely neglected in contemporary academic research.  Hence, continuous 
research efforts are needed to gauge how police officers and police services collectively respond 
to the evolution of civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario and beyond.   
This study presents a theoretical framework that may be useful to future researchers who wish to 
further probe police officers’ attitudes, perceptions and experiences in this regard.  This 
framework proposes that police officers’ attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms are 
mediated by some of the following intertwined factors: socio-demographic and life/career 
experiences; perceptions about the mandate and effectiveness of civilian-led oversight 
mechanisms; perceptions about the qualifications (e.g., knowledge, skills and abilities [KSAs]) 
of civilian investigators/administrators; perceptions related to procedural justice issues; and, 
perceptions about the role of appropriateness of civilians scrutinizing the “professional” conduct 
of police officers.  The findings presented throughout this study have demonstrated that this 
theoretical framework is worthy of continued exploration and development.   
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8.3  Recommendations for Stakeholders 
The following recommendations for stakeholders emerged directly from the results garnered 
throughout this project. 
8.3.1 Recommendations for police officers, police services and police associations 
Individual Police Officers 
 This study revealed that many police officers lack knowledge on the various oversight 
bodies that scrutinize their professional conduct.  In combination with the education-related 
recommendations below, it is recommended that individual police officers act to educate 
themselves about the staffing and performance of the various oversight agencies across the 
province.  Such information is readily available through oversight agency websites and 
annual reports.  These materials furnish information on a wide variety of issues including 
clearance-by-charge rates among the SIU and the OIPRD and staffing members.  Acquiring 
basic knowledge about the practices and structures of these organizations will likely help 
to separate myth from reality, alleviate unnecessary stresses and promote trust between 
police and oversight agencies. 
 
 Many respondents from this study remarked that they waited for weeks and months without 
hearing any updates about the status of their respective investigation.  When appropriate, 
it is recommended that police officers under investigation serve as their own advocates in 
requesting frequent and ongoing status updates with the various oversight agencies, both 
individually and with the assistance of liaisons/leadership from their own police service. 
 
 
Police Services (and Police Associations) 
 In comments written by survey respondents and/or voiced by interviewees, police officers 
praised the host police service for their ongoing efforts to develop an effective and 
responsive Professional Standards Bureau.  With the incorporation of highly skilled 
investigators with criminal investigation experience, it would appear that these investments 
have paid dividends: respondents expressed a high level of esteem and respect for the work 
of the Professional Standards Bureau.  Since Professional Standards Bureau investigators 
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are crucial liaisons between civilian-led oversight agencies and police officers who face 
conduct/complaint investigations, it is recommended that police services in Ontario 
continue to invest considerable efforts and resources into developing the most expert, 
robust and effective internal investigative bodies possible, as their respective effectiveness 
will largely determine the success of relations between individual officers and civilian-led 
agencies.  
 
 It is recommended that police services improve training and education about the mandate, 
staffing and performance of all oversight agencies discussed in this study (police services 
boards, SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau).  This notion is supported by Maguire 
and Dyke (2011: 10) who concluded that attitudes toward “organizational programs” (e.g., 
Professional Standards Bureaus) can be improved through educational initiatives.  With 
the addition of local statistics and trends regarding the resolution of complaints and 
allegations of misconduct, such information can be incorporated in a variety of training 
and educational forums such as in-service training, online training tools (e.g., Canadian 
Police Knowledge Network [CPKN] courses), and in OPC courses that are delivered “in 
house” (e.g., supplements to Basic Constable Training [BCT], Advanced Patrol Training 
[APT], Coach Officer Training, Front Line Supervisor course, and executive-level 
courses). Such training opportunities could provide reinforcement of the Police Services 
Act (PSA)/Ontario Regulation 268/10 “Code of Conduct” and those internal policies and 
procedures that are the source of frequent investigation by the various oversight bodies.  
Such enhanced training and pro-active education can serve to promote positive action by 
police and deter negative actions by police.  
 
 Whenever suitable and appropriate, it is recommended that police services should make 
materials available internally that are modelled upon those contained in reports of 
provincial human rights boards and provide brief summaries of resolved 
complaints/investigations involving their own police service members.  This would allow 
for meaningful and relatable examples to be shared throughout the organization about the 
processes involved in resolving complaints/investigations (e.g., timelines, 
interview/investigative processes, correspondence, resolutions).  When suitable examples 
arise, permission should be obtained from involved members to disclose general details at 
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briefings, training days, and in e-learning and internal website postings for educative 
purposes.  Through this proactive educational vehicle, service members could learn 
through the experiences of their peers (e.g., mistakes, successes, stresses, positive and 
negative interactions with oversight agencies, positive and negative resolutions).  Often, 
such results are published in other forums (e.g., SIU, OIPRD, OCPC websites and annual 
reports, traditional media outlets and social media).  However, the purpose of this 
initiative is to create a culture of risk management, complaint-avoidance and resilience.  
As a related reference point, other professional organizations such as the Ontario College 
of Teachers (OCT), the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO), the 
College of Nurses of Ontario (CNO), Law Society of Upper Canada/Law Society 
Tribunal (LSUC) also publish the results of their internal disciplinary matters. 
 
 While respecting the integrity and sensitivity involved in investigating complaints and 
allegations of wrongdoing (and parallel investigations), it is recommended that police 
services seek to improve the quality and frequency of communication on behalf of 
members involved in SIU, OIPRD and Professional Standards Bureau investigations.  
Police services have dedicated liaisons with each agency that can seek to ensure members 
are notified immediately regarding investigative status updates or outcomes.  Whenever 
possible, police services should seek to avoid investigative delays or should pro-actively 
seek out status updates on behalf of members when timelines are breached or information 
about the status/outcome of SIU, OIPRD or Professional Standards Bureau investigations 
is not forthcoming.   
 
 Many officers who participated in this study reported significant stress when facing both 
external and internal investigations.  It is incumbent upon police supervisors and police 
associations to ensure that officers are offered appropriate peer support or counselling 
through their respective employee assistance programs (EAP) and/or Peer Support/Critical 
Incident Stress Management programs.  To reduce the perceived stigma that may be 
associated with the use of counselling services, it is recommended that such referrals be 
incorporated into policy and practice for all complaint and misconduct investigations and 
not simply reserved for “high profile” incidents or traumatic events.  Additional referrals 
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for counselling should be made on a recurring basis for those investigations that stretch 
over months and sometimes years. 
 
8.3.2 Recommendations for civilian-led oversight agencies 
Police Services Boards and Police Governance bodies (e.g., CAPG, OAPSB) 
 Continue to develop and deliver standardized training and educational opportunities for 
police services board members across Ontario.  Although there are a variety of police 
services board mandates across the province (e.g., Section 31, Section 10, First Nations 
police services boards) basic training/educational curricula should be mandatory for all 
police service board members and can likely be delivered through a combination of in-
class and e-learning modules.25 
 Where provincial, regional or local appointments to police services boards are not 
legislated/mandated, develop common qualification standards among police services board 
members to ensure consistency across the province for those who fulfill these roles. 
  
 Develop best-practice guidelines to ensure police services board members are adequately 
familiarized with the day-to-day roles of officers/services they oversee.  Such initiatives 
may include mandating and tracking an hourly commitment (on an annual basis) to active 
participation/observation with police officers from their respective police service.  For 
example, police services board members could become well-immersed in police practices 
by spending 10-20 hours annually on “ride-alongs”, attendance at platoon briefings, 
training days, specialized branches, special events, and so on. 
 
Special Investigations Unit (SIU) 
 Improve the quality and frequency of communication with police officers involved in SIU 
investigations.  Ensure police officers/police services are notified ASAP regarding 
investigative status updates or outcomes.  At the time of publication, it is estimated that 
                                                          
25 The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (2015: 20) and the OAPSB have made recommendations about the 
enhanced delivery of standardized and comprehensive training for police services board members across Ontario.  





many SIU investigations take upwards of nine months to complete, which results in 
considerable stress for all parties involved (Gallant, 2015).26   
 
 Improve coordination with police service liaisons to ensure that subject and witness 
officers are notified about the outcome of investigations, especially before a public media 
release occurs.   
 
 Continue to improve outreach and educational opportunities with police services/police 
officers:  
o This study demonstrated that many police officers are largely (but not universally) 
accepting of investigators who have a background in policing.  If not published, 
police services should be made aware of how many current SIU investigators have 
police backgrounds so that such information can be shared during training.   
 
o It is further recommended that police services/officers be informed about the 
specialized investigative training that SIU investigators possess/receive on an 
annual basis.   
 
Office of the Independent Review Director (OIPRD) 
 
 Improve the quality and frequency of communication with police officers involved in 
OIPRD investigations: 
o Ensure police officers/police services are notified ASAP regarding investigative 
status updates or outcomes.  Alert involved police officers if the OIPRD 
website/online tracking system has been updated.   
o Ensure that subject officers/police services are notified about the outcome of 
investigations before a public media release occurs.   
                                                          
26   In June, 2015, the OACP (Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police) asserted that it takes an average of nine 
months for the SIU to complete an investigation and for the SIU Director to issue his closing report (see Gallant, 
2015: http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/07/15/special-investigations-unit-urged-to-pick-up-the-pace.html ).  
The SIU published an average clearance rate of 78.3 days per case in their 2014-2015 Annual Report.  However, this 
figure factors in a “stop-restart” calculation (p. 30: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/siu_ar_2014_15_ltr_final.pdf ).  The 
SIU has set a performance standard of closing 65% of cases within 30 business days.  In 2014-2015, 33% were 
closed within this period.  In July-September, 2014 I had several rounds of email correspondence with the SIU.  
Ultimately, an interview was not granted and discrepancies between the OACP’s position and the SIU’s official 




 Continue to improve outreach and educational opportunities with police services/police 
officers: 
o Continue to publish and disclose the number of OIPRD investigators have police-
related backgrounds.   
 
o It is further recommended that police services/officers be made aware of the 
specialized investigative training that OIPRD investigators possess/receive on an 
annual basis.   
 
o Continue to improve and develop outreach/educational opportunities with police 
services/police officers regarding the mandate and practices of the OIPRD (e.g., in 
recent years, OIPRD Director Gerry McNeilly has made repeated addresses with 
the Basic Constable Training (BCT) program at the Ontario Police College).   
 
8.3.3 Recommendations for the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional 
Services (Ontario Police College) 
 
 Ensure that the Basic Constable Training (BCT) program (for new police constable 
recruits) includes thorough education about the mandate and practices of civilian-led 
oversight agencies, such as police services boards, the SIU and the OIPRD.   
 
 Consider implementing the same educational components cited above in curriculum for 
intermediate and senior officers as well (e.g., Advanced Patrol Training (APT), Coach 
Officer Training, Front Line Supervisor course, executive police leadership training, 
promotional examinations).   
 
 In training developed for Professional Standards Bureau investigators (i.e., the “Police 
Services Act, Police Complaints Resolution & Human Resources Management” course), 
incorporate dialogue about methods to mitigate stress faced by police officers who undergo 
investigations related to police complaints and allegations of wrongdoing (e.g., internal 
and OIPRD/SIU investigations).  The procedural justice issues highlighted in this study 
should be incorporated into such dialogue.   
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8.4 Limitations and Considerations for Future Research 
This project revealed a number of limitations which may provide directions for future research.   
Although my research addressed the three primary civilian oversight organizations in Ontario 
(police services boards, SIU, OIPRD), it did not include all of the civilian-led oversight agencies 
across the province and the variety of means by which the performance of police officers is 
scrutinized.  There are several other civilian-led organizations that oversee various aspects of 
police conduct or complaints against the police, such as the Ontario Civilian Police Commission 
(OCPC) and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).  Furthermore, judicial bodies such 
as the Ontario Court of Justice, the Superior Court of Justice, the Ontario Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court of Canada regularly assess the conduct and performance of police officers as 
their respective cases move through the judicial system.   
Legal scrutiny may also come from government lawyers (e.g., Crown Attorneys), defence 
attorneys, paralegals, and individual citizens who file civil lawsuits against police officers.  
Future researchers might find it fruitful to analyze issues such as police officer testimony, the 
success rate of charges/court cases based upon the performance of police officers, as well as case 
law precedent initiated by police actions (e.g., powers of detention, arrest, and search and 
seizure) (e.g., Daly, 2011).  Some researchers may wish to consider the ways in which police 
services and individual police officers are held to account by traditional media outlets, social 
media, and through citizen-led activist organizations.  Future research may examine the manner 
by which police behaviour is regulated by the use of technology, such as cell phone cameras,  
closed circuit television (CCTV), “dashboard” vehicle cameras and body-worn cameras and 
other forms of imbedded technology (e.g., cameras on conducted energy weapons, GPS in police 
vehicles).  As the Council of Canadian Academies (2014: 61) has noted, “[i]ncreasingly, cameras 
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used both by police and the public are serving as another layer of individual accountability” (see 
also Goldsmith, 2010).  
Assessing attitudes and experience from members of a single police service arguably restricted 
the scope of the study.  I recommend that future studies consider assessing national, 
provincial/state, regional and municipal police services in order to determine if there are varying 
attitudes and experiences among police officers from police services of varying composition.  
The possibilities for comparative research would seem limitless.   
Future researchers may seek to forge a research agreement that allows for the name of the host 
police service to be published.  The ability to openly analyze trends and statistics related to 
oversight and accountability mechanisms for the sample frame (e.g., SIU/OIPRD/Professional 
Standards Bureau complaints, investigations, resolutions, etc.) would allow for a deeper and 
more nuanced discussion and understanding about the experiences of police officers.  In 
addition, while this study did not focus upon the wide spectrum of behaviours and activities that 
might constitute complaints against the police or fall under the umbrella of alleged “police 
misconduct,”  future studies may tend to the wide variety of complaints that fall under the Police 
Services Act (PSA)/Ontario Regulation 268/10 “Code of Conduct” (e.g., Discreditable conduct, 
Neglect of duty, Deceit, Corrupt practice, Unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority), or the 
spectrum of police actions that might trigger an investigation by the SIU (e.g., use of force 
resulting in serious injury or death, sexual assault).   
This study did not linger upon the many ways in which complaints about police conduct are 
lodged, processed, mediated and resolved informally; however, doing so may prove to be an 
interesting and rewarding pursuit (e.g. Porter and Prenzler, 2012; Prenzler et al., 2013).  
Moreover, while this study noted that a portion of my respondents possessed personal experience 
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with an oversight agency as an involved officer, it did not provide information on the types of 
conduct or incident that resulted in the situation (e.g., minor complaints versus serious 
allegations of misconduct) nor probe how the outcomes (positive or negative) of these 
investigations impact police officers’ attitudes and perceptions toward civilian oversight 
agencies.  Hopefully, future research will recognize the merits of doing so and pursue these types 
of inquiries.   
Future researchers might also profitably make the experiences of citizens who file complaints 
against the police the focus of their inquiries and seek to assess their perceptions of oversight 
bodies (e.g., Landau, 1994, 1996, 2000; Schulenberg & Chatterjee, 2013; Prenzler et al., 2013).  
Research which focuses on the experiences of complainants and police officers in relation to 
complaints about police conduct would predictably allow for a more comprehensive treatment of 
procedural justice issues.  Furthermore, researchers might consider incorporating the attitudes 
and experiences of civilian oversight agents/investigators themselves and, by doing so, add 
another dimension to this research. 
The methods employed in this study (mixed method sequential explanatory design) worked very 
well to obtain a reasonable sample frame for the survey questionnaire and a healthy pool of 
interview participants.  Future researchers may choose to replicate or alter this research design 
(e.g., mailed or hand-delivered survey questionnaires, in-person interviews), or they may seek to 
incorporate another method such as direct observation or focus groups.   
Finally, another area of fruitful research is consideration of the trend towards the 
“civilianization” of police roles that is occurring in countries such as Canada, the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  Stone and Travis (2011: 13) noted this growing trend in the United 
Kingdom as a means to reduce the swelling costs related to policing:  
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To decrease costs, police departments will likely accelerate the shifting of work to 
nonsworn, and therefore less expensive, specialist personnel, especially in crime 
investigation units...A range of new specialists, including crime scene technicians, 
data analysts and victim liaisons, might well replace one half or more of today’s 
detectives.  A wide range of civilian roles could emerge, boosting the prominence 
of civilian police careers in much the same way that nurses and technicians have 
taken on many of the roles traditionally played by doctors within the medical 
profession. 
Similar trends are observable in Ontario, Canada.  For instance, it is noteworthy that the 2015 
report of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario identifies the following among their 
primary recommendations: “Make legislative changes to permit the greater transfer of specific 
functions to civilians or other security providers where appropriate” (AMO, 2015: 4).  The 
increased “civilianization” of police services has also been highlighted by the Council of 
Canadian Academies (2014) and Ahlgren (2015).  One may consider the potential ramification of 
this development and profitably ponder how the civilianization of police roles may impact 
ongoing efforts to police the police and ensure their accountability to the communities they 
serve.  Thus, if these trends directly challenge and threaten the autonomy and expertise of sworn 
police personnel, they also invite consideration of what type of agency is best suited to regulate 
these new para-policing professionals.   
8.5 Concluding remarks 
The merits of this academic pursuit have been re-affirmed throughout the dissertation.  The 
literature review confirmed that previous research on this topic is dated and sparse and is almost 
entirely limited to the United States.  As the first study of its kind in Canada, this project has 
provided a sound platform from which to conduct comparison in future research along 
municipal, regional, provincial, national and international lines.  This study both complements 
and expands upon previous research efforts spanning over several decades while making 
meaningful and fresh contributions to sociological/criminological research on policing, the 
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regulation of police conduct as well as the sociology of professions.  In the broadest sense, this 
study has highlighted how fascinatingly complicated the accountability mechanisms of 
contemporary policing have become. 
In utilizing a mixed methods approach and concentrating on police officers’ attitudes regarding 
multiple civilian oversight agencies, rather than one single police complaints system/agency, this 
study has provided a comprehensive, enhanced and nuanced understanding of the attitudes of 
police officers in Ontario.  In doing so, it has provided a launching point for future researchers 
who may elect to expand upon or replicate this research with individual civilian oversight 
agencies or a combination of police services boards, complaint oversight agencies (e.g., OIPRD), 
or specialized investigative agencies related to police officers’ use of force (e.g., SIU).   
At the heart of this project is a desire to breathe new life into the academic dialogue about 
civilian oversight of policing.  The voices of police officers have been almost entirely absent 
from this dialogue in recent decades, yet the development of multi-tiered civilian-led oversight 
mechanisms has fundamentally transformed the career of policing in many respects.  This study 
has sought to help rectify this omission as it is believed that valuable insight has been lost about 
the mechanisms that are purported to uphold the standards of accountability and professionalism 
among police officers.  In this pursuit, knowledge has been gained that may improve 
relationships between police officers and the oversight agents/agencies that scrutinize their 
professional conduct in Ontario and beyond.   
The primary purpose of civilian-led oversight of policing is to instill public confidence that the 
police are accountable and answerable for their actions.  By and large, most police officers in this 
study expressed acceptance of the necessity for civilian-led oversight on this premise.  The 
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public demands the highest level of accountability and transparency, and increasingly police 
officers and police services are demanding it of themselves.    
The host of proposals and recommendations for all involved stakeholders are put forth with the 
expectation that some healthy tension will inevitably remain between police officers and those 
who are responsible for overseeing and scrutinizing their professional conduct.  Such tension 
stands as an eternal central feature of the “currency” of police work; conflict and the mediation 
thereof.   
Broadly, this study has sought to better understand what level of trust police officers hold for the 
mechanisms that oversee and scrutinize their professional conduct.  The findings from this 
project suggest that as civilian-led oversight institutions have evolved, police officers have 
grown more accustomed and more accepting of the role that civilians play in ensuring their 
professional accountability.   Peter Tinsley (2009: 1), former President of the Canadian 
Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (CACOLE), remarked that the attitude of 
the police towards independent oversight has improved in recent years:  
It is fair to say that historically the attitude towards the reception of oversight was 
one of resentment and even active resistance by both police leaders and front line 
officers. With some that continues to be the case, but, overall it is also fair to say 
that such oversight is now generally accepted with a far higher degree of 
cooperation and recognized as a necessary part of police professionalism and the 
maintenance of community confidence. 
Tinsley’s statement might very well be true, but prior to this academic inquiry, there has been a 
lack of sufficient evidence to support claims that police officers in countries such as Canada have 
grown more accepting of civilian-led oversight mechanisms.  Furthermore, this study has clearly 
demonstrated that police officers’ views about civilian oversight are complicated and context-
specific.   
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This study’s findings also reveal that more concerted efforts are required by police services and 
civilian-led oversight agencies to improve levels of cooperation, communication, training and 
education on many levels.  Ultimately, the shared pursuit and fulfillment of such enhancements 
will serve to strengthen civilian-led oversight mechanisms in Ontario and beyond and, in turn, 
will hopefully improve the collective trust in one of our society’s most crucial public services.  
All affected stakeholders deserve police services and multi-layered accountability mechanisms 
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 Law Enforcement and Oversight Branch, Alberta 
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 Alberta Serious Integrated Response Team 
British Columbia 
 
 Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner 
 Independent Investigations Office    
Manitoba 
 
 Manitoba Police Commission 
 Law Enforcement Review Agency 
 Manitoba Independent Investigations Unit 
New Brunswick  New Brunswick Police Commission  
Newfoundland  Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints 
Commission    
Nova Scotia 
 
 Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner 
 Serious Incident Response Team   
Ontario 
 
 Special Investigations Unit 
 Office of the Independent Police Review Director 
 Ontario Civilian Police Commission   
Prince Edward 
Island 
 Office of the Police Commissioner   
Quebec 
 
 Police Ethics Commissioner 
 Police Ethics Committee 
 Ministère de la Sécurité publique du Québec  
Saskatchewan   Saskatchewan Public Complaints Commission  
First Nations   Six Nations Police Commission   
Federal 
 
 Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP 






Survey Questionnaire Recruitment Letter 
 
2014 Ontario Police Officer Satisfaction Survey 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight Mechanisms 
in Ontario, Canada.   
This study seeks to understand how police officers feel about the following civilian-led oversight agencies in 
Ontario:  
 
 • Police Services Boards;  
 
 • The Special Investigations Unit (SIU); and 
 
 • The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) 
 
This email is being sent on behalf of PhD Candidate Mark Crowell from the Department of Sociology and Legal 
Studies at the University of Waterloo, who is conducting this study under the supervision of Dr. E.D. Nelson.  
Mark Crowell is also a Sergeant with the Waterloo Regional Police Service.  
Below is a link to a survey questionnaire that asks police officers from Ontario about their perceptions and 
experiences regarding civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario. 
The purpose of this study is to learn more about the extent to which police officers are satisfied with the practices of 
the existing civilian-led oversight agencies.  With your participation, it is hoped that this study will generate 
practical recommendations that will lead to improved relations between police officers and civilian-led oversight 
agencies in Ontario, Canada and beyond. 
This study has received formal support from the following organizations: 
 The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP)                
 The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB)  
 The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police - Research Foundation (CACP-RF)           
 
If you are interested in this study, please follow the link below to the survey questionnaire.  This survey will take 
approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete.  
Please click on the SURVEY LINK below: 
*SURVEY LINK* 
This link is uniquely tied to this survey and your email address.  Please do not forward this message.   
Your participation in this survey is VOLUNTARY and CONFIDENTIAL. 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Questions, comments or concerns should be directed to researcher, Mark Crowell, PhD Candidate at the 
University of Waterloo, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at EMAIL or by phone at PHONE #.   
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Department of Sociology & Legal Studies 







Ontario Police Officer 
Satisfaction Survey 
 
INTRODUCTION and CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Mark Crowell, PhD Candidate in the 
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo, under the supervision of Dr. 
E.D. Nelson.  
Mark Crowell is also a Sergeant with the Waterloo Regional Police Service.  
The goal of this survey is to learn about how police officers feel about civilian-led oversight agencies in 
Ontario:  
• Police Services Boards; 
• The Special Investigations Unit (SIU); and 
• The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) 
The purpose of this study is to learn more about the extent to which police officers are satisfied with the 
practices of the existing civilian-led oversight agencies. With your participation, it is hoped that this study 
will generate practical recommendations that will lead to improved relations between police officers and 
civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario, Canada and beyond. 
If you decide to volunteer, you will be asked to complete a 10 to 15 minute online survey that is 
completed anonymously. You are not asked for your name or any identifying information. Survey 
questions focus on police officers’ perceptions and experiences regarding civilian-led oversight agencies 
in Ontario.  
Participation in this study is voluntary. You can withdraw your participation at any time. 
This study has received formal support from the following organizations: 
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• The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) 
• The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB) 
• The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation (CACP-RF) 
 
There are no known or anticipated risks from participating in this study. Should you wish to seek 
counseling as a result of any impact raised by this study, you are encouraged to seek assistance from your 
police service's Employee Assistance Program (EAP), for which contact information is available at your 
local detachment. 
 
It is important for you to know that any information that you provide will be confidential. Only 
summarized/group data will be presented. No individual will be identifiable from these summarized 
results. The data, with no personal identifiers, collected from this study will be maintained on a password-
protected computer database in a restricted access area of the university. 
Should you have any questions about the study, or if you would like a copy of the results, please contact 
Mark Crowell (m2crowell@uwaterloo.ca ,  519-502-6004) or Faculty Supervisor Dr. E.D. Nelson 
(eds@uwaterloo.ca , (519) 888-4567, ext.35190).  
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a 
University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is 
yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please feel 
free to contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin in the Office of Research Ethics at 1-519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or 
maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca. 
Thank you for your participation in this important study.  
 









SECTION A - BACKGROUND 
I'd like to begin by finding out a little about your background in police work. 
 












What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 High School graduate 
 Some College 
 College graduate 
 Some University 
 University graduate 
 Advanced Degree completed (e.g., Masters, PhD) 
 Other 
 




How long have you been a police officer? 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 - 4 years 
 5 - 9 years 
 10 - 14 years 
 15 - 19 years 
 20 - 24 years 
 25 - 29 years 
 30 years or more 
 
What is your rank? 
 Probationary Police Constable 
 Police Constable 
 Detective Constable 
 Sergeant 
 Staff Sergeant 
 Senior Officer 
 Other 
 
What is the approximate size of the population that your detachment serves? 
 Less than 5,000 
 5,001 - 25,000 
 25,001 - 50,000 
 50,001 - 75,000 
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 75,001 - 100,000 
 100,001 - 200,000 
 More than 200,000 
 Don't Know / Not Applicable 
 
How would you best describe the community your detachment serves? 
 Mostly rural 
 A mix of rural and urban 
 Mostly urban 
 Don't Know / Not Applicable 
 
I support my police association. 
 Yes 
 No 
 I don't know 
 
I regularly attend police association meetings. 
 Yes 
 No 
 I don't know 
 
 
SECTION B - GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT 
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT 













Civilian oversight of policing 
helps to ensure accountability. 
      
Civilian oversight maintains 
public trust in policing. 
      
Civilians are incapable of 
understanding police work. 
      
We should keep civilians out 
of police oversight. 
      
Civilians have the necessary 
skills to investigate police 
wrongdoing. 
      
Alleged police misconduct 
should only be investigated by 
police officers. 
      
Civilians are biased against 
police officers. 
      





regarding alleged police 
misconduct. 
      
I would prefer civilians only 
review allegations of police 
misconduct (not investigate). 
      
Civilian oversight infringes 
upon the professional status of 
police officers. 
      
If civilian investigators were 
former police officers, I 
wouldn't mind if they 
investigated alleged police 
misconduct. 
 
      




SECTION C - POLICE SERVICES BOARDS 
 
Is your police detachment governed by a Police Services Board? 
 Yes  
 No  





SECTION C - POLICE SERVICES BOARDS 
 
I understand the mandate of my Police Services Board. 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don't Know / Not Applicable  
 








Don't Know / 
Not 
Applicable 
I respect the mandate of 
my Police Services Board. 
      
My detachment's Police 
Services Board doesn't 
affect me very much. 
      
The Police Services Board 
is necessary. 
      
The Police Services Board 
is effective in their 
      
 356 
 
oversight of my 
detachment. 
I trust the Police Services 
Board. 
      
Members of the Police 
Services Board are 
qualified to carry out their 
oversight of my 
detachment. 
      
Members of the Police 
Services Board listen to the 
concerns of my 
detachment. 
      
Police Services Boards 
infringe upon the 
professional status of 
police officers. 
      
The Police Services 
Board's oversight of my 
detachment is mostly 
political "window 
dressing.” 
      




SECTION C - POLICE SERVICES BOARDS 
 
I understand the mandate of Police Services Boards in Ontario. 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don't Know / Not Applicable  
 










Don't Know / 
Not 
Applicable 
Police Services Boards 
are necessary in Ontario. 
      
Police Services Boards 
help to ensure 
accountability in policing. 
      
Members of Police 
Services Boards are 
qualified to oversee police 
work. 
      
Police Services Boards 
infringe upon the 
professional status of 
police officers. 
      
 





SECTION D - SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU) 
 
I understand the mandate of the SIU. 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't know / Not applicable 
 















Don't Know / 
Not Applicable 
What proportion of SIU 
investigators are former police 
officers? 
      
What proportion of SIU 
investigations are cleared by 
criminal charge? 
      
 






Agree Agree Don't Know / 
Not 
Applicable 
I respect the mandate of the 
SIU. 
      
My organization has 
sufficiently educated me 
about the SIU. 
      
The SIU helps to ensure 
accountability. 
      
The SIU is effective in their 
oversight of policing in 
Ontario. 
      
I trust the SIU.       
The SIU is biased against 
the police. 
      
The SIU is objective when 
they conduct investigations. 
      
SIU investigators are 
qualified to investigate 
alleged police misconduct. 
      
The SIU infringes upon the 
professional status of police 
officers. 
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My organization supports 
the work of the SIU. 
      
My police association 
supports the work of the 
SIU. 
      
 
Please include any additional comments: 
 
 









SECTION D - SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU) 
 
During your SIU Investigation(s), were you... 
 A subject. 
 A witness. 
 I have been both a subject and a witness. 
 












That you were 
promptly notified of 
the SIU 
investigation? 
      
That the SIU 
investigation 
process was 
explained to you? 
      





      
That you were 
treated courteously 
by the staff of the 
SIU? 
      
With the objectivity 
of the SIU 
investigator(s)? 
      
With how fair the 
investigators' 
questions were? 






      
With the speed of 
the investigative 
process? 
      
That you were kept 
informed of the 
progress of the 
investigation? 
      
With the amount of 
time it took to 
complete the 
investigation? 
      
That you were told 
about what 
happened as a result 
of the investigation? 
      
 




SECTION E - OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE 
REVIEW DIRECTOR (OIPRD) 
 
I understand the mandate of the OIPRD. 
 Yes 
 No 






















Don't Know / 
Not Applicable 
What proportion of OIPRD 
investigators are former police 
officers? 
      
What proportion of OIPRD 
investigations are cleared by 
criminal charge? 
      
What proportion of OIPRD 
investigations are cleared by Police 
Services Act charge? 
      
 








Don't Know / 
Not 
Applicable 
I respect the mandate of 
the OIPRD. 
      
My organization has 
sufficiently educated me 
about the OIPRD. 
      
The OIPRD helps to 
ensure accountability. 
      
The OIPRD is effective in 
their oversight of policing 
in Ontario. 
      
I trust the OIPRD.       
The OIPRD is biased 
against the police. 
      
The OIPRD is objective 
when they conduct 
investigations. 
      
OIPRD investigators are 
qualified to investigate 
alleged police 
misconduct. 
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The OIPRD infringes 
upon the professional 
status of police officers. 
      
My organization supports 
the work of the OIPRD. 
      
My police association 
supports the work of the 
OIPRD. 
      
 
Please include any additional comments: 
 
 





SECTION E - OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE 
REVIEW DIRECTOR (OIPRD) 
 
During your OIPRD Investigation(s), were you... 
 A subject. 
 A witness. 
 I have been both a subject and a witness. 
 
The primary investigators on my OIPRD investigation were: 
 OIPRD investigators 
 Police investigators (e.g., my police service's Professional Standards Bureau) 
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That you were 
promptly notified of 
the OIPRD 
investigation? 
      
That the OIPRD 
investigation 
process was 
explained to you? 
      





      
That you were 
treated courteously 
by the staff of the 
OIPRD? 
      
With the objectivity 
of the 
investigator(s)? 
      
With how fair the 
investigators' 
questions were? 




      
With the speed of 
the investigative 
process? 
      
That you were kept 
informed of the 
progress of the 
investigation? 
      
With the amount of 
time it took to 
complete the 
investigation? 
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That you were told 
about what 
happened as a result 
of the investigation? 
      
 





SECTION F - YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S 
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU 
 




 Don't Know / Not Applicable 
 

















Don't Know / 
Not 
Applicable 
What proportion of your police 
service's Professional Standards Bureau 
investigations are cleared by criminal 
charge? 
      
What proportion of your police 
service's Professional Standards Bureau 
investigations are cleared by Police 
Services Act charge? 
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Don't Know / 
Not 
Applicable 
I respect the mandate of my 
police service's Professional 
Standards Bureau. 
      
My organization has 
sufficiently educated me 
about our Professional 
Standards Bureau. 
      
My police service's 
Professional Standards 
Bureau helps to ensure 
accountability. 
      
My police service's 
Professional Standards 
Bureau is effective in their 
oversight of my 
organization. 
      
I trust my police service's 
Professional Standards 
Bureau. 
      
My police service's 
Professional Standards 
Bureau is biased against the 
police. 
      
My police service's 
Professional Standards 
Bureau is objective when 
they conduct investigations. 
      
My police service's 
Professional Standards 
Bureau investigators are 
qualified to investigate 
alleged police misconduct. 
      
My police service's 
Professional Standards 
Bureau infringes upon the 
professional status of police 
officers. 
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My organization supports 
the work of our Professional 
Standards Bureau. 
      
My police association 
supports the work of our 
Professional Standards 
Bureau. 
      
 
Please include any additional comments: 
 
 
Have you ever been a subject or a witness in an investigation conducted by 





SECTION F - YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S 
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU 
 
During your Professional Standards Bureau investigation(s), were you... 
 A subject. 
 A witness. 


















That you were 










explained to you? 
      





      
That you were 
treated courteously 
by the staff of the 
Professional 
Standards Bureau? 
      





      
With how fair the 
investigators' 
questions were? 




      
With the speed of 
the investigative 
process? 
      
That you were kept 
informed of the 
progress of the 
investigation? 
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With the amount of 
time it took to 
complete the 
investigation? 
      
That you were told 
about what 
happened as a result 
of the investigation? 
      
 
Please include any additional comments: 
 
The survey is completed.    Thank you for your participation! 
 







Interview script for police officers 
PhD Dissertation project 
Mark Crowell 
University of Waterloo 
 Department of Sociology and Legal Studies 
 
Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight Mechanisms in Ontario 
 
Participant ID: ________________________ 
Participant Agency: __________________________ 
Date: ________________________ 
Start Time: ________________________ 
End time: ________________________ 
Interview location: ________________________ 
 
PREAMBLE 
This study examines the attitudes and experiences of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian-
led oversight agencies, such as  
 
• Police Services Boards;  
• The Special Investigations Unit (SIU); and 
• The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) 
 
As compared to other professional groups (such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, accountants, etc.), 
policing appears to be unique in the respect that so much of its professional conduct and 
accountability standards are overseen and managed by “outside” civilian agents/agencies (West, 
1991: 383).   
 
However, very little is known about the positive and negative impacts of this unique arrangement, 
especially from the point of view of police officers. 
 
Throughout our interview I will be asking questions about these civilian-led agencies, both in 




Please keep in mind that, regardless of your personal and professional background, knowledge 
and experience, I will be attempting to ask the same core group of questions for everyone I 
interview.   Therefore, some questions might not necessarily apply to you. 
You can skip any questions you wish. 
Are you okay to get started? 




1. MALE  _______  FEMALE _________ (determined by researcher) 
 
2. How long have you been a police officer? 
 
3. What’s your current rank? 
 
4. How old are you?  
 
5. What’s your highest level education? 
 
6. What did you do before policing? 
 
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT – OVERALL 
7. Prior to this interview, had you ever given much thought to the role that civilians play in 
the oversight of policing in Ontario? 
 
8. What is your understanding of the history of having civilians involved in the oversight of 
policing?  That is, why these types of agencies were developed in Ontario and elsewhere? 
 
9. How do you personally feel about civilians being involved in the oversight of policing 
and investigation of alleged misconduct? 
 
 Where do you think your views fall in line with those of your peers? 
 
10. Do you think that civilian oversight agencies, like police services boards, the SIU and the 
OIPRD, are necessary to ensure accountability of policing in Ontario? 
 




11. Do you think that civilians are qualified to oversee and review the work of police officers 
(e.g., PSBs provide administrative oversight, the OIPRD reviews a lot of public 
complaints)?  Why or why not? 
12. Do you think that civilians are qualified to conduct investigations into alleged police 
misconduct (e.g., SIU, OIPRD)? Why or why not? 
 
13. What do you feel are some advantages and disadvantages of having civilians involved in 
the oversight of police conduct? 
 
 Advantages ?       
 Disadvantages? 
 
14. Do you have any concerns that civilians (either administrators or investigators) might 
hold some bias against the police? 
 
 If yes, in what way?   
 Could anything be improved in this regard? 
 
 
15. How do you feel about former police officers being involved in these agencies? 
 
16. As I said in the preamble, As compared to other professional groups (such as doctors, 
teachers, lawyers, accountants, etc.), policing appears to be unique in the respect that so 
much of its professional conduct and accountability standards are overseen and managed 
by “outside” civilian agents/agencies. 
 
In that light, do you think that having civilians involved in the oversight of policing has a 
positive or negative impact on the professional status of police officers?  That is, how we 
see ourselves as “professionals”? 
 
POLICE SERVICES BOARDS 
 
17. During your career have you worked under the structure where there has been a police 
services board in place? 
 
18. What do you think about the oversight provided by police services boards?  
 
19. Do you think that anything should change about the oversight that police services boards 
provide? 
 
Issues to probe, if applicable:   
 Quality of oversight;  
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 Qualifications of police services board members;  
 Mandate of police services boards;  
 Level of involvement of police services board members 
 
 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE – SIU / OIPRD / PROFESSIONAL 
STANDARDS BUREAU 
20. Have you had any personal experience with an investigation conducted by 
 
 The SIU?    ________? 
 The OIPRD?  ________? 
 Your police service’s Professional Standards Bureau?   ________? 
 
Are you interested in talking about any of your experiences? 
 
IF APPLICABLE, MOVE TO APPROPRIATE SECTION 
 
 
SIU – THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT 
 
21. Can you provide some insight into your experience of being investigated by THE SIU? 
 
 Do you mind telling me some basic details about what was under investigation? 
 e.g., Were you a subject officer?  Were you a witness officer? Both a subject and witness 
officer? 
 
22. Can you tell me about the process of being investigated by THE SIU? 
 
 e.g.  - How you were treated?   
 e.g. - Your impression of the quality of the investigators or the investigation itself? 
 e.g. - Were you kept up to date about the progress or the outcome of the investigation? 
What was the level of communication? 
 
23. Is there anything you would change about the process of being investigated by  THE SIU? 
 
 
OIPRD – OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW DIRECTOR 
 





 Do you mind telling me some basic details about what was under investigation? 
 e.g., Were you a subject officer?  Were you a witness officer? Both a subject and witness 
officer? 
 Was your investigation conducted exclusively by OIPRD investigators (or were local 
police investigators involved)? 
 
25. Can you tell me about the process of being investigated by THE OIPRD? 
 
 e.g.  - How you were treated?   
 e.g. - Your impression of the quality of the investigators or the investigation itself? 
 e.g. - Were you kept up to date about the progress or the outcome of the investigation?  
What was the level of communication? 
 





YOUR POLICE SERVICE’S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU 
 
27. Can you provide some insight into your experience of being investigated by YOUR 
POLICE SERVICE’S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU? 
 
 Do you mind telling me some basic details about what was under investigation? 
 e.g., Were you a subject officer?  Were you a witness officer? Both a subject and witness 
officer? 
 
28. Can you tell me about the process of being investigated by YOUR POLICE SERVICE’S 
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU? 
 
 e.g.  - How you were treated?   
 e.g. - Your impression of the quality of the investigators or the investigation itself? 
 e.g. - Were you kept up to date about the progress or the outcome of the investigation?  
What was the level of communication? 
 
29. Is there anything you would change about the process of being investigated by  YOUR 




30. Do you have any recommendations to improve relationships between police officers and 




 e.g. - Is there anything POLICE SERVICES/POLICE OFFICERS could do better?   
 e.g. - Is there anything CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AGENCIES could do better? 
 
31. Is there anything else you would like to add or discuss that we didn’t cover? 
 
We’re done!  I really want to thank you for your time.  I sincerely appreciate your help.   
Once this study is completed, you’ll be contacted in order to receive a copy of the results.   
I am going to end the interview now. 
 





Items from Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 5-55: Examples of Ethnic/Cultural Origins Identified by survey respondents 
1. Hungarian, Irish and Native Cree (2, 1, 6) 
2. English and French (1, 4) 
3. Scotch/Irish/Czechoslovakian (1, 2) 
4. French, Aboriginal, English (4, 6, 1) 
5. Russian, French, First Nations and English (2, 4, 6) (only first 
three were coded, 4th excluded) 
6. British/ Scottish/ Irish (1) 
7. Canadian - English - Dutch/Belgium ancestors (3, 1, 2) 
8. Canadian/Italian (3, 2) 
9. Hungarian, German (2) 
10. Ukrainian/French/First Nation (2,4,6) 
11. English, French and Hungarian (1,4,2) 
12. Caucasian, English/Irish, French (7, 1, 4) 
13. French, Irish, Native Canadian (4, 1, 6) 
14. French, Irish, English, Metis, Polish (4, 1, 6) (only first three 
were coded, 4th excluded) 




Table 5-56: “Visible Minority” Status 
 Frequency Percentage 
NON Visible Minority 
Status 
1455 91.3 






The Visible Minority variable is comprised of the following 
references from Cultural Origins variables:   
- South American  
- First Nation/Aboriginal (incl. Metis)  
- Middle Eastern (incl. "Arabic")  
- Caribbean  
- Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean)  
- "African" (incl. "Black", African Canadian, etc.)  
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If civilian investigators 
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I wouldn't mind if they 






















Table 5-58: Police Services Boards 
Is your police detachment governed 
by a Police Services Board? 
 





















Table 5-59: Respondents governed by a Police Services Board 
 
I understand the mandate of my 
Police Services Board 










I Don't Know / 





























































































































































































































































Table 5-61: Respondents NOT governed by a Police Services Board 
 
I understand the mandate of 
Police Services Boards in Ontario. 
 











I Don't Know / 
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Table 5-63: SIU Mandate 
I understand the mandate of the SIU. 
 
























































I respect the mandate 

















My organization has 
sufficiently educated 


































The SIU is effective 
in their oversight of 
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My police association 
























Table 5-65: Personal Experience with the SIU 
 
Have you ever been a subject or a 
witness in a SIU investigation? 
 
 
During your SIU investigation(s) were 
you… 
 Total responses 
(N) 
 




















I have been both 
a subject and a 












Table 5-66: Personal Experience with the SIU: Satisfaction Matrix 
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treated courteously 
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That you were told 
about what happened 




















Table 5-67: OIPRD Mandate 
 
I understand the mandate of the OIPRD. 
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Table 5-69: Personal Experience with the OIPRD: Satisfaction Matrix 
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investigation process 
















That you were 
interviewed soon after 


















That you were treated 
courteously by the staff 
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Table 5-70: Professional Standards Bureau Mandate 
I understand the mandate of my police 
service’s Professional Standards Bureau. 
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Professional 
Standards Bureau 
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My police service's 
Professional 
Standards Bureau is 
effective in their 
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Table 5-72: Personal Experience with the Professional Standards Bureau 
 
Have you ever been a 
subject or a witness in an 
investigation conducted by 




During your Professional Standards 
Bureau investigation(s), were you... 
 Total responses 
(N) 
 






















I have been both a 












Table 5-73: Personal Experience with the Professional Standards Bureau: Satisfaction Matrix 
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Items from Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 6-74: Recoded variables: General Questions about Civilian Oversight – General Attitudes 
ORIGINAL VARIABLE RECODED VARIABLE 
Civilians are incapable of 
understanding police work. 
RECODE Civilians are incapable of understanding police work. 
We should keep civilians out 
of police oversight. 
RECODE We should keep civilians out of police oversight. 
Alleged police misconduct 
should only be investigated 
by police officers. 
RECODE Alleged police misconduct should only be 
investigated by police officers. 
Civilians are biased against 
police officers. 
RECODE Civilians are biased against police officers. 





regarding alleged police 
misconduct 
 
RECODE I would prefer that my police service's Professional 
Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle 
investigations regarding alleged police misconduct 
 
I would prefer civilians 
only review allegations of 
police misconduct (not 
investigate). 
RECODE I would prefer civilians only review allegations of 
police misconduct (not investigate). 
Civilian oversight infringes 
upon the professional status 
of police officers. 
RECODE Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional 
status of police officers. 
If civilian investigators were 
former police officers, I 
wouldn't mind if they 
investigated alleged police 
misconduct. 
RECODE If civilian investigators were former police officers, I 
wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct. 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 -  Disagree 
3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
6 – Don’t Know / Not Applicable 
1 – Strongly Agree 
2 -  Agree 
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly Disagree 


















RECODE Civilians are incapable of 
understanding police work. 
.659  
RECODE We should keep civilians out of 
police oversight. 
.758  
Civilians have the necessary skills to 
investigate police wrongdoing. 
 .485 
RECODE Alleged police misconduct 
should only be investigated by police 
officers. 
.667  
RECODE Civilians are biased against 
police officers. 
.650  
RECODE I would prefer that my police 
service's Professional Standards Bureau 
investigators exclusively handle 
investigations regarding alleged police 
misconduct. 
.599  
RECODE I would prefer civilians 
only review allegations of police 
misconduct (not investigate). 
 .470 
RECODE Civilian oversight infringes 
upon the professional status of police 
officers. 
.743  
RECODE If civilian investigators were 
former police officers, I wouldn't mind if 












; 12.428 % 
of variance 
explained 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
2 components extracted. 
 
 
Table 6-76: Recoded variables: Respondents Governed by a Police Services Board - General 
Questions 
ORIGINAL VARIABLE RECODED VARIABLE 
My detachment's Police Services 
Board doesn't affect me very much. 
RECODE_Detachment PSB doesn’t Affect Me 
Much 
Police Services Boards infringe upon 
the professional status of police 
officers. 
RECODE_PSBs Infringe On Prof Status of Police 
The Police Services Board's oversight 
of my detachment is mostly political 
"window dressing.” 
RECODE_PSB_Mostly Window Dressing 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 -  Disagree 
3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
6 – Don’t Know / Not Applicable 
1 – Strongly Agree 
2 -  Agree 
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly Disagree 




Table 6-77: Recoded variables: Respondents Not Governed by Police Services Boards 
ORIGINAL VARIABLE RECODED VARIABLE 
Police Services Boards infringe upon 
the professional status of police 
officers. 
RECODE_NON PSB Infringement on Profess Status of 
Police 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 -  Disagree 
3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
6 – Don’t Know / Not Applicable 
1 – Strongly Agree 
2 -  Agree 
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly Disagree 









Table 6-78: Recoded Variables: SIU – General Attitudes 
ORIGINAL VARIABLE RECODED VARIABLE 
 
The SIU is biased against the police. RECODE_SIU is Biased Against Police 
 
The SIU infringes upon the professional 
status of police officers. 
RECODE_SIU infringes On Professional Status of 
Police 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 -  Disagree 
3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
6 – Don’t Know / Not Applicable 
1 – Strongly Agree 
2 -  Agree 
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly Disagree 




Table 6-79: Recoded Variables: OIPRD – General Attitudes 
ORIGINAL VARIABLE RECODED VARIABLE 
 
The OIPRD is biased against the police. RECODE_OIPRD is Biased Against Police 
The OIPRD infringes upon the professional 
status of police officers. 
RECODE_OIPRD infringes Professional Status of Police 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 -  Disagree 
3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
6 – Don’t Know / Not Applicable 
1 – Strongly Agree 
2 -  Agree 
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly Disagree 




Table 6-80: Recoded Variables: Professional Standards Bureau – General Attitudes 
ORIGINAL VARIABLE RECODED VARIABLE 
 
My police service's Professional 
Standards Bureau is biased against 
the police. 
RECODE_Professional Standards Bureau Biased Against Police 
My police service's Professional 
Standards Bureau infringes upon the 
professional status of police officers. 
RECODE_Professional StandardsBureauInfringes Profess Status Police 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 -  Disagree 
3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
6 – Don’t Know / Not Applicable 
1 – Strongly Agree 
2 -  Agree 
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly Disagree 
6 – Don’t Know / Not Applicable 
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Table 6-81: Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model – Alternative View 
Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model  – Alternative View - PART 1 of 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
*p < .05,  ** p < .01,  *** p < .001 
N=1285 for all models 
 























Constant -.298  (.081)  -.292  (.082)  -.196  (.074)  -.178  (.079)  
Sex – Female -.075  (.066) -.031 -.074  (.066) -.030 -.192  (.060) -.079** -.185  (.061) -.076** 
Age – Over 45 .181  (.078) .091* .181  (.078) .091* .125  (.070) .063 .124  (.070) .062 
University Education .225  (.055) .112*** .223  (.055) .111*** .209  (.050) .104*** .207  (.050) .104*** 
Career Experience – Over 20 years .153  (.079) .077 .154  (.080) .077 .192  (.072) .097** .191  (.072) .096** 
Rank – Above Constable .291  (.058) .146*** .293  (.058) .147*** .205  (.052) .103*** .205  (.052) .103*** 
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A .069  (.059) .033 .073  (.062) .035 .101  (.056) .048 .104  (.057) .050 
Do not regularly attend police association 
meetings 
-.152  (.074) -.056* -.152  (.074) -.056* -.159  (.066) -.058* -.159  (.066) -.058* 
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards   .000  (.000) -.125 .000  (.000) -.083 .000  (.000) -.086 
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards 
BINARY 
  .238  (.237) .117 .129  (.214) .064 .135  (.214) .066 
Gen. Attitudes – SIU     .418  (.024) .419*** .421  (.025) .422*** 
Satisfaction – SIU       .000  (.000) .072 
Satisfaction – SIU BINARY       -.180  (.243) -.090 
Gen. Attitudes – OIPRD         
Satisfaction – OIPRD         
Satisfaction – OIPRD – BINARY         
Gen. Attitudes – Professional Standards 
Bureau 
   
     
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau         
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau – 
BINARY 
   
     







Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model – Alternative View - PART 2 of 2 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
*p < .05* p < .01 
*** p < .001 
N=1285 for all models 
 























Constant -.165  (.079)  -.157  (.087)  -.166  (.087)  -.156  (.087)  
Sex – Female -.204  (.061) -.084** -.198  (.061) -.081** -.198  (.061) 
  
-.081** -.194  (.061) -.080** 
Age – Over 45 .116  (.070) .058 .112  (.070) .056 .105  (.070) 
 
.053 .104  (.070) .052 
University Education .213  (.050) .107*** .213  (.050) .106*** .216  (.050) 
 
.108*** .216  (.050) .108*** 
Career Experience – Over 20 years .194  (.072) .097** .198  (.072) .100** .204  (.072) .102** .200  (.072) .101** 
Rank – Above Constable .214  (.052) .107*** .218  (.052) .109*** .234  (.053) .117*** .227  (.054) .114*** 
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A .095  (.056) .046 .091  (.057) .043 .093  (.057) .044 .092  (.057) .044 
Do not regularly attend police association 
meetings 
-.162  (.066) -.059* -.167  (.066) -.061* -.169  (.066) -.062* -.165  (.066) -.060* 
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards .000  (.000) -.083 .000  (.000) -.082 -.000  (.000) -.079 .000  (.000) -.078 
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards 
BINARY 
.136  (.214) .067 .136  (.213) .067 .136  (.213) .067 .135  (.213) .066 
Gen. Attitudes – SIU .398  (.026) .400*** .399  (.026) .401*** .415  (.027) .416*** .415  (.027) .416*** 
Satisfaction – SIU .000   (.000) .063 .000  (.000) .066 .000  (.000) .075 .000  (.000) .078 
Satisfaction – SIU BINARY -.184  (.242) -.092 -.189  (.242) -.095 -.205  (.242) -.103 -.207  (.244) -.104 
Gen. Attitudes – OIPRD .075  (.026) .075** .077  (.027) .077** .083  (.027) .083** .084  (.027) .084** 
Satisfaction – OIPRD   .001  (.000) .315* .001  (.000) .321* .001  (.000) .318* 
Satisfaction – OIPRD – BINARY   -.720  (.327) -.323* -.736  (.327) -.330* -.725  (.327) -.325* 
Gen. Attitudes – Professional Standards 
Bureau 
    -.050  (.027) -.050 -.049  (.027) -.049 
Satisfaction – Professional Standards 
Bureau 
      .000  (.000) -.055 
Satisfaction – Professional Standards 
Bureau – BINARY 
      .073  (.171) .033 
R /  R² /  Std. Error of Est. .508  /  .259 /  .861 .511  /  .261 /  .860 .513  /  .263 /  .859 .514  /  .264 /  .859 
 
